The Americans in the Philippines, a history of the conquest and first years of occupation, with an introductory account of the Spanish rule;

:t^''': '■'■\x

I

THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOLUME I

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2007 with funding from

Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/americansinphiliOOIerouoft

3 SEjpey^ ©

® Panama

%

THE AMERICANS
IN THE PHILIPPINES

A HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST
AND FIRST YEARS OF OCCUPATION
WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNT
OF THE SPANISH RULE '^'

BY

JAMES A. LE ROY

Late American Consul at Durango, Mexico. For two years connected

with the United States Philippine Commission during the estab-

lishment of civil government in the Philippines

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

VOLUME I

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

1914

COPYRIGHT, 191 4, BY MABEL P. LE ROY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published March IQI4

PREFACE

The publication of the Americans in the Philippines was
made possible by the tender sympathy and loving appreciation
and loyalty of the author's friends. To the Honorable William
H. Taf t, for the Introduction ; to Mr. Harry Coleman for the
Biography, and to Mr. Hobart Hoyt and Mr. Robert Grouse,
brothers in Delta Upsilon, without whose help the manuscript
would not have been published, thanks are gratefully expressed.

Mabel Pound LeRoy.

CONTENTS

Introduction, by William H. Taft ix

Biographical Sketch, by Harry Coleman xiii

I. The Spanish Regime — A Three-Century Prelude . . 1

11. Municipal Reorganization 42

III. Revolt against Spain: A Race War 79

IV. Intervention of the United States . . , . . 147
V. Germany displays Interest in America's Intentions . 210

VI. The Capture of Manila by "Threat" 232

VII. The Filipino Organization 280

VIII. Drifting into Disagreement 307

IX. The Treaty of Paris 354

X. Mutual Distrust 378

XI. Military Diplomacy 399

Note. The colored map of the Philippines, used as frontispiece to the
first volume, is from Atkinson's Philippine Islands, by permission of Ginn &
Company. The portrait of James A. LeRoy, which faces page xiii,
is from a photograph. The map of Manila Bay, facing page 148, is re-
produced from a government map.

I

INTRODUCTION

Mr. James A. LeRoy was a graduate of the University of
Michigan. He and his wife were classmates at the same high
school, and the friendship that they made under those condi-
tions ripened into an engagement. They were married and
spent their honeymoon on the trip with the second Philippine
Commission which went to Manila to begin its labors. Mr.
LeRoy was the secretary of Commissioner Worcester, the one
of the commission who knew most about the islands, the most
concerning their flora and fauna, — for he had twice made
trips of scientific research through the islands, — and the most
concerning the people, because he knew the Spanish language
and had traveled the islands over, living with the people in
their villages and with the priests in their conventos.

As confidential secretary and assistant of Mr. Worcester,
Mr. LeRoy's attention was very early directed to a study of
the whole situation there, and from his conversations with Mr.
Worcester he received accurate impressions before he reached
the islands. He had great facility in the study of language,
and he became, before he left the islands, well versed in Cas-
tilian. He learned something, too, of the local dialects, espe-
cially of Tagalog. While he was in the Philippines, this desire
to learn the languages and the dialects, and the acquaintances
that he formed through Mr. Worcester, who knew a great
many of the natives from former trips, led him to move in
circles into which few Americans ever went. He studied the
opinions of the native Filipinos of the different classes, and he
became greatly interested in the early history of the islands.
He had a judicial mind and a very great love of accurate re-
search and investigation. I think he was possibly not free from

X INTRODUCTION

some prejudices, for those usually affect all men, but, on the
whole, his intense love of the truth and his desire to be correct
historically were so strong that his account and his view of
what he learned from his investigations were likely to be as
little colored as that of any historian.

While there is a good deal of material for history in the
form of accounts written by various persons of the different
centuries, it still is true that there is much inaccurate tradition
about things in the history of the islands that needs careful
modification and keen sifting. This, I think may be fairly
said, Mr. LeRoy has supplied.

Mr. LeRoy remained in the islands some three years or more,
but having contracted tuberculosis he felt it necessary to seek
a country in which recovery was more likely than it could be
in the moist climate of the Philippines. Through the recom-
mendations of the commission, he was appointed as consul at
Durango, a place in Mexico where the climate was such that
it was hoped he might live down the disease which had posi-
tively established itself in his lungs. He longed for the oppor-
tunity to visit Seville and other places in Spain where there
were records in manuscript of conditions in the Philippines
transmitted by the friars of ancient day, who were the historians
of that period, and by the reports of Spain's of&cial represen-
tatives in her far-off colonies. This he was denied, and he was
obliged to take at second hand the contents of the records. It
was a great loss that his health prevented his making a life
study of that which was nearest his heart. The dread disease
from which he was suffering increased its ravages, and his
condition aroused his anxious concern lest he might not live
to finish the history that he had undertaken so that the pro-
ceeds from the copyright could support his wife and two chil-
dren. Much of what he wrote was written as he looked death
in the face. He had intended to bring his history down through
the first five years of the Commission Government, but the
pen dropped from his hand, and he was not permitted to com-

INTRODUCTION xi

plete his narrative beyond the date when he first arrived in
the islands.

In spite of his failure to round out the work, he has left a
most valuable aid to the student of Philippine history in that
which he did complete. It is very essential, in order to under-
stand the problems that the American Government has had to
meet and solve in those far-off Gems of the Pacific, to know
what their history was under the Spanish regime. The influ-
ence of the theocracy which prevailed in the islands under the
friars, the constant friction between the civil and the religious
governmental influences, on the one hand, and the union of the
two in control of the people, on the other, all make not only
an interesting study, but one which throws great light on the
present conditions in the islands.

Nowhere can a clearer and more judicial statement be found
than in these chapters which Mr. LeRoy, who had really given
up his life for the Philippines, was able to complete. There
will be differences of opinion with Mr. LeRoy's conclusions,
but what makes his work so valuable is that he states the evi-
dence on both sides of controversial issues, and while he draws
his own inferences, he adduces the sources of his information
and states the evidence on both sides in such a way as to enable
the reader to exercise his judgment, and affirm, or differ from,
the conclusion of the author.

I sincerely hope that the work may have the circulation that
it deserves as a real contribution to the history of a people
whose fate is now so much bound up with that of the people
of the United States.

William H. Taft.
August 1, 1913.

JAMES ALFRED LEROT

BY HARRY COLEMAN
Editor of the Pontiao (Mich.) Press Gazette

Emerson has said that every commanding monument in
the annals of the world is the triumph of enthusiasm. It fol-
lows that any life which leaves upon the progress of the world
the mark of labor well performed must be sustained by un-
selfish enthusiasm of the kind that overcomes all obstacles^
goes deeply into the fundamentals, and, thus, passes on to fu-
ture generations and history something tangible and inspiring
for others to follow. The true historian lives for generations.
Time cannot erase what has been impartially written of the
years that have passed, and he who has executed a true word-
picture of the world's progress has made for himself a monu-
ment of truth that must take first rank by the side of other
high arts.

When the President of the United States came to Pontiae,
Michigan, in the fall of 1911, it was not to speak of the all-
absorbing problems of the day. There was no word of the
tariff or the currency question ; there was no reference to any
of the details of government. He had come to pay a tribute
to the life and public services of Mr. James Alfred LeRoy and
to lay a wreath upon his tomb : " Here near the school where
he graduated," said President Taft, "I wish to pay a debt of
gratitude to his memory in behalf of the people of this nation.
He went to the Philippine Islands, learned the people and
their history, and he finally gave up his life, as a soldier gives
up his life on the field of battle, because he there became a
victim of impaired health. His death did not occur, however,
until after he had rendered a service to the Government of a
most important character, and one which entitles him to the
gratitude of all the people of the United States."

xiv BIOGRAPHY

A great task calls for uninterrupted effort, even, it may be,
to the extent of a lifetime ; and it devolved upon Mr. LeRoy
to crowd into the thirty-three years of his career a knowledge
of Spanish and Philippine history that would ordinarily take
the full span of a long life to acquire. This he did by apply-
ing himself to the subject with an abounding enthusiasm, with
an unremitting effort directed into every avenue where knowl-
edge was to be found, and by personal contact with the vari-
ous phases of latter-day Philippine development. Once wholly
engrossed in the task of securing a thorough understanding
of the subject, there was no barrier too great for him to sur-
mount. Exacting in nature and a foe to slipshod methods of
research and in the determination of true facts, he spared no
effort in the acquirement of the minutest bit of information
which might enable him correctly to inform himself.

During the last four years of life his brilliant mind per-
formed a feat which would have baffled any less determined
individual. His health had been seriously impaired by tubercu-
losis contracted in the Philippines, and, with all his knowledge
and grasp of the various phases of Oriental and Spanish his-
tory, he had thus to labor in his writing with the handicap
of a weakened body. Striving to overcome the ravages of the
disease by change of climate, he, nevertheless, pursued his
interest in the subject of his deep concern with undaunted
effort. Men of his will-power do not surrender even under the
impending danger of the plague. Like the pathetic instance
df Robert Louis Stevenson, stricken in like manner, his mind
kept up its unceasing effort both to conquer the plague and
at the same time give to the world what abundant preparation
and inclination had prompted. His heart was in the new co-
lonial experiment of raising the Filipinos to a position of ample
educational and self-governing qualifications. He had seen the
islands fall into our hands through the exigencies of war. It
was not a question with him of the wisdom of their becoming
a part of our possessions. They were already ours; therefore,

BIOGRAPHY

XV

what was our duty toward them ? His sense of justice frowned
upon their exploitation by selfish seekers after treasure. His
viewpoint carried only the thought that as a nation we had,
by the Treaty of Paris, assumed an obligation which was to
test our righteousness and exemplify the spirit of a democracy
turned missionary. The fruitful interest and enthusiasm of a
man of Mr. LeRoy's character, applied to so great a problem,
meant much not only to this country, by way of informing the
people here at home of the exact truth of the progress in
the Far Eastern experiment, but to the Filipinos themselves,
the confidence of whom he possessed to a marked degree.

He had gone to the Islands as secretary to Professor D. C.
Worcester of the Second Commission appointed by President
McKinley. A man of his ambition and attainments could not
be confined to the details of this assignment. Like the indus-
trial leader, who rises from the ranks by gaining each day
additional and valuable experience from tasks not assigned but
nevertheless taken up through enthusiastic desire, Mr. LeRoy
faithfully did his routine task and then left no avenue closed
against the completion of his fund of information. From
early young manhood he had earned his way, and by combin-
ing practical newspaper work with his course in college he
became not only a close student of contemporary events, but
particularly well informed concerning the events which were
finally to make up the history of the new possessions. His
position with the commission placed him in close contact with
the membership of that governing body. Being endowed with
qualities that command attention, and manifesting an eager
desire to go far beyond the requirements of his duties in the
active work of establishing the new government, men of the
highest rank soon gave him their confidence and began to
seek his counsel. These men were not slow to observe his in-
tense interest in the subject which was giving them much con-
cern. That he had the faculty of turning off work of the most
intricate and exacting nature, and with the dispatch of a

xvi BIOGRAPHY

trained journalist, early came to the attention of the commis-
sion ; that he possessed tremendous energy and intense love
for his task was apparent within but few months; that he
sought to cooperate and assume the fullest share of responsi-
bility which his position made possible, were facts that pressed
themselves upon the notice of his higher associates.

A trained secretary, one whose education has been of the
practical kind, combined with mastery of fundamentals em-
bracing a higher course in professional or literary attainment,
soon demonstrates his true worth. Such a man is not a mere
machine, but a trained diplomat and executive. He carries in
large measure the burden of responsibility resting upon his
superiors, and hence, if serving in the highest degree of effi-
ciency, must take rank with those above him. Mr. LeRoy ful-
filled these demands, and then on his own account began to
delve into all past events leading up to the establishment of
the Taft Commission. The task was a heavy one and, in many
cases, such information as existed was fragmentary and col-
ored by the viewpoint of partisanship. Within a short time,
however, he had acquired the basis of a library covering early
Spanish periods and leading on through the various stages of
the insurrection against the rule of Spain. This library in-
creased in size until it embraced practically everything written
on the subject. Over this vast accumulation of print, every page
of it in a foreign language, he went with painstaking care,
and in the end was rewarded with a comprehensive view
extending over the old Spanish regime.

Having literary connections with numerous publications in
the United States, he turned the knowledge to account, his
contributions appearing in the Political Science Quarterly,
the American Historical Review^ the Atlantic Monthly, and
the Independent. In addition, a volume entitled Philippine
Life in Town and Country (Putnam) appeared in 1905 and
is now in its third edition. This work was designed only to
set forth the Filipinos as they are, and was in no sense an ex-

BIOGRAPHY xvH

position of any policy with regard to the "Philippine Question."
A demand existed for a brief outline of native life which
should picture the typical Filipino community, its activities,
and the social and educational phases of the Islanders. In set-
ting forth the status of the great majority, as differentiated
from the traditional leaders and economic bosses of these
masses, — the ignorant peasantry, rather than the somewhat
distant and unsympathetic upper proprietary classes, — the
author supplied a new picture of the situation, and removed,
to an appreciable extent, the average reader's unfamiliarity
with numerous tribes making up the population of the Philip-
pine possessions. In this work, by way of introduction, he
assumed an attitude frankly and cordially in sympathy with
the aspirations of the Filipinos towards liberalism and modern
life and progress. The best Filipinos, he argued, are optimis-
tic as to their race and its future, and we ourselves can at least
be decent enough to give them the benefit of the doubt, if not
to encourage their optimism. He was, however, in much doubt
as to how far we are justified in accepting the proportionately
small class of natives possessing education and social position,
as spokesmen and representatives of their people.

It was in his treatment of Filipino life that Mr. LeRoy ac-
corded to Spain a full measure of credit for her aims and
achievements in the line of colonization. He regretted the ig-
norant attitude inspired by race prejudice which would deny
to the Spaniard an influence for good as applied to the Philip-
pine subjects. That the Spanish rule resulted to a profound
extent in an amelioration of conditions was freely stated by the
author, and in particular did he lay stress upon their benevo-
lent achievement and its net result. While condemning the
backward and halting step, however, which at last turned the
Filipinos against Spain's rule, it was Mr. LeRoy's belief that
in order to put the Filipinos of to-day in their proper category,
full justice should be done Spain's actual accomplishments, if
not as ruler, at any rate as teacher and missionary. He fully

xviii BIOGRAPHY

realized that Spain, in the Peninsula itself, had never yet
entered into the nineteenth century, politically or intellectu-
ally. On this account, how much less, as he reasoned, was she
able to guide a backward people of the Orient, themselves but
awakening to contact with the world at large and but dimly
aware of the goal toward which they f^el it within them to
strive. It was his opinion, as a conclusion to his allusion to this
phase of the Philippine question, that dogmatize as one might
about the racial and environmental inheritance of the Filipinos,
as being of the Orient, the fact that they themselves rejected
Spain, as an unsatisfactory mentor in Occidental civilization,
is an indication of their fitness for further progress in that
direction.

Through his numerous contributions to various publica-
tions, and by reason of the extended comment aroused in the
press as they appeared, Mr. LeRoy soon became known, among
those best able to judge, as an authority on subjects connected
with the Philippines. His services were sought in many addi-
tional directions, but human minds and hands, even when
backed by the store of energy which this man possessed, have
their limits. He performed what has been conceded as the work
of two men as secretary, and with it all he labored long into
the evenings, many times until sunrise, in quest of stray bits
of information which would enable him finally to attain the
object of his vision : '^ A Review of the American Occupation
of the Philippines."

As a preparation for this worthy ambition he had gained the
knowledge and the place of a competent and unbiased observer.
His research into Spanish history had been that of a close
student ; his contact with the various governmental activities,
military and civil, in the Islands had enabled him to separate
fictional and unreliable data, which always accompany a new
situation, from the facts as history should record them. An
omnivorous reader and one who kept an extensive daily record
in his own handwriting of all events that might later become

BIOGRAPHY xix

the basis of misunderstanding or controversy, he launched into
the introductory pages of what was to be his important Hfe
work.

Going to the Islands with athletic strength and possessed
of stupendous energy, he, nevertheless, drew too heavily upon
his physical resources. The uncertain and depressing climate,
together with the unsanitary conditions then existing, pro-
duced a run-down condition that later made a place for the
germ of tuberculosis. At the threshold of many a strong man's
career there appears before him the threatening force of an ill
fate. It comes creeping to the doorway and stands ready with
upHf ted hand to strike without warning or command ; its clinched
fist is raised in defiance of all that is good ; its insidious nature
knows neither the weak nor the strong, and its victims are not
measured by the great usefulness that is in them. Mr. LeRoy
had been met by the demon of disease. It was to drive him
from the Islands and the people in whose interest the impulse
of his brave and abiding heart had been directed toward a more
satisfactory governmental and educational development.

Returning to the United States on the advice of a physician
at Manila, he sought medical advice in San Francisco, and was
informed that his case had reached a serious stage. Another
physician, at Los Angeles, contradicted this diagnosis, and
informed him that a change of climate was not necessary.
Returning to his home state, Michigan, the advice of the first
doctor was corroborated, and he was informed that his future
depended upon his living in a dry climate. With all this con-
flicting professional advice of a disconcerting and disappoint-
ing nature, he was greatly perplexed; but a friend who owned
a ranch in New Mexico persuaded him to make the trip there,
and within a short time he accepted. Behind him he left his
young wife and baby, to search in a far-off, rough country for
health and strength with which to continue his work. In this new
location "he remained eleven months, and while there regained
much of his lost weight. Filled with his characteristic spirit

XX BIOGRAPHY

to be busy, he could not be persuaded to take a complete rest,
and within a short time was surrounded by piles of periodicals,
Philippine bulletins, and Spanish publications. The habits of
study and daily labor could not be broken, and he was soon
engaged with his writing.

During a trip on horseback to Santa Fe he was thrown and
sustained a fracture of his right arm. His daily letter to his
wife, written in a cramped left hand, caused her to leave imme-
diately for his side. She found him with his broken arm in a
plaster cast, busily engaged with his left hand manipulating
the keys of the typewriter. Within a short time husband and
wife were located on a small fruit ranch near the Tesuque Res-
ervation, just out of Santa Fe.

About this time the agitation against the so-called imperial-
istic tendencies of the Government were rife, and a strong
party in the United States called for the independence of the
Philippines. Mr. LeRoy, while favorable to the largest partici-
pation of the natives in their own government consistent with
their qualifications, looked with grave concern upon any move-
ment which had for its end the turning over of the Islands to
complete native control. He traced much of the impulse under
which many well-intentioned Americans were arguing for inde-
pendence, to designing native politicians whose influence, if
allowed to have recognition, would overturn the reconstructive
work already accomplished. And it may be well to state here
that up to the time of his death (1909) he had never changed
his mind in this respect. It was his firm belief that until the
great mass of Filipinos have been raised to a higher standard
of citizenship, both from an educational standpoint and with
a knowledge of stable governmental discipline, any efforts
toward independence would tend to the creation of factional
difficulties of a disrupting and demoralizing nature. To promise
the Islanders any particular time when independence would
be granted seemed likewise to him unadvisable, in that such
promise would keep ahve within the minds of certain leaders

BIOGRAPHY xxl

a burning desire for power, and of a kind that was pregnant
with bad results both to themselves and the people over whom
they would expect to exercise direction. He desired that the rule
of the home government should prevail, without giving promise
of termination, so long as the best interests of the natives should
be served, and he believed that such service must be rendered
until the people had undergone a long process of education
both in governmental principles and through contact with
the better civilizing influences.

And thus it was from his temporary home in New Mexico,
that the keen interest of Mr. LeRoy was aroused toward the
"anti-imperialistic" propaganda being carried on, particularly
in the Eastern States. He plunged into magazine and news-
paper writing, allowing no argument in favor of Philippine
independence to go unchallenged. Day after day, and week
after week, his contributions appeared. In none of these was
there any attempt at controversy other than properly to inform
the people of the United States of the duty resting upon them,
to the end that the Filipinos should not be cast adrift while
undergoing a sane and unselfish process of amelioration. That
his influence was greatly felt at this critical time is shown by
the fact that very early the anti-imperialistic talk largely
subsided and in its place was implanted a general behef, held
even to-day by the best informed, that to turn the government
of the Islands back to the natives would be a serious mistake,
fraught with uncertainty as to their ultimate destiny.

After two months spent in putting the little fruit ranch into
livable condition, a telegram came to Mr. LeRoy offering him
the post of consul to Costa Rica. Inquiry as to climatic con-
ditions satisfied him of the un suitableness of the altitude; but
later came an offer of similar services at Durango, Mexico,
which he accepted. Ranch life was not to his liking, and while it
had been resorted to for the outdoor life, he was without capi-
tal, and the call to become active once more in work that was
congenial proved irresistible. A long, tedious trip to the City

xxii BIOGRAPHY

of Mexico followed. The United States Ambassador was in the
States, and it was four weeks before the formal details neces-
sary to taking up the post at Durango had been completed.
Once located in this quiet atmosphere, and having organized
the consulate office, he proceeded in his endeavor to regain
health in a dry climate, at the same time relinquishing little
of his active concern in world affairs, and especially the Philip-
pines. His consular reports were varied and of a nature to
attract the commendation of the State Department. In fact,
many of his suggestions for improvement of the service figured
in the many reforms that came as a result of Secretary Root's
efforts. All of his spare time, aside from the duties of the
consulate, was applied to writing of the events leading up to
the American occupation of the Philippines. The old city,
with its quiet, easy-going life, offered abundant opportunity
for delving into old and rare Spanish books. Day after day
the book collectors brought everything to his door which they
thought the taste of the new consul would fancy. The great
majority of these tenders were, of course, useless, but there
were a number of historical works that proved a valuable ad-
dition to his already extensive library. To the large amount
of data in his possession was constantly added fresh and re-
liable information from friends in the Islands. Back and forth
a chain of letters was passing which made new inquiries and
further informed him of such facts as would prove of historical
use. He could not touch in a light way the extensive subject
which he had chosen to handle. There had been too much
superficial literature written upon Philippine subjects, and as
much misinformation as fact was already abroad to peqDlex
him, but, at the same time, to stimulate his own thorough
treatment of the questions involved. It was a most exacting
duty, and yet a loved one for him. Through all the agony of
his ill fate, and with a body succumbing gradually to the rav-
ages of the disease, he, nevertheless, labored on. There was
no complaint, no surrender, and through it all he maintained

BIOGRAPHY xxiii

the iron will and determination which were characteristic of
him. Far from the associations of people from whom he was
accustomed to receive inspiration, and with hopeful heart, he
completed a page to-day and a page to-morrow of the manu-
script that was to become the basis of his review. Of that re-
view he wrote: —

I have said that the manuscript sent to you will comprise about
one half of the work when completed, — I think it will, — one half,
that is, of the text proper. It contains the Introductory Chapter on
the Spanish regime and the four chapters ^ carrying through the his-
tory of 1898-1900 inclusive, the four longest and most difficult chap-
ters of the book, I think; at any rate, I regard my work of com-
position as now more than half done, though there are eight more
chapters as planned. Then, too, there will be bibliographical lists and
notes at the end of each chapter, some four to six appendices (one
consisting of some 30,000 words, the others relatively short), and, of
course, a very comprehensive index, indispensable in a work which
will be, like this, so largely a reference work merely.

The other chapters to come are : V, Progress in Pacification, re-
counting the events of 1901 to the latter part of the year, the col-
lapse of the insurrection, and the establishment of civil government
in part ; VI, the Recrudescence in Rebellion, seen in the Batangas and
Samar campaigns, this chapter dealing with the question of the re-
lations between the American army and the Filipinos ; VII, the
Philippine Question in the United States, primarily a review of the
"army cruelty" campaign and the enactment of the constitutional
law of the Philippines in 1902, but also reviewing the history of
anti-imperialism (strictly without taking sides, and to a considerable
extent merely in a bibliographical way), and of the discussion of the
Philippine question and legislation upon it in the United States,
1898-1905; VIII, describing the essential features of the new Philip-
pine government and their practical workings, from 1901 on ; IX,
the various Philippine questions which are economical in character,
notably Chinese labor, the question of tariffs, the development of
agricultural, mining, and forestry resources, etc. ; X, the friar and
religious question, in its various phases ; XI, the questions related
with the government of the Moros and the pagan tribes, historically
and bibliographically treated in the main ; and, XII, the summing-up,

* For the convenience of the reader, the author's original five chapters have
subdivided in the printed book.

xxiv BIOGRAPHY

which I think I can make short, and in which I desire to review
the salient things brought out in all the preceding chapters, histor-
ically speaking, showing plainly the things which may be regarded
as established facts from 1898 on, and stating the main elements
of the " Philippine problem " from the diverse points of view from
which it is at present regarded.

This will, I think, set before you a very complete idea of the na-
ture and comprehensiveness of what I am trying to do.

During the last year Mr. LeRoy was at Durango new
developments had arisen in the Philippines and the State
Department determined to send Secretary Taft to the scene.
A congressional party was soon organized to accompany the
former governor and to obtain full knowledge of the progress
which had been made. Mr. LeRoy was made a member of the
secretary's ofl&cial staff. It was not until his death that his
wife, in the reading of his diary, found a warning that had
been sent him of the danger attending such an exertion, and
that he had suffered a slight hemorrhage due, he recorded, to
the cramped position assumed while at work on his typewriter.
He chose to make the trip, however, inasmuch as it once more
afforded him opportunity for contact with men of affairs.
Aboard ship and with long trips to China and Japan, these
months were a delight after the monotonous years of exile in
Mexico. For this diversion he may have sacrificed a few weary
days of life, but it was " worth the while," as he would say,
to one whose tastes were for purely intellectual pursuits.

Directly upon his return to Durango he was tired and some-
what indifferent to completing his review. But the stout heart
was not broken — the will-power still remained, and with reso-
lute courage he went forward collecting the data for the later
chapters. Upon his return from the Lake Mohonk Conference,
in 1905, where he lectured on the Islands, the work of writ-
ing occupied five months, this being followed by a serious
illness. He had put his whole soul into the effort. It was
to be his life work ; it was to be a heritage to his wife and

BIOGRAPHY XXV

children. Upon its pages he had placed the image of his im-
partial mind; and whatever may become of the Islands, their
true friend and adherent had, during his declining days,
striven to give a faithful portrayal of the many events that
went hand in hand with their governmental existence. He had
rebuked an earlier fate, though his remaining days were num-
bered.

After his severe illness he resolved to seek out-of-door em-
ployment. Offers of a change of posts, among them that of
consul-general to Madrid, had to be refused, and the telegram
declining this place he never saw until three days after, being
too ill to speak. When he arose he never referred to the inci-
dent, so keen was his disappointment at being obliged to forego
a position of greater responsibility.

Coming north to Michigan, following the resignation of the
post at Durango, he strove to interest capital in Mexican
lands. While the negotiations were in progress he again suf-
fered a relapse, after having started back to Durango, and,
reaching the city, was carried to the old barracks, formerly
occupied by the consulate. Here his faithful servant waited
upon him for the following three months. All of this time
hope did not relinquish its hold upon his mind, and, in spite
of broken strength, he saw the possibility of help in the
mountain air. Being obliged, however, to abandon any move-
ment in this direction he asked for admittance to the military
hospital at Fort Bayard, New Mexico. For a time he showed
improvement, and the brave fight which he waged, that he
might once more have with him his wife and three little chil-
dren, excited the deepest sympathy and close personal concern
of the officials of the hospital. Just when the dread disease
appeared to be baffled and his courageous fight seemed won,
the summons came, and a message to his family and friends
at home announced his death.

xxvi BIOGRAPHY

James Alfred LeRoy was born at Pontiac, Michigan, De-
cember 9, 1875, the son of Edward and Jennie LeRoy. At
twelve years of age he had demonstrated an extremely preco-
cious mind and was far advanced in his studies. During vaca-
tion, at this period of life, he learned stenography while an
instructor was engaged in teaching an older member of the
family. At thirteen he had read Blackstone in a local law
office, and at fourteen he accepted a temporary position as
stenographer in the office of the Pontiac, Oxford & Northern
Railway. At fifteen he busied himself outside of school hours
by reporting for local newspapers, pursuing this activity until
he graduated from the high school at the early age of seven-
teen. His work in the school attracted general comment among
the teachers, inasmuch as he embraced in his studies all four
of the courses offered, his diploma allowing him one year's
credit at the University of Michigan.

Being thrown on his own resources he arranged, in connec-
tion with his university course, to supply a chain of newspa-
pers with news of an athletic nature. Of robust body and pos-
sessed of a desire to show his full prowess, the records in high
jumping, hurdling, and sprinting which he made during his
freshman year served to honor him in Western collegiate
circles. A new running broad jump record was soon estab-
lished, and its equal was not found until many years after.
His college course was marked by efficient accomplishment in
languages, mathematics, and history, and with all this difficult
classroom work went much writing in connection with a daily
published and maintained by students. Every university has
its leaders in various lines of student activity, and it would be
difficult to separate many of these diversions from the man
LeRoy, who was always doing his part in worthy collegiate
enterprises. While in college he became a member of the
Delta Upsilon Fraternity. He was graduated in 1896 from the
University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts, his standing
throughout his course entitling him to the highest honors.

BIOGRAPHY xxvii

Thirteen years after, when the Phi Beta Kappa Society,
founded on scholarship, was organized, he was made a member,
his high standing while in college making him eligible for
membership.

Following his graduation he became, at twenty years of
age, principal of the Pontiac High School, from which he had
graduated only three years previously. Within a year the super-
intendent resigned, and the Board of Education was divided
on the question of LeRoy's eligibility for the position. All
admitted his educational qualifications, but some believed him
too young to be entitled to the place. Resigning his position
at the close of the term he entered the ranks of journalism,
being successfully connected with the Detroit Free Press and
Evening News, ?Lui occupying a responsible position as political
reporter. New York being the goal of all starving newspaper
men, he was soon in that city, where he made extensive con-
nection with the best publications. Later he became Sunday
editor of the Baltimore Herald, It was while on this news-
paper that he had an assignment in Washington which placed
him in touch with the members of the Philippine Commission
only recently chosen by President McKinley. While only
twenty-four years of age at this time, he was of mature mind,
and his extensive experience gained him the responsible posi-
tion of secretary to Commissioner Worcester. Only a few days
remained before the commission was to leave for Manila, and
at this juncture Mr. LeRoy did a characteristic act and one
which showed him equal to any emergency. He was unmar-
ried, and the young woman of his choice. Miss Mabel Pound,
lived in Michigan. Immediately after accepting the call to
the Islands he telegraphed her as follows: "Will you marry
me Friday in Pontiac and go immediately to the Philippines?"
The wedding was arranged and the bride and groom were soon
on the way to San Francisco, joining the members of the Com-
mission at Chicago.

Since his death the widow and her three children have

xxviii BIOGRAPHY

taken up their residence in Washington, where Mrs. LeRoy is
the only person, outside of the President himself, who is
authorized to sign his name to official papers. And now as the
years go by, and three little children are left with the mother
to make their way without the guidance and care of one who
loved and labored for their future, it is good to know that
they are fulfilling his every hope. The inspiration of his life
will one day come to lead them to new visions of usefulness,
for the world is wide and, in its struggles, calls for the same
unselfish and ennobling service that their father rendered.

Beset with difficulties and ill fate on every hand, he had
never shirked a duty nor overlooked the many little things of
life that busy men are prone to forget. His active career was
dedicated to expounding the truth and attempting to set the
progress of the world one step farther toward the ideal. When
disease and weakness were upon him, and the tremendous
energy he was expending to combat the '^anti-imperialistic "
cry caused one of his friends in Washington to suggest that
he enter outdoor business life and cease his writing, he re-
corded these words in his diary : " I wrote that, if it came

down squarely to a decision between a mere chase to add years
to a life and also ' make a competence,' and the living of a
life more after my own inclinations and doing something satis-
fying, even though shorter, I should prefer the latter."

Here was the measure of the man. He believed in the cause
through which the United States was turned missionary to the
Filipinos. He beheved in the usefulness of the administration
of their affairs by this country. Only one barrier could, he
firmly believed, be erected against a successful ultimate result
in the Islands, and that was an ill-timed and badly advised
change. Such a devout adherent of the Filipino-American ex-
periment could not in conscience relinquish his work. And he
died fighting — fighting for the faith that was in him.

THE AMERICANS IS THE PHILIPPINES

k

I

THE AMEKICANS IN THE
PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER I

THE SPANISH REGIME — A THREE-CENTURY PRELUDE

The people of the Philippine Islands were, on the 1st day
of May in 1898, the product of a mixed Asiatic ancestry, both
of blood and of environment ; of more than three centuries of
rule by mediaeval Spanish ecclesiastics; of commercial and
political contact for that length of time with Spaniards of a
more progressive type, and for a half-century back with the
world in general ; and of a generation of strife and of evolu-
tion, on the part of their somewhat homogeneous civilized
elements, toward a more independent existence and a dimly
recognized ideal of nationality. That neither the statesmen
nor the public of the United States knew the elements of this
composite did not in the least lessen the fact of its complexity.
And since the ignorance was reciprocal, and the Filipinos knew,
in fact, even less of the history, the national characteristics,
and the aims and ideals of the "North Americans," the
events that brought these two peoples close together at the
end of the nineteenth century were invested with something
of awe and mystery, blinding them both at the time to the
real trend of enlightened self-interest and leaving the issue of
their contact, both for themselves and the outside world, very
much in doubt. If the time has not yet come to dispel that
doubt, at least 'there is much to be gained by a sober, careful,
and critical weighing of the events and the facts revealed by
their relationships for the more than half a decade that has
since passed.

I

% THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The first requisite to such a review is a knowledge of the
facts. Not only have these often been obscured in the heat of
partisan discussion in the United States, but the very mass of
accumulated data is a hindrance to that clarity of understand-
ing which ought to prevail under government by the people.
And if, in the fury of our scribbling, our debating and our re-
solving, we have confused the very events happening under our
eyes, less creditable yet to us of the greater and more respon-
sible side of this partnership is it that we still plan and resolve,
discuss and legislate, in careless ignorance of the antecedent
data of our " new problem," untroubled and almost contemp-
tuous as to the history of those whose welfare we have, with
or without their consent, assumed to control. It is not less
necessary now, in attempting to review the events of these six
years, than it was in the early days of 1898, to go back and
consult previous PhiUppine history for enlightenment as to our
course.

Because we of a favored continental expanse had never be-
fore 1898 turned our attention to the Philippines, they were
not necessarily bound to disclose themselves an El Dorado of
riches to our magic touch. Because as a nation we had grown
to bearded manhood in ignorance of the existence of the Fil-
ipinos, it was not perforce to be assumed that they were un-
discovered children of free nature, to be catalogued and clas-
sified after their kind and to be governed from an ethnological
textbook. If this had been the case, much of the advice which
was so generously lavished upon us by our British guides,
counselors, and friends, and by their imitators in some of our
new collegiate " colonial laboratories " at home, would have
been more pertinent. But the Filipinos had developed, or, at
any rate, had acquired, some degree of civilization before the
Spanish friars and arquebusiers came upon them, and the
plain truth of their history since teaches him who will consult
it that glib phrases about the " degenerate influence of corrupt

i

^

THE SPANISH REGIME S

Spain" do not sound well upon the lips of those who are
proud to call themselves Anglo-Saxons.

A. THE PRE-mSTORIC FILIPINOS

An investigation of the careless and contemptuous way in
which the Spanish conquerors, lay and ecclesiastical, almost
uniformly dealt with the characteristics and institutions of the
sixteenth-century Filipinos, as well as of the more advanced
Mexicans, and sought to sweep them away as wholly evil, and
of the equally intolerant and unscientific way in which their
Spanish successors have treated these more or less primitive
communities in their writing of history, might well have
preached modesty to us. An excellent piece of scientific work
lies open to him who shall first reconstruct for us the com-
munities of the pre-conquest Filipinos. Of late years, in Spain
and the Philippines, the heat of bitter partisan controversy
has tended more and more to obscure the facts, already so un-
satisfactorily brought out in earlier writings. What may be
called the " friar party " has sought to paint the primitive
Filipinos as savages pure and simple, and the tendency has
been to heighten the colors of the picture as imaginations and
passions were worse mixed. Two motives inspired this cam-
paign, one the desire to enlarge the importance of the work
wrought by the friars, and the other to combat the extension
of liberal institutions to the Filipinos. On the other hand, cer-
tain superficial Filipinos and mentally exuberant Spanish Lib-
erals have gone to as great extremes in painting the early Fil-
ipinos as models of virtue, intelligence, and social progress,
and their society as one unique in Oceania, an antipodal civil-
ization in the midst of a sea of ignorance and vices.

As stated, it is not yet possible to pronounce a critical
judgment as to the status of the pre-conquest communities of
lowland Filipinos, the Christianized population of to-day.
Doubtless, much of interest wiU be brought to light when

4 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

careful studies are made of the still half-wild Malay commu-
nities of the hills of Luzon and of the Moro settlements of
Mindanau ; it must be remembered, however, that there is a
probability that the former are Malay immigrants to the Phil-
ippines of an earlier date than are the lowlanders, and that
the Moros represent later migrations from Java and other
islands, where they had, in part at least, acquired before com-
ing the Mohammedan religion, and with it various social insti-
tutions, modified since by communication not only with other
Mohammedan communities of similar institutions, but also to
some extent with the world in general. Of the early Spanish
writings, most of which are unsatisfactory for the reasons
stated, the best and more informative are a treatise on the
customs of the natives written by Father Plasencia, a Francis-
can friar, in 1589, and adopted by the Government for the
use of its officials, and Dr. Antonio de Morga's work on the
progress of affairs in the Philippines up to 1606, its author
having been a member of the supreme court of the islands.*
These works and others that supplement them go to show that
the Filipinos of the central islands and Luzon's western coasts
were somewhat past the clan stage, and had a political organi-
zation under local chiefs which virtually amounted to a mild
feudalism, their so-called slavery and their land tenure fitting
better into such a conception of their society ; that they had
a system of laws or customs, administered by the councils of
old men ; that their religious ideas, undeveloped and imbued
with superstitions as they were, included, nevertheless, the
recognition of a Supreme Being — the contest between Mo-
hammedanism and Christianity among these Malays in the
sixteenth century, with their readiness to accept either, being
significant and illustrative ; that they had a system of writing,
based on a phonetic alphabet, probably derived ultimately
from the same source as that from which ours came in the
dawn of history, and that some in each community could read

1 See Bibliography.

THE SPANISH REGIME 5

and write; that they had long since passed the nomadic state
— probably long before the Malay migrations to the Philip-
pines.

Discarding exaggerations and matters in doubt, we know
that polygamy was then practiced by Filipinos of sufficient
status to maintain more than one wife ; that the morality of
the women left much to be desired, under the standard then
obtaining, publicly at least, in European society; that gam-
bling was by no means learned from the Spaniards, although
new ways of gambling were ; that the petty chiefs were fre-
quently at strife with each other, these tribal wars not con-
tributing to the progress or the happiness of the people ; that
agriculture and such arts as weaving, ceramics, etc., were in
a primitive state (as, indeed, they still are). The natives had
iron implements of warfare and various articles of other
metals ; but contact with the continent of Asia explains these.
They were in regular intercourse with China and with Japan,
Borneo, and other islands some centuries before Spanish dis-
covery. In the little-known work of Chao-Yu-Kua, a Chinese
geographer of the thirteenth century, is a chapter on the Phil-
ippine trade.* The Chinese then obtained from the Filipinos
not only such raw materials as yellow wax, cotton, pearls,
tortoise-shells, betel-nuts, cocoanuts, and vegetables, but also
jute fabrics (probably those woven from ahaka, Manila hemp,
as to-day), other woven goods (of cotton, Blumentritt sug-
gests),^ and fine mats. The Filipinos took in exchange porce-

» Chapter xi is devoted to the Philippines. For the data herein derived from
this interesting work, the only reference available to the writer has been a Span-
ish version of the chapter in question, printed in La Alborada, oTg&n of the Manila
Lyceum (a secondary school), on November 9, 1901. This translation was sent to
Jos^ Rizal by his intimate friend and co-worker in Philippina, Dr. Ferdinand
Blumentritt, in 1894. The letter of transmission and the translation are in the
collection of Mr. Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila, who was, prior to his decease in
1904, ofiBcial bibliographer of the Philippine Government. Blumentritt states in
his letter to Rizal that a poor version of this chapter had been published in Madrid
the year before, but he had since carefully compared his Spanish version with the
English version of Dr. Hirth.

* Father Pedro Chirino, in his RelaciSn d« las Itlas Filipinos (Rome, 1601),

6 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

lain, gold, iron, needles, vases for perfumes, lance-heads, arti-
cles of lead, silk parasols, black damask, and other silks.
Chao-Yu-Kua tells of their settlements, some of a thousand
families each, their houses of cane being clustered on high
places. This was nearly three centuries before Magellan.

B. SPANISH CONQUEST AND MISSIONARY LABORS

The history of the Spanish conquest is by no means com-
prised in the events of the four expeditions from the glori-
ously disastrous one of Magellan, which discovered the islands
in 1521, to the successful one of Legaspi, which planted the
city of Sebii in 1565 and that of Manila in 1572. Roughly
outlined, the conquest period lasted until 1700. By that time
the islands were almost as fully occupied by the outposts of
Spanish power and Spanish Christianity as they were two
hundred years later. Spasmodic attempts were made there-
after to bring into the fold of the Church the wild commu-
nities of the mountains which form the spine of every large
island in the group, but in the main these communities
were only crowded farther back by the growth of the lowland
population and the extension of its quasi-civilization. In the
eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century, there were
sustained efforts, only partially successful, for the subjection
and settlement of the Moro country in the south (as there had
already been in the seventeenth century). But by 1700 the
Spanish flag had been raised and Spanish churches built
over practically all the territory which, upon the transfer of
sovereignty to the United States, could be said to have been
effectively subjected to the mixed civil and ecclesiastical dom-
inance of Spain. Progress thereafter was mainly in the growth
of population within these limits, leading to the formation of

speaks of the natives weaving cotton into fabrics for clothing, which was worn by
the women in long robes reaching the ankles. See the English translation of this
work in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 (cited in the Bibliography at the end
of volume ii), vol. xn, pp. 187, 206; also pp. 187 et seq,, for references to the
prehistoric trade with Japan.

"^■\

THE SPANISH REGIME 7

new pueblos and new parishes out of places that were at the
end of the conquest period outlying districts of the older
Church centers. Even the island of Negros, which lay for
the most part undeveloped until the nineteenth century, when
it became the chief sugar-producing center of the Bisayan
Islands, forms, strictly speaking, no exception to this general
statement.

Certain features of the conquest period detach themselves
as significant to the student of recent Philippine history. First
of all, it need not be said, at least to one who has read even
slightly in the history of Spanish colonization, that the conquer-
ors considered it a work of necessity and also of beneficence
to stifle all manifestations of the life of former times and to
supplant all the social institutions of the new-found peoples.
Yet they went to work to do so in a fairly tolerant sort of
fashion, in a way, indeed, that was destined in large part to
render their efforts unavailing. It is a trite remark that the
Christian religion was in Mexico merely grafted on existing
beliefs and rites, which fact, coupled with certain superstitions
connected with the coming of the white men, made the appar-
ently marvelous acceptance of a new faith by some milHons of
considerably civihzed people really only the following of the
line of least resistance.^ Any one who comes in contact to-day
with the Pueblo Indians of our Southwest, whom the Spanish
friars ostensibly Christianized three hundred years ago, will
readily observe how they have preserved all the intricate mass
of superstitions, poetic imagery, and nature-worship which
formed their primitive creed under a very thin veil of the out-
ward forms of the Roman Catholic Church; their \evj fiestas
are the same as of old, cloaked under the name of some more
modern saint. Without entering into a comparison of the civil-
ization of the primitive Filipinos with that of the Aztecs or of

* Humboldt more than once paused to wonder at this invariable result of Spanish
eolonization in Central and South America, then to demolish with his clear analyses
•11 the miraculous features claimed for it

8 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the Pueblos, it is perfectly apparent that much the same thing
took place in the islands discovered by Magellan. The early
missionaries had just as little tolerance here as elsewhere for
the customs of the natives, — " ways of the devil " all, — and
scarcely ever turned aside even carelessly to record or comment
upon them. Yet ingrained ways of living and doing were not
lightly to be suppressed, had the new regime been much more
rigid than it was, and perhaps we may even suspect that the
institutions and habits which have survived are quite com-
monly those of a less desirable sort. Where the main stress
was laid upon the outward forms of the new life, religious or
political, vices and superstitions had great opportunity to flourish
underneath. If we may not say that this is what happened
with the Filipinos, at least this is the most charitable and sym-
pathetic way of passing judgment upon those islanders to-day.
Recent writers have developed rather unwarrantable gener-
ahzations from the survival of the harangay, in which they see
a primitive Filipino institution.^ It was the survival of a name
(and the name itself transformed from the Malay form of
haldngay) rather than of an institution, and has of recent
years been made conspicuous both because of the almost total
disappearance of Malay names for social or political ideas and
also because certain Spanish and mestizo writers laid great
stress upon it in the campaign for " assimilation " which pre-
ceded the municipal reform of 1893. As already seen, we must

^ The name means a sort of small boat in Tagalog and other dialects. It was
applied also to a family group or clan, under the leadership of a petty chief, some
conjecture, because of the way in which the Malays migrated to the Philippines in
groups. The name survived to the close of the Spanish regime, the cdbeza de ba~
rangdy being the lieutenant charged with tax collection in the barrios (outlying
groups) of a pueblo. See the Philippine history of Father Rodrigo de Agdnduru
Moriz, reproduced in volume 78 of ColecciSn de documentos ineditos para la historia
de Espana (Madrid, 1882), p. 515. See also Cronicas de la ApostSlica Provincia de
San Gregorio de Religiosos Descalzos de N, S. P. San Francisco en las Islas FilipU
nas, etc., by Father Juan Francisco de San Antonio (Sampalok, 1738-44), part 1,
book 1, chapter xuv. This institution is also dealt with in Pedro A. Paterno'g
El Barangay (Madrid, 1892), a pamphlet only slightly less fanciful and more
unscientific than the other writings of this Filipino.

I

THE SPANISH REGIME 9

reject the claim so often reiterated of late years that the early
missionaries found nomadic or half -fixed clans and taught them
the ways of village life. Village life there was already, to some
extent, and it was upon this that the friars built. Doubtless
they modified it greatly, until in time it approached in most
ways as closely to European village life as might be expected
in tropical islands whose agricultural resources are not as yet
well developed. From the first there would be a tendency to
greater concentration about the churches,^ beginning with the
rude structures of cane and thatch, which were replaced before
1700 in all the older settlements by edifices of stone, frequently
massive and imposing, especially so as they tower over the acres
of bamboo huts about them, from the inmates of which have
come the forced labor which built them. From the first,
too, it was to the interest of the Spanish conquerors, lay and
priestly, to improve the methods of communication between
the communities which formed their centers of conversion or
of exploration and collection of tribute. Yet to represent either
the friars or the soldiers as great pathfinders and reconstructors
of wilderness is the work of ignorance. When Legaspi's grand-
son, Juan de Salcedo, made his memorable marches through
northern Luzon, bringing vast acres under the dominion of
Spain with a mere handful of soldiers, he found the modern
Bigan a settlement of several thousand people ; his successors
in the conquest of the Upper Kagayan Valley, one of the most
backward portions of the archipelago to-day, reported a popu-
lation of forty thousand in the region lying around the modern
Tugegagau, and so it was quite commonly everywhere on the
seacoasts and on the largest rivers. Some very crude deductions
have been made as to the conquest period by writers of recent
years who assume that the natives were at the beginning mere
bands of wandering savages, and that all the improvements

^ How the miMionaries in some of the central islands gathered the scattered
elnsters of native huts into one town may be seen in Chirino (7^e Philippine
Itlandi, 1493-1898^ toIs. xii and xm, especially toI. xin, pp. 90-91).

10 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

visible in their external existence to-day were brought about
in these early years. It was in the decade 1830-40, under
Governor-General Enrile and the soldier administrator Pefia-
randa, his chief assistant, that the Philippines first felt a real
stimulus to road- and bridge-building and internal improve-
ments generally; since that time the growth of external com-
merce, with the resultant better cultivation of some of the
provinces, such as Batangas and Pampanga, has led to great
improvement in the ways of communication in these places, due
both to the civil authorities and to some degree of initiative
on the part of the mestizo plantation-owners. In the main,
however, the Philippines are even now a country without roads.
There is no detraction from the really great accomplish-
ments of the conquest period in the statement of facts. But
constantly, in a discussion of the merits and demerits of the
early conquerors, we are seemingly drawn into the modern
friar controversy. This is so, simply because the early friar
chroniclers claimed everything for the missionaries in general
and for their respective orders in particular ; and their more
modern imitators have gone far beyond them, in the heat of
controversy, until even the barest recital in a nonpartisan way
of the general features of early Philippine history inevitably
involves more or less of a categorical denial of the false state-
ments upon which recent exaggerations are based. The friar
missionaries did not bring about the first settlements and con-
quests under Legaspi ; they did not blaze the way in wilder-
nesses and plant the flag of Spain in outlying posts long in
advance of the soldiers, the latter profiting by their moral-
suasion conquests to annex great territories for their own
plunder ; they did not find bloodthirsty savages, wholly sunk
in degradation, and in the twinkling of an eye convert them
to Christianity, sobriety, and decency, solely by some magical
influence of their sacred garb and holy mission ; they did not
teach wandering bands of huntsmen or fishermen how to Hve
peacefully in orderly settlements, how to cultivate the soil,

THE SPANISH REGIME 11

erect buildings (except the stone churches), and did not bind
these villages together by the sort of roads and bridges which
we have to-day, though they had considerable share in this
work, especially in later times ; they did not find a squalid
population of 400,000 to 750,000 in the archipelago, and
wholly by the revolution wrought by them in ways of life
make it possible for that population to increase by ten or
twenty times in three centuries.

The soldier conquerors at the outset preceded the mission-
aries into practically every corner of the archipelago, and this
continued to be true up to the very close of Spanish domina-
tion, with regard to the Moros and hill-tribes. If the military
conquest of these divided Malay settlements proved to be as
easy as their religious conversion by the wholesale, whenever
their more or less absolute petty rulers led the way, we may
dispense with the plea of the miraculous and reasonably con-
clude that Spain's way was made easy by the Malay lack of
cohesiveness on one side and by native docility on the other.
That men of peace, who came in the garb of charity and in
the name of a new and better rehgion, were more important
in such a conquest than rough soldiers with arms in their
hands, is beyond dispute. And justice to the aims of Spain in
this conquest demands a recognition of the fact that always
and everywhere, in official plans and proclamations, the con-
version of the natives was put in the foreground as the work
of prime necessity and to which everything else and everybody
else should be subordinated.^ Spain always aimed at a peace-
ful conquest, after the early adventures in Mexico and Peru,

' See RecopilaciAn de Leyes de Indias, book vi, title x, law i (repeating the will left
hj laabella the Catholic as to the treatment of the Indians) ; book ii, title ii, law
VIII, and book i, title i (entire). In general, careless writers who have been wont
to paM harsh criticisms upon the Spanish colonial regime, both as to aims and
methods from first to last, would do well to read this ponderous collection of laws
dMigned to safeguard the rights of the natives. Their counterpart is not to be
found in the records of the British Parliament nor in the Revised Statutes of the
United States, except in detached provisions here and there. That the laws of the
Indies were not enforced is, indeed, as true as it is unfortunato.

n THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

and, in the main, she achieved it ; in the Philippines her task
was rendered easy by the condition and the characteristics of
the inhabitants. And yet, both because of a lack of mission-
aries and because of the eagerness of those who had been sent
to Manila to leave those islands for the more alluring and ad-
venturesome fields in Japan and China, we find the soldiers
and tribute collectors outstripping the friars in most parts of
Luzon, in Leite, Samar, Bohol, Negros, Mindanau, and other
islands, in portions of Sebii (the first island occupied) and
Panai, as well as in the smaller populated islands, by from one
year to a quarter-century.^ The first Bishop, a Dominican
friar, was complaining bitterly, in 1594, that the encomende-
ros ^ had in some places been collecting tribute for twenty
years of natives who had as yet heard no word of the Christian
rehgion nor seen a f rocked Spaniard. It is precisely for this
reason that the earliest baptismal and parish records of the
Church do not afford a very reliable index of the size of the
population at the time of the conquest, whereas by 1700 they
do. We may place the pre-conquest population of the whole
archipelago anywhere from one million to two and a half
millions, though perhaps nearer the former than the latter
figure.

Quite enough was accomplished by the early friars, as well
as by some few civilian administrators and soldiers (who were
often seriously handicapped in their efforts by the opposition

^ See documents in vols, vn, vm, and IX of The Philippine Islands^ U9S-1898,
edited by Blair and Robertson. This important series of translations of Philippine
historical docimients is more fully mentioned in the Bibliography. The volumes
here cited also contain much information bearing upon the question of the number
of inhabitants at the time of the conquest.

2 Encomenderos, lay conquerors, who were, in consequence of services in the ex-
tension of Spanish rule, given an encomienda, or " charge," of territory, with power
to collect tribute from the natives dwelling therein, turning the royal portion into
the treasury and retaining the rest, out of which they were required by law, though
this was frequently a dead letter, to provide for the religious instruction of the
natives. The system led to great abuses, was in fact a wretched piece of " spoils
politics," on a par with the early colonial monopolies on the economic side ; it sur-
vived the conquest period, but was eventually merged into a civil organization of
government.

THE SPANISH REGIME 18

of the ecclesiastics in high position to everything which they
could interpret as interfering with their very wide preroga-
tives), to excuse even Spanish boastfulness. By 1700 about
three fourths of a million souls were baptized and settled in
orderly communities, clothed in a modified European style,
familiarized with the catechism and with various religious exer-
cises printed for them in their native dialects, and were attend-
ing mass and hearing sermons in those dialects in stone struc-
tures wherein Europe seems for the moment to be transplanted
into the Far East. The principles of that great body of law
with which the name of Justinian is identified only as a sort
of intermediary landmark, had in some degree been put into
practice in this detached portion of the non-individualistic
Orient. Some few ways of commerce had been marked out ;
navigation between the islands had become a common thing
and was conducted in the then modern boats, while Manila
was a great depot for the European and American trade with
China and the " spice islands " which was beginning to draw
the Oriental out of his shell. Ways of agriculture were being
improved, and new plants brought from Mexico and elsewhere,
with some resultant diversification of products. Charity and
education (though the latter was confined mainly to religious
matters) were works which went hand in hand from the
first ; Manila had its hospitals (though established primarily
for Spaniards) nearly half a century before the Pilgrims came
to Plymouth, and there had been a college founded there at
the very opening of the seventeenth century.^ The first print-
ing-press in the Philippines was at work before the founding
of Jamestown, and little pamphlets of religious instruction in
the dialects, as well as more weighty publications in Spanish,

^ Both this foundation of the Jesuits and the college opened soon after by the
Dominicans and made a " Royal University " in 1645 (the University of St.
Thomas of Manila), were at first for the education of Spanish or half-caste boys ;
bat the Government had aided with lands and money, and it compelled the open-
ing of their doors to natives before 1700. Set Montero y Vidal, HUtoria de Filu
pmas (Madrid, 1887), vol. I.

14 [THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

were multiplied during the succeeding century ; we cannot to-
day call these works of the friars scholarly, but, considering
their times and their purposes, they are not the less notable.
Woman occupies a higher position in the Philippines than she
ever did in any other Oriental country, and, indeed, there are
few places in the world where she plays a more prominent
and independent part, not only in the affairs of the family,
but also in the life of the community, and even in many in-
stances in business; a glance at the Moro and pagan com-
munities and at the other peoples of the Orient compels the
belief that this is due to the introduction of Christianity into
this segregated portion of the East.^ Yet it would not do to
overlook the signs of ability, capacity, and initiative in the
Filipino women themselves. In similar manner, we may give
due credit to the early missionaries for a general improve-
ment in the morals of the Filipinos along with the better-
ment of their material condition, without going to the extreme
of claiming that their habits were completely revolutionized.
If the natives have been, by force of teaching and influence,
made so conspicuously temperate as they are to-day, a grave
responsibility rests upon their mentors for not having simi-
larly reformed them as regards the very serious habit of
gambling, their passion for which amounts to a vice. Failure
to reform them in this particular makes us suspect that
there has been exaggeration of the drunkenness and licentious-
ness ascribed to them at the time of the conquest, that their
abuse of appetite could not have been so bad as painted.

Enough of good there was about this period of conquest
and settlement to justify its being called the " golden age,"
the glorious era of missionary work (wherein, however, the
comparatively few Spanish laymen in the islands, aside from

1 In matters of religion, woman is the great conservative as well as the great
zealot ; inevitably, it has been through her that the friars achieved their greatest
results, as well as through her that thej longest retained their hold upon the
people.

THE SPANISH REGIME 15

the direct representatives of the Crown and its generally benef-
icent intentions, played a role often only less ignoble than
their fellow-adventurers on the continent of America, and,
moreover, the natives were sometimes abused and exploited by
the friars themselves). But already before we enter upon the
eighteenth century, not only had the scepter of power passed
from Spain, but with it also preeminence in exploration and
her claim to leadership in civilization. The new economic
regime was not yet fully outhned, but the European peoples
farther north who were eventually to be identified with it had
already come into control in the councils of the nations and
on the ways of that world-commerce which of itself was to
prove a civilizer superior to dogma and ritual. The remain-
ing two centuries might well be called one long prelude to the
final crash. Patriotic, sometimes also intelligent, efforts were
made to avert it, and the nineteenth century in particular was
in Spain a drawn-out wrestling bout between the blind power
of the old giant of mediaevalism and reaction and the spas-
modic and nervous exertions of the young man of Spanish Lib-
eralism, re-aroused at intervals to the movements of scientific
and political progress in the outside world. Generous in dis-
position, democratic of manner if not of government, but
proud and self-contained and sensitive, Spain was unable to
free herself from the iron bands which bound her stationary
to a past in whose glories she came more and more to live.
How much less was she able sympathetically to interpret or
intelligently to direct a never less than alien and an Oriental
people (whose eyes she had herself first turned toward Occi-
dentalism), bringing them into a fuller understanding and a
closer contact with that developing civilization itself !

0. THE OLD REGIME IN ITS TYPICAL PERIOD

It is difficult to recognize any general trend in the events
of the eighteenth century in the Philippine Islands. There
were, however, certain events and movements of general sig-

16 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

nificance. The perennial strife between civil and ecclesiastical
authorities saw various new and some exciting phases. This
was due in great measure to the arrival from time to time, as
during the first century and a half of occupation also, of
more vigorous and capable governor-generals. The post had
too often been held by civilians who were merely figureheads,
also for intervals by the Archbishop of Manila ; and the re-
hgious orders, which had grown to look upon the archipelago
as really their private territory ^ under the division which they
had before 1700 made of the various provinces, regarded any
action taken by the civil authorities in matters of general
policy, without their advice or against their consent, as con-
stituting a sort of infringement upon vested rights. Having
accomplished in large part their work of baptism and their or-
ganization of the parishes, they refused to give way to secular
priests ; in fact, their original willingness to see Spanish secu-
lar priests sent out to occupy cathedral offices or minister to
purely Spanish parishes, in Manila, for instance, disappeared
as a campaign for secularization gradually outlined itself and
was pushed at intervals in Spain or in the islands themselves.
It was in part this jealous watchfulness of their own interests
which led them to adopt a policy adverse to the ordination in
numbers of native priests, who might in time, as in other
countries, be expected to supplant the missionary priests ; it
made them desirous of keeping within their own ranks the
appointments to the bishoprics, metropolitan and suffragan ; '^

* This was wholly natural, in view of the declared aims of the Spanish kings in
taking and holding the territory (especially after Philip III was persuaded, early
in the seventeenth century, not to abandon his then costly possessions in the Orient,
partly through the arguments of the friars that he should hold them as a trust
upon the royal conscience, his predecessors having undertaken to Christianize
them), and in view of the labor already expended by the orders in the islands.
The four orders of friars which had taken part in the missionary work (Augustin-
ians, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Recollects) and the Jesuits, also early on the
scene, had divided the provinces among themselves, and considered themselves to
have the right of appointment to all curacies within their respective territories.

* The bishopric of Manila was created in 1578, and was raised to a metropolitan
see in 1595, when the dioceses of Nueva Segovia and Nueva C^eres in Luzon and

■

THE SPANISH REGIME 17

made them oppose the attempts of certain bishops coming
from the secular clergy to enforce episcopal visitation and in-
spection of parishes, on the ground that members of the regu-
lar clergy could be held subject only to the superiors of their
own orders, that the parishes should be held to be preferences
of the orders themselves and the nominations and transfers of
their curates made only by the said superiors ; and it made
them also insistent upon retaining in their own hands the con-
trol of all means of education. Thus the " friar controversy,"
which has to so large an extent made up the history of the
islands, beginning in the earlier years chiefly in the friction
between the rival civil and ecclesiastical aspirants for power,
gradually broadened to include also a Philippine phase of the
world-wide contest within the Roman Catholic Church between
the regular and the secular clergy, between the regulars and
the ordinary jurisdiction.^

The organization of a seminary to train natives for the
priesthood was decreed in 1702, but the Philippine ecclesi-

that of Sebd in the Bisajas were also created. The last was divided and the ad-
ditional diocese of Jaro created in 1865. This is the ecclesiastical organization as
it exists to-day. In 1902, Pope Leo XIII, in his bull on the Philippine Church
(Q^<E mari nnico), provided for the division of the archipelago into seven dioceses,
but this plan, with the promise of the appointment of one or more native priests
as bishops, seems to have been abandoned.

* For some evidence of the importance assumed at times by this contest in the
Philippines even before the eighteenth century, see Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. i,
chaps, xni, xv, xxiii, xxv, xxvu, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxin. The first bishop to
attempt to visit and inspect the curacies of the friars was Serrano, in 1621 ; and,
when they refused him entrance and threatened to abandon their parishes, he
yielded, and the question was submitted to Rome and Madrid. (The Spanish ar-
chives are heavy with the controversial documents submitted at this time, but the
question wtui to live for a century and a half yet.) In 1653, Archbishop Poblete
tried to carry out Urban YIII's bull regarding secnlarization, but failed ; and in
1097, Archbishop Camacho revived the question of episcopal visitation. The oon-
tMts of Governor-General Corcuera with the clergy (1635-40); the sending of
Governor-General Salcedo to Mexico in chains for trial before the Inquisition as a
heretic, he cheating his ecclesiastical enemies by dying on the way (1669) ; and the
stormy scenes centering around the exile of Archbishop Pardo (1683) and his snb-
sequent retnm to power and excommmiieation of the Audiencia judges, are simply
the most striking phases of the perennial strife between the civil and ecclesiastical
•tetet, •pitodes which lessen our surprise at the ■mniinition of a governor-general
is tbt cigbteenth century.

18 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

astical authorities prevented the opening of the institution
until 1772, when Governor-General Anda and Archbishop
Santa Justa y Rufina were in accord on it.^ The King decreed
in 1714 a secular university, beginning with courses in law
and theology ; and in 1719, Manuel de Bustamante, the gov-
ernor-general charged with carrying out this plan, was, as a
result of various strifes with the orders, slain in the govern-
mental palace in Manila by mutineers organized and led by the
friars and Jesuits, the palace guard fleeing before the cruci-
fixes of the fathers.^

Highly significant also were the agrarian disturbances in the
neighborhood of the friar estates, in large degree prototypes
of the revolts of 1872 and 1896. In 1743, the people around
Balayan, Batangas, in protest against what they considered to
be usurpation of their lands by the Jesuits, who then had an
estate there, led a revolt which spread over a large part of
Batangas and cost the Spanish army (mostly natives from Pam-
panga) a number of lives.^ At the same time, there were repeated
and serious disturbances about those Tagalog towns in Cavite,
Manila, and Bulak^n provinces, where the principal friar estates
lay until their recent purchase by the American Government.
The royal commissioner appointed to investigate and pacify
the people seems to have found much evidence of the truth of
their charges that their own land had been usurped, that their
liberties to fish, cut wood, and pasture their animals had been
wrongly curtailed, and that there had been fraudulent extension
of the boundaries of the friar estates through the collusion of
a high official of the Government. The latter was suspended and
heavily fined, and the old boundaries were ordered restored.'*

1 The friars had already trained natives to serve as coadjutors to some extent in
their early monastery schools; some few (or, at any rate, mestizos) seem to have
been admitted to the orders, and several of the bishops of the seventeenth century
are said to have had native blood in their veins.

2 Montero y Vidal, op. ciL, vol. i, p. 413. The Spanish archives are literally
burdened with material about this episode.

8 Ut supra, p. 478.

* The royal cedula of November 7, 1751, which summarizes this whole investiga-

THE SPANISH REGIME 19

Perhaps the most striking events of the eighteenth century
center about the English occupation of Manila in 1762-63 and
the figure of Simon de Anda, the vigorous lawyer-soldier, who,
anathematized by the archbishop-governor and deserted by
most of the Spanish elements in the islands, yet succeeded,
with the aid of his loyal Pampangan soldiers, in confining the
invaders to Manila, and thus probably saved the archipelago for
Spain at the making of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The city
was surrendered practically without defense by Archbishop
Rojo (thereafter, no archbishop served as governor-general).^
The Jesuits in pursuit of their general policy, promptly raised
the English flag over their monastery and went bodily over to
the supposed new sovereignty.^ To some extent the other orders

tion and recites the decision may be found in La Democraciat Manila, November 25,
1901. This same controversy had arisen a half-century before under Archbishop
Camacho. When he arrived in Manila in 1697, a royal official appointed to settle
titles to land had demanded that the friars show their titles to the estates they
held; they had refused, and the Audiencia had embargoed the estates. Camacho
at first sided with the friars and denied the jurisdiction of the lay court; but
he himself found the orders in rebellion against him when he undertook to visit
and inspect the parishes, and he thereupon made common cause with the Audi-
encia. For some of the data of this resounding controversy, which dragged
along through years, to end with the friars remaining where they were, see T. H.
Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipina (Washington, 1903), pp. 77-78, under the
heading "Camacho "; also Montero y Vidal, op. cit.y vol. i, chap. xxxi.

* To untangle the various conflicting accounts of the capture and occupation of
Manila by the English, especially those of religious writers, will be the work of
the future historian of the Philippines. Some data regarding the " siege " of twelve
days and the entrance of the English through a breach in the walls may be ob-
tained from a monograph on the " Walls of Manila and its Capture by the Eng-
lish," prepared by Major J. C. Bush and Captain A. C. Macomb for Major-General
A. W. Davis (Reports of War Departmentt 1903^ vol. ni, appendix ix). For a re-
view of many important documents bearing on this period (as also upon Anda's
career), see Sinibaldo de Mas, Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinos en 18^
(Madrid, 1843), vol. i, first section, pp. 122-201.

' This was one reason assigned for their expulsion in 1768, though that followed
the general order of 1767 for their expulsion from all Spanish dominions, one phase
of the campaign at that time conducted against them in Catholic Europe. Any of
the collections of Spanish legislation which contains the decrees of Charles III and
Charles IV may be consulted for the numerous provisions designed to carry this
order into effect, as well as also to restrict to a considerable extent the activities and
the very extensive powers that had been secured by monastic organizations in gen-
eral. All the provisions regarding the Jesuits were published in a work of five parts
at Madrid in 1769-90 entitled CoUcdSn general de las providencias . . . sobre el

20 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

in the city furnished Anda with financial assistance, and the
friars outside aided him in other ways, but there was much
division of loyalty among them, since he had proclaimed him-
self the representative of Spanish authority in the islands and
was denounced as a usurper by the archbishop. The antipathy
engendered by this and other causes was cherished by Anda
when later he became governor-general, and he aroused bitter
opposition from the Augustinians and Dominicans, especially
by his support of the efforts of Archbishop Santa Justa y
Rufina to visit and inspect the friars* parishes and to install
secular priests.^

Santa Justa y Rufina was one of the comparatively few secu-
lar clergymen who have served as Archbishop of Manila. One
of the foremost assistants of Charles III in enforcing the ex-
pulsion of the Jesuits from Spain, he was sent to the Philip-
pines for the purpose of checking the regulars in their usurpa-
tion of absolute ecclesiastical control. Not unnaturally, when
Anda followed him out there as governor-general, the two lent
each other mutual support. The opening of the seminary for
native priests has already been remarked. Anda also urged on
the home Government the secularization of all educational in-

extranamiento de los regulares de la Compania, etc. A recent contribution to history
covering this same ground is: F. Rousseau, Expulsion des Jesuitesen Espagne. De-
marches de Charles III pour lew Secularisation {Revue des Questions HistoriqueSf
January, 1904).

1 The falsehoods that have been printed and reprinted about the episodes of
Anda's career in the Philippines are almost inextricably interwoven with the truth
about those times. Anda himself was far from being meek and without spite. The
fairest account from the friar standpoint, also nearly contemporary, is that of
Father Joaqufn Martinez de Ziiniga, an Augustinian, who wrote his Esiadismo de
las Mas Filipinos (published by Retana, Madrid, 1893) from 1803 to 1806. Anda's
own statement of his ideas about the friars is one of the most interesting docu-
ments of all Philippine history, yet one will search for it in vain in the histories
which pretend to be complete. It is contained in a memorial to Charles III written
in 1768, while he was in Madrid, before*, his appointment as governor-general. It
details " thirty-seven abuses or disorders that have grown up in the Philippine
Islands under the cloak of religion and at the expense of the royal treasury."
This memorial was published with notes by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera at Manila
in 1899. See also a translation into English in Blair and Robertson's The Phil-
ippine IslandSf 1493-1898.

THE SPANISH REGIME 21

stitutions, beginning with the Dominican university and second-
ary school. The archbishop promulgated a schedule of fees to
be charged for baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc.^ The storm
raged principally, however, about his efforts to enforce episco-
pal visitation and inspection of the parishes in his diocese. Anda
at times used troops to aid him, and the Augustinians had been
forcibly removed from Pampanga and their provincial deported
to Spain before the orders yielded, the Dominicans leading the
way. The contest was too violent and acrimonious not to be
attended by extreme and reckless measures on both sides. In
his haste to secularize the clergy and his zeal for the advance-
ment of the natives, the archbishop caused Filipino priests, too
often fitted neither by general education nor by ecclesiastical
training, to be hurriedly ordained and put in the places of
many of the friars. Quite naturally, most, though not all, failed
to come up to the mark ; and the archbishop later was compelled
sadly and reluctantly to admit that he had made a mistake. He
and Anda were both ahead of their times in liberal measures.
Without discussing the merits and demerits of the Filipino
priesthood, it is certain that this overhasty attempt to install it
resulted in a reaction which enabled the friars to strengthen
themselves in control of the parishes for years to come.^

Not less vigorous, but less pugnacious, than Anda, Gov-
ernor-General Basco y Vargas strove to rouse the country from

* That this was afterwards generally disregarded, formed one of the complaints
of the revolutionists of 1896. That there were already abuses in this respect in 1591
ii set forth in a statement by the Jesuits on the question of the tributes, trans-
lated in volume vn of Blair and Robertson's The Philippine hlandSf lJ^S-1898f
p. 317.

* Quite full bibliographical data on the busy times of Archbishop Santa Justa y
Rufina are given under his name in Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipina, pp. 383-
88. In ibid., pp. 110, 140, and 208, are listed documents on these questions repub-
lished in 1863 aud brought down to date in the anti-friar campaign beginning in
that year. See also Mas*s Informey vol. ii, ^ction on Estado ecUsidstico and Re-
tana's Archivo del bibliSfilo Jilipino, vol. I, Papeles interesantes para los regulares, etc.,
for a r^um^ of the official measures regarding secularization in the eighteenth
century, and an indication of how Santa Justa's efforts were nullified between
178.5 and 1825. Anda himself became less zealoui for secularization, as some of
the archbishop's failures became apparent.

22 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

its lethargy and state of industrial unprogressiveness. He in
large part deserves the credit for the foundation in 1781 of
the "Economic Society of Friends of the Country," composed
of Government of&cials, merchants, and owners of estates.
The society had a spasmodic existence until 1890 (most of
the time slumbering in quietude), and a catalogue of the
things it tried to do is enlightening. It sought to promote the
cultivation of cotton (not so widely grown then as at the time
of the conquest, owing to the greater importation of Chinese
fabrics, and to-day virtually confined to two or three pro-
vinces), of the cinnamon tree (native of Mindanau, found there
by Magellan, but never developed), of pepper and silkworms ;
and to improve dyestuffs and methods of dyeing; it published
the first periodical of commerce ; it became patron of the first
course of agriculture in the friar schools of Manila in 1821,
and established a school of design ; studied unsuccessfully to
destroy the ravaging locusts; labored for the removal of the
export duties on rice; preached improvement of the breed of
horses, etc. In the main, however, not only did such an organ-
ization have to struggle with the lethargy or active opposition
of Government officials and of the propertied classes, pure
Spanish, half-caste or native, who might have been expected
to cooperate vigorously, but also, and more important, it could
make little headway against the retroactive economic policy
which prevailed in the mother-country during most of the time
when these distant possessions were not left in careless aban-
donment. The informing spirit of this policy is revealed in the
following argument before the Council of State of Spain in
1607: —

The preservation of the Indies consists in this, that, through their
need of articles which are not produced there, they may always de-
pend upon this country ; and it would be the means of losing them
if their wants could be supplied elsewhere.

The restrictive measures by which Philippine trade was
hedged about during the early part of the eighteenth century

THE SPANISH REGIME 23

were nothing new; the controversy waged then between the
conflicting interests was simply noisier than it had ever been
before, because of the greater power of the silk manufacturers
and some of the trading societies of Spain, and because of the
extraordinary riches being reaped for the time from the trade
through Manila, " the Pearl of the Orient/' this trade and the
commercial importance of Manila being then at its height. To
save the trade of the Americas in the main for the manufac-
tures of Spain; to prevent too great an outflow of the silver
of Mexico and South America to the Orient, where it was
then, as it still is, in great measure mysteriously swallowed
up; and to limit the trade of Manila to an amount the imposts
on which would merely yield the cost of maintaining the
Spanish establishment in the archipelago, without bringing too
much of the cheaper goods of the Orient into competition with
those of Spain, seem to have been the main motives of Spain's
economic poHcy. But it is difficult at times to recognize any
policy at all in the measures adopted, and the hand of pater-
nalism was laid so heavily over every circumstance bearing
either directly or indirectly upon commerce that private enter-
prise was throttled on one side while monopoly and privilege
were fostered on the other, and the trammels devised were
sometimes futile of anything but the accomplishment of evil.^

1 Both documentary and printed material on the economic measures of Spain
abound in the Spanish language, coming down to the closing hours of that nation's
colonial rule. Judging by the published volumes and the prospectus, the Blair and
Robertson historical series already cited will contain a quite complete array of
material regarding trade monopolies, tariff restrictions, shipping regnLations, etc.
See also the bibliography of the Library of Congfress entitled Books on the Philip-
pine Islands (Washington, 1903). For the controversy of the early eighteenth
century over Philippine trade, see the T^Bum6 with some bibliographical data,
also the description of the galleons and their voyages, in Montero y Vidal, op. cit.f
Tol. I, chap. XXXVIII (erroneously numbered xxviii in the text of the volume).
A review of the Spanish colonial system is contained in the chapter under that
bead in Wilhelm Roscher's Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Austvanderung (3d ed.,
Leipzig, 1885), an English translation of which has been issued in pamphlet form
by Edward G. Bourne, under the title The Spanish Colonial System (New York,
1904). It is especially valuable on economic measures, though very incomplete;
for the rest, the author hat relied too much upon musty authorities, and the chap-
ter nnells of the library more than of real Spanish colouial life. It is scarcely

U THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Maintaining a Government monopoly of shipping and means
of communication with the Philippine Islands during the first
two centuries when that trade was most remunerative (in-
deed, retaining a virtual monopoly of shipping until the second
decade of the nineteenth century), Spain did not then turn to
free and unrestricted shipping as the remedy for her waning
commerce and for a remaking of her colonial trade along the
new lines which private competition in shipping over the world
in general had laid down ; instead, she sought for some years
to bolster up a private shipping monopoly under her authority,
an enterprise which, born toward the close of the eighteenth
century, dragged its name and its threat of stifling private
enterprise (under a many-headed charter of privilege) well
into the nineteenth century. The Government had more or
less effectually monopolized various articles of commerce from
the earliest years ; and, though the tobacco monopoly was not
formed until 1781, when comprehensive measures for raising
revenue had to be undertaken, it survived until 1884. Those
who find a praiseworthy institution in the former culture sys-
tem of Java may make out a fair case for the old " company
systems " as stimulating in early times the agricultural devel-
opment of tropical Eastern countries ; certain it is that the
rich valley of the Kagayan in northern Luzon lies to-day a
one-crop and wretchedly undeveloped area, while the mass of
the people in it are perhaps the nearest to ignorant serfdom
of all the Christian populations of the archipelago.^

Yet it should be said that the shipping monopoly of the
" Company of the Philippines," which virtually came to naught,
the tobacco monopoly and the other measures of Charles III

necessary to remark that Spain was not, especially in the earlier periods, the sole
offender among the colonial powers in the matter of trade restrictions.

1 A good deal of careless information has been given out with regard to the
working of the cultare system in Java, much of it originating with those interested
in the continuance of the system. A new book, which all but demolishes these ar-
guments, is Professor Clive Day's The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in
Java (London, 1904).

■

THE SPANISH REGIME 25

coincided with the formation of the economic society above
described, and were intended, all together, to stimulate the
development of the archipelago. But it remained for the first
Cortes (1811) to abolish the voyages of the time-honored gal-
leons between Manila and Acapulco, and to pave the way for
private, though afterward subsidized, shipping. Thus the Phil-
ippines were released from dependency as a province upon the
viceroyalty of Mexico (at the moment engaged in the struggle
for her independence). Direct communication with Spain by
the passage of saihng vessels around the Cape of Good Hope,
begun in the preceding century, was continued until the cut-
ting of the Suez Canal almost coincided with the opening of
a new era for the Philippines.

Spain had herself been engaged from the very opening of
the nineteenth century in domestic and foreign wars, in every
step of which there was involved, in one way or another, the
contest between liberalism and reaction. It is not strange that
the various phases of the contest — now Spanish nationality
against the Napoleonic invasion, now the new-found constitu-
tionalism against the old-fashioned absolutism, again Spanish
liberalism against the outside dictation of the Holy Alliance,
or constitutional monarchy against Carlist-clerical attempts to
restore the old regime — should awaken from time to time
some echo in the Philippine Islands. The strange thing is that
those islands, governed in rapid succession by men first of one
Spanish faction and then of another, and which had been much
less closely in touch with Spain than with Spanish- America —
now in the throes of the contest going on in the home coun-
try, a contest which on American soil soon became a struggle
for complete independence — should have remained so quiet.
There were some few uprisings in the Philippines, which might
be called mere mutinies, not popular rebellions; there were
bitter partisan contests, but mostly over office and the use of
the powers of office. In the main, the significant thing is that,

26 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

practically throughout the first half of the nineteenth century,
the Philippines were, if not oblivious to what was going on
elsewhere under the Spanish flag, at least surprisingly little
disturbed or moved by it. They were on the other side of the
world from Spain, and were reached only by slow-going sail-
ing vessels, while the quarrel over the trading monopoly of
the "Company of the Philippines " was still under way, and the
result of the contradictory provisions made about it by the
rival governments in Spain was that neither did the company
itself take steps to make good its privileges nor did other Span-
ish shippers come forward to stimulate it by competition. The
old trade in silks, etc., from China, artificially diverted through
the Philippines and hemmed about by restrictions, had dwin-
dled considerably before connection with Mexico was severed.
The Government tobacco monopoly was developing very slowly
a new trade with the home country, though probably it would
have developed more rapidly if left to follow its natural course.
Neither abaca nor sugar had become as yet articles of foreign
commerce worthy of mention, nor were to do so until Spain
should let down the bars whereby she kept outside of her pos-
sessions foreigners who wished to come to develop their re-
sources or to engage in commerce in them. Virtually, the
islands had no foreign trade, except as Manila still served
as a depot for the exchange of Chinese and Indian goods for
silver, at the beginning of the nineteenth century.^ There were
during the first half of this century only from 2000 to 5000
Spaniards in the islands, and scarcely any other Europeans at
all. The mestizo population was to some extent identified with
the European element in aims and interests. The great mass
of the people, however, slumbered in what the friars of to-day
assert was an Arcadia, " nurtured and protected by fatherly
religious mentors and paternal laws, undisturbed by dreams

^ According to Sinibaldo de Mas (op. cit., vol. n, section on Comercio exterior,
p. 2) : " During the years 1780 and immediately following, the exportation of
sugar, the only article of exportation of any importance at that time, did not ex-
ceed 30,000 piculs [about 2000 tons]."

■

THE SPANISH REGIME 27

of imaginary rights, unvexed by the duties imposed upon them
later by laws they did not understand, leading simple and con-
tented lives and ready to get out of the road respectfully when-
ever they met a white face."

To be sure, the Philippines were represented in the Cortes
of 1810-14 and again in those of 1820-23, and were at first
expected to send representatives to the Cortes when it reas-
sembled in 1836. This representation, however, was more nom-
inal than real, and was brought about not by any demand from
the islands, but by the sentimental attempt of the always vision-
ary Spanish liberals to realize a great " representative empire,"
wherein all the lands under the Spanish flag should gather for
a proportionate share in the work of constitutional reconstruc-
tion. In order to realize this dream, which, as events proved,
was altogether impracticable as applied to the Spanish- Ameri-
can countries, and which was necessarily still more impractica-
ble as regards the more distant and much less advanced
Philippines, they appointed " substitute deputies " at the open-
ing of these Cortes for the distant provinces which had not
been able to elect. In 1811, however, a Spaniard arrived from
Manila as that city's elected representative in the Cortes. He
himself it was who, in 1812, when it was proposed to extend
the provisions of the constitution in their full force to the
Philippine Islands, pointed out to his fellow-deputies that the
people of those islands were not prepared to enjoy the full
privileges nor to assume the duties of citizens under such a
constitution, being in the vast majority uneducated and dis-
tant six thousand leagues by sea from the home country. He
reminded them that, at the ratio of one deputy to every 70,000
inhabitants, the Philippine Islands would have to elect over
twenty-five representatives to the Cortes, and that expense alone
forbade this.* Besides discussing this question, the first Cortes
gave very little attention to the Philippine Islands. When

' See Diario de las Cortes (official edition, royal press, Cadiz, 1812), vol. xiii,
pp. 264-67.

«8 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

they reassembled in 1820, two " substitute deputies " were re-
ligiously named in Spain to represent the Philippines, and
later four representatives were duly elected in Manila; but
again the subject of their credentials was about all that was
ever discussed. In 1836, the question of elections to the Cortes
to be held in the Philippines was again threshed over, but in
the following year it seems to have dawned upon these amateur
legislators that the assimilation of this archipelago of the Ex-
treme East to a not yet well-established constitutional legisla-
tive regime was not practicable, and the right of representation
was withdrawn from the Philippines and the Spanish Antilles,
and it was decided that they should be ruled by special laws.^
From the very first, reform movements in Spain have gone so
by action and reaction that there has rarely been any states-
manlike adjustment of liberal measures to the actual conditions
to be met in the Philippines. Instead of making a place in the
new national legislature for one to four delegates from the
Philippines who might on occasion speak for the interests of
the islands and represent them before committees, the early
Spanish Liberals botched the whole matter of administering
colonies under their sort of a constitutional government by
attempting to make the Cortes a real " imperial legislature " ;
and, failing in that, as they were bound to do under the con-
ditions, they abandoned in disgust the attempt to introduce
a liberal colonial regime, even abdicating to the executive di
partment of the colonies which was later introduced into the
government that measure of control over the laws for the foreign
possessions of Spain which they should have retained for them-
selves. So we find, even to the close of Spanish rule, despite
the reassumption by the Cortes of considerable power after the
revolution of 1868, that laws for the Philippines were promul-
gated by the Minister for the Colonies in the form of royal
decrees.

The FiHpinos themselves seem to have given their Spanish

1 See Montero y Vidal, op. cii., vol. n, pp. 563-69.

THE SPANISH REGIME 29

rulers less trouble during the first part of the nineteenth century
than during any preceding period since the conquest. As already
noted, conquest itself was accomplished almost with ridiculous
ease. There was, however, hardly a decade for over two cen-
turies during which the conqueror's authority was not more
or less vigorously disputed in some small or large area of the
archipelago — speaking now of the Christianized population,
and not of the Moros and hill-pagans. If conquest was easier
in the early days, collection of tribute sometimes became dif-
ficult, owing primarily, there is plenty of evidence to show, to
the abuses of the Spanish encomenderos. In the seventeenth
century, we find that quite frequently the friars, too, are in-
cluded in the list of those proscribed by the native rebels,
because they were most actively identified with the use of
forced labor for building ships and equipping their crews for
expeditions against the Moro pirates, as well as for putting
up churches and parish-houses. One such revolt, which began
in S^mar in 1649 with the murder of a Jesuit who was not
such a shepherd as he should have been,^ spread over the cen-
tral islands and to Luzon and Mindanau. There was a similar
rising against a Jesuit in Bohol in 1750,^^ and that island was
for some years thereafter abandoned ground for the mission-
aries. The nearly coincident uprisings near Manila have already
been remarked as agrarian in character, and it is to be said
that all the revolts of the Tagalog provinces have been pri-
marily of that sort. Spanish authority was so shattered after
the withdrawal of the English in 1763 that Pangasinan, the
Dokan provinces, and the people of the Kagayan Valley gave
more or less constant trouble for the rest of the eighteenth
century and into the nineteenth century. In the latter revolts,
it was plain that the Ilokans were fighting against the arbi-
trary restrictions of the Government tobacco monopoly, requir-
ing each family to plant so much, consume only so much, and

1 See F. Jajfor, Reiten in den Pkiltppinen (Berlin, 1873), p. 188.
* Montero y Vidal, op. cit., toI. i, p. 478.

so THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

sell at official prices, the betel-nut and other plants being also
for a time included in the Government control. It is claimed
that nearly three hundred thousand natives were killed during
these successive risings in the Ilokan provinces.

In the main, however, the disturbances of the first half of
the nineteenth century are not to be traced, as were those
which preceded them, to dissatisfaction among the Filipino
masses. There was considerable excitement worked up around
Manila relative to the taking oath to the Constitution of 1812,
which, it was reported, was to exempt the masses from the
payment of tribute ; and there was a corresponding disturb-
ance when, shortly afterward, it was revoked, but nothing
noteworthy occurred. In 1820, the foreigners, including the
Chinese, in Manila were mobbed and some killed by the lower
classes of the city, it being rumored about that the epidemic
of cholera then raging had been caused by the foreigners poi-
soning the water.^ In 1823, when constitutional government
was revoked by Ferdinand VII, a rather formidable conspiracy
among the troops in Manila developed into mutiny on the part
of some eight hundred of them, led by Captain Novales and
other Spanish- Americans, who were in sympathy with " the
Reform." So again, a decade and a half later, the Spanish
Liberals in Manila, claiming to believe that Governor Salazar
was in league with the Carlists at home and would not pro-
claim the Constitution of 1837, threatened an uprising, which
was headed off by the governor's conciliatory attitude, and
which seems to have been more a scheming for office than

^ Much confasion reigns in the accounts of this affair. Some of the historians
charge Governor-General Folgueras with lack of energy in putting down the mob
before it became dangerous, sacking all the business section of Binondo as it did.
The governor-general himself, in a proclamation to the people, virtually accuses the
friar priests of having not merely consented to the story that the foreigners were
poisoning the water, but also of having spread it among their ignorant parishioners.
The entire document is reproduced in Pardo de Tavera's Bihlioteca Filipina, pp.
45^7. M. Th. Aube, an officer of the French marines, writing about Manila in
the Revue des Deux Mondes for May 1, 1848, declares that this was one way which
the friars took to get rid of the foreigners then beginning to come to the islands.
Montero y Vidal (op. cit.f vol. m, pp. 96-97) indignantly denies this as a calumny.

THE SPANISH REGIME 81

anything else. Plainly, such movements as these did not touch
the masses, and cannot be said to have significance from the
Filipino point of view. The great bulk of the population must
be somewhat shaken out of its shell of indifference, and the
provinces must begin to acquire some interests in common,
before either the Liberal campaign then going on in Spain
could affect the sympathies of more than a few mestizos, or
the various tribes could unite in anything more than a merely
local outburst of banditry or outlawry in protest against the
abuses of their rulers. Such fanatic religious movements as
that which upset the entire province of Tayabas and part of
Batangas in 1841, when hordes of people took up bolos and
followed a self-proclaimed "God," have been and still are
common occurrences, on a smaller scale, in the Philippines,
and are mainly significant as showing the ignorant condition
of the masses.

Two facts of general application have been made more or
less clear by the foregoing outline of events and conditions up
to about 1860, facts which have also a direct bearing upon the
more strenuous period succeeding 1860. First, it seems fairly
evident that Liberalism in Spain had as yet neither the power
as a movement nor the ability within its ranks to reconstruct
on new and progressive lines this old monarchy's colonial sys-
tem. Neither before nor since then, indeed, has it been able
to establish effectually in the mother country itself modern
ideas in government, in education, in land-tenure, or in political
and religious tolerance in their full scope. Second, had it been
possible to keep the archipelago forever as commercially in-
comunicado as it was up to forty years ago, the religious and
political disturbances of Spain would not have disrupted the
peace of the Philippines, so soon seriously to be threatened by
a real clamor for modern ideas and modern institutions. The
friars and their defenders of to-day who lament the old regime
as really the happier should bring the indictment for breaking
up their Arcadia not so much against the Liberals of Spain

82 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

as against all the forces which modern commerce and modern
science represent, which brought to the islands in so rapid
sequence foreigners keen for the development of their idle
resources, a direct pathway to Europe by the Suez Canal, mod-
ern steamships, ocean cables, the telegraph, and all the things
that in a short span of years were to alter in no inconsiderable
degree the life of the people in quite a number of provinces.
Feodor Jagor, the keen-eyed German who traveled through
the islands just before 1860, found much to praise in the old
paternal regime of the friars, and added : —

The old situation is no longer possible of maintenance, with the
social change which the times have brought. The colony cannot longer
be excluded from the general concert of peoples. Every facility in
communications opens a breach in the ancient system and establishes
a motive for reforms of a liberal character. The more that foreign
brains penetrate there, the more they increase prosperity, education
and self-esteem, making the existing evils the more intolerable.^

^ F. Jagor, op. cit., p. 287. Of the French, English, and German travelers,
scientists, business men, and soldiers, who have given us an insight into the condi-
tions in the islands from 1775 to 1860, Jagor, the last of the list, was the keenest
observer and has left the most valuable book. He it was who clearly foresaw the
inevitable loss of the Philippines to Spain, and, with prophetic insight into the
expansion of the Pacific commerce of the United States, predicted almost in so
many words the occupation of the Philippines by the United States. He closed his
book with these paragraphs : —

" The influence of North America in the Spanish provinces beyond the seas will
make itself felt, and especially in the Philippines, as the commerce of its western
coast develops. The Americans seem to have the mission of reviving the germ of
the Spanish seed. As conquerors of the modern age, as representatives of posi-
tivism in opposition to the romanticism of cavalierly enterprises, they follow their
way with the axe and the plow of the colonist, just as the Spaniards went bearing
the cross and flashing the sword.

" A great part of Spanish America already belongs to the United States, and
has already attained since the change an importance it had not even suspected it
possessed while under the rule of Spain, and less still in the anarchic period that
followed its emancipation.

" The Spanish system, in the long rim, cannot prevail against the American.
While the former exploits the colonies directly in benefit of privileged classes, the
latter draws from the metropolis its best forces to sustain them. In spite of its
population being so scanty, America attracts the most advantageous elements of
all the countries, which, there set free from embarrassing subjections and handicaps,
progress with unceasing activity, extending continually their power and their influ-
ence. The Philippmes will not be able to evade the influence of the two great

THE SPANISH REGIME 83

D. AWAKENING TO MODERN LIFE, ECONOMIO AND POLITICAL

There had been an English house established in Manila in
1809 by special permission. This privilege was extended to all
foreigners at the time of the general European peace in 1814,
and most of the foreigners killed in the cholera riots of 1820
were Frenchmen ; but these were only trading representatives
whose activities were confined to the capital and who were
looked upon with no little displeasure by the Spaniards them-
selves. We find an earlier edict of the insular Government
repeated in 1828 and again in 1840, forbidding foreigners, in
much the same way as the Chinese were specifically "regulated,"
to sell at retail or to enter the provinces to carry on business
of any kind. ^ In 1842 there were in Manila thirty-nine Spanish
shipping and commercial houses, and about a dozen foreign
houses, of which seven or eight were English, two were Ameri-
can, one was French, and another Danish, while consuls of
France, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium re-
sided there.^ Jagor gives credit to these two American houses

neighboring powers, so mnch the less since neither in the islands themselves nor
in their metropolis is there a situation of stability and equilibrium.

** It is to be hoped, for the sake of the natives, that the preceding hypotheses
be not speedily converted into facts, for their present education has not prepared
them sufiBciently to sustain the strife with those peoples [the British and American],
tireless creators and little given to humanitarian considerations."

Compare with this remarkable prediction of 1873 a somewhat similar warning
that Spain would not be able to retain the Philippines, made by Sinibaldo de Mas,
Minister of Spain to China, in 1843, in a third part of his In/orme sobre el estado
de las IsUu Filipinos en 184^, this part being privately published and seen only by a
few friends, only a few copies of it being now in existence. In this secret expression
of opinion, Mas advised the creation of a legislative assembly in the Philippines at
M early a date in the future as the status of the inhabitants would permit, this and
Oliier concessions of a character tending toward self-government being made with
a Tiew to granting to the Filipinos, eventually, their independence ; otherwise,
thought Mas, they are sure to grow out of the ancient moulds in which they have
been kept, and Spain will make herself their enemy, instead of a perpetual friend,
if the endeavors to check this development. See the reproduction of a portion of
thie secret memorial in the final number of La PolUica de Espafla en Filipintu
(Madrid, fortnightly), vol. vin, no. 187 (December, 1898).

* Montero y Vidal, op. cU., vol. m, p. 31.

* This statement is made on the authority of the Diccionario geogrdfico, estadis-
tico, kistSrico de las Islat FUipincu, of Manuel fiuzeta and Felipe Bravo (Madrid,

34 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

for the development of the ahaka into an important article of
export, in spite of the fact that the natives were using the fiber
for the weaving of their common cloths when the Spaniards
came. These American houses in the first years sunk large
sums of money in advance loans, and were only able to get the
business on a paying basis when, in 1863, they were permitted
to establish warehouses and presses in the provinces at the prin-
cipal points where the crop was produced, and to deal directly
with the producers. The situation that had in general previ-
ously prevailed is thus described by Jagor : —

All former attempts were foiled by the opposition of the Spaniards
of the Peninsula and of the Philippines, because the latter consider
the inter-island commerce and shipping as belonging exclusively to
them. They are very envious of the interference of the foreigners,
" who enrich themselves at their cost." If it were left to these fel-
lows, they would compel all foreigners to leave the country and only
keep the Chinese as coolies.^

It was this sort of jealous opposition which caused seven
new ports opened in 1830 to be closed a year afterward, so
that the two Bisayan ports, Iloilo and Sebii, now date respec-
tively from 1855 to 1863.^ Even after these latter years the

1850-51), a book useful for reference for a period about which data are not easy
to find, though its priestly compilers borrowed most recklessly from the works of
others, especially of foreigners, and g^ve no credit.

1 Jagor, op. cit.f pp. 251-52.

2 The port of Manila had for the first time been opened to foreign vessels in
1789 (though Europeans had conducted some clandestine traffic there, under
cover of the permission to Chinese and Moros to enter and trade), but they
were long held under hampering restrictions. In 1841, despite paying as a rule
double port and customs dues, ships under other flags than the Spanish were doing
four fifths of the external carrying-trade of the Philippines, among them being
many " tramp vessels " from the United States plying between China and the
Philippines. See S. de Mas, op. cit.^ section on Comercio exterior^ especially pp. 3-^
et seq.f for tables showing exports and imports, entries and clearances, 1835-41, as
compared with 1810 and 1816. Mas gives great credit to the foreign business men
and ships for the rapid increase in trade during this period, and argues for the
removal of the restrictions upon them. His tables show how the prophecies of
those interested in the old galleon-route between Acapulco and Manila, that the
abolition of this business would ruin the Philippines, had been belied. Mas says
the exportation of products of the Philippines had increased by seven times be-
tween 1816, the date of the return of the last galleon from Acapulco, and 1842.

■

THE SPANISH REGIME 85

Spaniards would rather have seen them closed than invaded
by the English and other merchants, whose operations speedily
developed sugar into an article of export worth considering.^
When the foreigners could acquire land in the country, they
settled themselves still more solidly. Around their shipping
operations, with steamers of Hght and medium draft, around
their hemp- and sugar-buying operations in southern Luzon
and the central islands, around their sugar- an drice-miUs, and
later still the small line of railroad to Dagupan, there gradu-
ally began to be developed a class of more independent and
capable natives, something approaching, indeed, a Filipino
middle class. This was much more noticeable in Manila and
its environs, the center of the new commerce, both because it
was the commercial center and because it had been socially
the most advanced part of the archipelago when the Spaniards
came and had naturally not lost that preeminence afterward.

But if, anticipating the events of the last part of the nine-
teenth century, we interpret the partial awakening to self-
consciousness of the Filipino people as being the result pri-
marily of the entrance of foreign commerce, we must still not
overlook the fact that there was progress made by Spain in
her dealings with the colony. In 1863 the Minister for the
Colonies (Ultramar) first took his seat in the Cabinet, after the

His figures for 1810 show a total of entrances and clearances from Manila of
11,025,000 pesos, of which 5,400,000 were silver, gold, and other metals and cur-
rency trans-shipped between America and China and India through Manila, and
nearly 4,000,000 were goods of China and India trans-shipped through Manila to
America and thence Europe. Of all the foreign goods entered in 1810, the Philip-
ptuM had taken only 900,000 pesos for their own consumption, and in return had
■old less than 500,000 pesos in sugar, tobacco, and other products. Says Mas:
*'The gains from that trafBc, for which Manila was only a port of exchange,
were divided between the merchants who had the monopoly of the galleon, but
the colony in general received but small advantages from it." By comparison with
1810, he shows that in 1839 the Philippines exported 2,675,000 pesos of their own
products and imported 2,150,000 pesos of foreign goods (apparently exclusive of
etinency).

^ Jagor says (p. 242) that in 1857 there was not a single iron sugar-mill in the
ialaods, and that the archaic wooden afTairs lost 30 per cent and upward of the
juice in the cane, as in many places in the Philippines the cmde sugar-mills in use
itiUdo.

86 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

semi-constitutional government of those times had blundered
about for over ten years with various cumbersome substitutes
for the old Council of the Indies, which had dealt with the
affairs of the colonies in previous centuries.^ Projects of colo-
nial reform, with majority and minority reports, multiplied until
they became confusion worse confounded in the years which
followed, particularly as no government either in Madrid or in
Manila was ever stable or lasting enough really to give any
one of them a fair trial. Nevertheless, in the years from 1863
to 1896, there was some net progress. That progress we can
here trace only in outline.

The Peninsula itself was in the throes of educational re-
form (a reform to-day woefully incomplete there), and it was
proposed to apply the system of primary education there
adopted to the Philippine communities. A decree of 1863 pro-
vided for the same course of study as in Spain, and for secular
school-teachers drawn from a competitive list, which was in
time to be supplied by normal schools for both sexes. These
normal schools were put under the Jesuits.'^ The new system
was, however, left under the supervision of the friars: the
curate of each town was to be local inspector, and to have
full direction of the instruction in religion, which in practice
commonly resulted in reducing the school boards, then first
created, to nonentities ; the superior friar official of each prov-
ince was to be on the provincial board ; and the rector of St.
Thomas University was, except during brief intervals, a sort
of superintendent of public instruction for the islands, though

^ For a summary of the different methods of administering the colonies under
" constitutional government " and the transitional governments in Spain from
1814 to 1863, see La PolUica de Espana en Filipinos^ vol. vi (for the year 1896),
p. 133.

* The Jesuits had returned to the Philippines in 1859, and thereafter devoted
themselves to education and to mission work among the Moros and pagan tribes.
They have been responsible for the introduction of more modem methods — no-
tably, scientific laboratories — and for much of the educational progress since 1863.
The Dominicans did not relish seeing the palm taken from them in a matter in
which they had so long held almost undisputed supremacy. The normal schools
later opened for women were managed by Sisters of Charity and Augustine nuns.

THE SPANISH REGIME 37

having no direct intervention in primary schools. Prior to
1863, primary education began and ended with daily lessons
in the catechism and other books of rehgious exercises, and
there was usually very little else in the middle. The teachers
were village natives, who could write and cipher to a limited
extent, but who commonly knew little or no Spanish. They
were paid whatever the friar curate, who supervised or per-
sonally conducted the work with the catechism, felt that he
could allow, and often eked out their living in the fields.^
After 1863, and up to the American conquest, the catechism
still remained the chief feature of daily work in the primary
school, often relegating all else to an insignificant place —
much depending on the preparation, at best a scanty one, of
the teacher. The badly printed and cheap 250-page pocket-
size textbook prescribed by the Government for the schools
(the same as used in Spain) was reader, writer, speller, arith-
metic, geography, history of Spain and the world (Spain over-
shadowing), Spanish grammar (often not taught, because the
teacher knew little or nothing of it, or the friar-priest ob-
jected), and handbook of religious and moral precepts (many
pages). A glance at this book will reveal how pitifully inade-
quate was the ordinary Filipino child's schooling at the best;
for often not even this textbook was in use, no copies being
available or the teacher using only the dialect. Even those of
the teachers who had been trained in the normal schools were
scarcely as thoroughly equipped in the elementary branches
as an American child at the sixth grade .^

* This was the system in general, as described by yarious contemporary wit-
iMMes; but conditions were better in some parishes, particularly in good-sized
towni. The schools were just as good or just as poor as the friar-curate made
them, since everything was left to him.

» The textbook referred to, El Monitor de los NifioSt devotes ten lines of its
geography section to the United States. On the cover-page of the Philippine edi-
tion there is what purports to be a r^um^ of Philippine history, which concludes
tlms : ** The education, richness, and culture of the Philippine population, espe-
dally of Luzon, increase in a notable manner, thanks to the assimilation it enjoys
in all branches of public administration with the laws and institutions ruling in
Sptin. The statistics of primary education need not envy those of the most ad-

38 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the '^ Maura law " of municipal reform in 1893 the newly
created "municipal councils" (which were not really repre-
sentative bodies) were in theory made also local school boards.
By creating these quasi-councils, this law was supposed to
confer upon the towns a hitherto unprecedented measure of
autonomy. Yet the padre was an ex-officio member whose vise
was required for almost everything ; and in promulgating the
law, Governor-General Blanco took pains to explain that his
school-inspecting powers were not lessened, at least as regards
religious instruction, which could easily be stretched to include
everything. Moreover, it was significant that he instructed the
municipal councils to employ " the most practical means for
the diffusion of the Spanish language." A decree of 1863 had
provided that, after fifteen years, the two principal town offices
should be held only by those who could speak, read, and write
Spanish, and that after thirty years no one not possessing
these qualifications should be exempted from forced labor on
public works, i.e., be one of the principalia. For the matter
of that, if one cared to trace the history of unfulfilled laws of
this sort, he might go back to 1550, when the first decree
commanding the teaching of Spanish to the Filipinos was
promulgated, and make a long list of them.^

vanced nations of Europe." Many children never g^t beyond the little paper
pamphlets containing the alphabet, a few simple syllables, the multiplication-
table, the " explanation of Christian doctrine," miracle-tales, etc. The miracles in
one of these {Silabario 6 Caton Cristiano para Uso de las Escuelas) are such as
the following : " St. Roman the Martyr, lacerating his flesh, said to the tyrant
Asclepiades: *If you do not believe what I say, ask the innocent child, who, as he
does not know how to talk, does not know how to lie.* It was a babe of a few
months, at its Christian mother's breast, in the midst of the crowd. Upon the in-
stant, taking its mouth from the breast, the tender infant turned its face to the
tyrant and in a clear voice said: 'Jesus Christ is the true God.' And being asked,
* Who has told you that ? * with a thousand graces the child replied : * To me my
mother told it, and to her God told it.' The Church which tells us this is our
mother, and to her God has told all that she teaches us."

^ See RecopilaciSn de Leyes de Indias for those of early years ; the one of 1550
is lihro VI, titulo i, ley xvm. Legislative collections covering the Philippines will
show many provisions on this subject for the years succeeding 1860, during which
the question was repeatedly brought to the front. Even under the reactionary
administrations, such provisions were adopted as that all books in the native dia-

THE SPANISH REGIME 89

The friars maintained quite complete control of secondary and
higher instruction till 1898.^ A reaction from the Liberal pro-
grammes of 1863 to 1870 was stimulated by the appearance of
a radical party in the Philippines and by an insurrectionary
movement in Cavite in 1872. The friar party declared these to
be the natural consequences of " reform," and before King Ama-
deo's short reign was over they had successfully called halt to
the onward party at home. The short-Hved republic scarcely
had its existence proclaimed in the Philippines, and the net
result of Minister Moret*s decree of 1870 for the seculariza-
tion of St. Joseph's College (which had come to be administered
by the Dominicans since the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768)
and of St. Thomas University was that in 1875 not only was
the decree formally revoked (never having really been put into
effect), but the Dominicans also emerged from the fight with

leot designed for general circulation should also include a Spanish version of their
contents. Friar writers take various positions on the subject. A common incon-
sistency in their attitude is that betrayed in Father Eladio Zamora's Las Corpo-
raciones Religiosas en las Islas Filipinos (Madrid, 1901), wherein the author first
asserts that the friars always did their best to spread the Spanish language among
the Filipinos, then sets out to demonstrate that such effort is both foolish and
certain of failure. Friar Migfuel Bustamante published in 1885 a fair-sized book
in Tagalog for the purpose of showing the Tagalogs that they ought not to learn
Spanish nor seek to adopt European civilization, that in ignorance lay the happi-
ness of the " Indian. *' The friars later withdrew this book from circulation and
disowned it. (See Pardo de Tavera's Bihlioteca Filipino, p. 74.) The Filipino peti-
tion against the friars in 1888 (Marcelo del Pilar's Soberania monacal, p. 69),
charging the friars with refusing to have Spanish generally taught in order to
retain their position of mental supremacy, says a pamphlet regarding the con-
fessional, published in Tagalog, changes the Spanish phraseology, " And you,
father, I beg to pray to God for me. Amen," into this language in its Tagalog
translation : " And you, father, since you are the substitute of God on earth, free
me from my sins and chastise me. Amen, Jesus."

^ Strictly speaking, of course, the Jesuits' schools could not be called those of
"the friars" ; however, they were, in the sense here implied under Church con-
trol. Moreover, the Rector of St. Thomas University had theoretical supervision
of the Jesuits' secondary school. Much has been said by certain Filipinos of pri-
vate schools for higher education. Some few of these were started in the more
advanced provinces after the extension of the Spanish civil code to the Philippines
in 1889 gave tacit authority for their organization ; but they led a precarious ex-
istence, in the face of the reactionary campaign for the withdrawal of the right to
organize such associations, and for other reaeoni exercised very little influence
open the educational situation prior to 1898.

40 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

more complete control of the valuable estate of St. Joseph's
College.^ They promised to devote the income of this endow-
ment to courses in medicine and pharmacy, never before taught
in the islands. This is the medical college in which bacteriology
has been introduced since American occupation and is taught
without microscopes, which has no library worth the name,
and uses textbooks long antiquated, which has a farcical
course in dissection, and few graduates of which have ever
attended a case of confinement or seen a laparotomy. In St.
Thomas University prior to 1863, besides canon law and a
fairly good course in civil law (with lay professors), there were
three courses in Latin grammar, three in philosophy, and six in
theology, taught in the scholastic manner with the textbooks
of Spain's friar convents. A Government committee of 1863
added to the curriculum these subjects, some of which were
never taught: mathematics, lineal drawing, chemistry, uni-
versal history, Spanish history, geography, Greek, Hebrew,
French, English, and bookkeeping. Shortly thereafter an
English chemist was hired to coach the new "professor of
chemistry," a friar unacquainted with his branch.'^ When the
Jesuits began to introduce something like laboratories into
their secondary school at Manila, governmental and popular
pressure forced modern science upon St. Thomas's. In 1863

^ This is the property now in litigation in the Philippine Supreme Court be-
tween the Philippine Government and the metropolitan see of the Philippines, the
latter claiming it as Church property, the former maintaining that its original
donor gave it to the Spanish Government, which merely permitted the Jesuits and
then the Dominicans to administer it in trust. For the arguments in the case and
the act of the Philippine Commission conferring special jurisdiction on the Philip-
pine Supreme Court to decide it, see Act No. 69 of said body, with the resolutions
of January 5, 1901, reciting the reason for said act and these pamphlets, printed
at Manila in 1900 : by Felipe G. Calderon, El Colegio de San Jose^ Alegato pre-
sentado d la Comisi6n^ etc., and Refutacidn de las pretenciones alegadas . . . par el
Sr. Delegado de S. S. y el Sr. Arzohispo de Manila ; also the " Statements " to the
Commission by Archbishop Nozaleda and Apostolic Delegate Chapelle.

2 So Pardo de Tavera (Biblioteca Filipina, p. 281), in listing some addresses of
Friar Miguel Narro, says he began teaching English in St. Thomas University
without knowing it, simply repeating to his pupils each day the lesson taught him
previously in his cell by a Portuguese.

f

THE SPANISH REGIME 41

its rector had offered to establish "a brief medical course,
suited to the limited intelligence of the natives."^ A short
time before a predecessor had said : " Medicine and the natural
sciences are materialistic and impious studies." A Fihpino
student of the sixties who proposed a thesis on economic rea-
soning was gravely warned that political economy was a " sci-
ence of the Devil." And again in 1901, the friar professor
who delivered the address opening St. Thomas's college year
paid his respects to modern science in general and to EngHsh
and German anthropology and biology in particular, wiping
Darwin, Haeckel, and other such men off the slate with quota-
tions from the Bible and the saints of the Church. That same
year, when young Filipinos began coming to the technical
schools of the United States, the rector of St. Thomas's an-
nounced a course of " engineering, taught by an English pro-
fessor"— without laboratory and without mechanical equip-
ment.

Technical education also got little beyond the decree stage in
the Philippines prior to American occupation. A nautical school,
for some years successfully opposed by the friars, it is claimed
because it involved the teaching of higher mathematics, and a
military school had come to play honorable roles. The trade
school opened in Manila with such a flourish of governmental
trumpets in the sixties soon found its way into the hands of
the Augustinians ; it had no great achievements to catalogue.
The same is true of the so-called "model farms" and the cen-
tral agricultural school, a pet idea of the spasmodically flour-
ishing Liberal ministries of Spain, which inspired some reams
of official reports. The trade school was in 1891 reopened as
a Government institution, and the following year the old
school of drawing, painting, and sculpture was revived.*

> See Montoro j Yidal, op. cU,, yol. ni, for ibis and other reference! to thii
period.

' For a review of educational institutions as they existed at the time of the
American occupation, see lUpt. Phil. Comm. 1900, vol. I. part in, also vol. u, ex-
hibit VL

t

CHAPTER II

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION

Municipal reorganization was more or less united with edu-
cational reform, as will have been seen by the references to
the governmental measures of 1893. In the interim, there had
been various minor reforms, especially in 1886, in the direc-
tion of making civil administration of provincial and munici-
pal affairs more complete; all the more important political
divisions of Luzon, except Cavite, to the number of nineteen,
bad been made civil provinces, though all the political divisions
of the central islands remained "politico-military," the su-
preme provincial official in each case being a Spanish army
officer.

In 1889, Minister Becerra had declared the municipal meas-
ure of which he was patron to be a step of preparation for the
Philippine towns in time to " exercise complete intervention in
local affairs"; it was, however, only a decree conferring upon
a few of the larger towns (viz., Sebii, Iloilo, Bigan, Albay,
Batangas, and Nueva Caceres) the right to organize an ayun-
tamiento like those of the municipahties of Spain, though the
Filipinos were not given the right to elect the members of this
municipal corporation. The other towns of the islands re-
mained under the gohernadorcillos and cahezas de harangay,
the former being a sort of honorary chief and figurehead for
the execution of the directions of the village priest and of the
Spanish officer of the local garrison of "carbineers" or "rural
guards," and being assisted by lieutenants and "judges" of
the planted fields, of police and of cattle. The heads of the
harangay 8 or harrios were charged chiefly with the collection
of the taxes in their immediate districts. All the offices were

i

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 43

compulsory, since the cahezas were pecuniarily responsible for
whatever part of their district's quota of taxes remained un-
collected, a feature which resulted not infrequently in the
mulcting of a well-to-do native and made the office unpopular
in many places. The elections were held under the direction
of the chief provincial officer and the local priest, who assem-
bled the principalia (men belonging to the caste which held
these local offices), selected from them six ex-gobernadorcillos
and six ex-cabezas de harangay by lot, these twelve being the
delegates who chose the officers for the ensuing year by ballot.
In practice, of course, the Spanish officials, especially the priest,
dictated the selections. ^

The Maura law of 1893 extended the principalia to include
also the principal taxpayers; renamed the local offices, and
made their duties and powers somewhat more clear and com-
prehensive ; provided for elections by ballot, though the prin-
cipalia were to choose twelve delegates and these delegates in
turn the five town officers; made a sort of municipal council
(called the Tribunal) of the five officers, with whom on most im-
portant questions the twelve delegates must also sit, while the
parish priest retained the right to intervene on all questions
and his vise was necessary in most matters of importance.
The heads of harangay were to be selected by the provin-
cial governor from a list proposed by the municipal coun-
cil, were given slightly wider powers, and also a larger share
of the taxes they collected as their personal perquisites. The
decree indulged in more or less vague provisions as to the new
municipal governments having greater control of local finances,
and, to the end that they might undertake improvements, gave
them the power to impose for the first time a tax on rural real
estate.

Governor-General Blanco does not seem to have deemed
the times ripe for the innovation, and the regulations he pro-

> For the description of an election in a village of Sdmar in 1859, see Jagor,
op, cU., p. 189.

44 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

mulgated in December, 1893, for putting the new law into ef-
fect virtually left these clauses a dead letter. For the matter
of that, the entire municipal reform of 1893, greeted by such
a blare of trumpets as it was at the time, remained very much
a dead letter. For lack of time, ostensibly at least, Blanco
nominated all the new officers who were to take seats January
1, 1894, and inaugurate the new law ; and long before the four
years came around when there should be quasi-elections under
the law, it had been set aside by Blanco himself, under the
exigencies of rebellion, while still more rigid provisions of
martial law than he invoked were in force under his successors.
Much the same fate befell the provincial boards which were,
by the Maura law, created to supervise the new municipal
governments and advise the provincial governor, they being
made up mainly of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical authorities
of the province, serving ex officio, and of four residents of the
capital, chosen for six years by the presidents of all the towns
in the province. Nor, when the troubles of 1896 came on, had
anything practical been realized from the provision of the
1893 law that divided Luzon and the Bisayas into three dis-
tricts each, the provincial boards of these districts to choose,
in turn of provinces, one citizen from each of these districts
to act as an adviser to the Council of Administration of the
central government at Manila. The Maura law remained, like
too many other reforms of Spain, mostly promise.^

Other notable administrative reforms were, in 1884, the re-

^ For a rdsum^ of the whole govemmental system of Spain in the Philippine
Islands, see Rept. Phil. Comm. 1900, vol. i, part iv. The reader is, however, in
danger of being misled if he does not understand that the organization as there
outlined was, in considerable degree, only a paper organization, showing the
governmental scheme as modified by recent laws, some of which had not at all, op
had but lately, taken effect. A more adequate idea of the old Spanish system of
internal administration is afforded by the appendix to volume xvii of The Philip-
pine Islands, lJf93-1898, in the translations from Mas's Informe of 1843 and Mou-
tero y Vidal's Archipielago flipino oi 1886. A comprehensive manual on the Maura
law reform, with the texts of the decrees, regulations made by Blanco, municipal
blank forms, etc., is Comentarios alReglamento Provisional de las Juntas Provinciales,
by Felix M. Roxas (ManUa, 1894).

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 45

duction from forty to fifteen of the number of days' labor on
public works that each native must contribute without pay,
and the suppression of the old "tribute," or head-tax (estabhshed
under Legaspi), as such, with the substitution for it of the
cedula personal, virtually a poll-tax, though ostensibly a fee
for a document of identification. The principalia and all
whites had always been exempted from forced labor {prestadSn
personal), but under the new law all became theoretically sub-
ject to it ; actually, all European residents paid for the cidula
of a class high enough to exempt them from labor, while na-
tives who paid for one of the lower grades of cedulas and
wished to commute their labor-tax in money could do so at a
certain rate. The mass of the people paid from one to three
dollars Mexican for a cedula, including both men and women
between twenty-five and sixty, where only the men had formerly
paid the tribute of one peso to one peso and a half. The re-
duction in the number of days of forced labor was a great re-
lief to the masses, but the system itself had been subject to
abuse from the days of the conquest and remained so to the
end. It was one of the ways in which the slavery of the masses
to their *' caciques," existent as a system upon the arrival of
the Spaniards, has continued to this day. Instead of taxing
the propertied classes for public improvements, and paying the
workmen their daily wage, the Spanish system was to put the
burden on the poor. And even then, except for the churches
and convents, the improvements that were needed, especially
roads, remained in most provinces unmade ; the Spanish officials
or native "caciques" hired out the public labor to private
parties and pocketed the proceeds.*

In economic administration, the most notable thing of re-

^ 8e« Retana's edition of Father Zti Riga's Estaditmo de Uu Islcu FHipinan
(Madrid, 1893), Appendix H, Polistat. For a keen observer's testimony as to the
abasM of the politta system fifty years before, see Mas's Informer sections on
Estado ecclesuutico and ContrtbucioneM. In former times, each tributary paid also
an extra real (one eighth of a dollar) which was supposed to go into the Tillage
treasury for use on local improyements.

46 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

cent years was the abolition of the Government monopoly of
tobacco, which was decreed in 1881 but not fully effected till
1884. This monopoly had been instituted in 1781, and had
been followed by monopolies on other products throughout the
archipelago, soon giving a revenue of half a million pesos ; for
some years before the final abandonment of the system, it had
been limited to tobacco alone and to the valley of the Kagayan
River in Luzon, but nevertheless produced the Government
from four to six millions annually.^ An attempt was made
during the seventies and eighties to put the archipelago on
the gold standard; it was persisted in with admirable inten-
tions, and with the Spaniard's full confidence in the powers
of royal decrees, but scarcely with good judgment, since the
promoters of the plan continued to fly in the face of the work-
ings of the " Gresham Law."^ Similarly, the attempts to reg-
ulate the immigration, the habitat, and the occupation of the
Chinese were not any more successful during the last genera-
tion than during the preceding years of Spanish rule; when

1 Monopolies of a minor character, on playing-cards, etc., had existed from the early
years of Spanish rule, in accordance with general colonial legislation. Under Basco
y Vargas, the example already set in the Spanish Antilles of a monopoly on tobacco
was followed in the Philippines, and similar revenue projects were soon after ex-
tended to alcoholic products, powder, etc. (the betel-nut having previously been
monopolized to a certain degree). See Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. ii. pp.
295, 314, 316. The Library of Congress Bibliography and Pardo de Tavera*s Bib-
lioteca cite various sources on Philippine monopolies, especially tobacco, but there
is no work comprehensively covering the subject. Mas's Informe (vol. ii, section
on Contribuciones) shows that the receipts from the tobacco monopoly had increased
by steady growth to 1,280,000 pesos, and that the gross revenues from the mono-
poly on native wine and liquor (vino and nipa) were 690,000 pesos in 1835. Jagor
says, op. cit., p. 267 : " During my stay there, the state factories could not manu-
facture as many cigars as there was demand for, the strange case arising of higher
prices being paid for large quantities than what they bought at retail in the de-
positories. To prevent dealers making their purchases in the depositories, a maxi-
mum was fixed and an odious and expensive police surveillance set up to watch
the sales and prevent a single person making various purchases in different agen-
cies. The penalty was confiscation of all the purchaser had. Any one could buy
cigars at the depository for his own consumption, bnt not dispose of a single box
to another person, even at the same price he himself had paid."

^ See the contributions on the subject in La Politica de Espana en Filipinos for
the years 1893 to 1896, evincing most amazing ignorance of fundamental economic
principles on the part of official projectors as well as unofficial contributora.

■

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 47

the laws and restrictions became too troublesome to avoid or
disregard, the Chinese " saw " the officers in charge.

The Laws of the Indies provided that, in so far as practicable,
the rights and duties of the laws of Spain should be made
applicable to her colonial subjects. Special exemptions were,
however, gradually given to them, whereby (the intent was)
their prosecution in the courts was to be simplified and their
financial responsibility before the law was quite narrowly limited.
It was inevitable that, in the hands of bad or careless admin-
istrators, these very exemptions, designed for protection, shoidd
become instruments of oppression. Moreover, in the nineteenth
century, as the Filipinos came more in touch with the outside
world, their more prominent individuals were bound to clamor
for full equality before the law. Hence, we find that the penal
code of Spain was finally extended to the Philippine Islands
in 1887, and the civil code and the law of commerce in 1889.
Important exceptions were speedily introduced into the decrees
establishing the civil code ; these were the provisions retaining
the old censorship of the press and withdrawing from the
Philippines civil marriage and registration, after a bitter con-
test waged by the religious orders. The reform of judicial pro-
cedure to a considerable extent either preceded or accompanied
the alteration of the organic law. Justice of the peace courts,
presided over by natives, were introduced in 1886. Before
that, the simpler old form of provincial administration, whereby
the Spanish alcalde discharged both the functions of civil
governor and judge,^ and justice in minor cases was adminis-

^ It was not till 1844 that the provincial alcaldes^ who were at once governors
and jadges, were forbidden to engage also in trade in their provinces ; and abuses
of this sort were common thereafter. See Mas's Informe (vol. ii, section on Ad'
mini$tr€LCx6n dejusticia) for a good picture of the early regime in the provinces,
whan the Laws of the Indies, the antiquated Siete PartidaSj etc., still governed,
and oonld be twisted to suit the administrator-judge's desires. Mas recommends
■p«cial codes for the Philippines, and that the alcaldes-mayores be themselves law-
yers, be forbidden to trade, and receive better salaries. He also quotes Tom^ de
Coroyn (Estado de Uu Islas Filipintu en 1810, Madrid, 1820, another of the few
nally invaluable Philippine works, of which an English edition was published in
in 1821), who described the same abases as existing in 1810, namely, the

48 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

tered in the towns by the local executive chiefs, had been done
away with by the separation of the executive and judiciary in
the provinces.^ A great amount of really judicial power re-
mained vested in the person of the governor-general, and in
actual practice the archipelago was only too readily converted
at his will into territory subject to martial law, its inhabitants
at the summary disposition of the very comprehensive military
tribunals which he could call into being.

The Philippine archipelago has an area of approximately
75,000,000 acres, comprised mostly in some thirty islands
of size and importance. Of the total area, not 6,000,000
acres have ever been brought under cultivation.^ Perhaps
25,000,000 acres, owing to rocky character, climate, nature of
the forest, etc., will never, or only in the very remote future,
be cultivated. Even under this estimate, less than one eighth
of the land area that is susceptible to agriculture has yet been

alcaldes making 40,000 pesos or more per year in trade; money at a high rate of
interest, with internal commerce thus officially monopolized; the offices of alcalde
lacking the prestige they should have ; leniency and slackness in the administration
of official duties, resulting in ladronism, even in Manila's outskirts ; the alcaldes
manipulating the gobemadorcillos to their own ends, and the latter the people, thus
riveting the evils of caciquism even more firmly upon the masses, who were kept
enslaved by debt.

1 This pretended separation of the executive and judicial branches of the
government was, however, even then by no means complete. The Bisayan provinces
remained under military government till the close of Spanish rule, and their ad-
ministrators possessed not only executive and judicial authority, but also quite ar-
bitrary military powers. Until 1861, the governor-general of the islands was presi-
dent of the Audiencia, and he afterward retained particularly through the courts
of special jurisdiction (these courts being military, " contentious," etc., as well as
ecclesiastical), virtually judicial powers. No better r^sum^ of the law in force in
the Philippines to 1898 and of the rather intricate system of courts can be found
than in a monograph on the subject by Cayetano S. Arellano, now Chief Justice
of the Philippine Supreme Court, which monograph is Appendix J to Report of
Taft Philippine Commission, 1900. The forthcoming Philippine census reports
will contain a more elaborate review of the subject by Florentino Torres, a judge
of the Philippine Supreme Court.

2 A. de la Cavada, Historia Geografica, GeolSgica y Estadistica de Filipinos
(Manila, 1876), vol. n, pp. 391 and 398, gives 2,280,421 hectares (5,700,000 acres)
under cultivation, and approximately 52,000,000 acres as tropical forest. More
recent estimates of the area under cultiyation have generally been smaller than
Cavada's figures.

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 49

redeemed from forest or morass. And perhaps 1,000,000 acres
of the area now cultivated are occupied by squatters, owing
to the defective registry system of Spain. By the Treaty of
Paris, therefore, the United States secured title over 90 per
cent of all the land in the islands, including practically all the
timber land, most of the area of mineral deposits, and perhaps
15,000,000 acres of land which comparatively soon can be re-
deemed for agriculture. These figures themselves afford the
most graphic comment that can be made upon the record of
Spanish rule as regards the development of the resources of
the archipelago. In recent years, when commerce, as we have
seen, began pressing on the outside for the development of
those resources, there were efforts, more or less sustained and
intelligent, to throw open the great area of waste land to occu-
pation and improvement, as well as to lead the settlers on im-
proved land to perfect their titles. Foreigners were, after 1870,
as already noted, allowed to acquire real estate. Beginning with
1880, there was promulgated a series of comprehensive royal de-
crees aimed to make it easier for occupants of land to perfect their
titles ; the administrative machinery provided was, however, so
compUcated and unwieldy that only a fair proportion of the
large proprietors and very few squatters on small tracts availed
themselves of the privileges extended in that year and by the
subsequent decrees of 1883, 1884, 1888, and 1894. By the
decree of 1894, foreign corporations were expressly denied
the privilege of acquiring Philippine land.^ There were also
some intelligent efforts made on the part of a few of the more
progressive Spanish officials and of other Spanish laymen to study
and display not only to the commercial but also to the scientific
world the wealth of the virgin material whicff had remained
almost unexplored for three centuries. Prior to these years,
what little had really been accomplished in these lines was

> See the War Department document, Spanish Public Land Latps in the Philip^
pine hlandi and their History to August 13, 1898, compiled by Ahern and Ban
(Wathington, 1901).

50 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

owing notably to the inexpert and generally unscientific labors
of a few diligent friars. And in spite of the newly kindled in-
terest in the Philippines of recent years, it remains true that,
for the scientific world, they are to this day almost an unex-
plored field. In botany, there is the monumental, though not
strictly reliable, work of the Augustinian, Father Manuel
Blanco,^ and some monographs of the Spanish forestry officials
of late years, notably of Sebastian Vidal y Soler. In geology,
three Spanish officials, Abella y Casariego, Centeno, and Jor-
dana, published treatises of value. The work of the Jesuits in
meteorology since 1865 is authoritative, and to a small degree
their work in other scientific lines is acceptable. In general,
however, the student who desires to know about the Philip-
pines in any field of science will find, first, that scarcely more
than the preliminary investigations have been made, and,
second, that he can very speedily exhaust the works of im-
portance in Spanish and must turn to German, English, and
French works.^

As may be inferred from even this hasty summary of gov-
ernmental measures of the latter half of the nineteenth century,
Spain was unquestionably making progress in the Philippine
Islands. It is not at all difficult, indeed, for apologetic Spanish
writers of recent years to make out a very excellent defense
for their Government — on paper. But if we dismiss from con-
sideration altogether the rising wave of Filipino opposition
to the persistence in their villages of frocked ecclesiastical
masters, we shall still find several important obstacles to giv-

1 Mora de FilipinaSy Manila, 1877-80, first published in an inadequate form fortj^i
years earlier.

2 Perhaps in no other line does Spanish incompetence and lack of interest come
out so clearly as in that of ethnology. In general, anything that a Spanish writer
says about Philippine ethnology is ipso facto suspicious, and very often ridiculous.
Thus far one must depend mainly upon German writers upon Philippine ethnology.
Of these, Blumentritt is the one who has written by far the most voluminously, and,
on the whole, most informatively. Yet Blumentritt was never in the Philippine
Islands at all ! Mistakes, of a comprehensive character as well as of detail, abound
in his treatises.

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 51

ing the Spanish lay government in the islands a clean record.
In the first place, the constant political changes in Spain itself
interfered seriously with the movement in the islands toward
a freer economic regime and a more liberal political adminis-
tration. Back in 1873 we find the much-quoted Jagor saying
as to the tobacco monopoly : " The circumstance which in a
country economically well administered would have great influ-
ence in favor of setting this industry free, but which with
Spain, on the contrary, tends to preserve the monopoly, is the
number of employees which it requires. Every ministry needs
to dispose of those places to content its numberless claimants,
and it cannot lose the opportunity of giving fat jobs to its
creatures, nor that of sending in honor to the antipodes the
persons who are in its way in Spain. The cost of the trip is
at the expense of the Philippine treasury. Those who go are
so numerous that at times it is necessary to create posts in
which to place the newcomers." ^ He goes on to point out that

* Jagor, op. cit.t p. 267. Montero y Vidal, op. cit.^ vol. in, p. 490, charges this
** coiinterdance of employees, which has made thousands and thousands of Span-
iards pass through the Philippines as trains pass through a tunnel," upon the Lib-
erals, who resorted to it after the revolution and dethronement of Isabella II in
1868. He fails to take into account that it was a practice of long standing and that
the Liberals simply returned to it in upsetting the imperfect rules of 1866 for a
civil service based on merit, though perhaps they made a cleaner sweep of subor-
dinate employees than was ever made before and thus set the example followed
until 1898. An idea of the confusion and expense incident to changes of govern-
ment and of plans is afforded in ihid.f p. 478, where Montero y Vidal speaks of the
*' hall of accounts " for the colonies established in Madrid in 1867, and says :
** Later . . . the courts of accounts in the colonies themselves were reestablished,
and once again they were suppressed and the [bureaus at Madrid] restored, and
yet, with all the coming and going of boats laden with accounts, no other result
has been obtained than the expending of thousands of good dollars, while the ac-
oonnts are still waiting for some pious soul to examine them." Evidence of the
continuance of such evils to the close of the Spanish rule may be found in recom-
mendations like these, made by Governor-General Primo de Rivera to the Madrid
Government in July, 1897: "At least a reasonable degree of stability [for Gov-
ernment employees] and a rate of pay not so inadequate are conditions absolutely
necessary in order to require work, competency, and morality. ... So long as
there come to the colonies, for no other purpose but to make money, the wild
jonth, the ruined nobleman, the cacique who bae spent his property in politics, etc.,
. . . the administration will not be bettered nor can territories like this be peace-
fully governed, especially after convulsions such as has just been experienced.'*

52 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

from December, 1853, to November, 1854, the Philippines had
four governor-generals, two regularly appointed and two act-
ing temporarily ; and tells a story of a judge of the Audiencia
who arrived in Manila in 1850 with his family, having gone
out by the way of Good Hope, only to find himself out of a
place and his successor already on the ground, arrived by the
way of the Isthmus of Suez. It is worth remarking that, from
1834 to 1862, Spain had 4 constitutions, 28 parliaments, 47
presidents of the Council of Ministers, and 529 ministers with
portfolios, and during the next twenty years, with other revo-
lutions and a republic, the changes came more frequently still.
From 1835 to 1897 inclusive, the Philippines had fifty gover-
nor-generals, each serving an average of one year and three
months. That a civil service under such conditions would be
inefficient, if not corrupt, might be deemed a foregone conclu-
sion ; and corruption was doubly assured, one almost feels like
saying, by the low scale of salaries paid, a scale that practi-
cally became lower in recent years, as it was based on silver
and silver was steadily falling. That there were honest, con-
scientious men in the Spanish civil administration, is somewhat
worthy of note ; but there was very much about the whole
situation to lend plausibility to the friars' claim that it was
this horde of civilians fattening on the FiHpinos which roused
them against the mother country. It remains only to be added
that the corruption notoriously extended on occasions to the
governor-generals themselves ; certain there were of them who
paid well for their appointments, and saw to it that the bargain
was not a losing one for themselves.

Moreover, there are vital objections to be urged against th

(See Primo do Rivera, Memoria al Senado, Madrid, 1898, p. 161.) The same poin'
is insisted upon in connection with his complaint that the already over-powerful
governor-generals " have little or no share in the making of the laws," when he
says {ibid.j p. 9) : " There is imposed upon them a personnel in all the branches of
administration in the choice of which no other consideration or guaranties have
governed than favoritism, intrigue, and, sometimes, even lower motives." (Some
well-posted critics consider that Primo de Rivera was well qualified to speak on
corruption in the Philippine Government.)

J

It*

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 53

Spanish governmental system in the islands as a system, even
with the reform patchwork of recent years upon it. Both econ-
omically and politically, it remained to the last paternalistic ;
paternalism is still highly necessary in those islands, but a
paternalistic regime to be successful must be untiring and
energetic, and Spain's paternalism remained to the end nine
parts plan and promise and one part fulfillment. When all
other defects of her administration have been discounted, it
must still be said that she milked into her central treasury the
comparatively mild taxes she laid upon her subjects, this being
done ostensibly for the better administration and more intelli-
gent expenditure of the fiscal resources, but actually to the de-
triment of local and general improvements. The insular budget
for 1894-95 shows a total expenditure of $13,280,139.41:^
of this sum, $6,495,237.51 went for the army and navy;
$2,220,120.98 for internal administration ; $1,687,108.88 for
the church and the courts, $460,315.24 being spent on the
courts, while $1,045,540 of the amount spent for ecclesias-
tical maintenance went for salaries to the bishops and priests
and for supplies for the parish churches; $1,360,506.53 on
general standing expenses of Spain charged against this col-
ony, among them over $60,000 for the maintenance of Spain's
diplomatic and consular service in the Orient, $118,000 on
the colonial department at Madrid, $70,000 on the colony of
Fernando Po on the African coast, and $718,000 on pensions
and retiring allowances ; $823,261.95 on the fiscal adminis-
tration, centralized for the archipelago, of which sum nearly
$450,000 went for salaries ; and lastly, $628,752.46 for spe-
cial educational institutions and pubhc works, over 60 per
cent of the $110fiOO spent for what might he called public
improvements going for salaries.

The estimated revenue for the same year was $13,579,000, as

^ These tams, u all tarns of money for the closing jears of Spanish rule, are
givM in the value of the Philippine peso, which may, for practical purposes, be
WNHUUnd the equivalent of the Mexican dollar.

54 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

follows : from the direct taxes, $6,659,450, this item including
$4,586,250 from cedulas, $482,800 from the special head-tax
on the Chinese, $1,323,000 from the industrial tax, $110,000
from the tax on urban property, and $155,000 from surtaxes
on various of the industrial and urban taxes ; from customs,
$4,565,000 including $430,000 in export duties ; from the
opium monopoly, $602,300 ; from the Government lottery,
$873,000 ; from internal revenue stamps and stamped paper,
$510,500; from Government dues on timber cut, $122,000;
from sale of public lands, $45,000 ; the rest, miscellaneous.^

Under this system, the burdens of government rested to an
extraordinary degree on the shoulders of the poor. The cedula
tax, to be sure, could not be called excessive ; but there is
obviously something wrong about a governmental system
which derives its chief source of income not from an impost
w^on property but upon heads. Of the indirect tax, the ex-
port duties on tobacco, sugar, copra, and indigo and the im-
port duty on rice bore eventually upon the masses, and less

1 An analysis of the budget for 1894-95 will be found in the Rept. Phil. Comm.
1900, vol. I, pp. 79-81. The budget for 1896-97, the last complete year, is con-
tained in Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 409-11, and in the
appendix to F. H. Sawyer's The Inhabitants of the Philippines (London and New
York, 1900). A detailed summary of the actual receipts of the Philippine Gov-
ernment, 1890 to 1897 inclusive, drawn up under American military government,
is furnished on pp. 32-34 of the Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine
Islands on Civil Affairs, 1900 (Rept. War Dept. 1900, vol. i, part 10 ; also Manila
edition of MacArthur's report of 1900, vol. ii, appendix AA, exhibit A). It shows
the actual receipts from direct and indirect taxes for 1894 and 1895 to have ex-
ceeded the estimates above. Receipts and expenditures were by 1896 over
$17,000,000 silver each. It should be noted that they had been steadily growing
since the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the tobacco monopoly was
established, prior to which time they were in the neighborhood of half a million
each. They increased most rapidly after the abolition of the monopoly and the
adoption of more comprehensive schemes of taxation in the early eighties. Cus-
toms receipts grew from $800,000 in 1865 steadily to their average of over
$4,000,000 from 1890-95. For the budgets of 1889-90 and 1893-94, and also for
the figures on revenues and expenditures in earlier years in general, see Retana's
edition of Ziiniga's Estadismo de las Islas Filipinos, appendix H, Rentas e Ini'
puestos del Estado ; chapter xiv of The Philippine Islands, by John Foreman
(London and New York, 1899) ; and various documents on this subject presented
in the important series already frequently cited, The Philippine Islands^ IJfiS-
1898.

ii

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 55

plainly they were also handicapped by the whole system of
import duties, which were proportionately light on luxuries
and heavy on provisions, etc., while the system was prefer-
ential for Spain. The industrial tax bore most heavily upon
the proprietors of small retail enterprises and upon salaried
employees; under it, the proprietor of a sugar estate, for
example, paid a small tax on his mill, while he went scot-free
upon his acres of tilled land. The nearest approach to a real-
estate impost was the urban tax, imposed in 1879, which levied
five per cent on the rental actually received from dwelHngs in
the towns, with deductions for those of lighter materials ; and,
as seen, this tax on the rental value produced in the entire
archipelago hardly more than $100,000. It is to be remem-
bered that this budget included not only receipts and expen-
ditures for the general insular government, but for the pro-
vincial and departmental government as well ; for the fiscal
administration was entirely centralized, even down to the small-
est barrio. As for the municipalities, there was left to them
what meager revenue they might derive from the sale of privi-
leges for fisheries, amusements, markets, ferries, from public
pounds, fines, transfers of cattle, taxes on lights, a surtax of ten
per cent on the urban tax (the numerous surtaxes being not the
least vexatious and cumbersome features of the Spanish cus-
toms and internal revenue assessments), and the fifteen days'
personal-labor tax. Up to the very last, too, the towns contin-
ued to lay imposts, in the old Spanish fashion, on products
brought to their markets from other towns.^ In the average
Philippine town, the revenue was eaten up principally by the
police force that it was required by insular regulations to keep.
There were no funds for salaries to the officers, much less for

* Thi* old sjstem of alcabaUUf or of ** protective " checks upon internal trade,
between province and province, town and town, lurvived in Spain itself until
recent years. It was not abolished in Mexico until 1896, and in his expose of the
onrrencj reform inaugurated in the latter country in November, 1004, Finance
Minister Limantonr assigned to this abolition of the alcahnlan chief place as influ-
encing the development of internal trade and progress generally.

56 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the sadly needed improvements, such as good schoolhouses,
cleaner streets, better roads and bridges, and hygienic appli-
ances and regulations.

That the Filipino people, and in particular the humble Fili-
pino, had legitimate grievances against the Spanish administra-
tion, would appear to be evident from the foregoing recital.
Even leaving out of consideration the small degree of participa-
tion in the management of their own affairs that was allowed
to the Filipinos, it disposes of the paper showing of Spanish
political apologists. But far from being able to argue there-
from that it was the blunders of Spain's civil administration
which cost her the sympathies of her Philippine subjects and
made them ripe for active revolution when the chance came to
throw off the yoke, we must, in any fair accounting, find that
that administration was really making progress toward a better
regime. How explain, then, that coin ciden tally with this fal-
tering progress, the Filipinos themselves grew steadily, during
the last thirty years, more restless and assertive ? The story is
not told if we pause here and simply bring a general indict-
ment against the Filipinos as acting the part of ingrates toward
their benefactors. At Madrid, during those years of Filipino
renaissance^ the religious orders which had such extensive
landed and parochial and educational interests in the islands
were fighting at every step, with secret political power, with the
superstitious hold their ecclesiastical position gave them upon
the Spanish people, and with the most up-to-date resources of
a political party (with newspapers, candidates, propaganda,
etc.), against every encroachment upon the old regime by the
Liberal party of Spain. In the Philippine Islands the ecclesias-
tical hierarchy and the heads of the same orders were using
all the power of their intrenched position, all their prestige and
authority, religious and official, and not infrequently all the
baser weapons at their disposal, to bend the administration of
the islands to their will. In almost every town of size in those
islands, there was a friar, ready to assert the ancient preroga-

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 57

tive of fatherly direction, ready to use in the interests of his
regime all the manifold rights of intervention in local affairs
which the law gave him, ready to place the heavy hand of
superstition or of paternalism upon the head of every parish-
ioner who showed a tendency to think or to do for himself,
eager and earnest in his determination to maintain the intel-
lectual status quo. That the friars were honest and sincere in
this attitude of horror toward modern progress in general,
toward Liberalism, toward scientific education, did not render
it any less certain that they were bound eventually to lose in
their fight to keep the Filipinos in the Middle Ages. For a
whole generation, the catastrophe was preparing; but it was
inevitable, from the day when the Philippines were first aroused
from their dreams of slumbering isolation.

What differentiated the Cavite revolt of 1872 from any of
the previous mutinies of native troops was the fact that the
Spanish authorities, rightly or wrongly, identified with it, and
made chief victims for punishment, three native priests, one
of them an old man almost in his dotage. If we accept the
testimony of Filipinos more or less closely in touch with the
incidents of that year, the evidence on which those priests
were convicted, by a secret military tribunal, of instigating
the mutiny, was manufactured at the prompting of the friars,
because, encouraged by the anti-clerical campaign waged dur-
ing the preceding decade in Spain, these Filipino priests, and
particularly one of them, had been outspoken in asserting the
rights of the native clergy to serve the parishes of their country
and in charging the orders with limiting their education, keep-
ing their number down, and generally reducing them to the
position of servants of the friars. The official Spanish version
of the affair is that these priests were the prime instigators of
a mutiny in the Cavite arsenal, and that, if their plans had
not been frustrated by the confession of a native woman to a
friar, all whites in Cavite and Manila might have been put to
the knife. The natives have never ceased to believe that there

58 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

was a cold-blooded plot on the part of the friars to get rid of
the few independent native priests who refused to lick their
hands in servility and spoke out boldly for their own priestly
rights and their people. Under the circumstances, the action
of the Spanish authorities in taking bloody vengeance without
clearly and publicly proving their case must be deemed one of
the most serious tactical blunders made during the troublous
times of recent years.^ Governor-General Izquierdo, who was

1 The Filipino version of the afPair was reflected in the dedication by Jostf
Rizal of his novel El Filihusterismo (Ghent, 1890) to Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and
Zamora (executed on the field where Rizal himself was to fall nearly twenty-five
years later) with the words : " The Church, by refusing to degrade you, has placed
in doubt the crime imputed to you ; the Government, by surrounding your case with
mystery and shadows, justifies the belief that there was some error, committed in
fatal moments ; and the entire Philippine country, by worshiping your memory
and calling you martyrs, admits your culpability in no respect. Inasmuch, there-
fore, as your participation in the Cavite disturbance is not clearly proved, and
as you may have been patriots or not, may or may not have cherished aspirations
for justice, aspirations for liberty, I have a right to dedicate my work to you
as victims of the evil I seek to combat. And while we are waiting on Spain to
rehabilitate you some day, and expect her to refuse the responsibility for your
death, let these pages serve as a tardy crown of dried leaves placed upon your un-
known tombs; and let every one who assails your memory without clear proofs
stain his hands in your blood! "

A detailed Filipino version of the 1872 affair, which is cited not as a complete
or wholly reliable account of the uprising, but as showing the sort of stories about
it which have circulated among the people, is related in the unpublished appeal
for intervention by the United States in the Philippine Islands made to the United
States consul-general at Hongkong by certain Filipinos there in January, 1897.
This document recites that the three condemned priests. Father Josd Burgos and
Jacinto Zamora, of the chapter of the Manila Cathedral, and Father Mariano
Gomez, the curate of Bakoor, Cavite, had vigorously opposed the taking of these
prominent posts from them by Recollect friars, who had some time before left
Mindanau in accordance with the agreement which restored the island to the Jes-
uits for missionary work; that special enmity was felt by these friars toward
Father Burgos, because he had exposed in a newsp.iper of Spain the robbery of
the rich jewels and the funds of the famous parish church of Antipolo by a Recol-
lect who had been put in possession of that curacy; that the Recollect provincial
summoned from Sambales a member of the order very similar to Father
Burgos and had him unfrock himself and pretend to be Burgos in connection with
bis efforts to bribe the Cavite garrison to mutiny ; that he accomplished this plan
through two dissolute Spanish sergeants, who wanted money for gambling; that
afterward the friars manipulated the torture of the prisoners taken in the mutiny,
compelling another sergeant, named Saldua, to declare that the mutiny had been
begun by Burgos' s orders; that this sergeant made this declaration before the

I

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 59

so energetic in putting down this really insignificant mutiny,
had been preceded by Governor-General de la Torre, who had
inaugurated an era of sympathetic assimilation between Span-
iards and Filipinos, a sort of " policy of attraction " for which
his recalcitrant fellow-countrymen in the islands could not
pardon him. The pendulum now swung far in the other direc-
tion and the two peoples drifted farther and farther apart. The
policy of the " strong hand " was accepted as necessary even
by the Liberals in Spain, receiving their information about
the Philippines from interested sources, and, as already noted.
Minister Moret's decree for the secularization of education was
instead turned to the advantage of the friars, while other
reform projects, some practicable and some not, were shelved
for the time being.

The contest in behalf of the native priesthood and of the
secularization of the parishes had, however, been revived.

military tribunal, only after the promise that he would be set free for making it,
but that he was executed along with the three priests so as to have him out of the
way; that his widow began to denounce the proceeding and to tell in public the
promises made to her husband, when suddenly she and her children disappeared
from their house and have never been seen since; finally, that " even in the minds
of the most humble inhabitants of the Philippines there rests the conviction that
the tragic end of those victims had been bought with gold." It is a fact that the
Jesuit-Recollect arrangement had something to do with bringing on the trouble
of 1872. The Recollect priests who had been replaced by Jesuits in Mindanau
sought to oust the more prominent native priests from the best posts in and near
Manila that were not already in the possession of friars, and the three priests executed
were precisely those who had been most outspoken in behalf of their own rights
and those of the native clergy in general. A contemporary French account of the
Cavite mutiny may be found in the Reime des Deux Mondes for May 15, 1877,
written by E. Plauchut. This account has been vigorously disputed by Spanish
writers, especially by Philippine friars. A contemporary account of the 1872 affair,
the Resena of Father Casimiro Herrero (see Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca for this
and other data on the revolt), in its chapter on the cause of the revolt (reproduced
in La Politico de Espaha en FUipincu^ vol. il, pp. 58-61), reveals the general
eharacter of all the friar writings on the subject in these remarks: "The Cavite
inionection has the same origin and is the result of the same causes as those of
Fnuioe, Italy, and Spain, or rather of Europe and America. They are all the fruit
of the corruption of the intelligence and the heart. Tell man, Ton are free to think
and to will, because reason recognizes no dependence and will follows reason, and
yon have put [into action] the principle of disorder and anarchy which so domi-
uues society."

60 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

More and more every year it became an expression of the
slowly rising Filipino nationality, a demand for priests from
among the people, as other countries have. To that extent, at
least, the friars' defenders are correct in saying that the op-
position to the friars was opposition to them as Spaniards.
The seminaries for native priests, though not closed, had fallen
into decay after the reaction from the campaign for seculari-
zation of Bishop Santa Justa y Rufina in the eighteenth cen-
tury. In the early sixties, the Paulist Fathers were put in
charge of the seminaries at the seat of each of the bishoprics,
except at Bigan, where the Augustinians presided over the
seminary ; there was also a second seminary at Manila, under
the direction of the Jesuits. The Filipinos charge that the
course of instruction and the number of natives ordained were
purposely limited, that the orders might always present at
Rome, as the conclusive argument against secularization of
the parishes, the fact that there were not enough native priests,
nor were they yet well enough equipped, to take over the pa-
rochial administration. In 1870, of the 792 Philippine parishes,
excluding ten mission parishes of the Jesuits, the friars were
in charge of 611, and secular priests, nearly all natives, of
181. The contention that in general only the poorer, less pro-
ductive parishes were assigned to native priests is borne out
by the fact that the average number of parishioners in their
181 parishes was 4500, while in the friars' parishes the aver-
age was well beyond 6000 ; the Augustinians, the first mis-
sionaries in the islands, who always held the greatest number
of important parishes, had an average of nearly 10,000 souls
to each of their 196 parishes.^ The number of native priests,

1 A. de la Cavada, op. cit, vol. ii, p. 402. Sinibaldo de Mas (op. cit, vol. ii, sec-
tion on Estado ecclesidsticOf pp. 36-37) says there were 450 friars and 700 Fili-
pino priests in 1842. One inclines to believe this an error or a misprint as regards
the number of seculars, since the seminaries to train them were at the time, and
had for some years been, neglected, and in 1898, thirty-five years after the reor-
ganization of the seminaries, the number of ordained Filipino priests fell short
of 700. Mas, at any rate, lists only 198 parishes in the four dioceses of that time
as being in charge of seculars, while 288 were administered by friar-curates. Mat

1

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 61

coadjutors and all, was about 600 in 1898; but the number of
their parishes did not increase, and they remained to the last
mainly the coadjutors of the friar priests in the larger parishes.^
Nor should they all be identified (at least actively, though
quite commonly in sentiment) with the opposition to the
friars ; their very position as underlings made them, with the
exception of the more independent spirits, bootlicks of their
masters.

There are certain inconsistencies in the books, manifestoes,
speeches, etc., made in defense of the friars in recent years,
by themselves, their hirelings in literature, or their creatures
in the political arena of Spain. They uniformly claim that the
mass of the Filipinos love them, and that the opposition to
them is voiced only by a few forward and conceited "Indians,"
put up to it by the Liberals ("freethinkers" and "Free-
masons," they generally say) of Spain. They as uniformly
dwell with great emphasis upon the labors of the orders as
having in a short space of time converted communities of wan-
dering savages into happy, peaceful, law-abiding Christian
communities.^ Then, in the bitterness of the campaign against
the extension of new rights and Hberties to the Filipinos, they

gives in this section an excellent presentation of the friars' side of the contention
under the earlier r^g^me and a picture of the friar priests as benevolent adminis-
trators and pastors, which coincides with that drawn by Tom&s de Comyn still
earlier in the nineteenth century. Both should be consulted.

^ According to the Etudes of Elis^e Reclus of July 5, 1898 (quoted in Catholic
World for August, 1898), the spiritual charges of the regular and secular clergy
in the Philippines were as follows : 1892, Angustinians, 2,082,131; 1892, Recol-
lects, 1,175,156; 1892, Franciscans, 1,010,763; 1892, Dominicans, 699,851; 1895,
Jesuits, 213,065 ; 1896, secular clergy, 967,2M.

' They are able to quote the very just testimony of foreign travelers like Jagor,
Mall at, and others, to the better conditions of the Filipinos, so far as regards the
conditions of livelihood and association with the white rulers, than that of the
Malays of Java or of the English possessions, where the natives were never Chris-
tianized. This testimony, however, like that of the competent Spanish observers,
Comyn and Mas, dates back to the earlier portions of the nineteenth century or to
other periods before new ideas and aspirations had begun to enter the Philippines,
and does not take into account the fact that the Spaniards had introduced their
subjects to the possibilities of a " divine discontent " and must satisfy that discon*
tent or reckon with it in years to come.

62 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

give such depressing estimates of the natives' ability and launch
such invectives against the natives' character as belie their
claims to having done wonders in transforming them. The real
missionary spirit of earlier years had, in a great measure, been
lost before ever the eighteenth century began ; but it was not
until after 1863 that the campaign of depreciation of the na-
tive became so bitter, was so openly conducted before his face
and so absolutely regardless of truth or of charity and reck-
less of consequences. Such incidents as the reciting by a
Philippine official distinguished for his defense of the friars, at
public literary exercises of the University of St. Thomas, of
verses representing the natives, two thousand of whom were
there as students, as mere animals, building their homes like
the birds of the air and living like the lowest beasts, became
more and more common. It was of these verses that a friar
very prominent in one of the orders said, in an open letter to
Minister Moret in 1897 : —

They brilliantly set forth the savage instincts and the bestial incli-
nations of those faithful imitators of apes. ... As neither Spain
nor the friars can change the ethnological character of the race, so
inferior to ours, it will be idle to desire to apply to them the same
laws as to us. . . . The only liberty the Indians want is the liberty
of savages. Leave them to their cock-fighting and their indolence,
and they will thank you more than if you load them down with old
and new rights. ^

The Dominican newspaper of Manila not infrequently refers
to the people as chongos (Philippine colloquial for " monkeys " ).
If there is a spark of spirit or of independence in a people at
all, they will rise against that sort of treatment, even when

^ The whole letter and discussion connected therewith may be found in La Po-
litica de Espana en Filipinos, vol. vii, pp. 35-37. A typical book in defense of
the friars is Las Corporaciones Religiosas en Filipinas, by Father Eladio Zamora
(Madrid, 1901). Father Zamora was a Philippine Augustinian. The book pre-
sents the side of the friars in the Philippines very well, but its author is as reck-
less of facts and ignorant of Philippine history as some of the less ambitious
pamphleteers among his fellows. His book forms the basis of the alleged history
contained in Stephen Bonsai's article on '* The Friars in the Philippines" in the
North American Review for October, 1902, though Mr. Bonsai failed to give credit

I

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 63

the masters who so depreciate them govern them with absolute
justice. If the defense of the record of the friars is to be con-
sistent, it must either elect to regard the Filipinos as in the
mass hopeless of complete regeneration, or it must cease to
harp on the wonders wrought by the friars. If the Fihpinos
are to-day totally incapable, the tradition of miracles having
been wrought by the missionaries must be abandoned ; if they
have been raised to a state approaching in some degree that
of European peoples, they cannot legitimately be denied the
opportunity to advance the rest of the way.

THE FILIPINO REFORM PROPAGANDA

The real question here involved is, Did the Filipinos them-
selves demand such an opportunity ? The best answer to that
question is not found in the incidents of the so-called Revolu-
tion of 1896, actively participated in only by sections of the
archipelago, and by certain classes to the very considerable
exclusion of others, inspired, moreover, by various mixed mo-
tives, among which were not wanting the baser ones of per-
sonal revenge and race hatred. The best proof of the rising
Filipino sentiment of nationality is found in the campaign
carried on in the eighties and nineties by the more progressive
element of young Filipinos, a two-sided campaign, waged in
Spain for the extension to the Philippines of freer govern-
mental institutions, for an honest administration, and for the
speedy replacement of the friars by FiHpino priests, and waged
in the islands themselves for the improvement of educational
facilities, a removal of the espionage upon the press and pub-
lic opinion, and, above all, for an awakening of the lethargic
masses. There were only a chosen few who comprehended in
their campaign this full breadth of purpose, and there were
actively laboring with them, in partial comprehension of the
far-reaching scope of what they were trying to do, compara-
tively but a handful of less capable prosely ters ; but they had
made their influence felt in every little village where their

64 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

educated compatriots dwelt, and even the consciousness of the
docile masses had perhaps been touched with something like
an ideal of progress.

This campaign was, first of all, a foreign propaganda, be-
cause it was stimulated into activity by the deportations of
prominent Filipinos following the Cavite mutiny of 1872.
They gradually found their way from the criminal colonies of
Spain to Hongkong and Singapore in the Orient, but more
particularly to Paris and London, and, as their real or sup-
posed offenses were blurred by time, to Madrid itself. For the
succeeding twenty years, deportations were more or less com-
mon at intervals, depending upon whether the regime at Ma-
nila was representative of Liberals or Clerical-Conservatives in
Spain. The friars, who were becoming all the time more and
more anxious to repress all the new tendencies of the Philip-
pine times and more and more rabid against the natives, played
no small part in urging forward this policy of deporting every
man who became too independent, or, as they called it, too
anti-Spanish, in his local community. Eventually, no doubt,
they got credit for more deportations than were really inspired
by them. Nevertheless, they cannot complain that their repu-
tation in this respect was not fairly earned. Their recommen-
dations were quite commonly final in all local affairs, and, in
most of these cases, if they did not actually set the machinery
of denunciation going for the removal of a troublesome man,
a word from them would at least have left him in peaceful
possession of his property and the enjoyment of his family
and home. The whole policy of deportations was at least of
questionable value. But, if indorsed as a policy, the way in
which it came to be carried out made it not only ineffectual
as a means for the repression of plotting, but a very potent
instrument for widening the breach between Spaniards and
Filipinos. Secret service denunciations, with full discretion to
act upon them vested in the governor-general,^ who only in

* Marcelo del Pilar (Za Soberania monacal^ p. 9) says this discretionary power of

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 65

very conspicuous cases seemed to feel called upon to bring
even the summary proceedings of a military court to bear,
were plainly open to great abuse; and business or personal
jealousies played no small part in bringing about deportations.
The speedy result was the creation in most of the towns of a
well-defined class of sycophants of the friars or other Spanish
authorities, most of them Spanish half-castes, who, through
fear, religious superstition, personal animosities, or because
born with that nature, became a set of despicable spies upon
their more independent fellows. Spain was, therefore, rapidly
losing the affections and sympathies of the better sort among
its educated, property-holding subjects, and was in many prov-
inces allying herself, through the village priests, through the
local and military representatives, or through the higher pro-
vincial officers, with the least desirable element of the popula-
tion, the fellows who wished not to consider themselves Fili-
pinos but Spaniards, and who would lick the boots of the white
man to be accorded a halfway recognition by him. Meanwhile,
wider trade and commerce and the new industrial and agricul-
tural institutions, mostly the work of foreigners, were, as has
been shown, calHng into existence the beginnings of a " mid-
dle class." At first, only the wealthy and educated men had
been marked for deportation. Later, rumors of local discon-
tent were enough to bring the officers of the law down upon
the less conspicuous natives, even sometimes upon the humble
workmen of the lower classes ; these were mostly removed to
some other part of the archipelago, generally upon the fringes
of the Moro country.^

the goyernoF-general was based upon a decree of 1588 (Leyes de Indias, lib. m,
tit. IV, ley vn), and points out that the chapter in which it appears deals with
matters of war, hence, aside from its antiquity, is not properly applicable to or-
dinarj peaceful times.

* An instance of personal knowledge is that of a bright, self-educated machin-
ist of Pampanga, who, with only a riUage-school education, had mastered many
of the principles of mechanics in the sugar- and rice-mills of an English firm, who
had pursued the subject with books and with the foreigners' help, who had ceased
to kiss the local friar's hand because of the intellectual self-esteem thus aroused.

66 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

All this record of deportations might indicate an active
campaign against Spain in the islands, and that is what the
officers who ordered them and the friar writers would have us
believe was going on. If it was, however, these authorities have
lost the moral argument they might have employed by failing
to produce in public the proofs of it. There was, undoubtedly,
an undercurrent of opposition to Spain, directed particularly
against the friars, and, very naturally under the circumstances,
it steadily became stronger. But it had no chance for public
expression, even in the intervals of freer speech under Lib-
eral administrations, and not much chance for secret propa-
ganda until the closing years of Spanish rule. The propa-
ganda naturally began abroad, first because of the deportes
who began to form colonies in various places, and next be-
cause the Filipinos of position who were in sympathy with the
yet undefined movement were sending their sons abroad in
greater numbers every year, and these young men almost in-
evitably became, with their expanded opportunities and broad-
ened vision, advocates of the new regime.

The campaign did not outline itself clearly until the latter
part of the eighties. It is significant that the young men who
finally gave form and force to this movement were representa-
tives for the most part of the rising middle class in the islands,
so far as such a class was being created by wider educational
facilities. This is a comment on how things had progressed in
the Philippines, a comment that should be completed by the
further significant remark that the radicals of eight and ten
years later, the men who forced the issue for revolution in
1896, came in turn from the lower classes of the population.
The whole movement began with the more independent mesti'
zos ; but it grew too rapidly for the most of them to keep up
with it, and eventually became, to a notable degree, a move-
ment from below. It was Graciano Lopez Jaena, a pure-blooded

and who was deported as a dangerous citizen shortly after the friar found that he
was a subscriber to the Scientific American,

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 67

Bisayan from the Kapis province of Panai (which province to-
day feels and shows the influence of his semi-socialistic preach-
ings among its notable element of middle-class natives of
some degree of education), who founded in Barcelona in 1888
the first organ of the propaganda, " La Solidaridad." Marcelo
del Pilar, a Tagalog from Bulak^n, without social prominence,
but who had obtained a legal training in Manila and who had
started a Tagalog daily there to instruct the masses, went to
Spain the next year virtually as the agent of Filipinos of means
at home, who proposed through him to conduct a propaganda,
and he acquired this publication as one of his first steps. Next
to Jose Rizal, he was its most notable Filipino collaborator;
the Bohemian teacher and friend of Rizal, Ferdinand Blumen-
tritt, and various Spanish Liberals were also regular contribu-
tors. Its circulation was of course principally in the Philippines,
where it had to be introduced surreptitiously. Already in
1887 Rizal's first poUtical novel, " Noli Me Tangere," had be-
gun to be read in the Philippines ; printed in Berlin, copies were
introduced into the islands in one way or another, and were
read behind closed windows. Rizal himself was the son of
parents of pure Tagalog ancestry, in moderate circumstances,
residents of Kalamba, Laguna province, and occupants of land
claimed as belonging to one of the largest and oldest friar
estates, and he had been schooled in boyhood by a very capa-
ble Filipino priest. For lack of a real understanding on the
part of outsiders, especially Americans, of the events of the
Filipino campaign for freedom, and through his own people's
tendency to carry hero-worship to the point of religious
frenzy, he has been canonized as a sort of Filipino miracle, the
one genius the Malay race has produced ; he is in many re-
spects their greatest man, but he is really a thoroughly typical
product of his times and of his exceptional opportunities.*

^ Sir Hugh Clifford has carried this view of Rizal as an abnormal Malay to the
•xtreme in his appreciative article upon him in Blachoood*8 Magazine for Novem-
ber, 1903. What almost invariably vitiates for us the well-meant advice of English-
who have beeu colonial adminiftraton in the Orient is that they proceed

68 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

There cooperated with this circle of, so to speak, " young
men of the people," almost the entire colony of Filipinos
abroad ; composed for the most part, of course, of the sons of
the wealthy mestizos. In the main, however, the more capable
among the scions of the propertied families of the Philippines
were moved to be cautious about their expressions in public,
for fear of involving their families at home, however freely
they might join with these propagandists in secret. Moreover,
a very large element of these mestizos were of a class which
can only be described by dubbing them " Superficials." Fil-
ipinos of this sort have been so numerous, and have made
themselves so prominent as self-elected spokesmen for their
people, both before and since 1898, that it has been easy for
the opponents of a more liberal regime in the Philippines to
cast ridicule upon the whole movement, and hard at times for
outside sympathizers to feel that the whole campaign was not
hopeless, or at least premature. It is this class which carried
the talk about " assimilation " (of the Philippines with Spain)
to ridiculous extremes ; which, when a very proper effort was
begun to point out the failure of Philippine history as gen-

upon the assumption that an Oriental is essentially, if not utterly, different from
the white man, and never seem to understand that Spain converted the Filipinos
to a sort of Christianity and started them part way toward European life and Eu-
ropean ideals, and that, to that extent at least, we have a different problem from
theirs in dealing with Mohammedan peoples whose ways of life and thought have
^not been more or less arbitrarily changed in the mass. The best discussion of Ri-
aal's personality, written by an intimate friend, is that of Ferdinand Blumentritt
in the Internationales Archiv fur Ethnographic (Bd. X, Heft ii), a translated ab-
stract of which appeared in the Popular Science Monthly for July, 1902. The sig-
nificant features of his career to bear in mind are that, having drained dry the founts
of education at Manila when scarcely past twenty, he found the means to go to
Europe for medical study ; that he almost immediately broke loose from the back-
ward scientific school of Spain, and made his way to Paris and then to Germany,
studying at Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Berlin. What it meant, that this full-blooded
Malay of undoubted native ability was thus brought into contact with modem
science (political as well as physical), as taught by some of the masters of the "re- ^
search method," may readily be guessed. Had he, like Mabini, been confined by ■
circumstances to the Philippine Islands, and forced to whet his appetite for broader '
culture and a wider knowledge of the outside world with stray books and pam-
phlets of the old school of French socialists, he would very likely have become what
Mabini became, a socialist-idealist and dreamer of the school of 1789.

4

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 69

erally written to deal fairly and scientifically with the primi-
tive natives and their descendants, well-nigh made a laughing-
stock of every FiHpino or Spaniard who identified himself
with this effort by burdening Spanish presses with asinine
treatises designed to show that the pre-conquest Filipinos had
a religion equal or superior to Christianity and Hved in a sort
of elysium of patriarchal justice and of fraternal love ; this
class, in short, which, bred up in the narrow and scholastic
training of the friars' schools at Manila, and continuing in the
same grooves of education in Spain, was only blindly aware of
the real nature of the aims of such a young prophet as Rizal,
yet insisted on floundering around after him and producing
imitations of modern scientific treatises.*

There was exaggeration enough about the campaign of the
more intelligent, sensible Filipinos. Their clamor for assimila-
tion with the home Government of Spain, with an organization
like that of any one of the provinces of Spain, was a clamor
for something impracticable and undesirable either for the
Philippines or for Spain.^ It was mostly sentimental and never
well reasoned out. Back of it were the real and the reasonable
aspirations of the Philippine Liberals, namely, for representa-
tion in the Cortes of Spain, for some share, that is, in the gov-
ernment which ought to pass upon only their more general
interests ; and for a much greater measure of home rule, to-
gether with the liberties of press and of association. This sec-
ond and more far-reaching aspiration carried with it as a log-

1 It would be profitless, besides consuming space, to attempt a catalogue of this
class of Filipinos ; they have made themselves conspicuotis enough so that anj one
who studies the literature of their coimtry's recent history will meet with them
only too frequently. The people of the United States have had some experience
with them within their own borders since 1898.

* The Federal Party's plank declaring for statehood in the American Union, put
forth in 1900, but virtually dropped in 1903, was a revival of the *' assimilation
campaign," adapted to the conditions of the new sovereignty. Both because of the
state of culture of their inhabitants snd because of their geographical location, the
Philippines need, from every standpoint, a government on the spot and a govern-
ment especially adapted to them.

70 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

ical consequence the removal of the friar priests ; in fact, it
began with and grew from that demand.

The significant thing after all, even when we have restated in
more reasonable and practical form, as well as more accurately,
what were the real aspirations of the Filipino reform party, is
that the campaign stopped short of being a separatist campaign.
This statement impugns the reiterated charge of the friars and
of their Spanish supporters that, from the very outset, the op-
position to them was due only to a desire to oust Spain from
the islands. It is nevertheless the inevitable conclusion to be
drawn from the whole record of the propaganda of 1886 to
1896. Before setting out for Spain in 1888, Marcelo del Pilar,
one of the bitterest critics of the existing regime, wrote in the
prologue to the Spanish-Tagalog dictionary of a schoolmaster
friend: "His aspirations will be fully realized, and our satis-
faction immense, if the work should contribute to the diffusion
of Castilian speech in this archipelago, which, being a piece of
Spain, ought to be Spanish in its language, Spanish in its re-
ligion, in its sentiments, in its habits and in its aspirations." *
It would be easy to multiply such quotations. It is also easy
to present apparent proof that independence was the real aim
from the first by assorting quotations from " La Solidaridad,"

1 Prologue to Pedro Serrano Laktaw's Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog (Manila,
1889). And, after reaching Spain, Del Pilar said, in his first pamphlet published
under the guarantee of liberty of the press in the home country (Za Soherania mo-
nacaZ, Barcelona, 1888; Manila edition, 1898, p. 11): "There is no serious evidence of a
proposal on the part of the Philippines to separate from Spain. . . . The little disturb-
ances that have occurred in Luzon have never been popular in character . . . they
have always been put down by these same sons of Spain themselves [the Filipinos in
the Spanish army]. To emancipate itself from Spain is to go counter to the rising
progress of the Filipino people. The archipelago being spread out in numerous
islands, it needs a bond of union to fortify all the elements of its prosperity and
welfare ; without such a bond, division is imminent; from division to internal war-
fare, and from such strife to international strife is only a step. The Filipinos are
by no means ignorant of this. Surrounded by countries with which they have not
the least commimity of principles, and exposed constantly to foreign avarice, . . .
to think of their emancipation under such circumstances would be suicidal." Tliis
is almost the same language as that of the Manila petition of 1888 for the expul-
sion of the friars fto be mentioned below) ; Del Pilar and Doroteo Cortes were its
authors.

I

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 71

and particularly from RizaFs writings. Feeling ran high on
both sides, and the truth is not to be obtained from detached
selections, but from a careful survey of the whole literature of
the times. We find Rizal in 1891 calmly weighing the possi-
bilities of the Phihppines being seized by any foreign power
in case they should ever achieve their independence from Spain.*
His first novel, "Noli Me Tangere," published in 1886, was
the passionate cry of a Malay, who felt himself the equal of
any white man, had so proved himself in the halls of learning,
and was so received by the scholars whom he met in Germany,
for a fair chance for his race. It was, as he said, an attempt
to expose to the world the ills of his people, as the ancients
" exposed on the steps of the temple their sick, that everyone
who came to invoke the Divinity might propose them a remedy."
What wonder, then, that indignation at the abuses his people
suffered, when he had compared their backward state with
that of other peoples, made this young crusader (then only
twenty-five years old) set forth the Spaniards, friars, military
men, and all, with somewhat of the bitterness of the zealot ?
Even then, " Noli Me Tangere " is most notable for its photo-
graphic reproductions of one phase after another of the life
of the Filipinos, shown with all their weaknesses and their
vices as well as from more agreeable viewpoints ; in the same

* It is significant, however, that the article, which appeared in La Solidaridad
for September 30, 1891, was entitled " The Philippines Within a Hundred Years."
It may be of interest to know that, after presenting reasons why the colonizing
nations of Europe would be fully occupied with Africa and would leave the Phil-
ippines to go their own coarse, he weighs the possibility of the United States in-
terfering, and says : " Perhaps the great American Republic, whose interests are
in the Pacific [Rizal had recently returned from a visit to the Philippines, going
back to Europe via Japan and the United States], and which has no share in the
spoils of Africa, may sometime think of possessions beyond the seas. It is not im-
possible, for the example is contagious, covetousness and ambition are vices of
the strong, and Harrison showed something of this disposition during the Samoan
question. But the Panama Canal is not opened, nor have the States a plethora of
inhabitants in their own territory; and, supposing they should openly make the
attempt, the European powers, knowing well that the appetite is stimulated by the
first monthfuls, would not leave them free to pursue this course. North America
would be a too troublesome rival, if it once took up the career. Besides, it is
against her traditions."

72 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

prologue, he had said : " I will lift part of the veil that covers
the sore, sacrificing everything to truth, even self-love itself,
for, as a son of thine, I suffer also from thy defects and weak-
nesses." ^ And " El Filibusterismo," published in Ghent in
1891 (written in Biarritz, Paris, Brussels, and Ghent), much
the stronger of his two novels as a piece of political writing,
though not equal to " Noli Me Tangere " as a piece of liter-
ature, is less vindictive against Spanish institutions, and shows
the maturer judgment of the author as to the necessity for his
people to remain yet awhile in leading-strings. This is, in fact,
the theme of the story. And in general, in everything that
Rizal wrote there stands out preeminently the preacher to his
people, seeking to arouse them to an appreciation of their
shortcomings and defects. He saw that there must be self-re-
liance on the part of the individual before there could be inde-
pendence for the nation. Again and again do such thoughts
as these come out : " The Filipinos seem not to know that tri-
umph is born of strife, that happiness is the flower of many
sufferings and privations, and that every redemption presup-
poses martyrdom and sacrifices ; they think that, with lament-
ing, with folding the arms and letting things take their course,
they have fulfilled their duty. ... As for the fatherland,
every Filipino thinks : Let it take care of itself, let it save it-
self, let it protest, let it strive ; I do not have to trouble myself,
it does not depend on me to arrange affairs ; I have enough to
do with my own interests, my passions and my caprices ; let
others pull the chestnut out of the fire, then it will be time
for us all to eat it."^

1 The title Noli Me Tangere, translated from the Latin as " Don't touch me,"
ha8 been given various meanings in the United States, generally being supposed
to refer to the attitude of the friars. In Spanish, however, nolimetangere, written
as one word, signifies a malignant ulcer ; this meaning, taken together with the
above quotation from its prologue, shows that Rizal had in mind his own people's
condition as the subject about which his book was primarily written.

2 An " adaptation " of Noli Me Tangere, reduced to more than half, probably
translated from the French version (which, apparently, is all Sir Hugh Clifford
ever saw), and with even the name changed to Tlie Eaglets Flight, was brought
out in New York in 1901. Its garbling of this exposition of the Filipino cause

MUNICIPAL EECRGANIZATION 78

It was late in the history of the propaganda before it was
actively carried on in the Philippines. Everything published in
Spain or elsewhere reached the islands and circulated secretly,
but many things that could be said or printed in Spain would
not have been tolerated in the islands. In 1888, during an in-
terregnum in government before the arrival of Weyler, and
while Jose Centeno, the Liberal official whose work in geology
has been noted, was acting civil governor of Manila, there was
a public demonstration against the friars, an indiscriminate
gathering of natives marching to Centeno's residence and pre-
senting a petition addressed to the governor-general and ask-
ing the removal of the friars and the secularization of the cura-
cies, also attacking directly Archbishop Pedro Paya, who had
recently clashed with the Liberals then in the chief executive
posts on several matters of administration. Some eight hundred
signers were obtained, nearly all obscure or ignorant persons;
the men of standing and education who were back of it were
afraid to affix their names for fear of proscription, and the
very man who wrote most of it, a wealthy mestizo^ after-
ward deported under an order also confiscating his property,
did not sign it. The hue and cry raised over this incident, and
the scandal that was made of it by the friars, show how rare
and dangerous a thing it was felt to be.^

almost amounts to sacrilege. Still stronger words are to be used about a " transla-
tion " of the novel put forth under the name of Henry Gannett in 1900. Reprints
of these novels in the Spanish, the first, by the way, ever issued in the Philippines,
were brought out in Manila after American occupation beg^n, Noli Me Tangere
in 1899 and El Filibusterismo in 1900. Several editions of the former have appeared
in Spain. Miscellaneous poetical, political, historical, and scientific writings of
Rizal, some of them still in manuscript, have yet to be collected and published to-
gether. Nearly everything he wrote is worthy of reproduction to-day.

^ This petition (possibly with some changes) was printed in a pamphlet entitled
** Long live Spain ! Long live the Queen I Long live the Army f Away with the
friars 1 " brought out by the propagandists at Hongkong the same year (see nos.
1697 and 2807 of Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipino). The document as printed
in that pamphlet is reproduced in Marcelo del Pilar's Soberania monacal (Manila
edition, pp. 54-63), which pamphlet is made up mostly of the various episodes
occurring just prior to Del Pilar's removal to Spain and leading up to the petition
and public demonstration. These were, principally: an enrlier protest of various
Filipino local officials against Archbishop Paya for failing to attend the funeral

74 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

In 1891, differences having arisen among the propagandists,
the factions grouping more particularly about Del Pilar and
Rizal, — the weakness of every Filipino movement, good or

services for Alfonso XII, presumably on account of their being organized by the
Liberal officials; the archbishop's action in limiting the 1888 celebration of St. An-
drew's Day (anniversary of the defeat of the Chinese pirate Li-Ma-Hong in 1574)
to the Spanish walled town, connected also with the trouble over the celebration
of La fiesta naval in Binondo and the manifestation by Filipino officers of certain
barrios of Manila of hostility toward the friars ; the refusal of the officers of cer-
tain Bulakdn towns to submit to the dictation of the friar curates in matters of local
administration; the demonstrations of Laguna tenants of the Dominicans against
the raising of rents, etc. These almost unprecedented instances of defiance of the
friars and the display of a new spirit of independence in some few of the Filipino
communities were charged by the religious orders and their organs to the openly
anti-friar attitude of Centeno, and particularly of his immediate superior, Quiroga
Ballesteros, director-general of civil administration. It had all come to a head in
the order of the latter forbidding the exposure of corpses in the churches (a prolific
source of burial fees), ostensibly upon sanitary grounds alone. The archbishop, in a
circular to the parish priests of October 28, 1887, virtually set at naught the order of
the civil authorities, though in form pretending compliance with the instructions of
Quiroga. Again, the latter took measures to have the proposed orphan asylum and
trade school near Manila become a Government institution purely, the Augustinians
rejecting the conditions imposed upon them for the trust. A speedy change of
administration, bringing General Weyler as governor-general, resulted in the
downfall of Quiroga, Centeno, and other officials non gratos to the friars. An analy-
sis of the petition of 1888 and of its signers, with a diatribe against the whole
anti-friar movement, comprises the second part of W. E. Retana's Avisos y pro-
fecias (Madrid, 1892). Retana was an industrious and fairly accurate Philippine
bibliographer, but as a political writer he was, as a Filipino has put it, a " veri-
table calamity." Other Filipinos, and Spaniards as well, do not treat him so chari-
tably, but openly charge him with having been a hireling of the friars, during the
latter part of his stay in the Philippines (when he had special favors from the or-
ders), during his term as deputy to the Cortes (as a representative of one of the
districts of Cuba, under the administration of Weyler, to whose influence he owed
his selection for this post, and whose defender and " press-agent " he was during
the last few years prior to the war between the United States and Spain), and
during his editorship of La Politica de Espana en Filipinas, the organ of the ancien
regime, published at Madrid from 1891 to 1898. Retana is now writing on another
tack, is reported to have severed all connection with the orders, and seems to
have lost his old sympathy for them. His chief associate on La Politica was Pablo
Feced, who under the pseudonym of " Quioquiap " wrote any amount of contribu-
tions to the press of Manila and Spain, and a number of pamphlets, during the
closing years of Spanish rule in the Philippines, always treating the Filipinos as
a race essentially and permanently inferior, and sometimes displaying great bitter-
ness toward them. He, even more than Retana, deserves credit for having sowed
the seeds of discord between the two peoples ; yet his writings, mainly economical
(and displaying great ignorance of economic principles, as well as of the things about
which he wrote), and devoted especially to his chief hobby, the colonization of
Mindanau by Spaniards, are entirely unimportant.

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 75

bad, lies in the jealousies that invariably arise between its
leaders, — the latter set out for Hongkong, where he organized
the first branch of his lAga Filipina, and projected a return
to his home.^ He seems to have had a fleeting notion of getting
together a colony of family and friends and emigrating with
them to English territory in North Borneo. The governor-
general in Manila at the time, however, was Don Emilio Des-
pujols, a military man of an old family, but with democratic
tendencies and personally very popular with the Filipinos.
Through the Spanish consul-general at Hongkong, he had re-
plied in a friendly way to RizaFs letters offering his services in
aid of the Spanish Government in the islands, as well as sug-
gesting the colonization project ; and Rizal decided to return
to the islands in June, 1892. The troubles upon the Kalamba
friar estate were then acute, and various of Rizal's relatives and
friends had been deported, while his father and three sisters
were under sentence of deportation ; and the result of Rizal's
first interview with Despujols was a pardon for them.^ The mili-

' He had been home in 1887-88, but Weyler was just then coming into power
and trouble was brewing on the friar estates where his parents and neiglibors
lived, so he was thought to be putting himself in jeopardy. It was then that he
had gone to London, via Japan and America, and undertaken as his first work
the editing of a new Spanish edition of Antonio de Morga's Sucesos de las Islas
FUtpinaSf published in Mexico in 1609, of which an English edition had appeared
in London in 1868 (Haklujt Society, translation of Henry £. J. Stanley), but
which was almost unknown to Spaniards and Filipinos. In annotating this work,
Rizal himself went to extremes in virtually claiming that the Filipinos had under
the Spanish rule retrograded from their state in Morga's times.

* For the protest of the Kalamba tenants of the Dominicans in 1887-88, see La
Soberania monacal^ pp. 64-66. These demonstrations of a more independent spirit
in Kalamba were ascribed by the friars to Rizal's influence, just as Marcelo del
Pilar was felt to have been chiefly instrumental in the similar manifestations of his
neighbors of Malolos — doubtless correctly in both cases. For a one-sided account
of the popular disturbances on the Kalamba friar estate in 1891 (for which Weyler
deported twenty-five natives), see La Politica de Espaha en FilipinaSt supplement to
isfue of February 16, 1892. A letter from Rizal to his parents, written from
Hongkong on June 20, just before sailing for Manila, shows that he had no illu-
•ioDi as to the risk he was taking : ** The love I have always had and professed
for you was what led me to take this step, which only the future can say is or is not
wise. ... I know I have made you suffer much, but I do not repent of what I
haTe done ; if I had to l>ogin over, I should do just what I have done ; for it
if my duty. I set out gladly to expose myself to danger, not as if in expiation of

76 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

tary police, the ostentatiously " patriotic " Spanish newspapers,
and the friar circles of Manila had been in a turmoil of indigna-
tion from the moment it was announced that Rizal was to re-
turn ; and the enthusiastic greeting he received from his fellow-
countrymen added fuel to the fire. A few days after arriving,
Rizal assembled a large crowd of Filipinos of nearly all condi-
tions of life at the house of a prominent Chinese half-caste
merchant, for the purpose of organizing the Liga Filipina on
native soil. No particular pains were taken to surround the
meeting with secrecy, and the aims of the league, as pre-
sented in writing by Rizal, were to conduct a campaign, through
papers, pamphlets, etc., for the advancement and increase in
culture of the people, for more liberal political institutions and
improved educational facilities, and, as one of the specific
means to securing all these ends, to organize cooperative Fili-
pino commercial associations, establish foundries, machine-
shops, etc., and in general endeavor to capture for the native
element a more respectable share in the increasing commerce
and industry of the archipelago.^ Governor-General Despujols,

my faults (as in this respect, I do not tbiuk I have committed any), but to crown
my work and to testify with my example to what I have always preached. A man
should die for his duty and his convictions. I sustain all the ideas I have expressed
relative to the present state and the future of my country, and I will gladly die
for it, and even more in order to obtain for you justice and tranquillity. . . . Who
am I ? A man alone, almost without family, sufficiently undeceived as to life. I
have suffered many deceptions, and the future is dark, and will be very dark, if not
illumined by the light, the aurora of my native land, while there are many beings
who, full of hopes and dreams, may perchance be allowed to live happily after my
death ; for I expect that then my enemies will be satisfied and will no longer pursue
so many innocent people. ... If fate is adverse to me, know all that I shall die
happy, feeling that with my death I am to obtain for them the cessation of all their
bitternesses." A copy of this letter is in the writer's possession. This and other
data as to Rizal's career may be obtained from the special numbers of the Manila
newspapers El Renacimiento and La Democracia of December 30, 1901, the occa-
sion of the first formal celebration in Manila of his death.

1 The connection of the Chinese-Filipinos, who are almost the only element of
native origin and associations which has successfully made a showing in the modern
commercial expansion of the Philippines, was of course inevitable. The aims of the
Liga have been made public almost exclusively by Spanish writers, officials or
others, who desired to make it out as a direct assault upon the sovereignty of
Spain. To this end the testimony taken from those charged with complicity in the

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION 77

suspicious of Rizal from the first, through the Spaniard's exag-
gerated resentment toward any one who speaks in a way at all
derogatory of his country, let his good faith be easily imposed
upon by those who were interested in seeing Rizal removed, or
else seized the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Span-
ish element which had been so harshly criticizing his efforts at
conciliation of the Filipinos as a " policy of weakness." On
July 7, when Rizal had been in the city scarcely ten days, he
ordered him and a dozen of his intimates deported to the
southern islands, Rizal being sent to Dapitan, a scantily popu-
lated district of Bisayans on the northwest coast of Mindanau/

revolt of 1896 was directed so far as possible; the means employed involved some-
times the torture of the accused by the secret police, and sometimes, it is to be
feared, manipulation of the records. Unquestionably, the aims above outlined
looked for the fitting of the country for possible independence, and unquestionably
many Filipinos cherished that ideal, not a few of them hoping to see it realized
much earlier than did Rizal. But that the Liga Filipina was organized as a direct
campaign for independence is a charge brought forward afterward, with a very
definite purpose, by Rizal's enemies.

^ The decree of deportation was published in the Gaceta de Manila (the ofiBcial
gazette) on July 7, 1892. See also La Politica de Espana en FilipinaSf vol. n, pp.
223-24, for the full text (and following pages for extracts from the contem-
porary press of Manila and Spain on the episode and accounts of Rizal's move-
ments during his few days of liberty in the Philippines). Apparently, it was not
desired to try the issue of Rizal's alleged violation of law in the civil courts, or
even in a summary military court, and the governor-general resorted to his discre-
tionary power. The charges made against Rizal in this decree are: (1) That his
baggage on arrival was foimd to contain leaflets, entitled " Poor Friars," satirizing
the humility of the Filipino and attacking the religious orders; (2) that his novel
El FilibusterismOf just beginning to circulate, was dedicated to the priests executed
in 1872, and that on the title-page he had made his own a statement by Blumentritt
that there was no salvation for the Filipinos except in separation from Spain [this
was an outright distortion of Blumentritt's meaning] ; (3) that he had attacked
the Pope and the friars, and was plainly seeking to rob the Filipinos of their tra-
ditional religion; (4) that he bad, by his proceedings since arrival, shown ingrati-
tude for the lenient treatment of his father and his sisters, and had, when accused
of bringing in the leaflets, sought to throw the blame on bis sister. The decree is
significant, first, for its absolute identification of the Government, even under the
Inm regime of Despujols (who was persona non grata to the friars), with the cause
of the religious orders, and, second, because it makes no mention of the organiza-
tion of the Liga Filipina^ which was the handle his enemies had used in getting him
deported, and which was afterward alleged to be sole and sufficient cause. As for
the leaflets in his baggage, they were, at most, only seditious if an attack on the
(riart was deemed sedition. Moreover, the whole matter pertaining to them is
throoded in much mystery. Despujols took pains to say, as very likely be was led

78 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Liga Filipina died almost at its birth, though revived
secretly during the following year ; but the cause it represented
could not be smothered in such fashion, and Rizal's exile only
served to excite the Filipinos to greater bitterness. After a
lingering existence in secret for a year, the Liga was formally
dissolved, and prominent and wealthy natives, principally
Chinese half-castes and Tagalogs, but also a few Ilokans, Pam-
pangans, Bikols, and Bisayans, pledged themselves to make
stated contributions to carry on the contest (the Co^njyromi-
sarios). Almost at the same time, the Filipino agitation entered
upon a new phase with the organization of a new secret society,
in many respects distinct in membership and methods, and to
a considerable degree distinct in its aims, from anything that
had preceded it. This was the Katipunan.

to believe, that these leaflets were found on Rizal's arrival. The charge, however,
was not brought forward till some few days afterward ; some Spanish writers who
were then officially connected with affairs, say they were found in his baggage as
he was setting out for Dapitan. The Filipinos always have believed that these
leaflets were put in his baggage at the instigation of the friars, in the same way
they claim that evidence was forged against Father Burgos in 1872.

The additional clauses of Despujols' decree of deportation deserve citation.
They are: "(2) There is prohibited, if this had not already been done, the intro-
duction and circulation in the archipelago of the works of the said author, as well
as every proclamation or leaflet in whicli directly or indirectly the CathoHc reli-
gion or the national unity is attacked ; (3) There is conceded a period of three
days, beginning with the publication of this decree, in the provinces of Manila, Ba-
tangas, Bulak^n, Cavite, Laguna, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlak; of eight
days in the other provinces of Luzon, and of fifteen days in the remaining islands,
within which persons who have in their possession said books or proclamations may
deliver them up to the local authorities. After said period, every one in whose pos-
session any copy is found will be considered as disaffected, and treated as such."

CHAPTER m

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN : A RACE WAR

Before discussing the Katipunan/ about which more ridicu-
lous, exaggerated, and often willfully false things have been
written than about any other feature even of Philippine his-
tory, it is necessary to go back a little. First, it should be said
that the Katipunan was not a Masonic organization, while yet
Freemasonry, of a modified Spanish sort, prepared the way in
the Philippines for the Katipunan. The Spanish grand lodges
of Freemasons had installed branches in the Philippines as far
back as the sixties. For twenty-five years those lodges were
few in number and were organized in the commercial centers,
numbering only Spaniards and other Europeans, with here and
there a Spanish mestizo of prominence. At about the time the
assimilation propaganda hitherto described had become well
outlined, pressure was brought to bear upon the grand lodges
of Spain to permit the organization of distinctively native
lodges of masons in the islands. There was already a very close
connection between the Freemasons of Spain and the Filipino
propaganda.^ The membership of the Spanish-Philippine Asso-
ciation of Madrid and of Barcelona, and of the Filipino club
which had headquarters where " La Solidaridad " was printed,

* The full name of this society was Ang Kataastaasan Kagalanggdlang Katipunan
nang mafiga Anak nang Bayarif represented by the initials K. K. K. N. M. A. N. B.
and meaning " The Supreme Worshipful Association (or Junta) of the Sons of
the People."

* No one at all familiar with the history of Freemasonry in France and Spain
from the beginnings of the French Revolution, needs to be told that, if not anti-
Catholic, it has at least steadily conducted a propaganda in opposition to the asser-
tion of secular power on the part of the Papacy and in opposition to the monastic
orders. Freemasonry bat been in those ooantriei consistently and aggressively
"Liberal."

m

80 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

was practically identical with that of certain Masonic lodges.
The Spaniard at the head of a grand lodge of Madrid called
the Oriente Espanol, Miguel Morayta, a Spanish Liberal, suc-
ceeded Del Pilar as editor of " La Solidaridad." There can be
little doubt that the propagandists, the Spanish law of asso-
ciations not having been extended to the Philippines, deliber-
ately adopted the system of Masonic secret lodges as a means
of carrying on their work in the islands. A " Grand Regional
Lodge " was organized in Manila, and its workers were author-
ized to create subordinate lodges throughout the archipelago.
One of these workers claimed to have organized such lodges of
Filipinos from the Kagayan Valley on the north to the Span-
ish town of Jol(5 on the south. There were a number of lodges
in the Bisayas, and they were scattered all over Luzon, though
the two hundred or more organized between 1890 and 1896
were mostly in the Tagalog provinces.^

^ Viriato Diaz-Perez, the son of a Spanish Liberal (a Philippine office-holder,
who wrote various contributions to the press of Spain combating the pretensions
of the friars), in his pamphlet Los frailes de FUipinas (Madrid, 1904), pp. 18-21,
defends Masonry from having had any connection with the separatist or revolu-
tionary programme in Spain, producing figures to show that just prior to the out-
break of the trouble in the islands the Masonic lodges there numbered 1214
Spaniards and 32 other Europeans as against 890 Filipinos, mostly half-castes,
and that among the Spaniards and half-castes were many officials of the army who
fought against the revolutionists. The figures here given referred mainly to the
lodges organized in the Philippines as tributary to the " Grand Lodge of Spain,"
taking very little account of the more recent labors of the so-called Oriente Es-
panol under Morayta and the Filipinos who cooperated with him in Spain and in
the Philippines. Some published articles by Spanish Masons seem to indicate that
the " Grand Lodge of Spain " claimed to have the only authority to represent in
Spain and the Spanish possessions the Freemasonry of England and Scotland and
that the other grand lodge was deemed spurious, perhaps an offshoot merely of
French Masonry. Both these grand lodges had opened the way for the entrance
of Filipinos into the lodges in the Philippine archipelago from 1884 on ; but it
was only the organization under the Oriente Espanol which had connection, indi-
rectly at least, with the political propaganda from about 1890 to 1895. The statis-
tics given by V. Diaz-Perez are taken from an article contributed by Nicolas
Diaz-Perez, his father, to La J^pocQf Madrid, August 15, 1896, and vigorously
combated at the time by the friar press, which, however, afterward tacitly ac-
knowledged the non-complicity of the Grand Lodge of Madrid with the political
agitation in the Philippines. From the friar point of view, the final chapter of
Friar Edouardo Navarro's FUipinas: Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad
(Madrid, 1897) presents an arraignment of Masonry for all the ills of Spain dur-
ing the nineteenth century.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN Sf

Only slight familiarity with Filipino character and history
is needed to comprehend how such a secret organization, with
its signs, symbols, mysteries of initiation, etc., would, even were
its special aims not at the time constantly in the minds of the
Filipino leaders, spread with exceeding facility. It called into
play certain characteristics and propensities for secret, one
might almost say backhanded, procedure in which the Filipinos
sometimes seem to revel. It may as readily be seen how the
Katipunan, organized on similar lines, would spread among
the masses, hitherto but little reached by the propaganda, with
as great facility as Masonry had spread among the priiicipalia.
If allowed to work unhindered with the instruments of secrecy,
mystery, and superstition, any fanatic or impostor can to-day
speedily enroll half a province under his banner and levy con-
tributions upon them. When one adds that, in the communi-
ties where the Katipunan was chiefly organized, the masses of
the people were intensely aroused over the assertion of the
friar administrators' right to collect rent from them and over
the constant abuses of the civil guard, it is easily understood
that the idea of a popular secret society on similar lines, so far
as many of its forms were concerned, to the Masonic organi-
zation, and in which the initiates were made to understand
that in some way they were to achieve their rights in opposi-
tion to the Spaniards, and in particular to the friars, was, to
say the least, a practicable one. Whether, judged by the re-
sults, this method of organizing the masses and working them
up to the pitch of frenzy, is to be deemed wholly timely, hence
commendable and patriotic, is not a question for consideration
here.

The idea was primarily, it is said, that of Marcelo del Pilar,
with whose plans Rizal had to some extent disagreed.^ Of these

1 It is asserted also that there was a falb'ng-oat at Madrid over the administra-
tion of the funds sent from the Philippines by the committee of propaganda first
organized. Financial difficulties and charges of dishonesty in this respect have been
a close second to personal jealousies in disrupting all, or nearly all, distinctively
Filipino movements.

82 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

two men, Del Pilar was somewhat the older and more matter-
of-fact, if less brilliant and enthusiastic, and in general less
impetuous and radical of utterance. Yet in this case, whether
or no their differences arose from personal jealousy, when, as
the more sane and far-seeing of the active propagandists, they
should naturally have worked together, Del Pilar virtually put
himself with the more intemperate and reckless agitators in
proposing a "popular society," partly at least in opposition to
the conservative proposals of the Liga Filipina. The charge
that the whole propaganda from the first was a separatist
movement has been much strengthened by the sayings and
writings of some of these men, who were perhaps somewhat
jealous of the prestige Kizal had gained in Europe as well as
at home, and some of whom could not resign themselves to
going as slowly as he felt was necessary, could not sow the
seed and patiently wait for it to germinate. The Supreme
Council of the Katipunan was organized in Manila in 1892,
some say on the very day Rizal was deported. Middle-class
natives of the capital figured in it, and the first president was
a brother-in-law of Del Pilar. From the first, however, the
most energetic spirit in it was Andres Bonifacio, who was em-
ployed as porter of the warehouse of a German firm in the
Binondo district, and who, with a little education and reading,
had become a sort of socialist, with a vague understanding of
European anarchists' methods of propaganda. He gradually
undermined the first president, and, finding the man he had
substituted also not energetic enough to suit him, he put him-
self at the head of the organization by a sort of dictator's coup.
In 1894 and 1895 the society took on, under his leadership,
greatly renewed activity, and there are indications that its
plans were altered to suit his more radical inclinations ; at any
rate, it was not, as a society, merely carried along by the cur-
rent which was now bearing the Filipinos to a crisis. It is dif-
ficult to be precise as to the original aims of the Katipunan.
The published writings on it, and the testimony before the

; REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 88

Spanish courts-martial of 1896, are to be viewed with great
suspicion. It is perhaps safe to say that, as originally organized,
the Katipunan was to carry on much the same sort of propa-
ganda among the masses as the Liga Filipina had intended to
conduct among the more intelligent classes. That the very con-
dition of the Tagalog friar-hating masses, aroused by an agra-
rian grievance, was bound to lead such a society to more radical
means and measures, even without a Bonifacio, is evident. And
this is what had happened by 1895, aside from the fact that the
upper classes of Filipinos, too, had by then been organized
long enough to feel an impatience for definite accomplishments
and a straining toward more radical action. It is charged, by
rabid Spaniards, that the Katipunan was organized at the out-
set to stir the masses up to exterminate all whites in the islands,
and that Rizal and such men as he were in sympathy with this
programme, if not the inspirers of it. The latter accusation
needs no refutation. There are stray bits of evidence that ex-
termination had by 1895 come to be the preaching of the
more bloodthirsty leaders like Bonifacio, imbued with the notion
of repeating the scenes of the French Commune and achieving
" liberty " at one stroke. With a populace like that which they
set out to work upon, the more responsible leaders might have
foreseen such an outcome from the start.

Rizal had at first lent his support to the organization, the
prestige of his name in association with it as a silent sympa-
thizer contributing to its extension, while letters from him
and circulars over his nom deplume were secretly distributed
in its behalf, though, so far as has appeared, there was nothing
which indicated his having any direct connection with the so-
ciety. But when Bonifacio sent an emissary to Dapitan to ob-
tain his formal sanction to the idea of armed revolt, Kizal
promptly stated that he could have nothing to do with any
such project, that such a movement was premature ; in short,
that the path to follow, for the present at least, was that of
evolution, not of revolution. Bonifacio was so enraged at this

84 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

direct blow to his plans that he suppressed Rizal's reply, and
even represented him as being heart and soul with the idea of
revolt.^

1 Pio Valenzuela, a tool of Bonifacio in various enterprises, was sent to Dapi-
tan with two women ostensibly in need of Rizal's professional advice as an oculist.
Though the Manila secret police got most anything out of him they desired to
have him say in their various examinations he underwent after his arrest for com-
plicity in the revolt of 1896, he declared, in one of the first of these examina-
tions, that Rizal opposed the idea of Bonifacio to raise the people in revolt "so
tenaciously, with so ill humor and with words so indicative of displeasure " that
he came back to Manila the following day, instead of remaining in Dapitan a month
as intended (this in May, 1896). In a later examination, one of the objects of
which apparently was to get evidence against Rizal, Valenzuela's testimony was
that Rizal replied when he had broached the plan: "No, no, no, a thousand times
no!" citing some "philosophic principle to show him that what it was proposed
to do was not advisable, for it would result to the prejudice of the Filipino people,
with other reasons upon which he based his negative." (See Retana's Archivo del
lihliSfilo JiUpinOf vol. ill, pp. 226, 349.) It is said that steps were even taken by
the plotters to secure a steamer at Singapore, to steal Rizal from Dapitan and
carry him to Japan, where variotis Filipino propagandists had established them-
selves after Japan's defeat of China, partly in the hope of inducing Japan, as the
rising representative of Oriental independence, to take up their cause. (Marcelo del
Pilar was on the point of leaving Spain and going to join the committee in Yokohama
when he died at Barcelona in 1896, just as premature death was claiming in an-
other part of Spain Graciano Lopez Jaena, the chief Bisayan representative among
the propagandists.) From Japan some few arms were secretly introduced into the
Philippines in early 1896. The Filipinos in Japan claimed, in letters to their com-
panions in Manila, to have obtained audiences with high officials of the Mikado's
Empire; but there is not a scrap of evidence worthy of serious consideration going
to show that the Japanese Government violated its obligations of neutrality to-
ward Spain, or even indulged the thought of doing so. The excitement worked up
over the matter in Spain, just following Japan's emergence into view as a na-
val power to be reckoned with, and again when the irresponsible talk of some of !
the more reckless Filipino plotters became known, seems ridiculous, when the
stories sift down to a casual meeting in a Japanese bazaar in Manila between sev-
eral officers of a Japanese cruiser and a few almost unknown Filipinos, who were I
later courteously thanked by the Japanese for the present of a few melons. It I
recalls the previous stories that the Germans were preparing to seize the Philip- j
pine archipelago, based on the troubles over Protestant missionaries in the Caroline j
Islands in 1885 and on the further fact that Rizal and other Filipinos had found]
a congenial atmosphere and friends in Germany; one finds also talk of the same
sort as in 1904 about the " yellow peril " involved in Japan's career of martial his-
tory. The organ of the Katipunan, i4 n^ Kalayaan (Tagalog for "liberty "), which
printed one or perhaps two numbers in Tagalog at the beginning of 1896, bore
on its date-line the address Yokohama, but was probably printed secretly in Ma-
nila. Part of the contents of the first number, translated into Spanish, are repro-
duced in iUd.y vol. ni, pp. 134-48. The announcement of the editors contains the
plain statement that the day for the "a«?similation campaign" is past, is openly
anti-Spanish in fact : " The expression < Mother Spain ' is no longer anything bat

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 85

Unquestionably some of the more responsible and intelligent
leaders of the propaganda were by this time imbued with the
idea that the hour had come to rouse the people. Though this
class had practically no active share in the management of the
Katipunan organization, yet there were many wealthy half-
castes, especially Chinese-Filipinos, who were contributing to
the funds, aside from the real (one eighth of a peso) which
each member of the popular branches was supposed to give.
The number of lodges virtually corresponded with the number
of towns in the Tagalog provinces of Manila, Morong, Cavite,
Laguna, Batangas, Bulakan, and Nueva Ecija, and in addition
there were in some of the more populous barrios of towns in
the environs of Manila lodges in which the male population
of these barrios was mostly enrolled (also some few female
lodges of " coadjutors," just as a few female Masonic lodges
had formerly been organized). In the city of Manila itself, the
native districts of Tondo, Trozo, Binondo, Kiapo, Santa Cruz,
and Malate were quite effectively organized. The Katipunan
itself remained throughout Spanish rule quite purely Tagalog,
and may have numbered anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000
members, though probably nearer the former than the latter
figure. Its organization was not yet completed in 1896, nor had
its initiates in the mass been really enlightened as to just what
their association was for, except perhaps in the older and more
carefully established lodges, mostly inside the city of Manila
or near it. Naturally, all sorts of rumors prevailed among these
initiates, and, even had torture and threats not been resorted
to, it would probably have been just as easy to elicit proofs of
one sort and another that these ignorant members expected
massacre, or supposed that when the signal was given, they

« bit of adulation . . . there is no such mother, and no snch son; there is only a
race that robs, a people that fattens on what is not its own . . . ; there is hope in
nothing but our own forces and the defense of onrseWes." Yet the manifesto of
''Dimas-alang" (Rizal), though presenting in allegory the awakening of his peo-
ple by ** Liberty/* preaches mainly the need for an independence of spirit and a
self-reliance on the part of the people themselves, and most be distorted to find
anything countenancing immediate revolt.

86 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

-were to cut the throats of every friar and of every Spaniard,
man, woman, or child. Herein lay precisely the danger of such
an organization, and it is small wonder if Spaniards in Ma-
nila and outlying towns, as rumors began to multiply of plots
against them (the friars being busy at work extracting them
from the women in the confessional), became uneasy and
anxious, and the wildest sort of tales were afloat.^

Rumors there were in plenty during all of 1896 up to the
final coup in August. At one time they centered in Batangas
province, where there were well-defined tales of secret gather-
ings and of cargoes of rifles to be landed from Yokohama and
Hongkong.'^ Blanco, whom the friar organs excitedly accused
of being a Mason, and who undoubtedly sympathized to some
extent with the legitimate Filipino demands for reform, hesi-
tated to take the harsh measures that were urged upon him ;
and he might well do so, for many of the Spanish military and
other officials about him were not only as bloodthirsty as the

^ The initiation rites of the Katipunan were various, but in all forms were
calculated to be thoroughly awe-inspiring to the ordinary ignorant laborer. An
invariable feature was the pacto de sangre^ or blood -pact, wherein the blood was
drawn from the initiate's arm and a certain scar made upon it. It was a revival of
the old Malay custom, which Magellan had honored on arriving at Sebd, of two
chiefs establishing a friendship by drawing blood from each other's arms, mixing
it and drinking it. The initiation into the Liga Filipina had included the kissing
of a skull as a part of the oath-ceremony. The oath of the Katipunan, it is to be
noted, like the various other similar forms of it which have come to light both
earlier and later, gives considerable weight to the accusation that the Katipunan
was primarily an assassination-society. Its history shows that it unquestionably
lent itself at times to such purposes. But the fact that the oath, which was in
every sense calculated to bind the humble Filipino to awestruck obedience, pro-
vided for assassination, if required as a test of loyalty, does not necessarily
prove that such was the prime purpose of the organization, nor does it authorize
the charge that the society was bent on the extermination of Spaniards. We must
judge the Katipunan, both when used against the Spaniards and against the Ameri-
cans, by its deeds. They are bad enough, but do not warrant the sweeping charges
that have been made against it.

2 Governor-General Blanco ordered the deportation of some of the leading men
of Batangas in April, 1896. Felipe Agoncillo, afterward representative of the
Filipino revolutionary government in the United States, was one of them, but had
friends in power in Manila, who gave him telegraphic warning in cipher, and he
escaped to Japan, hidden, it is said, in the coal bunk of a Japanese steamer, and
carrying 80,000 pesos collected in Batangas for the propaganda.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 87

worst Katipuneros whom their imaginings depicted, but they
were also in a state of nervousness and excitement which lent
itself to denunciations upon the nearest rumor or upon imagin-
ings. Some of the friars were not behind them in this respect,
and seemed to think their chief function at the time was to de-
populate their respective towns of about all the prominent and
respected individuals of native blood who were in them. In
the main, the principal activities of this sort were, for obvious
reasons, in the environs of Manila;^ but there were friar de-
nunciations among the Bikols of Nueva Caceres, the Ilokans
of Union and North and South Ilokos provinces, the Pampan-
gans, and in Sebii, Leite, Negros, Iloilo, Kapis and elsewhere
in the Bisayas.^ There were gross abuses in this connection,
while at the same time it is not to be doubted that the old
Masonic organizations in all these provinces were to some extent
in touch with the new Katipunan organization in the Tagalog

^ Malolos in Bulak^n (Del Pilar's old home) continued to hold its place as a
storm-center, the open independence with which the leading native residents defied
the friar curates sent there between 1887 and 1896 being something new in Phil-
ippine history. In the fall of 1895, Blanco had been induced to deport to Min-
danau its principal citizens, including the entire municipal council. He had done
the same thing with the councilmen of Taal, Batangas, early in 1896. See Arch-
bishop Bernardino Nozaleda's Defensa oUigada (Madrid, 1904), appendices 5, 6,
and 7 for denunciations of the " work of Masonry " in BulakAn, Batangas, and
Pampanga, addressed by the archbishop to Blanco between March, 1895, and April,
1896, and appendix 8 for a denunciation of the Katipunan propaganda in Manila's
outskirts by one of his priests in June, 1896. The archbishop claims that the fact
that the Roman Catholic is the established church in the Philippines requires the
suppression of the " Masonic " propaganda, also insinuates that Blanco is a Mason.

^ In the Ilokan provinces, the trouble was almost purely over the friar question;
certain independent-minded native priests of that district were obnoxious to the
bishop and the friars, and they were quite ready to believe them filibusters or
anything else, only so they could g^t rid of them and of the wealthier natives who
Ijmpatbized and worked with them. In Nueva C^eres the most conspicuous native
of the Camarines was dragged into jail, later on, charged with plotting to intro-
duce arms there, the principal evidence against him being a confession by a fellow-
conspirator alleged to have been made on board the steamer that bore prisoners from
the Camarines to Manila, taken in irregular form before the vessel's crew, and under
other suspicions circumstances (see no. 42 of Documentor polUicos de actualidad in
Retana's ArchivOt vol. m); it is significant that he had refused to knuckle to the
friars in small ways, and that one of the Spaniards who denotinced him got him-
self appointed administrator of his estate after he was shot, and, it is said, enriched
himself from it.

88 THE AMERICANS EST THE PHILIPPINES

provinces. When it is estimated that the deportations under
Blanco before the actual revolt began in August were in the
neighborhood of four hundred, it may be imagined how busy
the friars would have kept such a man as Weyler.

Whatever might have been the outcome, had things been
allowed to drift longer in Manila, it is certain that the more
radical of the Katipunan leaders were preparing to break the
peace simultaneously at different points, when more arms had
been obtained. Just how far they had planned out the future,
in case of success, it is very difficult to say ; though some
among them had drawn up the list of men who were to form
the "Ministry of the Philippine Kepublic." There was some
indefinite talk of being able to obtain a protectorate from
Japan, or even from Spain ; but these half-formed projects
only served to bring out the confused state of Filipino aspira-
tions at the time. The Tagalog masses were imbued with the
notion of getting rid of the friars, whereupon some sort of
millennium might be expected to succeed, how it mattered not.
Their legitimate leaders were divided in a dozen camps, some
listening to the voice of caution that dictated doing nothing to
endanger their personal safety, some over-consumed with ambi-
tion and ready to let the radicals of lower social status but
with popular influence stir up the embers of conflagration,
some merely waiting like the pure opportunists they were
by instinct and training, some few urging patience and the
necessity for the development of the people, while most of the
distinctive conservatives among the Filipinos were not well
aware of what was actually going on.

Conservative and radical alike were, however, soon to find
themselves in the midst of the turmoil which followed upon the
publication of the Katipunan plot discovered by Father Ma-
riano Gil, the Augustinian curate of the Tondo parish of
Manila. Working in conjunction with the civil guard of that
district, the friar had been bringing the favorite instrument of
the confessional to bear since early in August, with the result

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 89

that on the 19th he came out with the confession of one of
Bonifacio's humbler co-workers, and with a most bloodthirsty
tale of assassinations soon to have been perpetrated.^ This was
just when Blanco was being urged by the secret police and
friars to take more active and radical measures of repression
in Batangas. The case worked up by Father Gil was so sub-
stantiated by particulars that, although Blanco seems to have
believed, both before and after this, that the proper way to
deal with the critical situation was to minimize it, and that to
take radical measures would unify the people, he felt himself
obliged to yield to the pressure upon him. He telegraphed
the home Government on August 21 : —

Vast organization secret societies discovered, with anti-national
tendencies. Twenty-two persons apprehended, including the Grand
Orient. . . . Special judge will be designated for greater activity in
proceedings.^

The last sentence contains a hint of the summary methods
that were to be adopted in running down and deahng with the
conspirators, through extraordinary military courts. These
were organized immediately after the issuance of Blanco's de-
cree of August 30 declaring a state of war to exist in Manila,
Bulak^n, Pampanga, Nueva ficija, Tarlak, Laguna, Cavite, and
Batangas provinces. Still, the governor-general coupled this
declaration with the concession of forty-eight hours during

^ The clue was said to have been obtained through the sister of this workman,
a pupil at the time in one of the sisterhood schools. With her help, all the forces
of religions superstition (and it may be forces of a more material sort) were brought
to bear for several days to make the workman tell on his fellows and save himself.
He was an employee in one of the Spanish printing-offices of Manila, where was
found the lithographing-stone used to print Katipunan receipts, concealed by the
workmen who were in the organization. It was claimed that many valuable and in-
eriminating documents were found here and in the warehouse where Bonifacio
worked, as well as in the private houses searched. If so, few of them have ever
been made public. See the affidavit of Father Gil in December, 1896, no. 24, of
Documentos politicos de actualidad (Archivo dd hihli/)filo JilipinOf vol. lu). See also
La PolUica de Espafia en Filipinas, vol. vi, pp. 275-308.

* For this and the subsequent messages and reports of Blanco and his suoces-
tort throughout the revolution, also Spanish press dispatches and comments, see
La PolUica de Egpafia en FilipiruUf September 15, 1896, and succeeding numbers
of 1896 and 1897.

90 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

which rebels who presented themselves to the authorities might
secure a free pardon, except the chiefs, who should have a
lesser degree of punishment in consequence of surrender.
This decree shows how rapidly events had moved. Warned by
friends, the Katipunan leaders had fled from Manila to the
suburb of Kalookan (Bulak^n province) early on August 22.
In spite of the premature disclosure of their plans, Bonifacio
insisted on armed resistance to the authorities, although some
pointed out the folly of such an attempt with the few firearms
they had yet obtained. He carried his point, it is said, in an
assemblage of some hundreds in a barrio of Kalookan, and
here, on the morning of August 26, was sounded the " cry of
Balintawak," and a little band of native troops of the civil
guard, under a Spanish lieutenant and two Spanish noncom-
missioned officers, were nearly captured by the masses of na-
tives who surrounded them, armed almost exclusively with
bolos.^ It was late in the day before the little band, which had
expended the last cartridge, had forced its way into Kalookan.
The revolution was on. Word had been sent out by the lead-
ers to raise the people simultaneously in the Tagalog provinces
on August 30. In the mean time, a nimiber of the hated Chinese
were waylaid in the outskirts of Manila and assassinated. On
the 30th, there were disturbances all around Manila. The
waterworks were captured, but abandoned; an attempt was
made to force entrance into the Sampalok suburb of Manila,
but was frustrated by a detachment of the civil guard ; on the
south side of the river, the suburb of Pandakan rose almost en
massCy and, the forces at the disposal of the authorities in the
city being scanty, there was rioting there all day ; across from
Pandakan, on the north side, in a stubborn contest near San
Juan del Monte about one hundred Filipinos were killed, and
in hand-to-hand fighting twice that many prisoners were taken,

1 According to the later testimony of one of Bonifacio's companions, they had
only four revolvers and two disabled shotguns, to which they added later ten
revolvers {Archivo^ vol. in, p. 206).

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 91

of whom four leaders were summarily tried and condemned to
be shot, fifty-three of their followers being executed with
them the following day. The bands around Manila worked
their way up the Pasig, and two thousand bolomen, with some
few rifles among them, nearly captured the civil guard and
Spanish authorities of the town of Pasig, besieging them in
the tower of the church. Nearly all the towns of Cavite province
rose on August 31, and, after more or less resistance, and with
the more or less speedy desertion of the native troops of the
civil guard's detachments, the petty officers of these detach-
ments, the friars and the other Spaniards resident in the towns
were in the hands of the rebels, everywhere outside the port
of Cavite and its immediate environs. The Nueva Ecija rising
began on September 3, when the important town of San Isi-
dro was attacked and besieged, its little garrison of native
troops and the Spaniards therein being nearly captured before
help arrived from Pampanga. Lesser disturbances happened
in the towns of Laguna and Batangas, and the authorities
asked themselves where next there would be call for troops.

It soon became evident, however, that, while there might
be much sympathy with the revolutionary idea, also some
active plotting, outside of the Tagalog provinces, there was
nowhere else either the arms or the organization to make much
trouble. Much was later to be made of the alleged plot to
slaughter all Spaniards in the Camarines, but it was certainly
magnified by the desires of the friars in Nueva C^ceres to get
rid of several independent native priests and of other Span-
iards to get rid of troublesome native rivals in business. The
reign of terror and torture inaugurated in some of the Ilokan
provinces, and the sending of leading men of Bigan to Manila
in chains in November, had a good deal of the same element
of ecclesiastical and business jealousy about it; the headquar-
ters of tortures in Bigan was the seminary of the native
priests, in charge of the Augustinians. Great alarm was
caused in September by an outbreak in Passi, near Iloilo,

92 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINE

•which was, however, put down by a small garrison of the
civil guard. Nevertheless, Filipinos made prisoners under
friar or military denunciation arrived at Manila at intervals
during the next three months from Panai, Sebu, and Leite,
and even from backward Bohol and Samar. A small garrison of
native troops in Mindanau and another in Jolo, where a Kati-
punan lodge had been installed among the Tagalog deportes
and troops, mutinied; but these were detached incidents.^ It
soon became evident that Cavite, whither Bonifacio had gone
early in the campaign, and where several determined and ener-
getic leaders like Aguinaldo had the people well organized,
was the head and front of the rebellion. To the north of Ma-
nila, another energetic leader, Mariano Llanera, operating from
Nueva Ecija, kept the mountainous district where that prov-
ince corners on Pampanga and Bulak^n in his possession,
and was capable of stirring up the towns far and wide when-
ever an opportunity presented itself. Farther east and on the
north side of the Pasig, the difficult mountainous country of
Morong and Manila provinces afforded excellent retreats for
the small bands recruited from the towns of Manila's neigh-
borhood, whose people were almost unanimously with the
rebels. The masses had not been so well prepared in Laguna
and Batangas, and geographical conditions gave them less
opportunity for concerted action than they had in Cavite.
Still, this whole country needed thorough policing, and many
more troops, and some of the towns bordering on Cavite were
in the insurgents' possession. Tayabas, also Tagalog, though
somewhat removed, was disposed to revolt, and it was later
found necessary to disarm the civil guard of the whole prov-
ince. Bataan and Sambales, the former pure Tagalog, the
latter partly so, were keen against the friars, and might pro-

1 The troubles in Panai and Negros from October, 1896, to March, 1897, are
reviewed in a pamphlet (Comandancia general de Panay y Negros. Alteraciones de
Srden publico, etc.) published at Iloilo in 1897 by General Ricardo Monet, the
Spanish o£Bcer in command there at the time. He magnifies their seriousness so
as to enhance his own importance.

BEVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 93

voke trouble at any time. Pampanga was, except in the north-
east, quiet, and Tarlak, though ripe for trouble, was a little
too far away from active operations to begin it alone.

Everywhere natives of position hastened to assure the Span-
ish authorities of their loyalty, this being almost as true in
the Tagalog towns outside of Cavite as elsewhere in the
islands. Some of these were mere sycophants, some (particu-
larly in Pangasinan, Pampanga, Union, North Ilokos, and the
Kagayan Valley) really meant it, and all without exception
felt such a step to be necessary for their own safety, even
where, in some few cases, the civil provincial governors were
deservedly popular men. And, while it is beyond question
that there was a general and a natural race-feeling of sym-
pathy for the insurgents, it is also true that there was a very
general feeling on the part of the more conservative and
capable Filipinos, of practically all the educated men who
ought in any national movement to be the leaders, that the
revolt was wholly premature.^

^ Apolinario Mabini was, by disposition and the training of ciroamstances, aa
well as by his self-education, anything but a conservative. He was one of those
arrested in the Manila police " reign of terror," being known to have been a Liga
Filipina officer, and was avowedly spared deportation only on account of his pa-
ralysis. Yet Mabini wrote in his posthumously published memoirs: "I never had
sufficient valor to disturb my countrymen so long as they preferred to live in tran-
quillity. I was an enthusiastic worker by the side of Rizal, Marcelo del Filar, and
others, who, after having opposed the evils which a discretionary and arbitrary
administration imposed upon the Filipinos, asked of the Spanish Government
that the Filipinos be made politically the same as a province of the Spanish
Peninsula, for the very purpose of preventing it coming to pass that many Fil-
ipinos should seek in separation the remedy for those evils, through the organiza-
tion of such a society as the Katipunan and an uprising like that in 1896. Know-
ing the calamities and miseries which always arise from the disturbance of public
order, I was not a member of the Katipunan nor did I take part in the uprising.
But when in 1898 I observed everywhere the unrest and indignation produced by
the blind obstinacy of the Spanish Government and the cruelties with which it
repaid the services of those who had shown it the dangers of bad administration of
the Philippines and had offered plans for doing away with these, I saw the popu-
lar will clearly manifested and deemed it my duty to take up the revolutionary
eaose. ..." The last sentence is significant as to the effect upon Filipinos of
even the abortive revolt of 1896-97; it carried them far beyond any former posi-
tion. The above is taken from a portion of the posthumous manuscript of Mabini,
published after hit death by El Comercio, Manila, July 29 and 30, 1903.

94 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Whether Blanco's "policy of attraction" might have suc-
ceeded in consolidating the conservative and the cautious suf-
ficiently to confine the revolt to certain well-defined places,
then end it therein, as previous mutinies had been disposed of,
or whether the time had gone by for unifying the Filipinos
under Spain, can never be known of a certainty. Even had
the Government not recalled him, the rabid savagery of the
Spanish " patriots " in the islands, especially at Manila, where
they controlled the newspaper press, and where the ecclesiasti-
cal hierarchy and the religious orders were heart and soul
with them in the clamor against Blanco, would have frustrated
his efforts. A few days after the revolt broke out, he asked
for a thousand more troops from Spain. The Government sent
two thousand, and, at the constant cry from the islands that
Blanco underrated the gravity of the situation, it kept sending
troops for four months.^ When the trouble broke out, there
were in Manila only about three hundred Spanish soldiers
(artillerymen) and about 2500 native troops, whose loyalty
was under suspicion from the outset. There were in all the

As for the unfortunately too small element of really capable and patriotic con-
servatives (men aspiring, as a rule, to eventual independence), it need not be said
that, however much they might sympathize with their fellow-comitrymen, they
did not believe in the rebellion. The attitude of such men is well indicated in this
extract from the personal letter of one of the most mature-minded and capable
Filipinos, occupying one of the foremost positions, and who, it is to be said, has
no personal grievance against the Spanish administration, which recognized and ']
honored him : " I know and confess the many defects from which we Filipinos
suffer, the effect in part of the wretched social education we have received. We
have vegetated in a medium hardly propitious for the development of men of
character and sincerity. . . . The remarkable thing is that, surrounded by an at-
mosphere both negative and lethal, some have succeeded in emerging with a de-
cided aspiration to progress and culture, demonstrating in a certain degree that
the race is susceptible of education and advancement." And even this Filipino,
copservative and careful of speech, says of the friars that they " covered them-
selves with discredit and shame by their infamous and criminal acts, saving rare
exceptions, and were the principal cause of the Filipinos rebelling against Spanish
power, being hated and rejected by the immense majority of the country."

^ When the first news of the outbreak came to Madrid, the "Spanish-Philip-
pine Circle " was closed and its papers seized. Morayta and other Spaniards were
for a time under arrest, but there was no case against them as instigators of
rebellion in the islands.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 95

archipelago hardly more than 1500 Spanish troops, several
hundred being within comparatively easy reach of Manila,
while the others were at posts in the Moro country and at the
military government headquarters in the Bisayas. By January
of 1897, about 26,000 troops, officers and men, most of the
latter being stripling volunteers, enrolled as scouts, had been
sent out from Spain/ There were upon the outbreak of the
trouble about 14,000 native troops, regularly officered and
incorporated into the army establishment of Spain ; and there
were over 4000 natives in the civil guard, the constabulary
force, scattered throughout the provinces. The latter deserted
or remained loyal, according to the stand taken by their com-
munities ; the early suspicion as to the loyalty of the native
regiments was for a time laid at rest by their quite general
steadfastness, and especially by the bravery of the 73d and
74th Regiments,^ which bore the brunt of the fighting inCavite.
Blanco's request to organize Spanish volunteers in Manila had
been favorably answered at the outset, and he was urged to
follow it up elsewhere. The Makabebes of Pampanga were
among the first provincial volunteers. The civil governors of
the provinces in which martial law had been established were
soon vying with each other as to which could send the largest
contingent of half-caste and native volunteers, of contributions
to purchase medical supplies, etc., and of horses to mount the
" guerrillas," as they were called. Of course, this opportunity
to demonstrate loyalty to Spain and relieve themselves of fear
was hurriedly accepted by well-to-do natives everywhere, while

* See La Political etc., vol. vi, p. 307 (figures from El Imparcial, Madrid, Au-
gust 25, 1896), and vol. vu, p. 26 (figures from La revista tecnica de Infanteria y
Caballeria of December 15, 1896), the latter citation showing some 1500 Spaniards
out of a total force of 19,000, including the civil guard, under arms at the time of
the outbreak. Spain's military resources were at the time strained almost to their
limit by the demands upon them from Cuba, and the raw recruits sent out to the
distant Philippines were certainly no better equipped nor supplied, especially ai
regards medical and hospital facilities, than those sent to Cuba.

* During the ''assimilation" campaign the native regiments of the Philippines
were renumbered to oorrespond with their theoretical incorporation into the
Peninsular army.

96 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

also there is no doubt that the provincial governors abused
the chance circumstances gave them to wring contributions
from the unwilling. Volunteers were supplied eventually from
the Kagayan, the Ilokan, the Pangasinan, the Pampangan,
and the Bikol provinces of Luzon. They principally guarded
the lines around Manila, while the Spanish guerrillas of Manila,
mounted on native ponies that were donated, made scouts into
the outlying districts and policed the suburbs of Manila. No
one might question the patriotism of these Spaniards, many of
them of prominent position; but their organizations did a
great deal of harm by their untempered zeal, their arrests and
their vicious treatment of the natives, right and left. When
the first troops arrived from Spain in October, their reception
was Hterally delirious ; and each subsequent expedition was
given the extravagant sort of greeting in which Spanish pa-
triotism revels, the ecclesiastics, from the archbishop down,
taking a prominent part. One who saw how little was actually
being accomplished outside, in spite of all this turmoil inside
the city, might readily have assumed that the Spaniards pro-
posed to frighten the Tagalogs to death with their street
parades, pompous drills, banquets and bloodthirsty speeches.*
The religious orders vied with each other and with the Spanish
Casino and newspapers in feasting each succeeding consign-
ment of troops in a way that must have seemed cruelty to
them later, during the ill-fed days of their actual campaign-
ing in the tropics.

Blanco sought to curtail Spanish excesses as well as to check
the propaganda the Cavite leaders were continually conduct-
ing on the outside. The latter had circulated the report that
the cedilla tax was to be greatly increased and other burdens
laid on the Filipino masses, and Blanco enjoined the provincial

^ Blanco himself, like every Spaniard in high official position, had the manifesto
habit. For the rabid speech of Rafael Comenge, president of the Spanish Casino,
in which he called on the newly arrived troops to " Destroy ! Kill ! No pardon f
. . . Wild beasts should be exterminated ; weeds should be exterminated ! " —
see Foreman's The Philippine Islands^ p. 649.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 97

officials in a special circular to take pains to publish the false-
hood of these charges, assuring the people that Spain would
continue " her noble conduct of treating with affection her
loyal sons." In another circular of October 11, he outlined his
" policy of attraction." He considered the insurrection entirely
localized, and that measures of rigor should give way to moder-
ation in order to calm the disturbed people. Hence, he said to
the provincial governors, " you will take care particularly not
to order imprisonments unless they are justified by serious com-
plication in the events now taking place or may lead to bring-
ing out the causes of these events," in order to impress upon
the people Spain's desire to be just and lenient with all not
" actively or seriously implicated in the rebellion," and will
employ all means possible to restore normal conditions and
tranquillity.^ Blanco's close friend. General Aquirre, was sent
with newly arrived troops through the towns of Laguna and
Batangas, not only to reassert Spanish authority in them, but
to hold a series of banquets and balls, in which sentiments of
friendship and accord were exchanged between Spaniards and
Filipinos. The press censor made the Manila newspapers call
the insurgents " bandits," and several " patriotic " demonstra-
tions started by the press, including one for Father Gil, were
suppressed. The feehng against Blanco waxed the stronger
for these efforts at restraint.^ It was complained that, instead

* This circular may be found in the ArchivOt vol. in, pp. 367-69, and on p. 117
of La InsurrecciSn en Filipinos y Guerra Hispano- Americana (Madrid, 1901), by
Mannel Sastrdn, for some years a subordinate official of Spain in the islands. This
book is the most complete record of the insurrection and the war with the United
States in the Philippines that has yet been issued in Spanish. It is, however, a
mere string of chronicles excerpted from the newspapers of the time, together
with various personal recollections of the garrulous author, who wastes many
pages in supposedly patriotic outbursts and pro-friar screeds.

* Blanco refers to his critics when he says (Memoria . . . dingida al Senado
aeerea de los ultimas sucesos ocurridos en la isla de LuzoUt Madrid, 1897, p. 68) :
" For certain people, the proofs of character and energy are afforded by executions
to right and left, to the taste of the public, which is generally aroused by passion,
when exactly the contrary is true : energy is shown by opposing all sorts of im-
potitions and that one above all others. It if easy to order men shot ; the difficult
thing is to refrain from it"

98 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

of allowing the full penalty of confiscation of the property of
rebels, as written into the Spanish civil law, to prevail, he had
only ordered the property of those under condemnation by
the mihtary court to be seized and held by the Government
and merely the revenues of such property to be confiscated.
He had done this by military orders of embargo in September,
organizing a board of administration of the property so seized.*
High officials of the central Government were connected with
this board, and not a few scandals were bruited about after-
ward with relation to the profits some of them derived from
their position. So also very definite tales were told about this
or that provincial official, or court-martial officer, who enriched
himself during the pursuit that was conducted of nearly all
the prominent wealthy half-castes. The scandal connected with
the shooting of one of two brothers, prominent mestizos of
Manila, while the other brother, who had been arrested first
and had been repeatedly charged by those conducting the
secret pohce investigations with having been back of the
Katipunan plot to introduce arms, managed to get his release
from Manila to go to Spain (leaving the boat at Singapore on
the way), and was afterward warmly defended in the Cortes
at Madrid.

From the moment it was announced in October that Gen-
eral Polavieja was coming out to assume command of the
troops, it was assumed in the islands that, owing to Polavieja's
high rank in the army, this meant Blanco's recall from the
governor-generalship. That the latter did not really check the
denunciations and deportations may be judged from the fact
that nearly 1000 natives had, before he left, been shipped
away to the Marianne Islands, and to the Spanish penal col-
onies near Africa, as many as 300 going in one boatload. A
contingent sent to the Marianne Islands mutinied, and 100 of

^ See T. H. Pardo de Tavera*s bibliographic note on the decrees relative to
embargo of property in his Bihlioteca FilipinOt p. 129. The property of fifty-two
Filipinos had been embargoed up to November 25 {La Politico, vol. vn, pp. 36-37).

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 99

them were shot down in cold blood. The military prisons of
Manila were crowded to suffocation, at one time over 4000
prisoners being held for trial as conspirators. In the mediaeval
dungeons of Fort Santiago and in other dungeons under the
walls, into which the filthy water of the moat was brought by
the tides, men died and were borne away almost by the cart-
loads. There came a time in Manila, shortly after Polavieja
took charge, when executions on the Luneta had grown so
numerous and were felt, even by Polavieja, to be so demoral-
izing (though he assigned as his reason the desirability of
having suspects tried in the provinces where the offenses were
said to have been committed), that he put forth a special de-
cree authorizing courts-martial under the brigade commanders.
Before the military courts had got under way in Manila in
September, thirteen men had been summarily arraigned, con-
demned, and executed in the town of Cavite (mostly middle-
class natives, though two were wealthy proprietors), primarily
upon the testimony furnished to the wife of the provincial
governor by a Tagalog woman serving in her kitchen. Besides
the 57 men captured in revolt and summarily executed on Au-
gust 31, fully 500 arrests were made in Manila and its suburbs
alone, following upon the denunciations of Father Gil.^
It becomes important to know how far this retaliation by a

^ This statement is found in an official report to the governor-general in Oc-
tober, 1898, by Olegario Diaz, a captain of the civil guard of Manila, having
charge of the secret police investigations. This document is an interesting, though
frequently inaccurate, statement of the whole history of Filipino propaganda down
to the discovery of the Katipunan. It is reproduced in the Archivot vol. iii, pp.
412-41. An English version may be found in a cheap little pamphlet published in
Manila in 1902, entitled TJie Katipunan^ or the Rise and Fall of the Filipino Com-
mune. It purports to be by one Arthur St. Clair ; if such a person really exists, he
is apparently one of the Englishmen and Americans of uncertain antecedents who
liATe since 1898 been employed by the Spanish friars in Manila to conduct a prop-
aganda in their behalf among the American colony and to present their version of
Philippine history. " St. Clair " employs 275 ont of the 335 pages of his pamphlet
in abuse of the Filipinos and misinformation as to recent history ; his so-called
" annotations from Spanish state documents " are interesting mainly aa showing
bow cheap an estimate the friars have put upon the intellect and judgment of the
American people, when they seek to influence them by such balderdash.

100 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

supposedly highly civilized people upon a people whom they
called downright savages was justified, if it could be justified
at all, by Filipino barbarism. As stated, the first revelations
as to the Katipunan plot in Manila had charged that it was a
plot to assassinate all Spaniards, regardless of sex. Much tes-
timony to support this charge was brought out during the mil-
itary trials. The torture of witnesses and the whole conduct of
these trials would, however, place under suspicion all evidence
brought out therein. Probably it is fair to say that, for rea-
sons hitherto outlined, a great many of the Katipunan rank
and file had come to believe that the purpose of the organi-
zation was extermination of Spaniards, and it would seem that
a few of the more radical leaders were at least willing to have
this idea disseminated. It is also to be said for the Spaniards
in the islands that, almost without exception, they believed
that themselves, their wives and children, as well as the friars,
had been marked for slaughter with more or less barbarous and
outrageous accompaniments. But, as time went by, and after
the supposed plot for extermination was frustrated and the
revolt assumed the form of a half -organized rebellion within
fairly well-defined limits, both justice and common sense de*
manded that it be judged by its deeds rather than by rumors
about its plans. Even then, there was enough about it to keep
the Spaniards on their guard and to subject the so-called pop-
ular movement to the very severe censure of civilized men.

Aside from the repeated bits of testimony extracted during
the trials to the effect that indiscriminate slaughter was planned,
various documents are quoted to the same effect. The most
quoted, and by far the most significant, if it is to be accepted
as valid, is an alleged order of the Supreme Council of the
Katipunan, dated June 12, 1896, from which this clause is
taken : " When once the signal of H. 2 Sep. is given, every
brother will fulfill the duty which this Grand Regional Lodge
[G. R. Log.] has imposed upon him, assassinating all the
Spaniards, their wives and sons, without considerations of any

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 101

sort, whether relationship, friendship, gratitude, etc." Other
clauses prescribe that, following the attack first upon the gov-
ernor-general and others, the convents will be assaulted and
their inmates beheaded, but the wealth in them is to be re-
spected and taken charge of by committees ; the following day
the bodies are to be heaped up and buried in Bagumbayan
field, and a monument in memory of independence will later
be raised over them ; the bodies of the friars shall not, however,
be given sepulture, but shall be burned for their felonies ;
those who shrink from the tasks laid upon them "already
know the tremendous punishment they will incur for disobe-
dience and disloyalty." This document purports to be signed
on the date stated, " in the first year of the much-desired inde-
pendence of the Philippines," by Bolivar, President of the Ex-
ecutive Committee ; Giordano Bruno, Grand Master, Adj. ; and
Galileo, the Grand Secretary. The very wording of this docu-
ment is suspiciously like that of one that might be made up
at the time to prod a court-martial, if not the Government at
home, to severity. It has continually been cited in official
documents and in private writings, but nowhere have its source
and authority been given.^

In general, the record of the revolutionists hardly bears out
the declaration that, had not the plot been discovered in time,
they would have sought to kill every Spaniard, if not every
white, in Manila. The record is bad enough, to be sure. The

^ It is given in full in Nozaleda's Defensa ohligaday appendix 9, as being taken
** from newspapers," and in A rchivo, vol. in, no. 19, of Documentos politicos de ao
tucUidad. (Other suspicious documents of this collection are nos. 16, 17, and 18,
the source of which Retana does not give, as he does for other documents. Such
a postscript as this reads as if inserted by some Spanish military prosecutor :
" Be extremely careful, and, in case of surprise, make a thousand protests of loy-
alty to Spain : supreme hypocrisy, a great thing in these affairs.") It is given in
part by M. Sastrdn, op. cit.t p. 54 ;also in English, as an appendix to the pamphlet
on The Katipunarit above cited, the author apparently obtaining this version from
El Katipxinan 6 el Filibusterismo en FilipinaSt by Josd M. del Castillo y Jimenez
(Madrid, 1897), a book which, though much quoted as authority, contains no sig-
ni6eant data not found elsewhere, and is virtually wortbleM because of its inacou-
neies and Spanish rabidity.

102 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Chinese, against whom a traditional hatred was directed, were
slaughtered by several mobs in Bulakan. Here, too, in the first
days of the revolt, several Europeans, including an English-
man who innocently strolled out to take photographs, were
slaughtered in cold blood by the irresponsible and almost
leaderless crowds. Again, during the first outbreaks in Cavite,
the wrath of the bolo-bearing mobs was directed against the
friar priests rather than against the subordinate officers of the
civil guard who were captured by them, although there were
two or three cases of massacre or outrage of lay Spaniards,
men and women. Thirteen Recollects, seven of whom were
lay-brothers managing the order's estates near Imus, were made
away with ; four of the number were parish priests who took
refuge on the estate, which was the center of the popular out-
break in that part of Cavite, and there were two also who were
killed at their posts in other parts of Cavite. Torture and bar-
barous treatment probably accompanied their deaths,^ as also
later the death of a Dominican, Father Piernavieja, who had
a very bad record in Bulakan before he was transferred to
Cavite to quiet the scandal, and who was forced by the rebels
to set himself up as a mock-bishop of the revolution, but was
afterward executed, charged with having communicated with
Manila. Later on, when the Bataan mob was aroused, two
priests were massacred there as the first actual sign of out-
break, and one was slain at the altar in Morong in December.
Undoubtedly, a number of friars in Sambales only saved their
lives by opportune flight. In the main, mistreatment of other
Spaniards was confined to minor outrages, and in most cases
they were simply detained as prisoners and forced to work on

^ But the statement of Foreman, op. cit.y p. 419, that they were cut up piece-
meal, burned or spitted in oil, etc., is not authenticated. These stories, and the re-
ports of Father Piernavieja's death tied to a post, bareheaded, in the sun, and of
the cutting off of Father David's head in Bataan province (see La Politica, vol.
vn, pp. 70-71) were rehearsed in great detail in the Manila correspondence of vari-
ous newspapers of Spain. Later, they were admitted to have been exaggerations
or falsehoods, Retana himself retracting them, along with his charge that a certain
wealthy Filipino was president of the Katipunan (ut supra f pp. 280-64).

\

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 103

roads, trenches, etc., in the sun, a proceeding which highly
dehghted the sense of humor of the Tagalog masses (for reasons
not altogether unapparent, in connection with the old forced-
labor tax). As the rebel camps in Cavite approached more
nearly something of an organized form, there was, so far at
least as some of the leaders, and notably Aguinaldo, were con-
cerned, a definite policy enjoined of treating the captured
Spaniards more nearly as prisoners of war would be treated
by a civilized power. On the whole, considering the feeling of
the Tagalogs as to past grievances and the reports that came
to them of the tortures and executions in Manila and of the
indiscriminate slaughters and the abuses of the volunteer
Spanish troops on their scouting trips, the record they made,
except at the outset, in the treatment of their prisoners was
rather better than it might have been expected to be. Their
treatment of their own fellow-citizens, coercing the peaceful
into revolt, forcing from them contributions far in excess of
what they had ever paid to Spain, and condemning them to
death right and left on the charge of treason, upon the sentences
of summary military courts set up in imitation of the Spanish
methods, was far more to be criticized, considering the aims
which they alleged were theirs.

The military record of the Spaniards up to the time of
Blanco's departure is neither extended nor notable. He had
only troops enough to quell the first outbreaks around Manila
and to the northward, and thereafter for several months to in-
dulge in forays against the little guerrilla bands which kept
the mountainous districts of Bulak^n and Morong stirred up,
besides dealing with more or less disorder in other Tagalog
provinces. Cavite was, from the outset, lost to the Spaniards,
except for the narrow peninsula on which lay the town of
Cavite and the naval arsenal; on either side of this neck of
ground, the rebels held territory well within the range of the
navy's guns, including the home of the Aguinaldo family
(Kawit, as the Tagalogs called it, Old Cavite, in Spanish

104 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

phraseology). Five expeditions, with 6000 troops, had arrived
before November 7, on which day Blanco went in person to
Cavite, to direct a double-column assault on the nearest rebel
positions, whence they threatened the garrison in Cavite it-
self. The objective points were Binakayan to the east and
Noveleta to the west of Old Cavite, both near the shore of the
bay and approached from opposite sides of the Cavite penin-
sula. The column directed against Binakayan was composed
of 1600 men, half of them natives, and, after the little navy
gunboats had played at shelling the insurgent trenches, not
dislodging the hordes hidden within them, a frontal attack
was made. Spanish troops cannot be accused of lack of bravery,
but this was poor warfare, and the taking of these trenches
against hardly more than 100 riflemen and an indefinite number
of bolomen cost the attacking army 70 officers and men. The
mountain-guns supposed to have been ordered were not there,
and the one old antiquated piece of artillery was almost as
ridiculous as the native's bamboo cannon. The next day's ad-
vance on Old Cavite was a failure. The Filipinos are said to
have shot nails, wire, etc., when they lacked proper ammuni-
tion for their miscellaneous arms. All the officers of the at-
tacking column (which again went direct upon the intrench-
ments) and two thirds of one company of native troops were
killed. Before the close of the day the Spaniards had to retreat
in confusion upon Binakayan. Meanwhile, the movement on
Noveleta had resulted even more ingloriously. Here more
troops than at Binakayan, under the command of no less than
a general of infantry and a colonel of marines, went in frontal
attack against trenches flanked on one side by a deep creek,
their approach proceeding up a narrow alley lined by impas-
sable mangrove swamps and filled with pitfalls, when they
might have flanked the rebel positions by marching or being
ferried along the sandy beach. They lost 100 men in the am-
buscade and were out of ammunition by ten in the morning,
losing another 100 men during their forced retreat to the

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 105

peDinsala. The Spanish reports give the casualties in these two
engagements as more than 500, which is probably a very con-
siderable underestimate. Greater than the military effect of
the failure to take Old Cavite and render the hold of the
Spaniards upon the peninsula more secure was the moral ef-
fect of such a real victory upon the revolutionary masses.
The young Aguinaldo, once merely a local Katipunan
organizer, who had been steadily gaining in prestige since
the outbreak in Cavite because of his activity as a local
leader, was henceforth of wider reputation as the "great
Tagalog general." ^

Camilo G. de Polavieja, a lieutenant-general of long stand-
ing in the Spanish army, who, besides military service in the
Peninsula and in Africa, had put down the uprising in Cuba in
1890, arrived at the beginning of December. The Government
expected Blanco to take the hint and resign, and a few days
later it "authorized" him to return to Spain. He would not
resign in the face of the enemy, and, after the bitter criticism
to which he had been subjected, he undoubtedly desired to end
the revolt on his own lines. But on December 9 the Queen
Regent herself sent a cablegram saying : " I have just ap-

^ Aguinaldo was, in 1896, but 27 years of ag^, fairly to be regarded as belong-
ing to the small middle class which has been conspicuous for independent ideas in
the Tagalog provinces. His father, a pure-blood Tagalog, had acquired some little
real property, had been many times gohemadorcillo of Old Cavite, and seems, as
far back as 1872, to have fallen under suspicion of the friars for his ideas, being
under arrest then for a time. The mother of Aguinaldo is said to have some Chinese
blood. There were four sons and several daughters. The family patrimony was
not sufficient to keep Aguinaldo in the Jesuits' secondary school in Manila more
than a short time, and to this day his writing of Spanish is very defective and his
speech in it not easy. He had been chosen municipal captain of Old Cavite under
the Maura law at a very early age, as such offices usually went in the Philippine
towns. He was active in the Katipunan organization from the first, though not out-
side of his immediate locality. The civil guard were already under way to make
arrests of suspects in Cavite, when, on August 31, 1896, he hastily gathered his
followers, armed only with bolos, and captured and disarmed a little detachment
of the native gtiards, in command of a Spanish sergeant. As in most oases in Ca-
vite, probably the followers of the sergeant were ready to desert him ; but the
news that a native had "defeated and captured a Spanish officer" traveled far
and rapidly in the province.

I

106 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

pointed you chief of my military household." ^ Before he
left on the 20th, he was given the pompous ceremonials of
banquets, processions, etc., in which the Spaniard delights ; but
he departed a disappointed man, and left behind him an un-
settled country, its jangling elements apprehensive of what
was to come. Manila was like a huge Inquisition. Blanco had
vowed the jeweled sword given him by the Ayuntamiento of
Manila for his victories in the Moro regions of Mindanau in
1895 to the famous shrine of the Virgin of Peace and Good
Voyage at Antipolo, a little town in the hills of Morong, less
than ten miles from the town of Pasig on the river above Ma-
nila ; but he could not at the time safely carry it there himself,
and left it in the capital. Only a short time before Llanera's
men had derailed a train bearing Spanish troops on the rail-
road twenty miles north of Manila.

Polavieja had taken charge on December 13, with the cus-
tomary " allocutions," in this case stern addresses to the army
and the people, in which he frankly identified himself with the
religious orders. He promptly introduced the Cuban idea of
reconcentration in the seven provinces surrounding the city of
Manila, including Bataan (Bataan and Sambales had been put
under martial law by Blanco before he left). In all the prov-
inces under martial law, elections to fill the third part of the
municipal councils under the Maura law were suspended, and
the civil governors were instructed to appoint to the vacancies,
" upon the recommendation of the parish priests."

A. SPAIN STRANGLES THE APOSTLE OF FILIPINO PROGRESS

The one step that did more to alienate the Filipinos forever
from Spain than perhaps all other circumstances united was to

^ The active part taken by the religious orders in the agitation, both in Spain
and the Philippines, for the removal of Blanco, is shown in this cablegram sent to
Madrid for publication : " Hongkong, October 31. — Dominicans, Madrid : situa-
tion grows more grave. Revolt is spreading. Apathy of Blanco inexplicable. To
remove the danger, an urgent necessity is the appointment of a chief. Opinion
unanimous. — The Archbishop and Provincials." (La Political vol. vi, p. 430.)

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 107

mark the very beginning of Polavieja's command. Jos^ Rizal,
who had started for Cuba to serve as a volunteer surgeon in
the Spanish army, and who had been returned from Barcelona
as a prisoner, upon the urgent representations of the military
prosecutors, reached Manila on November 3, and had remained
in prison since. Blanco was on record in a declaration of Ri-
zaFs innocence of complicity in the revolt, and could not con-
sistently have pushed the charge of conspiracy against him,
even had he been so disposed.^ Under Polavieja, a military

^ Data as to Blanco's relations with Rizal were contained in the special number
of the Filipino newspaper La Independencia of December 30, 1898, in honor of
Rizal, in the form of two letters from Rizal to Blumentritt, who sent copies of
them to the Malolos journal. In the first, Rizal states that the idea of offering his
serTices as a surgeon in Cuba had been suggested to him by a letter from Blumen-
tritt himself, received at Dapitan in 1895, stating that there was a great lack of
surgeons in Cuba; that he at once offered his services, but that months passed
with no reply, and he had made other plans for work on a little hospital at Dapi-
tan, when on July 30, 1896, he received a letter from General Blanco, which he
quotes, and which states that the Government at Madrid " found no objection to
his lending his services to the army " as a surgeon, and that, if he still desired to
do so, the authorities at Dapitan were to give him a pass to Manila. He decided
at once to change all his plans and go, " fearing they might attribute my refusal
to another cause." (One wonders if, having been told of the plans of the Katipu-
nan leaders for a rebellion, and understanding well its futility and inopportuneness,
Rizal had not found in this knowledge an additional reason for desiring to demon-
strate to the Spanish Government his opposition to armed rebellion and for wish-
ing to leave the Philippines at this time.) He arrived at Manila the 6th of August,
just before the outbreak, and when things were much stirred up and the secret
police busy. He says that, as the monthly mail-steamer had just left for Spain, he
sent word to Blanco that he desired to isolate himself on board the steamer on
which he came and to see only his family. Blanco sent him on the cruiser Castilla,
off Cavite, where he was incomunicado when the outbreak came. His words are
worth quoting :

" At this moment there occur the serious disturbances in Manila, disturbances
which I lament, but which serve to demonstrate that I am not the one who is upset-
ting things, for my absolute innocence has been shown, as is seen in the two letters
the general has given me for the Ministers of War and the Colonies, ... as well
as in the one to me."

The letters written by Blanco to Rizal and to Minister Azcdrraga are quoted
also by Foreman, op. cit., p. 533. In the letter to Azcdrraga, a duplicate of the one
to the Minister to the Colonies, Blanco says : " His conduct daring the four years
he has been a ddport^ at Dapitan has been exemplary ; and he is, in my judg-
ment, BO much the more worthy of pardon and benevolent treatment, in that he
is in no way complicated in the attempt which we are just now deploring, neither
in conspiracy nor in any of the secret societies that they have been getting up."

So, Rizal continoes, he left Manila on September 3 " to win a name and put an

108 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

court was quickly convened on December 26 for the final
hearing in the trial of Kizal on the charges of " rebellion, se-
dition, and illicit associations/' the trial having thus far been
conducted in secret, according to Spanish methods. The pro-
ceedings of this court, which was in session but a few hours,
have never been promulgated, with the reasons of its members
for the decision reached. The argument of the military advo-
cate for the prosecution was the principal feature of the session.
Spanish law does not provide for the confrontation of an accused
with the witnesses against him, with opportunity for cross-
examination, etc.; hence, allowing for the summary methods
of every military court, Rizal may be said to have been tried in
due legal form, though the manner of his conviction must be
repugnant to the sense of justice of every American, accus-
tomed to public trials, with a procedure open to objection and
contest on the part of the accused at every stage. The nearest
approach to verbal testimony in open court was when Rizal
was allowed to say a few words in his own behalf. The prose-
cutor had put upon the records of the court a declaration taken
according to Spanish legal requirements from Rizal himself, in
the course of the sumario, or summary procedure preliminary
to his arraignment on a formal charge ; like all other bits of
testimony in this and the other mihtary trials, it was not a ver-
batim report, question and answer, but the examiner's minutes
of the declaration of the prisoner, with the corresponding
amount of garbling which such evidence regularly got in these
trials. Rizal had denied forming the Liga Filipma for the

end to calumnies." The steamer stopped at several English ports en route, and he
might have escaped, at least at Singapore. Before it had passed Suez, the elements
in the Philippines which were determined on having his blood seem to have reached
the authorities at Madrid, and the people on the boat knew that he was to be ar-
rested on arrival at Barcelona, for Rizal states, writing to Blumentritt in the
Mediterranean on September 28, that a passenger has told him so. In a burst of
indignation, he thinks Blanco deceived him, and applies an epithet to the general,
saying : " I am innocent and have no participation in the disorders, and I can swear
it ; and now, in pay, they send me to prison. ... I cannot believe it; Spain cannot
bear herself so infamously; but so they assure me on board."

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 109

purpose of achieving separation from Spain ; it was, he said,
originally designed as a society to promote Filipino develop-
ment, social and economical. From the time of his deportation
in 1892, he declared, he had had nothing to do with this or-
ganization, nor had he been connected with the Katipunan,
nor in any way cooperated with labors looking toward separa-
tion from Spain. To combat this declaration of Rizal's, itself
stated in the most unfavorable way for the prisoner, the pros-
ecutor produced the minutes of other declarations, made by
prisoners directly implicated in the August revolt. Even tak-
ing these at their face value, they do not prove, at the worst,
more than an assumed acquiescence by Rizal in the revolution-
ary propaganda subsequently to 1892, while they only point
to the belief on the part of some witnesses that the Liga Fill-
pina had been from its inception a revolutionary organiza-
tion, not directly proving (at least, according to proper rules
of evidences) that it was in fact a revolutionary organization.
But, as has already been hinted, there are good reasons for
not accepting such declarations, taken secretly in prison, al-
most certainly under threat of torture or after its actual appli-
cation. In every case, too, the declarations of real significance
as " proof " (according to Spanish legal requirements) were
obtained from ignorant or pliable witnesses, willing to stretch
a point here and there, perhaps, if there seemed a chance of
saving their own lives or mitigating their punishments.* In

^ Any impartial judge, reading these declarations, without the least knowledge
as to the circumstances under which they were taken, would hesitate over accept-
ing a single line of them. The possibility that these records were doctored in order
to make the Katipunan's plans appear more barbarous even than they were, is one
of which, as already seen, we may well have suspicions. There is also apparent,
running through all those declarations that have been published, a persistent effort
on the part of the military officers conducting the examinations to involve Rizal
with the propaganda subsequent to 1892 and to implicate certain wealthy Filipinos
whose property was under embargo with the Katipunan. Note especially, among
Documentos pditicas de actualidad, in the ArchivOt vols, iii and iv, the declarations
of Villaruel, the tailor (no. 26) ; of a Spanish secret-police officer, allowed to tes-
tify, though he could not know it of his own knowledge, that the object of the
Katipunan was to " assassinate all Spaniards " ; of a Filipino who at first denied
all Imowledge of the conspiraoy, but two days later, being " better counseled/'

no THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

this manner, it was " proved " that the Liga Filipina had as
its chief object the gathering of money to buy arms for a re-
bellion to secure independence ; that the Katipunan was only
an offshoot of the League, a means whereby the educated men
of the League prepared the masses for rebellion ; and that the
aim of the Katipunan, which was thus held to be only one
phase of a unified secret-society campaign, was to " assassinate
all Spaniards " and proclaim independence. The links of clouded
evidence and purely hearsay testimony were bound together
by insinuations of the prosecutor — insinuations that were appar-
ently given the full weight of established facts — into a chain
of proof that Kizal had been a consistent rebel against Spain
from the time of reading his first schoolboy's poem about a
Filipino ^' fatherland " in literary exercises in the Jesuit acad-
emy of Manila until the day of the Katipunan outbreak, which
was pictured as the result of his advice and his labors. The
statement of one witness to the effect that Rizal had written
from Hongkong in 1892 that the League was to " raise the arts
and commerce, because the people, when rich and united,
might obtain its liberty and even its independence," — hearsay
evidence at most, and, under any fair interpretation, corrobo-
rating Rizal's own declaration — was held to prove the insin-
cerity of his aims as avowed. More flagrant yet was the
distortion of Rizal's position at Dapitan in counseling against
Bonifacio's plan of revolt ; that he had discouraged revolt was
not admitted to his credit at all, his culpability being held to
be increased by his having said that the Filipinos were not
ready and had not the resources for a successful rebellion.^ So

said a certain wealthy Filipino was to equip the rebels with arms, " according to what
a woman in Ermita had told him " (no. 27) ; and the later declarations of Valenzu-
ela, who had been a weakminded tool of Bonifacio.

^ See the Archivo, vol. iv, pp. 226-27 (Document no. 92). Rizal's testimony, as
presented in the words of the Spanish inquisitor, was that he told Bonifacio's emis-
sary that " The time was not propitious, because the various elements of the Phil-
ippines were not united, and they had not arms, ships, money, education, and the
elements essential for resistance; and that they ought to study the example of Cuba,
where, notwithstanding that the insurgents had great means and the support of a

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 111

ako, the very proclamation which he had written and offered
to publish just as Polavieja came into power, strongly con-
demning the rebellion then under way and asking his fellow-
countrymen in the Tagalog provinces to lay down their arms,
was turned against him. Polavieja had pigeonholed it, upon
the advice of a Spanish official of unpleasant memory in the
Philippines, because it did not condemn for all future time
the idea of independence from Spain; similarly, its phrases
were twisted before the trial court into a declaration to the
people : " Wait ; be quiet now ; and, when the time comes, I
myself will lead you against Spain." ^ A great deal was made

great power, and were veterans in war, they were g^ing to accomplish nothing."
The prosecutor used this, it would appear from the Spanish press reports, as an
argument aggravating Hizal's offense, because he had not protested against even
the idea of revolt, but merely against revolt at that time as inopportune. In other
words, in the case of a man on trial for the specific ofPense of inciting to rebellion,
he was held not to be exculpated at all for having, as was admitted, advised
■trongly against this particular rebellion, but on the contrary to be additionally
culpable for not having discountenanced the idea of revolt and of independence
for all future time. This is a sufficient commentary upon Spanish fair play, and
illustrates how the frankness and outspokenness of a man who did not hide his
aims were turned against him. Rizal was really condemned for having dared to
think and talk of a time, even in the indefinite future, when his countrymen might
have an independent nationality.

* See Archivo, vol. IV, pp. 266-69 (Document no. 102) for this proclamation,
signed by Rizal in his prison on December 15, 1897, and for Auditor Peiia's recom-
mendation adverse to its publication. Rizal said : —

Manifesto to Certain Filipinos.

Countrymen : — Upon my return from Spain, I have come to know that my
name had been used among some who were in arms as a battle-cry. The news came
to me as an unhappy surprise ; but, thinking everything already over, I kept silent
before a circumstance I regarded as impossible of setting right. Now I hear ru-
mors that the disturbances continue ; and, in case there are some who still continue
to employ my name, either in bad or good faith, in order to remedy this abuse and
undeceive the unwary I hasten to address you these lines, that the truth may be
known. From the first that I had news of what was being planned, I opposed it, I
fought against it, and I showed its absolute impossibility. This is the truth, and
there still live the witnesses to what I say. I was convinced that the idea was in
the highest degree absurd, and, what is worse, disastrous for us. I did more.
When later on, in spite of my advice, the outbreak occurred, I spontaneously offered,
not only my services, but my life, and my name as well, to be used in the manner
they thought best for the purpose of stifling the rebellion ; for, convinced of the
evils that it was going to bring upon us, I considered myself fortunate if by means
of any sort of sacrifice I might prevent such useless misfortunes. This also stands
proTed.

112 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

of the fact, as connecting Rizal in a guilty way with the Katipu-
nan, that his portrait had been given the place of honor in its
halls. The officer appointed mihtary advocate for Rizal went
through the forms of Spanish oratory in his behalf, but this
speech did neither any good nor any harm, and probably was
not intended to have any great effect. Nor, in the language of
a Spanish correspondent, did the words of Rizal himself (who
spoke with perfect composure, his arms still tied, as if the au-
thorities obtained some childish pleasure from presenting him
manacled) "have any effect whatever." He pointed out that the
letters of his which had been presented were all prior to 1892 ;
that he had planned a colonization of territory near Dapitan
by his family and friends; that he might easily have escaped
from Dapitan, or later from the steamer at Singapore, when
on his way to Spain ; cited his efforts to serve as a volunteer
with the Spanish army in Cuba, and his attempts to employ
his influence to prevent, and later to quell, the uprising in the
Philippines ; suggested the unwisdom of applying the same

Countrymen : — I have given proof, as much as has any, of desiring liberties for
our country, and I continue to desire them. But I set down as the premise the
education of the people, so that, through instruction and labor, it might come to
possess its own personality, and might be worthy of those liberties. In ray writ-
ings I have recommended study, and the civic virtues, without which there is no
redemption. I have also written (and my words have been repeated) that reforms,
to be fruitful, must come from above, and that those coming from below were only
to be obtained i» a manner such as would make them irregular and uncertain. Nour-
ished upon these ideas, I cannot less than condemn, and I do condemn, that ab-
surd and savage outbreak, plotted behind my back, which dishonors us Filipinos
and discredits those who may speak in our behalf. I abominate its criminal pro-
ceedings, and I disown any sort of participation in it, deploring with all the
sorrow of my heart the ignorant victims of deception. Return, then, to your houses,
and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith.

In the indorsement of Auditor Pena it is said : " With Rizal, the question is one
of opportuneness, not of principles nor of purposes. His manifesto might be con-
densed into these words : * In the face of the evidences of your defeat, lay down
your arms, countrymen ; afterward, I will lead you to the promised land.' It is of
no benefit in behalf of peace, and it might nourish in future the spirit of rebellion;
and on that account its publication is to be advised against. Instead, it might be
well to forbid its publication and to send these records to the judge-advocate of
the case being prosecuted against Rizal, to be added to those proceedings."

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 113

harsh treatment to those who desire to preserve Spanish sover-
eignty in the islands, though with administrative reforms, as to
those who are out-and-out separatists ; explicitly denied being
guilty of any of the charges against him, or of having conspired
against the Spanish Government ; but recognized that the ver-
dict was made up, and the die had been cast against him, when
he said : " A victim is sought, and I am the one who is chosen
to receive the whole blame." The members of the court reached
their verdict in an hour and a half .^

Word soon went about the city that Rizal was to die. The Jes-
uits, who had been his early teachers, and for whose efforts in
behalf of education in the Philippines he had given them much
praise in his writings, went to see him, finally induced him to have
the sacraments administered, and, under the influence of the hour,
obtained from him a statement which has been announced to be a
retraction of all that he ever wrote.^ He was shot at seven o'clock

* The more important of the Spanish press reports of the trial, reports badly
garbled as well as abbreviated, are reproduced in the Archivo, vol. iv, pp. 218-47.
Documents 90 to 105 inclusive are all Rizal documents, covering also the incidents
connected with his execution, with several articles from friar-inspired sources on
his life.

^ This document, as subsequently given to the public, reads : " I declare myself
Catholic, and in this Religion, in which I was born and reared, I wish to live and
die. I retract with all my heart whatsoever there has been in my words, writings,
publications, and conduct contrary to my quality as a sou of the Catholic Church.
I believe and profess what it teaches, and submit to what it commands. I abomi-
nate Masonry, as hostile to the Church and a society prohibited by the Church. The
diocesan prelate, as the superior ecclesiastical authority, may make public this vol-
untary statement of mine, to repair the scandal my deeds may have caused, and
that Grod and men may pardon me." (SeeArchivot vol. iv, p. 342.) The document is
really a revelation of how strong a hold the teachings and influence of childhood,
more than ever in a land like the Philippines, have even upon a man with the
mentality and the experience in life of Rizal, rather than a reliable indication that
Rizai repented the general tendency of his writings as a whole. Unquestionably, too,
AS be grew older he felt that he had been unduly rabid in his youth, and became
stronger in the belief that evolution, not revolution, was the proper pathway for
his people. His letter to the archbishop in connection with this retraction (Noza-
leda's De/erua obUgada^ appendix 12) shows that there was no real retraction of his
matnrer sentiments, on political matters, at least. The Jesuit fathers had sur-
rounded him from the moment of his death sentence, working with him all through
the night and into the following day, also running back and forth between the
prison and the palace of the archbishop. For other retractions, especially thos^ of
the Lnna brothers, see the ArchivOf vol. iv, Documents nos. 106 to 116, and No-

114 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

on the morning of December 30, 1896, on the large field next
the Luneta, before a gay crowd of Spanish army officers and
civilians and their wives, and, not least conspicuous of all, of
chattering, laughing friars. The night before, he had been
married to his Irish sweetheart, had composed a poem of fare-
well in his cell, and had written thus to his " dearest friend,''
Ferdinand Blumentritt : " I am innocent of the crime of rebel-
lion. I am going to die with a tranquil conscience."

This was not the first nor the last of such executions, but it
was the beginning of the end of Spanish rule in the islands.
Rizal represented all the poetry and imagination in the dawn-
ing national aspirations of a poetical people of the imaginative
Orient. He was, besides, chief spokesman of the sterner judg-
ment of the saner element among the people ; and, variously
as his ideas and aims were distorted among the masses, often
to suit the purposes of leaders of a very different type, his
name was a fetish among them. The shots, which he insisted
upon meeting upon his feet, not kneeling, reverberated around
the archipelago. Spain had almost unified the people against
herself, and she would sooner or later have had to reckon with
a very different sort of rebellion than the localized affair of
1896.

B. THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF 1897

Polavieja's plan at the outset of 1897 was first to quiet the
insurgents in the Bulakan-Nueva Ecija border on the north and
the Laguna-Batangas mountains on the south, before opening
directly on Cavite. His frequent movements against Llanera
only succeeded in driving the northern rebels farther into the
mountains, but surrenders in the Bulakan towns were frequent

zaleda, (^. cit.f appendix 11, for Antonio Luna's letter to the archbishop. In view
of the subsequent revolutionary record of Antonio Luna, as well as his declarations
on political and religious matters both before and after this period of imprison-
ment, his attitude of abjectness and the plain hypocrisy of his retraction, with a
view to pardon, which he and his brother secured, are of considerable interest in
a personal way.

t REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN / 115

and Llanera felt called upon to threaten with the pain of death
all who thus presented themselves. Aguinaldo, however, had
himself taken the field on the east border of Cavite, and the 4000
men with him were only prevented by active work on the part
of General Galbis from effecting a junction with Llanera, who
simultaneously sought to capture Pasig, burning part of it;
this effort, if successful, would promptly have raised the lake
region against Spain, while the insurgents could have closed
the river route above Manila. A group from Cavite also suc-
ceeded in arousing Sambales in February.

Early in February, Polavieja reorganized his troops. A di-
vision of three brigades under General Lachambre covered
Laguna and Batangas and the borders of Cavite, with an in-
dependent brigade under Galbis scouting on the south of the
river Pasig. General Zappino had a brigade, mostly of natives,
constantly working over the mountains of Manila and Morong
to the north and east of the city, to deal with Llanera and
Torres. Polavieja himself took the field the middle of the
month, initiating the campaign from the borders of the lake
south westward to Cavite, while Jaramillo, in command of the
brigade to the southeast, was at work thence from Batangas
into Cavite. The Spanish forces met with stubborn resistance.
By this time the insurgents had north and east Cavite dug up
with intrenchments as gophers burrow an alfalfa field. Primo
de Rivera subsequently declared their intrenchments to be
badly constructed, though well placed ; ^ but at any rate they
served to check the Spaniards more than once, when defended
by a handful of rifles, though by mobs of men and boys.
Time after time, the Spanish troops were sent against these
series of trenches without any effort being made to reconnoiter
or to flank them, until it seemed as if they had abandoned the
most elemental principles of warfare to show contempt for

* They had been constructed in large part under the direction of a mestizo named
Erangelista, who had studied engineering in Belgiuoi and was called "Greneral of
Engineert.''

116 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

their opponents. Polavieja's campaign was, however, much
better conducted than the short and disastrous one of Blanco.
His troops sometimes did flank, and they had, and used to
more or less effect, a few pieces of artillery, mostly defective
and cumbersome.^ Lachambre directed in person the advance
on the chief insurgent positions, beginning with Silang, where
five hundred natives were slain. Aguinaldo himself opposed
the Spanish general at the coveted post of Dasmarinas, with
5000 men under him.'^ Meanwhile, the troops from the lake
and river southwestward had met really desperate resistance in
obtaining control of the whole east bank of the Sapote River
down to Manila Bay, having three captains and over 40 sol-
diers killed in one little engagement, which became a hand-to-
hand fight. After he took Dasmarinas, reinforcements were
brought up to Lachambre, and with some 15,000 men at his
disposal, over half of them natives and volunteers, he captured
the insurgents' chief stronghold, Imus, losing 100 men killed
at the first set of trenches taken by the bayonet, and 150 in the

^ Much of the Spaniards' cannonading, including that from the little gunboats
used to batter the towns on the north shore of Cavite, was as ineffective (if not as
noisy) as that of the mock guns the insurgents had made from iron pipes, and even
from large pieces of bamboo wound with wire or iron bands.

* It is to be borne in mind, when insurgent numbers are given, that only a small
fraction of them had practical firearms, most of them being armed with bolos, while
ten men were ready to take up the rifle of one who fell. Primo de Rivera after-
ward declared that the total number of portable firearms they possessed had at no
time exceeded 1500. This was an underestimate, as Primo de Rivera continually
depreciated the insurrection in his reports to the home Government ; but at any
rate, Foreman's estimate of 7000 rifles is a great exaggeration, for that total could
not be reached, if parlor rifles, shotguns, revolvers, and nondescript arms of all
sorts were taken into account. Moreover, comparatively few new rifles were ob-
tained from Japan or Hongkong before the insurrection beg^n or during its con-
tinuance. La Independencia, November 16, 1898, contains a story about a shipment
of rifles from Japan being landed at Naik in October, 1896. The Katipunan leaders,
to encourage the Cavite masses to rise, circulated a proclamation that 40,000 arms
had just been obtained. The Spanish in Manila, where the steamer crew were
tried, thought that there were SCKX) so landed. Most of the arms of the insurgents
were at first in Cavite, and were obtained in large part by the desertions and cap-
tures of natives of the civil guard. The assortment thus obtained was nondescript,
was patched out everywhere by the defective and archaic guns and revolvers which
had been from time beyond reckoning in the hands of the ladrones who infested
all the mountainous regions, and the ammunition was in large part home-made.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 117

series of trenches just beyond, where 400 dead insurgents were
left, among them Crispulo Aguinaldo, a brother of Emilio and
a high officer in the insurgent organization. The town itself
and its powder magazine were then fired by the insurgents
and deserted. Lachambre sent men around to the west of the
peninsula to take Noveleta, intending to move from both sides
on Old Cavite. Bakoor was taken after a skirmish, but the
troops on the left had some warm work around Santa Cruz and
Noveleta. The latter taken. Old Cavite and Binakayan were
occupied without resistance. The north line of the province
was in Spanish possession, as well as the east, and, after seven
months' rule from the military headquarters of Imus and Old
Cavite, Aguinaldo had been ousted. He and nearly all the mem-
bers of the Katipunan cabinet^ had withdrawn to the southward
to San Francisco de Malabon ; but this place was already
threatened by the advanced Spanish position and fell on April
6, after a brief but vigorous resistance in the last well-intrenched
insurgent stronghold, the Spanish troops slaughtering 300 or
400 natives, most of them in cold blood with the bayonet.
The remaining towns near by were promptly occupied without
opposition.

General Polavieja had been cabling the Government for more
soldiers to use in garrisoning thoroughly the disturbed country,
desiring, it is said, as many as 15,000 fresh troops. The Gov-
ernment was fully engaged in Cuba, and had to refuse ; and
almost immediately thereafter Polavieja's request to come home
because of a tropical liver (which had compelled his return
from the field to Manila some time before), supported by the
diagnoses of physicians, was granted. He left on April 15, and,
during the ten days before the arrival of his successor, General
Lachambre was governor-sfeneral.^ In the four months of

^ Paciano Rizal, brother of Job6, and the latter'i wife, the former Miss Bracken,
were also in the rebel camp, having worked through the Spanish lines shortly
after the execntion of Jos^, and served to stimulate the masses.

■ Lachambre is the one Spanish officer of rank who emerged from the ITiilip-
pine campaign with credit The campaign under him has been described by F. de

118 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES \

Polavieja's rule, the Spanish forces had lost in killed 20 officers
(including one general) and over 300 soldiers, and in wounded
80 officers and 1200 men. ^Apparently, with the loss of its
chief positions in Cavite, the insurrection was all but over;
but Polavieja's demand for more troops, to supply the losses
by sickness, etc., and to garrison the points widely separated,
indicated that he regarded the attitude of the populace as
still more than suspicious. With the taking of Imus, he had
extended amnesty for a short space ; and in Bulak^n, Batan-
gas, Laguna, and the occupied parts of Cavite the presentations
soon mounted to 25,000. Scare-stories about uprisings in
Manila ceased to circulate, though as late as February 25 there
had been a mutiny of carabineers near the Bridge of Spain.
The people around Kahbo, on the north coast of Panai, had
recently effected an organization similar to the Katipunan, and
had given the neighboring commands of the civil guard some
trouble to suppress them; but this seemed to be a detached
incident.

There were evidences from the outside that the insurrection
had entered upon an agonic period. Bonifacio had, before the
outbreak, shown himself to be a rule-or-ruin leader. As Agui-
naldo's prestige and influence increased, Bonifacio's jealousy
of him became that of a spoiled child. It was not lessened
by his own failures as a military man, while Aguinaldo for
some time seemed, to the uncritical populace, to be achiev-
ing wonders. Bonifacio, too, might well have found legiti-

Monteverde y Sedeno in La DivisiSn Lachambre (Madrid, 1898). This is a record
of the Polavieja regime in general, rather more to be relied upon than the personal
records by Blanco and Primo de Rivera (in each case a Memoriae addressed to the
Senate of Spain, published in Madrid in 1897 and 1898 respectively). In Major-
General G. W. Davis's report on the division of the Philippines (Reports of the War
Department, 1903y vol. m) is the only reasonably satisfactory abstract there is in
English of the military operations of the Philippine insurrection during 1896-98,
prepared by Major John S. Mallory. He depended to some extent on Monteverde
y Sedeno, but principally on Sastrdn, and had not seen the memorias of Blanco and
Primo de Rivera ; his errors are the errors of the Spanish writers, above all in
their exaggeration of insurgent resources in order to excuse the Spanish blunders
and incompetency.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 119

mate cause for complaint in Aguinaldo's always noticeable
disposition to put his own relatives and friends to the front.^
Until some of the active participants come forward to tell
the story accurately and fairly, it is impossible to say just
what was the organization of the insurrection after the Kati-
punan headquarters were set up in Cavite in September, 1896.
It was, at any rate, only a piece of provisional patchwork.
Very soon, the Katipunan seems to have had two headquarters
whence it issued commands of a mihtary nature and also orders
having to do with the civil organization of the towns occupied
in Cavite. The Sangunian Magdalo had its seat at Imus, where
Aguinaldo was supreme, and the Magdiwang at San Francisco
de Malabon, where Bonifacio estabhshed himself. Part of the
time each seems to have had a more or less complete cabinet.
Cavite was divided into five military " zones " and the more
distant parts of the province were recognized as practically
under the dictatorship of appointed leaders, while Llanera
and Torres operated quite independently to the north of Ma-
nila, though recognizing the authority of the Cavite councils.^
Gradually, the military side of the organization became the
stronger, as was inevitable under the circumstances. Agui-
naldo came, almost by common consent, to be recognized as
supreme in this respect, under the title of " Generalissimo."
The jealousies between him and Bonifacio became more than
ever acute when defeat followed defeat in March and April of
1897. At Aguinaldo's instigation, Bonifacio was seized, and

^ The tax administration and three of the leading military positions in Cavite
were at one time in the hands of the Aguinaldo family, aside from the position of
** Generalissimo " itself and the other posts held by close friends and supporters
of Aguinaldo.

* The chiefs of the rather cumbersome civil organization, so called, which was
made up somewhat in imitation of the central government at Manila, were virtu-
ally figtire-heads, especially when the military organization came to be better de-
fined. They were, practically without exception, as were the military leaders, from
the rising middle class which was being created by educational and commercial
opportunities. The information about the insurgent organization of 1896-97 con-
tained in Sawyer, Foreman, and the Spanish writers on the period is unreliable and
incomplete.

120 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES ,

later seems to have been tried and sentenced to death by one
of the summary military courts he himself had been fond of
employing. He disappeared on April 23, when the insurgents
still remaining in ranks were seeking to strengthen themselves
in southern Cavite.^

The new governor-general, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera
y Sobremonte, Marques de Estella, arrived on April 25, 1897.
He was received with the usual great parade, the Te Deum in
the cathedral, and the other stately formalities, coming down
from mediaeval times, which survived to the last in Manila.
One of his first acts was the revival of Polavieja's amnesty,
extending it to May 17, the King's birthday. He was after-
wards to be harshly criticized both for underestimating the
rebellion's strength and for undue leniency. The rebels also
claimed later to have placed their hopes for reform upon his
assumed attitude as well as his more or less definite promises.
What his attitude really was, he himself has said, in his cable
message to the Government at Madrid on November 27,
1897:

. . . There must be much thought given to the political and eco-
nomic reforms, which should tend to assure the well-being of the na-
tive, or to guarantee him against abuses and clerical exactions, but at
the same time to separate him from modern currents and principles,
which, if they are the essential life of European societies, are the virus

^ More or less mystery has surronnded his death, from the unwillingness of those
who know the circumstances to talk about it, precisely as was the case in 1899,
when Aguinaldo's rival in the opposition to the United States was assassinated.
The Spanish version given by Sastr<5n, op. cit., p. 274, is that Aguinaldo arrested
Bonifacio in the midst of the personal rivalries between them, and, after he at-
tempted to escape, organized a council of war to try him on various charges, one
being his having executed on his own responsibility the friars Piernavieja (the
whilom " bishop ") and three Recollects, one of whom had been on very friendly
terms with Aguinaldo. The manner of Bonifacio's death is also in doubt ; some
say he was thrown over a cliflP. Apolinario Mabini, who was intimate with Agui-
naldo's disposition and conduct, in 1898 and 1899 at least, wrote these words in the
chapter of his posthumous memoirs which deals with Aguinaldo and Luna : " The
death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly revealed the existence in Aguinaldo of an
unrestrained ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of
artful intrigues, exploited this weakness to ruin him [Luna]." (^El ComerciOf Ma-
nila, July 23, 1903.)

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN m

that is inoculated in colonies for the growth of ideas of separatism
and ambition which revolutions originate.^

The new captain-general (the ex-offido rank held in the
Spanish army by the Philippine governor-general) took the
field in person the first of May. He claims the credit of orig-
inating an " envolving " campaign which was to surround and
crush the insurgents ; but Polavieja had, before his departure,
reorganized the army in separate brigades, with the apparent
purpose of hemming in the enemy in the south and center of
Cavite. At any rate, the plan was not a complete success. The
insurgents fought briefly, then melted from sight, most of
them returning to their homes under instructions to take ad-
vantage of the amnesty, the better-armed taking to more inac-
cessible regions. With the cooperation of the gunboats, the
start was made at Naik, near the coast of West Cavite, where
Aguinaldo himself put up a vigorous resistance, and most of
the 400 insurgents killed were bayoneted.^ The troops oper-
ating from the east were rapidly taking the southern towns of
Cavite, meeting with considerable resistance at Indang. The
troops immediately under the captain-general suffered nearly
150 casualties in taking Maragondon in a hand-to-hand fight
with Aguinaldo and his men. But thereafter the insurgents
promptly abandoned the three minor towns they still held, and
the opposition seemed to have faded from sight. Primo de
Rivera returned to Manila, and on May 17 extended the am-
nesty, which was producing surrenders in Cavite. Most of the
garrisons in Cavite were abandoned almost as soon as estab-
lished, and a few military centers were set up. It was the plan

^ Quoted in his Memoria dxrigida al Senado (Madrid, 1898), p. 87. He was
then speaking to the Liberal Miniatry, which had succeeded the Conservative Grov-
ernment under which he was sent out. The agreement of Biak-na-bat<S, to nego-
tiate which the new ministry had asked him to remain, was about to be concluded.

* The 73d Regiment of natives was, as quite commonly, in the forefront of the
Spanish attack. Primo de Rivera, op. cit.^ p. 50, says : "This body has taken a
most important part in all the combats during the war. In many, it has decided
the result. They go into danger happily, as if death were not threatening ; and
when it arrives, they see it come without uttering a complaint, however great the
•offerings that torment them."

122 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

to leave but a few soldiers from the Peninsula in the province,
and the rest were being drawn rapidly to Manila. Circum-
stances combined to start an epidemic of desertions among
the native regiments, which had fought so bravely, but were
dissatisfied with their scant recognition and with their treat-
ment. The Spanish staff organization and supply was wretch-
edly defective. Chinese cooUes and the native polistas (men
working out the labor-tax) had been employed to bear the
provisions, for lack of wagon- or pack-trains ; and at one time
over 1000 native soldiers had been disarmed and set to pack-
ing provisions on their backs over a rough trail. It was neces-
sary, unless the army supply should break down completely,
even with the reduced number of posts, to connect them with
military roads, Cavite being in large part without highways or
anything but poor trails. When the native soldiers were set at
roadmaking, they promptly began to desert in small parties,
taking with them their rifles, to insure them a welcome among
the insurgent bands operating as guerrillas on the Cavite-
Batangas-Laguna mountainous border.

Guerrilla bands were also quite active in various portions of
the provinces to the north and west of Manila, and actions in
them and on the south were not infrequent during May and
June, the most notable being the retaking of Tahsay in Batan-
gas, which the insurgent Malvar had held. Before he left,
Polavieja had said : " Cavite is the scandal, but Bulak^n is the
danger." Though hemmed in and a fugitive, Aguinaldo was
now absolutely supreme in command, but must make some
stroke to retain his prestige ; he decided to effect a juncture
with Llanera and transfer the center of operations to Bulak^n.
On June 10, he crossed the Pasig River, less than ten miles
from the walled city and perhaps in sight of the suburbs, join-
ing the rebel band on Purai Mountain, in Manila province,
though not, as supposed, taking part in the fight here four
days later.^ This was an ill-concerted action initiated by sub-

1 Frimo de Kivera says Aguinaldo had but a half-dozen companions. The for-

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 123

ordinate Spanish officers, one column failing to support the
other, which in consequence went directly against unflanked
trenches up a mountain-side and was compelled to retreat with
serious loss. Aguinaldo now began to be called " President of
the Revolutionary Government,*' but was virtually dictator.
He deposed three members of the former cabinet, and appointed
his close associate, Mariano Trias, " Vice-President," with com-
mand south of the Pasig. The Katipunan was kept up, at least
in form, wherever it could serve a useful purpose, and a native
priest was made president of it.^

Primo de Rivera apparently believed in May and June that
the final collapse had come, and his telegrams gave this im-
pression in Spain. He extended absolute pardon to all minor
offenders on June 18. Many of the deportes were being
brought back, and on July 15 the embargo on their property
was removed. Criticism of these measures by the Spaniards in
Manila was as open as it dared to be. Before this, however,
Primo de Rivera had checked his optimism, noting, as he re-
marks in a sort of bewildered fashion, that men surrendered
for a time in numbers, but never brought arms with them. On
July 2, he issued a proclamation of sterner tenor, strictly lim-
iting the amnesty to July 10, and reviving the old custom of
passports between towns and harrios? Only 4000 presented
themselves during July, practically all in one district. The
new revolutionary organization in Bulak^n had pulled itself
together, and was sending out orders right and left. The
rainy season had come on, and the young Spanish recruits,

mer's critics published in Spain the charge that Aguinaldo had 2000 armed men
with him. Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 280, says there were 500 followers. They were doubt-
leas few, as the main force with rifles, which it was desired to transfer to Bulak4n,
inarched around the lake through Laguna and Morong provinces.

1 In Cavite, the year before, the insurrection had had its " Chaplain of Forces,'*
and one native priest for a time bore the title of " Philippine Bishop," it is said.
The native priests took a much more prominent part in the revolutionary organ-
ization of 1898-1900.

' Considerable annoyance was constantly caused to the native tillers of the soil
ontKide the towns by this system, and minor officers in local authority very com-
monly took advantage of it to collect bribes for their issuance of passports.

124 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

who had long before begun to collapse from their poor nour-
ishment and lack of proper care while campaigning under a
tropical sun, were dropping out all the time and having to be
sent home. The strain on Spain's resources in Cuba was most
severe, and, upon the authorization of the Cortes, a royal de-
cree of June 28 announced the issuance of bonds to the amount
of 40,000,000 Philippine dollars, at six per cent interest, pay-
able in forty years, " with the special guarantee of the Philip-
pine customs and the general guarantee of the nation." ^

To meet the changed conditions to the north of Manila, the
Spanish forces there were reorganized and somewhat rein-
forced. By October, Primo de Rivera was feeling quite seri-
ously the need for more troops. After what he had reported
to Spain, he could not consistently ask that they be sent from
there. His repeated requests for authority to enlist more na-
tive troops, mixing them into the regiments with the Spaniards
to hold them more loyal, had not been granted, partly owing
to the changes of administration going on in Spain. Hence
he resorted to a new enlistment of volunteers in all parts of
the archipelago, so-called local volunteers being recruited for
police duty in and about their towns, the design being to release
more regular troops for operations, while the " mobilized vol-
unteers " were recruited to serve as auxiliaries for such opera-
tions. There seemed to be little trouble in obtaining such
volunteers ; of ttimes they were most easily secured in the towns
nearest the rebel operations, as the people were beginning to
feel seriously the strain and losses of constant guerrilla warfare
in their territory, since they had to support and pay both sides
all the time and frequently lose their crops as well. Attacks on
the towns or outlying barrios were frequent; three times San

* This was, strictly speaking, the first Philippine public debt. (An effort to nego-
tiate a Philippine loan of 3850,000 thirty years before had failed.) It afterward
figured in the discussions of the peace commissions which negotiated the Treaty
of Paris, and had an influence in connection with the payment of 320,000,000 by
the United States to Spain which has been generally overlooked in the discussions
of the matter in the former coimtry.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 125

Rafael, in Bulakan, was attacked desperately and once nearly
captured with the small garrison in it, while Aliaga, an im-
portant town in Nueva Ecija, was barely saved by the arrival of
reinforcements, after some of the Spaniards there had been
captured and the little force driven into the church and con-
vent. Guerrilla operations extended on the south into Tayabas,
and on the north and west into Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and
Sambales. On September 10, another alleged plot for a rising
in Manila was uncovered, and a heliograph with which it was
said the insurgents inside were communicating with Biak-na-
batd was captured. As many as 1500 men were at times en-
gaged in these attacks on towns. San Pablo, Batangas, was
only saved to the Spaniards by hand-to-hand fighting in the
streets, as was Nerzagaray, Bulak^n. In September, too, the
almost isolated town of Baler, on the Pacific coast of Luzon,
rose in mutiny, and the Spaniards there were only saved by the
cooperation of men from two gunboats, who relieved the gar-
risons besieged in the church. Still, the principal nucleus of
insurgents in the corners of Bulak^n, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
and Tarlak provinces was gradually being driven from post to
post in the mountains and hemmed in where it must make a
final stand. The troops under General Monet were overworked,
but quite generally successful from October on, though there
was occasional encouragement to the insurgents from such a
fiasco as that of the assault on Mount Kamansi (in the cor^
ners of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlak) on November 28.
The Spaniards did not reconnoiter, one column abandoned its
flanking movement, and the other attempted to capture
trenches by frontal assaults up a steep trail. After six re-
pulses with severe loss, they brought up some artillery the next
day and took the position, a little force of Makabebe volun-
teers distinguishing themselves. The insurgents were now
confined practically to the mountains of northern Bulak^n.
They were driven from Mount Minuyan, and Aguinaldo joined
the main contingent now left in the ^' impregnable " position of

126 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Biak-na-bat(5. This was their last mountain stronghold, and
their desperate efforts of a few preceding months to store this
and the other posts with supplies from raids on the chief
grain depots of the agricultural valleys had not been very suc-
cessful. Primo de Rivera was planning a trocha, another fea-
ture adopted from Cuban warfare, to hem them in completely
before the final attacks were made ; ^ and Archbishop Noza-
leda, bringing pressure to bear through the friar priests of the
Bulakan towns, promised him 20,000 natives to act as bearers
of provisions for the final operations, as it was believed, of the
campaign. But the blockhouses were never built, and General
Monet was, to his great bewilderment, ordered on December
13 to cease all active operations. A new phase of the revolu-
tion was about to develop itself — the much-discussed "Peace
of Biak-na-bato."

C. A TRUCE BOUGHT FROM GUERRILLAS

No end of contradictory statements have been made about
this curious agreement, sometimes called the " Treaty of Biak-
na-bat(5," both in Spain and in the Philippines ; but it is prin-
cipally in the United States that unwarranted deductions have
been made with regard to it, based upon equally unauthorized
premises. Some mystery does, indeed, surround its negotiation
and, in minor particulars, its actual terms ; but data have been
all the time quite readily accessible wheref rom the more im-
portant facts about it could be derived. In the first place, it is
to be said that no " treaty " was ever signed, and indeed that
so far as regarded the chief Spanish authority concerned in
the negotiation, he scarcely signed anything besides the checks
to be given to the insurgents. In the second place, this repre-
sentative deliberately and definitely refused to negotiate at all
upon the basis of the demands for governmental reforms which

1 For Primo de Rivera's proclamation of November, 1897, establishing a form
of " reconcentration " in the Tagalog provinces, to begin from December 14, see
La PolUicay vol. vm, pp. 4-5.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 127

were at first outKned by the insurgents, and they, or at any
rate their representative, acquiesced in this. Finally, it is im-
possible to say how far Primo de Rivera, who allowed it to be
written down that the insurgents " confidently expect " that
"Spain will satisfy the desires of the Filipino people" may
have given warrant for the belief that certain reforms would
be adopted, and above all, it is impossible to say how far the
negotiator, Pedro A. Paterno, may have encouraged this belief
in his representations to the insurgents. We are not able, on
evidence now available, to give the Ke direct to Aguinaldo,
when he states that he and his associates were promised re-
forms. What may be affirmed without possibility of doubt,
however, is that no formal engagement to this end was ever
made, as he and they must have known ; and the probabilities
are that the whole arrangement was simply for the payment of
a large sum of money by Spain to secure the absence from the
islands of the disturbing leaders and the surrender of their
arms.^

According to a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the
then President of the Spanish Cabinet, Seiior C^novas on Au-
gust 4, 1897, the idea of procuring peace and tranquillity in

^ The data wherebj the story of the Biak-na-bat6 affair may be constructed
with some approach to completeness are to be found in the following documents :
The Memoria of Primo de Rivera, already cited, pp. 121-58 ; Manuel Sastrdn, La
IruurrecciSn en Filipinos y Guerra Hispano-Americana^ edition already cited, chap-
ters V and VI ; captured documents of Aguinaldo relating to this ag^ement, now in
the possession of the War Department at Washington, translation of which appeared
in the Congressional Record, vol. 36, part 6, pp. 6092-94 ; a brief statement by
Aguinaldo in his Resefia veridica de la revoluci6n filipina (Nneva Ciiceres, Philip-
pines, 1899), a translated version of which appears in the Congressional Record,
pp. 440-45 of the appendix to vol. 35 ; and La Politico de Espofio en FUipiruu, vol.
vn., pp. 552-56, and vol. vni, pp. 7, 21-23, 45-49, 101-02. Foreman, op. cii.^
pp. 557-^, gives the ridiculous letter which Paterno afterward wrote to Primo de
BLivera plaintively demanding his " compensation," but Foreman apparently had not
taken the trouble to read the Memoria of Primo de Rivera, in which this document is
given, or he would not have made so many mistakes about the whole affair. The
document which he quotes on pages 546-47 as the text of the agreement signed
WM read in the Spanish Cortes in Jane, 1898, by critics of Primo de Rivera, but
is not the agreement as to the surrender that was finally signed, nor are its terms
correct as to the money payments.

128 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the islands by paying the insurgent leaders a round sum to
surrender their arms and depart for Japan or Chinese ports
had just been broached to him by Pater no. ^ The latter spoke
ostensibly for himself alone, but had apparently felt his way
with the insurgents on the matter, and probably, besides his
strong desire to "figure," was inspired by some discussion
among the various wealthy half-caste natives, of the desirability
of inducing the more irreconcilable native element to abandon
a useless struggle and use this action as a lever to obtain re-
forms from Spain. Before this letter reached Spain, Canpvas
had been slain by an assassin, and the provisional cabinet, during
its month or so of existence, did not reply to Primo de Rivera's
recommendation that this way of ending the rebellion offered
great economic advantages to Spain in the saving of troops
and military operations. Meanwhile, Paterno was going back
and forth between Manila and the rebel camp in Bulak^n. The
first reply which he brought from the insurgents on August
13 was a very great increase in the amount of money Paterno
had named as necessary to procure peace, and also contained
specific clauses as to reforms; namely : Expulsion of the friars;
representation in the Cortes ; equal rights under the laws for
natives with Peninsulars; a share for the native in higher ad-
ministration; tax-reform in their behalf; in connection with the
secularization of the parishes, recognition of the native priests ;
individual rights, the right of association and the liberty of
the press being named. ^ Primo de Rivera states, and thedocu-

* There had been some informal talk of peace negotiations under Polavieja. See
La PoliticGy vol. vn, pp. 326-28, and vol. vni, pp. 43-44. First, the Franciscans
broached the matter to Aguinaldo, then the superior of the Jesuits. Aguinaldo
said later that Polavieja failed to send his emissary to the place agreed upon (jbid.f
p. 47) ; it does not appear, however, that Polavieja was directly concerned in the
matter.

* These are the clauses which it has been repeatedly affirmed in the United
States constituted the terms of the " Treaty of Biak-na-bat6." They may be found
complete in translated form in the Congressional Record, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6093 ;
they are there inclosed in brackets, to indicate where Paterno crossed them out at
the direction of Primo de Rivera, Paterno also making other changes calculated to
eliminate from the document everything that might lend support to the charge

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 129

ments bear him out, that he absolutely refused to consider
these demands ; that he declared that Spain could never admit
anything " which might affect her honor or her sovereignty, or
involve compromises for the future " ; that they would have to
trust to the magnanimity of the Government, and that he could
only employ his good offices to indicate such reforms as he
thought were needed. There ensued a lull in the negotiations,
but Paterno was actively traveling about between the rebel
headquarters and Manila, going also to Cavite to interview
leaders there, and holding gatherings in his house in the capi-
tal. He finally came again to the governor-general, and, the
latter says, stated that the terms of the previous document repre-
sented " an aspiration which the rebels wished the government
to take into account; that they understood that the country
was not sufficiently prepared for the transformation they de-
sired.*^ Primo de Rivera continues : "Pardon for the masses,
the chiefs to depart in safety, and money, are what they de-
sired, as Paterno repeatedly stated, and in return the factions
were all to surrender their arms.*

On October 4, the provisional ministry was succeeded by a
Liberal Cabinet, with Sagasta as President and Moret as Min-
ister for the Colonies.^ Primo de Rivera, who had tendered

that its being received and discussed by the governor-general constituted to that
extent an obligation upon his government. Primo de Rivera, op cit.y p. 130, gives
a summary of the same demands.

* Primo de Rivera, op. cit.^ p. 131. The italics are those of the text.

* This was the administration which it was for a time hoped would bring about
a peaceful settlement of the issues in Cuba, and under which the well-known
autonomy programme for the latter island was adopted at the outset of 1898.
The Filipinos had especial reasons for hoping to obtain concessions through Moret,
as he had been a pronounced Liberal, had associated considerably with a certain
class of Filipino propagandists in Madrid, notably Isabelo de los Reyes and Pas-
cnal Poblete, whom be now gave posts under the Government. As already seen in
this chapter, he bad, as far back as 1870, projected the secularization of education
in the Philippines. Primo de Rivera had earned the reputation of being liberally
disposed toward the Filipinos, but he had obtained his appointment at the hands
of the Conservative party, which at once implied that he would be turned out by
the Liberals ; moreover, be had been harshly criticized in speeches by Seiior
Sngasta. There is some evidence that the War Department documents relative to
Biak-na-bat(5 had somewhere been " doctored " to throw the entire onus of the
Biak-na-batd agreement upon the Liberal Government In the copy of Patemo'f

130

THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

his resigDation on the 5th, cabled at length to the new Gov-
ernment on the 7th, announcing that a definite agreement for
closing with the insurgents on a money basis had been ob-
tained. He presented the advantages of the plan as being :
The saving of money; the saving of lives (the annual loss
through deaths and sickness being 40 per cent, or 10,000
men) ; and that it would destroy the prestige of the chiefs
who sold out a7id emigrated. There was danger all the time,
too, that the rebels would secure more arms by smuggling.
On the other hand, he presented his plans for military con-
quest, which he was certain of obtaining, if he could be au-
thorized to organize more volunteers, mixing the native troops
with the Peninsular in battalions ; and he urged a speedy re-
solution, as with December would come the dry season and
the time for operating. He concluded : " To offer reforms to-
day would be useless; they are fighting for independence;
after conquering them in one way or another, there may be
conceded or imposed the reforms that are suitable." ^ The new
ministry, fully occupied with Cuba, seems to have seized upon
his suggestions ; and, after asking further details as to the
manner of paying the money and as to what other officials
indorsed the plan,^ gave him authority to carry it out, only
enjoining upon him to do it speedily.

first letter to Aguinaldo, there is a reference to Moret's saccession to the Ministry
for the Colonies as being calculated to insure reforms in the Philippines. The
letter is dated August 9, 1897 ; and Moret did not become Minister for the Col-
onies until the following October. One of the first acts of the new Liberal Ministry
was to cancel the so-called " decree of Philippine reform " adopted by the con-
servative provisional ministry on September 15, 1897. This decree virtually nul-
lified the autonomy conceded by the Maura law, restored the rights of inspecting
schools, intervening in local government, etc., to the friars, provided specifically
against secret societies, and in general reintroduced the discretionary powers of
the old regime and strengthened the power of the friars. See La PolUica, vol. vn,
pp. 427-34, 465.

^ Primo de Rivera, op. cit.f pp. 125-27.

* Primo de Rivera replied that the archbishop, the chief of staff, the auditor-
general, the director of the Spanish-Philippine Bank, the alcalde of Manila, the
secretary-general, and the civil governor of Manila province were the only ones
taken into his confidencei and they enthusiastically approved the plan. (Tbid.f
p. 128.)

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN ISl

New difficulties arose, however. Other chiefs had been com-
ing to the front in the guerrilla operations outside of the im-
mediate direction of the three or four leaders in Bulak^n.
They feared they would not be recognized in the transaction,
and there was also a radical party among the insurgents and
among the propagandists at Hongkong which opposed the
surrender. This party seems to have imposed its will upon the
assembly of revolutionists at Biak-na-bat(5 during the last days
of October. Aguinaldo's leadership was not seriously ques-
tioned, but he was in effect given notice that he and a chosen
few intimates could not dictate the action of other chiefs unless
they took consultation with them.^ More potent, however, than
personal ambitions and jealousies or the sentiment for con-
tinuing the warfare was, it is to be feared, the suspicion that
there would not be a " fair deal " in the distribution of the
largesse of Spain which Primo de Rivera was only waiting to
bestow. There was more than a little anxiety about this in
the guerrilla camps of Cavite and Batangas, in Manila and
Hongkong, and even in the circles of the " Assembly " at
Biak-na-bat<5. Meanwhile, Primo de Rivera was cabling the
Government, after an examination of the provinces along the

^ It is strange, indeed, to note that, at the very moment when the insurrection
as an orgauized movement was well-uigh crushed, it made in some ways greater
pretensions to a " national " organization than in the days of its greatest ascend-
ancy in Cavite. The " Revolutionary Assembly " of the closing months in Bulakin
seems, however, to have left control of affairs to the " Supreme Council," consist-
ing of the President, Vice-President and secretaries of Foreign Affairs, War,
Internal Government, and the Treasury. According to Sastr<5n, op. cit.y p. 315,
the " Provisional Constitution," which was to last until the " Philippine Republic "
should be established, gave to the " Supreme Council " the general control of
government, and, among others, the special powers of levying and collecting taxes,
contracting loans at home or abroad, issuing paper money and coining money, inter-
vening to bring about an agreement in suits at lawp making alliances, and of harmon^
izing with Spain for the purpose of securing peace in the islands. Sastrdn dates this
document November 1, 1896, which is a mistake for 1897. As given in full in La
Political vol. vin, pp. 8-9, it proclaims definitely as the aim of the revolution a
complete separation from Spain, and provides simply for a " treaty of peace."
Tagalog is the declared " official language of the Republic," and universal suf-
frage is to be the method of electing representatives of the provinces in the
** Assembly," which if only given the power to elect the officers.

132 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

railroad, that he could get volunteers enough to end the dis-
order very speedily. However, the industrious Paterno ^ had
presented himself at Malakanang on November 15 with a new
power of attorney from the insurgents, in which Baldomero
Aguinaldo (cousin of the chief) appeared also as the more
direct representative of Cavite interests. There was then drawn
up a document which contained the bases that were accepted
and signed by Primo de Rivera as one party and by Paterno
on behalf of the insurgents.^ These bases were : The three
leaders who have empowered Paterno will surrender themselves
and all the arms under them, and obligate themselves to secure
the surrender of such commanders as actually follow them ; a
general and complete amnesty will be proclaimed, but Span-
iards and other non-natives in the insurgent ranks will be ex-
pelled from the army and Filipino deserters from the Spanish
army must return and serve out their time ; bands not recog-
nizing Aguinaldo's authority may surrender under these pro-
visions, but, if they do not do so, will be treated simply as
outlaws ; the governor-general will negotiate only with Agui-
naldo relative to providing " the means to support the lives "
of those who surrender, this aid being given " in view of the
desperate situation to which the war has reduced them."
Lastly, Paterno is permitted to state, " in the name of those
whom he represents," that they "confidently expect that, on
account of the foresight of the Government of His Majesty,
it will take into consideration and satisfy the desire of the
Filipino people, in order to assure them the peace and well-

^ In the famous letter already referred to (pp. 155-58 of Primo de Rivera's
Memoria, and pp. 557-60 of Foreman), in which Paterno, who styles himself the
" Maguino," or Prince, of Luzon and the " Arbiter of the Destinies " of the insur-
gents, modestly requests to be made a Spanish grandee of the first class, preferably
a prince or a duke, with a right to represent his people in the Senate ; he also
claims that he spent his resources abundantly, including " values both pecuniary
and of a non-material sort," to " win over the minds " of the insurgents to peace.
(Primo de Rivera says this remarkable document was left unsigned on his desk.)

* Primo de Rivera had been given express authority from Madrid to sign a
" contract." The document referred to is given in the Cong. Record, 57th Cong.,
Ist Sess., p. 6094.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 133

being which they deserve." The only other document officially
signed was the contract of December 14, containing the stip-
ulations as to how the surrender of arms and the payments
of money were to be made.^ The delay of one month in actu-
ally carrying out the agreement apparently reached on No-
vember 15 was caused by Primo de Kivera's objection to the
small number of arms it was proposed to surrender, by the
claim of Aguinaldo that he could not control more than a
fraction of his reputed followers, by the demand of Aguinaldo
to receive the full amount of money at once even though sur-
rendering but a fraction of the arms that were being used
against Spain, and by the activity which General Monet's cam-
paign took on at the close of November. The insurrection had
been driven from all sides upon Biak-na-bat(5 and was well
surrounded when, on December 12, the fifteen days Primo de
Rivera had conceded for the surrender of arms expired. That
day, a committee from the insurgent camp appeared, ready to
surrender, as Primo de Rivera cabled Madrid, " without pre-
tensions to reforms." He expressed his confidence of being
able to capture Biak-na-bat(5 at once, but was not sure the
insurgent chiefs would fall into his hands. The Liberal Gov-
ernment had repeatedly urged him to close the negotiation on
the money basis, and promptly gave the authority to sign the
agreement of December 14 as to money payments.'^

1 See Cong. Record, 57th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 6093.

* The money payments agreed upon were to be made thus : 8400,000 (Mexican)
in a letter upon a Hongkong bank, to be given to Aguinaldo before his departure^
payable upon telegraphic notification that the arms at Biak-na-bato had been sur-
rendered in accordance with the inventory ; two checks for $200,000 each to be
delivered to Paterno as soon as the arms surrendered should amount to 700, to
be payable after the Te Deum is sung and the general amnesty proclaimed. When
be presented himself to Primo de Rivera in August, Paterno had estimated the
amount necessary to buy peace as 8500,000. When he returned from Aguinaldo
on August 13, he bore a demand for 83,000,000, in addition to the reforms
outlined above. Primo de Rivera "split the difference," asking and securing au-
thority from the new ministry, at the outset of October, to pay 81,700,000.
When Paterno presented himself with the new power of attorney on November
15, he had written down 8800,000, explaining the difference by saying that the
ins urgents did not " renoonoe " the remaining 8000,000, but they were to " in-

184 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Lieutenant-Colonel Primo de Rivera, a nephew of the gov-
ernor-general, vrent in person to Biak-na-bato to secure the
signing of the agreement ; this was done by Aguinaldo only
after the " Assembly " had ratified it and the " Supreme Coun-
cil " had given its approval. Aguinaldo required that the gen-
eral's nephew should accompany him to Hongkong, as security
for the payment of the check, and that Generals Monet and
Tejeiro, the latter the chief of staff, should not only preside
at the surrender of the arms at Biak-na-bat(5 but also remain
there as hostages until he cabled to Artemio Ricarte that he
had received payment of the $400,000 for which he bore a
check to Hongkong. On December 27, Aguinaldo and twenty-
seven companions embarked for Hongkong at the port of Sual
on the west coast of Luzon near Dagupan.^ After the arms

demnify the unarmed," hence did not figure in writing. Primo de Rivera (op. ct<.,
p. 134), says he " did not think it prudent " to make any further queries about the
matter at the time.

^ The scenes connected with the surrender at Biak-na-bat5 and the departure
of the insurgent chiefs are described in letters and telegrams to the Spanish press,
reproduced in La PoliticOf vol. vii, pp. 552-56, and vol. viii, pp. 21-23, 45-49.
There were receptions, banquets, proclamations, and hurrahs from Biak-na-bat6,
through Bulakdn, Pampanga, Tarlak, and Pangasinan, to Sual, Aguinaldo himself
being every where prominent with "Vivas " and toasts to Spain. In his correspond-
ence with Franciscan and Jesuit fathers early in 1897 regarding the possibility of
peace (ibid.f vol. vii, pp. 326-28, and vol. viii, pp. 43-44), Aguinaldo (whose let-
ter to the Franciscan father is written in his own peculiar and bad Spanish) had
declared separation from Spain to be the object, and had condemned the Spanish
administration without appearing hostile to the friars. (There are, indeed, many
reasons for thinking Aguinaldo was never so anti-friar as nearly all his revolution-
ary compatriots.) In the " Constitution of Biak-na-bat6," as seen, separation from
Spain had been pronounced to be the prime object of the insurrection. Yet in his
interviews, proclamations, etc., before leaving for Hongkong, Aguinaldo appears
as repudiating hostility to Spain itself or the idea of independence. Perhaps his
oaths to " die before taking up arms against Spain," of being willing to fight for
the " incomparable motherland," etc., may be ascribed in part to the Spanish cor-
respondents taking some of his poor Spanish too enthusiastically. But, on leaving
Biak-na-bat6, he published over his own signature a proclamation (ibid., vol. vin,
pp. 101-02) to the " Maniolos " (an idea borrowed, no doubt, from Paterno, who
wished to connect the Filipinos with the people of some unknown island described
by the ancient Egyptian geographer Ptolemy as " Maniolos "), in which he said;
*' I leave, because, behind the back of the personal immunity conceded to me by
the laws, pledges and nobility of Spain, the exalted passion of hatred or some
other outburst of oppressive policy may raise its suicidal hand and make victims,
causing once more disturbances and interruptions in the life and progress of our

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 1S5

were secured at Biak-na-bat(5, the Spanish generals who had
remained there were assisted in securing surrenders elsewhere
by Baldomero Aguinaldo and Ricarte in Cavite, Paciano Rizal
in Laguna, and Malvar in Batangas. Just how many were so sur-
rendered, was never officially given forth. Aguinaldo claims^
that they exceeded 1000. Even so, the Spanish authorities
might well shrink from publishing the number of arms for
which they had paid such a fat price ; and it is probable that
the number did not reach 1000. The insurgents had offered
in November to surrender only 587, and the number stipulated
in the agreement of December 14 to be surrendered at Biak-
na-bat(5 itself was 225, besides some 2000 cartridges and 20
pieces of ordnance (mostly bamboo cannon, wrapped with
wire, etc).^

If there was disappointment in the Spanish headquarters
at the number of arms secured, there was no less dissatisfac-
tion among the insurgents as to the distribution of the money.
Two days after Aguinaldo left, there was a gathering at Biak-
na-bat<5, presided over by Secretary of the Interior Isabelo
Artacho, which drew up a protest to Primo de Rivera against
the rest of the money being sent to Aguinaldo, asking that
at least half of the second payment, or $100,000, be distrib-
uted among the " insurgents in most need." ^ They apparently

land. Long live Spain I Long live the Philippines I " And Aguinaldo and all his
companions signed this teleg^m to Primo de Rivera on leaving Sual :" . . . We
all tmst to Spain to grant reforms without blood or warfare, following the
path of right and justice. ... To the paternal policy of Your Excellency those
who to-day loyally offer themselves to Spain entrust the true harmonization of
liberties and rights. May God bless and make lasting this peace, for the glorious
future of our loved home, the Philippines, and for the prosperity and greatness of
the Spanish fatherland." See also ibid., vol. vin, nos. 180 and 186, for the doings
of the insurgent colony in Hongkong between December, 1897, and March, 1898.
1 Resefia veridica de la revoluci/in Jilipina.

* On January 6, Primo de Rivera cabled to Madrid that 516 " firearms " had
been surrendered at Biak-na-baUS (La PoliticOf vol. yin, p. 7)> but this might mean
revolvers, shotguns, etc., as well as rifles.

* This document reads : "The undersigned, principals of the Insurrection, who
have stayed behind in Biak-na-bat<S for the express purpose of rendering effective
the fulfillment of the bases established in the agreement of harmonization and
pacification celebrated between the Government of Spain and the Proyisional Got-

136 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

had the same idea as to how the money was to have been used
as did Primo de Rivera, who declares, though citing no docu-
ment in which this appears, that it was " for the men in arms,

emment of the Republic of the Philippines, represented respectively hj the Most
Excellent Senor Marquis of Estella, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte,
and by the Most Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno as arbiter ; being
gathered by previous call on this date, the 29th of December, 1897, in the said
place of Biak-na-bat6, under the chairmanship of Don Isabelo Artacho as principal
and first representative of the Supreme Council of the Government of the Re-
public, to deliberate with regard to the form or manner of executing the said
obligation, the undersigned, the session begun, and after lengthy discussion, agreed
unanimously : (1) That Don Jos^ Salvador Natividad be sent to Don Pedro Ale-
jandro Paterno, to set forth that the insurgents really injured in their persons,
families and interests, who first of all should have been the object of consideration
and attentions on the part of the Government of the Republic, in the way of alle-
viating, succoring or indemnifying them, at least in some degree, in their losses,
are unfortunately those who least have enjoyed or will enjoy the benefits of the
pacification, since up to the present there has not been designated for them any
sum nor has anything at all been given them, because the small amount of money
left behind in the Philippines in the possession of the Secretary of the Treasury,
Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, of which sum the undersigned have no certain or offi-
cial knowledge, scarcely suffices, according to said Secretary, to pay some of the
military officers and other officials stationed in Biak-na-bat<5 and Cavite ; (2) that
there exists a certain discontent on the part of various factions and principal offi-
cers, in consequence of this disregard of them, aside from the natural efiEects also
of discontented feelings produced in the mind of many who, though having more
right to the benefits of pacification, have nevertheless been left in complete aban-
donment in these Islands, while, on the contrary, others, of better fortune, though
with less merit or fitness, have embarked for foreign ports whither they have been
taken to be' maintained with the so-called treasury of the Insurrection ; (3) that,
on account of the foregoing, the undersigned foresee certain obstacles to the car-
rying to complete fulfillment what has been agreed upon, unless there is some
remedy for this desperate situation in which insurgents and officers disseminated
about Luzon have been placed ; (4) that, as an efficacious, just and equitable rem-
edy, they propose that the amount of one-half of the second installment, or $100,-
000 (one hundred thousand dollars), be distributed among the insurgents in most
need, this sum to be g^ven to Don Jos^ Salvador Natividad, who is formally dele-
gated by these presents to eflPect the distribution. — Biak-na-bat6, December 29,
1897. — (Signed) Isabelo Artacho. Josd Salvador Natividad. Artemio Ricarte
Vibora. Pantaleon Garcia. Isidore Torres. Francisco M. Soliman (Makabulos)."
[ A seal with : " Republic of the Philippines. Presidency."] There follows a power
of attorney from J. Salvador Natividad to Paciano Rizal, to act in the place of the
former. This is probably the document presented by Rizal to Primo de Rivera in
Manila, which the latter cites on p. 140 (op. cit.)^ similar in tenor to the foregoing.
The original as above translated is taken from a copy in the possession of the
late Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila. A very poor translation of it, wherein also
the entire 8400,000 yet to be paid was demanded by Artacho and his associates,
is given in Senate Document 208, 66th Cong, 1st Sess., part 2, pp. 2-3.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 137

and to aid the families which had been ruined by the war ;
for the widows ; for those who suffered an embargo of prop-
erty." Artacho afterward went to Hongkong and began suit
against Aguinaldo for the division of the money, and it was
in order to avoid attachment that the latter made a sudden
trip to Singapore. This suit was afterward compromised, the
sum paid to Artacho being, it is said, $5000. There is noth-
ing positive to disprove the assertion of Aguinaldo that the
money was to be kept undivided and used to renew the war
against Spain if the desired reforms were not granted. There
are, however, some indications that Aguinaldo was planning
to go to Europe when the war between Spain and the United
States broke out ; and his positive claim that the friars were
to be expelled and political reforms granted, this being Primo
de Rivera's verbal promise, " upon his honor as a gentleman
and a soldier," is to be termed a deliberate misstatement, un-
less Paterno led Aguinaldo to believe this, in order to close
the negotiations.^ Some mystery seems to surround the ques-
tion of how much money actually was paid over. Primo de
Rivera says that he gave $200,000 to Paterno and the chiefs
who made the protest, and that the rest was turned over to
his successor. General Augustin. Suit was brought in Hong-
kong on the claim that Aguinaldo had received all the money
that was ever paid over. As one Filipino has wittily put it :
" Some one has forgotten that he had $200,000 in his pocket."
The whole transaction was a demoralizing one, from beginning
to end.

The Spanish jubilation was not less than as if some great
triumph had been recorded. Regattas, horse-races, bicycle-
races, open-air theatrical performances, fireworks, a great ball
given by the city government, the formal presentation of a

' These statements are to be found at the beginning of the Resefia veridical
already cited. At the close of this docament, Aguinaldo states that the truth
thereof rests upon his word. It is not, howerer, written by him ; and if there are
not very many positive misstatements in it, there is certainly a great lack of can-
dor in some of its representations.

138 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

flag blessed by the archbishop to the 73d Regiment of native
troops, and similar celebrations, lasted for over a month. Janu-
ary 23 was the day of the official declaration of peace, and the
singing of the Te Deum in the royal chapel in Madrid took
place on February 24. Primo de Rivera, who complained that
his repeated recommendation of his pet idea of mixed bat-
talions of native and Peninsular troops had been answered
by the ministry " with many words but no solution," at last
received authority to proceed to carry out this plan, only he
must treat natives and Peninsulars on an equal basis as to
pay and rations. It was planned to send one of these mixed
battalions to Spain in May. Primo de Rivera himself was deco-
rated by Spain with the Grand Cross of St. Ferdinand, and a
subscription was raised in Manila to buy him the cross. Another
subscription was opened to present him with a " testimonial "
before his departure for home, he having again presented his
resignation. The amount raised was $60,000; but, before
General Augustin arrived to relieve him in April, he refused
the sum, because of the criticisms made, and because, moreover,
disorder was already breaking out in place after place.

D. A RECRUDESCENCE OF REBELLION

Bandit operations to the north of Manila had not stopped
at any time, as, indeed, they had been a feature of the entire
Spanish regime.* More serious and significant, however, were
the disorders which began almost simultaneously in Sambales
and southern Pangasinan. New chiefs had there taken up the
fight, and almost of a sudden possessed themselves of several
important towns, assassinating several friars, besides holding
other Spaniards for some time as prisoners. The movement
was really, however, rather anti-friar than anti-Spanish, as
the events showed, and had originated in opposition to the

^ Primo de Rivera's recommendations for the organization of a corps of native
guides and for a better military information system were fully justified. Spain
never had good maps of the provinces, and had never systematically gone to work
to exterminate the bands of ladroues.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 139

" Guards of Honor," which had been organized by some of
the friar priests among their more fanatic and ignorant parish-
ioners, partly in order to spy upon and combat the portion
of the populace which was recalcitrant. The Sambales rebels
seized the land telegraph line between Manila and Bolinau,
the landing-place of the cable to Hongkong, and besieged the
cable station, where for a week a sergeant was the only Spanish
officer in the Philippines who could communicate with the
Minister of the Colonies. Bulakdn was again reorganized by
Isidoro Torres, who claimed to have a nomination as provin-
cial governor from the " Revolutionary Government." He had
two encampments near Malolos. The Augustinian priest of the
latter town was cut to pieces with bolos on his way to the rail-
road station. Makabulos was inaugurating operations again
also in Pampanga, Tarlak, and Nueva Ecija. At Guagua, in
Pampanga, a Spanish physician and his wife were assassinated.
On March 25, a thousand Ilokans of Uni(5n and South Ilokos,
provinces hitherto peaceful, seized the town of Kandon, on
the west coast of Luzon, and, dragging three friars from their
hiding-place in the church, bore them to the hills, where their
bodies were afterwards found; a fourth friar they carried
through the mountains into Lepanto, finally releasing him. A
rising at Daet, in the Camarines, was quelled by the civil guard.
The latter organization had inaugurated a reign of terror in
Manila upon the first provocation. Raiding a house in Camba
Street, where a Katipunan meeting was said to be in progress,
they killed ten or more of the assembly outright, and the re-
maining threescore were imprisoned for summary trial. ^ Most

1 The other sixty were shot the following morning, according to the report of
United States Consul Oscar F. Williams, in a dispatch to the State Department
dated March 27, 1898 (see Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 321). The
information which precedes this, with regard to the desertion of the entire 74th
Regiment of natives when ordered to proceed against insurgents in Cavite, after
eight of their corporals had been shot for disobedience, is not authenticated, and
the Spanish newspaper reports examined for this chapter do not confirm the
consul's reports as to the shooting of the sixty men or in Tarions other particulars.
For Spanish press reports on the recnidescence of rebellion in early 1898, see La
Politica, vol. vm, nos. 181 to 1^5, especially pp. 102-03, 121-22, 146-48, 165-60,
for the Bolinau afiEair and the trouble in Pangasinan-Sambales.

140 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

of the number were Bisayan sailors, and their culpability has
never been established. On April 3, Holy Thursday, 6000 or
more natives suddenly rose in revolt in the city of Sebil. They
had few firearms, but there were only 40 Spanish soldiers in the
town, and they, with the friars, including Bishop Alcocer, and
the Spanish residents, speedily shut themselves up in the little
fort on the beach near where Magellan landed. The natives
sacked the convents and burned portions of the business sec-
tion. The revolt rapidly spread over the island, and eight
friars were captured, of whom three were assassinated. Three
Spaniards were also assassinated, one of them the husband of
a native woman. A telegram brought marines and a gunboat
from Iloilo, and troops immediately came down from Manila
under General Tejeiro. They had to capture the principal
towns of Sebii before Tejeiro returned to Manila on April 22,
and also to send a little expedition to Bohol, where trouble
threatened. The aspect of affairs on Panai became so alarm-
ing, particularly in the province of Antike, that all the friars
and other Spaniards were concentrated in the provincial capi-
tals. The new provincial governors for Luzon whom the Liberal
Government had insisted on sending out, though Primo de
Rivera urged the undesirability of making a change at such a
critical time, arrived in March, but only a few were permitted
to proceed to their provinces, on account of the danger to
their lives.

On April 10, 1898, Lieutenant-General Basilio Augustin suc-
ceeded General Primo de Rivera in the post of governor-general.
The latter had offered to remain if war was expected to take
place between Spain and the United States ; but he had been
associated with the frantic preparations for such an event in
Manila, and was well aware of the scanty resources for defense,
hence was doubtless quite satisfied to turn the jumble of affairs
over to the well-meaning, amiable, but rather dunderheaded
old soldier whom the Liberals had sent out to take his place.
In his farewell speech he lectured the Spanish residents for

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN , 141

their bitter attitude toward the natives. There was also plenty
of suppressed sarcasm among this element over the " allocu-
tion" in which General Augustin frankly identifiei himself
with the reformists.

War with the United States very speedily put a new aspect
upon affairs in the Philippine Islands. Upon promulgation of
the news, it was significant that there distinctly ensued a lull
in the guerrilla operations that had been growing more and
more active, and that various of the chiefs who had not gone
to Hongkong, among them Trias, Kicarte, and Pio del Pilar,
were announced as having offered their services to the Spanish
Government in the islands. Great hopes were built upon this
as to Spanish-Filipino cooperation in the defense of the archi-
pelago ; but subsequent events were to prove that the leaders
did not consider that they had bartered away their liberty to
act according to circumstances and that the masses, so far as
they knew what was going on, were simply waiting for the
word from above telling them what to do.

B. FILIPINO ATTITUDE AND ATMS IN MAY, 1898

It is fruitless to speculate upon what would have been the
outcome had Dewey's fleet not been sent to Manila Bay. It is,
however, of some importance to take into account the Philip-
pine situation at the time, especially as to what were the Fili-
jHno aspirations and what means they were prepared to take
to attain them. So many theoretical views as to the questions
here involved, based upon the purest of a priori reasoning,
have been and still are being promulgated that it is safest to
confine ourselves to established facts or well-substantiated
opinions. Very much as to the aims of the revolutionists will
have been revealed in the preceding pages. There is no ground
whatever for asserting that the idea of independence was never
dreamed of prior to 1898. We have found it in the minds of
the more intellectual propagandists as far back as 1890, and
it was really older than that ; yet the most gifted of these

142 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

leaders, Jose Rizal, was to grow steadily, until the last, stronger
in the belief that evolution along the lines of education and
commercial opportunity was to be the chosen route by which
his people should reach their ultimate destiny, whether inde-
pendence or a freer internal regime under the protection of
the banner of Spain or of some other nation. We have seen
that the more rabid leaders of the middle class forced the is-
sue of revolt in certain provinces, and that they were aided in
holding up their losing cause, with the tremendous sacrifices
it imposed upon the masses, by the over-zealous — to put it
no stronger — attitude of Spanish " patriots " in the islands,
and by the abuses of the armed forces of Spain. We have seen
the way in which the Spanish mihtary courts proceeded from
first to last upon the assumption that a deliberate campaign
for the extermination of whites and for irresponsible indepen-
dence was planned by the Katipunan, and we have seen with
what injustice and gross misjudgment, to put it mildly, Jose
Rizal was railroaded to his death without a real trial. The evi-
dence to support the charge that extermination was planned,
we have been unable to find, too many things pointing to the
contrary. As for national independence, that was undoubtedly
in the minds of many, but there is nowhere to be found even an
approach to a well-defined programme for achieving it or for
sustaining it when achieved ; nothing, that is, beyond the half-
blind resistance of the towns of certain provinces to Spanish
force, and a crazy effort to win assistance from Japan (later
also from the United States). The addition to the Cavite or-
ganization of such dependent subdivisions of territory as the
" Viceroyalty of Silang," and the putting forth by local officers
of towns, temporarily in power without the friar at their right
hand, of "royal decrees," etc., have no significance, beyond
showing how the insurgent " government " was not really or-
ganized but simply copied in the main the forms and methods
used by Spain. Had the Spanish Government in the islands
collapsed or disappeared by some miracle, we cannot imagine

i

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 143

the nondescript quasi-military organization of the insurgents
of 1896-97 stepping quietly into its place and fulfilling its
functions throughout the archipelago. And yet we must re-
spect the facts and find that many among these (very generally)
less educated leaders aspired, in some dim fashion, to inde-
pendence.^ And we must realize that a year and a half of seri-
ous resistance to Spain, in which she had been required to
strain to the utmost her available resources, aside from the
continual talk about Cuban success in attaining a freer adminis-
tration, or about United States interference there, had caused
the sentiment of downright opposition to grow and gain some
degree of confidence. Beyond doubt, a great proportion, almost
certainly the very great majority, of better^ducated and prop-
ertied Filipinos sympathized with the revolution, not alone
among the Tagalog communities, but very generally through-
out the archipelago; but they had given no sign that they
would actively take a hand in it. As for the great mass of the
people, the American reader unfamiliar with the Philippines
often assumes the existence of a public opinion such as that to
which he is accustomed. The masses of the Philippines were,
at the beginning of 1898, ready to be led by the nose by their
traditional " caciques," or, in the absence temporarily of these,
by any self -constituted military leader with shoulder-straps and
a revolver. This was only less true among the rather more ad-
vanced Tagalog towns than elsewhere ; among the other prov-
inces of Luzon than among the generally docile, apparently
stolid, Bisayans. Only in degree, as between different sections,

1 Such documents as the " manifesto of Malabar [probably Malvar]/' which Fore-
man cites (op. cit.f 542) as significant of insurgent aims in Julj, 1897, and which
President Schurmann employed to bolster up his remarkable statement in the
Report of the Philippine Commission that the idea of independence first arose in
August, 1898, and Aguinaldo's manifesto (Foreman, p. 543), in which the word
** independence " is rather carelessly used, are of small value when not considered
in connection with the entire history of the anti-Spanish movement and with the
subsequent conduct of the same leaders. Viewing the Biak-na-baUS afifair in the
most favorable light for Aguinaldo, he was ready to treat on the basis of a very
▼ague and indefinite prospect that certain reforms would be granted. Yet this
does not exclude him from aspiring to independence, as did others.

144 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

should any exception be made to the statement that the masses
were like driven sheep.

Reforms in the Philippine administration were expected at
the opening of 1898, even by the recalcitrant Spaniards in the
islands, and doubly so by the Filipinos of every class. The
rumors about the Biak-na-bato negotiation, the half-known
recommendations of Primo de Rivera, and the change to an
outright Liberal administration in the islands, were sufficient
basis for this expectation. Undoubtedly also, expectancy cen-
tered chiefly about the action to be taken with regard to the
friar-regime in the islands. In February, a number of Filipinos
in Madrid had signed a manifesto to the Liberal ministry, de-
claring that the revolt in the islands had in no sense been
directed against the sovereignty of Spain, but against the dom-
inance of the religious orders.^ The action of the orders them-
selves showed that they appreciated the trend of affairs. Just
before the outbreak of war with the United States, they ad-
dressed themselves to the Spanish Government with an offer of
"all they possessed" for the purpose of conducting this war,
if it should come on. They followed this patriotic demonstra-
tion almost immediately with a defiant cablegram, expressing
their determination, with the consent of the Holy See, to aban-
don the Philippines entirely, if the Government should adopt
a programme of secularization of the parishes and disentail of the
friar lands. On April 21, the very day upon which war became
a certainty, the provincials of the Dominicans, Augustinians,
Franciscans, and Recollects and the superior of the Jesuits

^ As has been shown, this statement was not exactly candid, though in spirit it
presented the truth. No mention has been made above of the episode, so much dis-
cussed in the after-fury of war talk in Spain, of the arrest of a Spanish editor in
Manila and the suspension of his paper by Primo de Rivera in February, for pub-
lishing a demand for " autonomy." The incident has little if any significance, as
revealing Filipino aspirations. The editor in question is a rather clever writer, now
on this side, now on that, who has consistently since 1898 sought to nurture bad
feeling between Americans and Filipinos. His demand for " autonomy " had refer-
ence to greater political initiative for Spaniards in the islands, rather than to
political liberties for the Filipinos. For Primo de Rivera's version of the affair,
see his Memoriae pp. 143-M.

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN 145

signed in Manila a lengthy manifesto to the Minister of the
Colonies, in which they set forth their view of the events which
had been happening and of the programme which should in fu-
ture be followed.^ They declared their certainty that the masses
of the people still loved them, and that the saner and more
cultured leaders had held aloof from the movement against
them ; they proclaimed flatly that secularization of the parishes
or discipline of the friars by the bishops would not be toler-
ated ; and they declared plainly for a full return to the old re-
gime in existence before any of the reform measures of modern
times had been adopted. The defiant attitude of the orders,
coupled with their well-known power in the political adminis-
tration of Spain, and such incidents as the appointment of two
more friars as bishops in the islands in early 1898, did not tend
to quiet the apprehensions of those who hoped a new religious
regime might now begin. Primo de Rivera, who, though asso-
ciated with the conservative administration, recommended curb-
ing very considerably the powers of the orders, had, while ad-
vising the new Liberal and supposedly anti-friar ministry that
he did not believe the friars could be replaced, if they could
be made to do " as they ought," yet recommended that full
episcopal authority over them be asserted when they acted as
parish priests, that all rights of interference in local adminis-
tration be taken from them, that their abuses in the imposition
of fees be curbed, and that the native priests should cease to
be their servants, stating in conclusion " that the settlement
of the problem of the friars carries with it the preservation or
the loss of the country." He said, moreover, that the hatred
for the friars had produced the hatred for other Spaniards in
genera], and that the Tagalog outbreak was due to the fact

^ This docmncnt, of which only ten copies for each order were printed, scarcely
ever saw the light of day. The succeeding events in Madrid and Manila buried it
from sight. The orders had secured representatives to take up their cause in the
Spanish Cortes in June, but, when advised of the resistance they would meet, they
desisted. This manifesto is a complete and authoritative sctting-forth of the friars'
petition, and at the same time well confirms the statements of their saner critici.

146 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

that there had been more abuses by the friars, and they had
greater possessions of land, in the territory of the Tagalogs.^
Here lay the real issue at the bottom of the whole mass of
difficulties. Spain, even though in the midst of bitter disaster,
had the good fortune to shove this problem, along with the
minor matters complicating it, over upon the inexperienced
Government of the United States, which was a long time dis-
covering just what it had on its hands.

^ These statements will be found in a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the
Spanish Ministry in December, 1897, cited by him on pp. 169-76 of his Memoria.
(It is also curious to note his recommendations, not only for reform in the Spanish
personnel in the islands, but also, in connection with educational matters, the in-
troduction of manual training and the bringing of school-teachers from Spain.) His
statements about the friars as above given do not tally very well with the senti-
ments quoted as being his by Stephen Bonsai in his article on the friars in the
North American Review for November, 1892, already referred to. Mr. Bonsai fell
into the same trap in this case as in many others, where he takes his data blindly
from Las Ordenes Religiosas en las Islas Filipinos by Father Zamora, the Augus-
tinian. Father Zamora culled to suit himself from the reports of governors-general,
and Mr. Bonsai sometimes made even Zamora's selections in favor of the friars a
little stronger in translation. A very frank exposition of the real attitude of prac-
tically all the friars is that of Father Eduardo Navarro, procurator of the Augus-
tinians in the Philippines, in his Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad, already
cited. He says (p. 276) : " It is not only advisable, but absolutely and peremptorily
necessary, to take a prudent and safe step backward, in the firm conviction that
this will be to gain, not to lose, will mean advancement and progress."

I

CHAPTER IV

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Both to foreigners and to Filipinos, the idea that the United
States might be drawn westward from the Pacific to take some
direct interest in affairs in the Philippines was not entirely a
new thing in 1898. But neither Jagor's prediction of 1873 as
to that country being destined in its commercial expansion to
become the territorial successor of Spain/ nor Rizal's half-
fearful notion of 1891 that it might follow on from Samoa to
other Pacific islands,^ would, if known to the American people,
have excited anything but ridicule from them, absorbed as they
were in the development of their own continent, no notion
more remote from their minds than that of holding colonies.
As the prospects for American intervention in Cuba became
better, some of the Filipino propagandists, especially those in
Hongkong, seem to have turned from their idle dream of
Japanese recognition of their revolution, and to have sought
to direct the attention of America to the Spanish colonies in
the Orient also. Their offer, made through Consul-General
Rounseville Wildman, of Hongkong, in November, 1897, of
an "offensive and defensive alliance" in case of war with
Spain, was, of course, promptly declined, and the consul-gen-
eral was instructed to refuse to be the medium for any more
such offers.' Although there is no published record of it, a
more elaborate appeal for the intervention and protection of
the United States had been presented to Mr. Wildman 's pre-
decessor in January of the same year, signed by a committee
of three Filipino deportee in Hongkong, but drawn and pre-
sented with the cognizance and approval of other Filipinos

* See footnote, pp. 32-33, above. * See footnote, p. 71, above.

• See SencUe Document 62, 55th Cong., lit Seas., part 1, pp. 333-34.

148 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

there and elsewhere.^ There is nothing to show that this doc-
ument ever reached Washington, or that the Government there
ever gave any further thought to the Philippines or to the
Fihpinos prior to May, 1898, than to choose Commodore
Dewey to take command of the Eastern squadron, assemble it
and make it ready to destroy the naval equipment of Spain in
the Orient, in case war should break out.

A. PREPARATIONS FOR A STRUGGLE IN PHILIPPINE WATERS

That the selection of Commodore Dewey was made because
it was, in the fall of 1897, deemed wise to have a man " who
could go into Manila if necessary," has been testified by the then
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Koosevelt,^ who, it
is generally believed, had something to do with the choice of
the man. Dewey, who took command at Yokohama in January,
1898, was that month given cable orders to keep all enlisted

' This document, which consists of some two thousand words, sets forth the
grievances against the friars, of course, charging against them the deportations
and the policy of confiscating property, and giving in detjiil the Filipino account of
the execution of the native priests and the " revolution " of 1872. (See footnote 1,
p. 58, above.) It is curious to note, however, how the phraseology and almost
the entire contents of this appeal are based upon the Spanish, and in general the
Continental, view of Americans, as being inspired only by "practical" motives.
The principal accusations against Spain are, not only that she taxes the Filipinos
for pensions to Columbus's descendants and others, for the support of penal
colonies in Africa and of the diplomatic and consular corps in the Orient, but
also that the Spaniards are well known to be " little given to work " and much
given to office-holding, living off the Filipinos in consequence, and, above all, that
they have done little to develop the mineral or agricultural interests of the country,
while foreigners have done all that has been done in these lines and that of shipping.
The bait is held out — one can imagine how cleverly these Filipinos felt it to be
— that there are great riches remaining undeveloped. The Cuban example is re-
ferred to, and America is asked to extend the same aid that Emperor Napoleon
{sic) gave to the American colonies in their struggle for independence. For the pe-
titioners ask protection and recognition, "with the right to govern their own coun-
try" and help "in the expulsion of the Spaniards by means of force"; they will
pay back the expenses incurred when independence is gained, and will grant fran-
chises in further recompense. This document was signed by Doroteo Cortes, Jos^
Ma Basa, and A. G. Medina, prominent deportes, at Hongkong on January 29, 1897.
A copy of one of the Spanish originals is in the possession of the writer, but the
petition was presented in English.

2 See his article in McClure^s Magazine for October, 1899.

I*-

MANILA BAY AND VICINITY

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 149

sailors of the Asiatic squadron whose terms had expired. Af-
ter the blowing-up of the Maine in February had come to
strain still more seriously the relations between the United
States and Spain, precautionary orders preparatory for war
were more numerous. First there was the familiar order of
February 25 cabled by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to Com-
modore Dewey, directing him to assemble the squadron at once
at Hongkong and to "keep full of coal," as, in case of war,
"your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not
leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the
Philippine Islands." Secretary Long the next day instructed
Dewey, in common with all squadron commanders, to "keep
full of coal, the best that can be had." It had been decided
to keep on the Atlantic station the Helena, which had started
for the Asiatic station by the eastern route in January; but
the orders for the return to the United States of the cruiser
Olympia were canceled in the above dispatch of Assistant
Secretary Roosevelt, and, on March 3, Secretary Long ordered
the Mohican from San Francisco to Honolulu, to replace there
the cruiser Baltimore, the latter proceeding at once to Hong-
kong with a supply of ammunition for the squadron. During
April, Dewey was authorized by cable to stock up fully with
provisions and to purchase two British steamers at Hongkong
for supply- and coal-ships, and was told to land from his ves-
sels all woodwork and stores not needed in operations; and he
then secured five months* supplies in advance. In a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy on March 31, Commodore Dewey says
that the five vessels of his squadron were all assembled at
Hongkong by the first week in March, and that they "have
been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready
to move at twenty-four hours' notice." ' The vessels referred

* See Sen. Doc. 73, 66th Cong., Ist Sew. For a full record of the precautionary
orders to Dewey and other commanders prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities,
sea Appendix to Report of Chief of Bureau of Navigation {Reports of Navy Depart-
ment, 1898), pp. 21-26 and 65-66. This document forms vol. iv of The Message of
the President for 1898 and Accompanying Documents, and was also issued separately

150 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

to, including the Baltimore, which reached Hongkong on
April 22, were: The Olympia, flagship, 5870 tons; the Balti-
more, 4413 tons; the Raleigh, 3213 tons, and the Boston, 3000
tons, all these being protected cruisers ; and the Petrel, a gun-
boat of 892 tons. The revenue cutter McCulloch, being on a
trip to the Orient, was detached for naval service and added
to the squadron at Hongkong as a dispatch boat. The supply-
ships purchased were the Nanshan and the Zafiro.

The information which the commodore had obtained with
regard to the Spanish fleet and the defenses of Manila Bay,
principally through his own private sources, was quite accurate,
though not entirely complete. As this information is outlined
in the letter just referred to, it shows an omission to take into
account the Isla de Cuba (called a cruiser by the Spaniards,
though really this and the Isla de Luzon were only first-class
gunboats), or the Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Velasco,
gunboats of over 1000 tons, while among the boats mentioned
as "armed tugs and launches for river service" were several
small gunboats, effectively built and armed with small guns
for inter-island service. Dewey was perhaps aware, however,
that the Ulloa was careened on its side for repairs, and the
Velasco in dry dock, although he does not mention this nor
the rumors of the times about torpedoes and about submarine
mines at the entrance to the bay. He felt sufficiently sure of
his own resources to say : " I believe I am not overconfident
in stating that with the squadron now under my command the
vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in
a day"; and his information led him to believe that the state
of opposition to Spain in the islands was such that the capture
of Manila virtually meant that the whole archipelago would
fall into the possession of the conquering power or of the
insurgents.

as House of Representatives Document 3, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Only cable instruc-
tions to Dewey are given therein ; whatever verbal or mailed instructions, if any,
he had with regard to engagements in the Orient, are not on record. (This Appen-
dix will hereafter be cited simply under the title Bureau of Navigation.)

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 151

Had the American commander been fully cognizant of the
real state of affairs, and of the confusion reigning at the head-
quarters of Spanish power in the Orient, he would probably
have been still more confident of an easy victory. In the first
"junta" of high authorities held at Manila to discuss plans for
defense, in view of the telegram from Madrid on March 12
that war was imminent and of the reports to the governor-
general and to Admiral Montojo from Hongkong that
Dewey's fleet was preparing for a descent upon the Philip-
pines, Admiral Montojo had made a comparison of the two
fleets, showing that in case of a meeting between them, a
Spanish defeat was fully to be expected.^ Indeed, in Spanish
official circles, defeat on the sea by the Americans seems
to have been accepted from the first with a resignation that
would appear more heroic had it not been accompanied by
so many outward demonstrations of bravado and rhetoric, nor
covered up by such a multiplicity of plans, "juntas" and
paper-propositions for victory. The chief care from the first
seems to have been directed to preventing a descent of insur-
gents upon the city of Manila, and the most intelligent efforts
for defense were exerted toward this end. As for the prepara-
tions made to meet Dewey, one might think in reading them over
that he was in some comic-opera kingdom of the sea, were it
not evident how seriously the numerous actors took their parts,
and were we not in the presence of a real tragedy for the once
great empire of Spain. From first to last, in all the meetings,
inspections, and reports which were spread so at large upon
the records, the idea of the Spaniards seems to have been not
80 much how best to make use of their really wretched re-

^ See Primo de Rivera's Memoria (cited in a preceding^ chapter), p. 181. He
•aji that Montojo " set forth in detail the data regarding the boats of the two
squadrons, it being shown that the American boats were superior in guns, in armor-
protection and in speed, and therefore in very superior condition to ours, not only
for accepting or not an attack in the place and manner they thought opportune,
but also, when once this were begun, the logical result ought to be the defeat of
our squadron. On this account, the idea of a fight to prevent the arrival at Manila
of the American ships was abandoned."

152 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

sources for defense as how most convincingly to make it ap-
pear on paper, after the inevitable crash should come, that in
each and every case the individual upon whom fell any respon-
sibility for meeting the situation had done all that it was pos-
sible to do. Undoubtedly, the antiquated military code of
Spain, under which defeat or surrender almost inevitably im-
plies the court-martial even of a commander who has no other
resource, had much to do in the Spanish-American War with
the frequent cases of what looked to outsiders like a curious
combination of incompetence and imprevision with boast and
bravado.

Montojo claims to have asked reinforcements from Spain as
far back as January. A board of Philippine naval officers had,
a year before, recommended that all the vessels of the squadron
be sent to Hongkong for a thorough overhauling in dry dock ;
no such authorization was received, and the little dry dock at
Cavite was being used to clean up the smaller boats. The
meeting of March 16 decided that the squadron should go to
Subig Bay, endeavoring to fortify the island at its entrance
and to close the narrow channel with torpedoes. For nearly
forty years, plans for the fortification and defense of Manila
and Subig Bays and the erection of a naval station in the lat-
ter bay had been pending. One elaborate plan drawn up under
Primo de Rivera in 1881, during his first term as governor-
general, was now hauled forth from the archives, and it was
seriously proposed to follow it. In accordance with this plan,
and also with recommendations of subordinate naval and en-
gineer officers, the wider of the two mouths of Manila Bay
{Boca Grande) was to be shut "if possible," and the means
of defense centered upon the narrower entrance [Boca Chica)
between Corregidor Island and Mariveles. This was subse-
quently modified to a double line of batteries to defend both
mouths of the bay, with a central line of torpedoes.

On paper, this reads as if serious obstacles would be opposed
to Dewey's entrance. But almost without exception, the guns

mXERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 153

were old, and such newer guns as were taken from the disabled
vessels for hasty mounting on Corregidor, or on the Cavite
side of the entrance, were necessarily light pieces. The really
humorous feature of the defense lay in the placing of the tor-
pedo-mines. Fourteen or fifteen seem actually to have been
dropped into the water at the entrance to the bay, without
connected fuses and it may be also without charges to be set
off had there been proper fuses. The same was the case with
the equal number of torpedoes sent up to Subig Bay with the
committee which first went up there to " study " a plan of de-
fense. In private conversation, the members of this naval com-
mittee had stated that it was impossible to accomplish anything
in the short time and with the scanty resources at their dis-
posal. Nevertheless, they went busily about making their " re-
port." The English ship which was laying the Philippine end of
the Hongkong cable from Bolinau to Manila was requisitioned
to supply insulated wire, etc., with which to connect the mines
in Subig Bay, as the Spanish navy's equipment was old and
useless. Five of the mines were actually thus placed, though
without charges really expected to explode or fuses really ex-
pected to work ! ^

The biggest guns available for coast defense (themselves
hardly entitled to be called coast artillery) were four 24-centi-
meter Krupp rifles, placed in front of the walls at Manila, and
not yet properly mounted to secure more than half the range
they should have had. The guns on the walls and in the fort
of Manila were nearly all antiquated smoothbores or muzzle-
loading rifles. Nevertheless, it was decided to remove hastily
to Subig Bay, for the purpose of fortifying its entrance, four
Ordonez rifles of 15-centimeter caliber, which, with the Krupp
g^ns, offered to Manila itself its only practical means of de-

* Fop the torpedo and mine epinode see Santrdn, op. cit.f pp. 374-380, also Joseph
L. Stickney's article in Harp€r*a Magazintf February, 1899, p. 481. La Politico de
Etpaha en FUipinas^ vol. viii, p. 180, says the Spanish naval authorities in the
Philippines had destroyed all the gun-cotton they had, because it was old and there
waa danger of its exploding.

154 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

fense against naval vessels. When Admiral Montojo, upon
receipt of the news that war had actually come, took his fleet
up to Subig Bay on April 25, these guns lay useless on the ''
sandy shore of Isla Grande, and the engineers who had under-
taken to place them informed him that it would be twenty
days before they could be properly mounted. It was then that
Montojo (first being careful to hold a "junta " of officers to jus-
tify his action) decided at once to return and await the Amer-
icans off Cavite, rather than give battle in the deep waters of
Subig Bay, where, if the vessels were sunk, their crews would
be lost. The other two Ordonez rifles, which had been lying
at Manila unmounted, were set up on Point Sangley, Cavite.

Madrid kept cabling contradictory information as to the
prospect of war. Before Primo de Kivera left, the circle of
confidential advisers upon means of defense had been enlarged
by the addition of a "junta" of civilians, composed of the
archbishop, who was chairman, the mayor of Manila, the gov-
ernor of Manila province and the secretary of the governor-
general. This organization constantly clashed with the already
existing "junta of authorities," a governmental advisory board.
As the days of actual conflict approached, plans and mani-
festoes multiplied proportionately. When a cable message an-
nouncing the war was received on April 22, a newspaper and
the governing body of the city organized a great demonstration
which paraded before Governor-General Augustin's residence.
He issued a decree pronouncing the service of arms compulsory
upon all Peninsular Spaniards in the islands and upon all pub-
lic functionaries under fifty years of age, and opening a vol-
unteer enlistment to natives and also to foreigners, except
Americans. The laws of war were also stiffened by the process
of a decree, and treason was made to include " those who cir-
culated news or tales tending to discourage the defenders of
the country." But the real energy of the governor-general was
put forth in the " allocution " which he addressed to his peo-
ple in the " Official Gazette " of April 23, saying : —

i

INTER\^NTION OF THE UNITED STATES 155

The North American people, made up of all social excrescences,
have exhausted our patience and have provoked a war by their per-
fidious machinations. . . . The struggle will be short and decisive.
The God of victories will grant unto us one that is brilliant and
complete, as reason and justice of our cause demand. ... A fleet,
manned by foreigners without instruction and discipline, is about to
come to this archipelago, with the wild purpose of taking away from
you all that implies life, honor, and liberty. . . . They appear to
look upon, as a feasible enterprise, the substitution of the Catholic
religion, which you possess, by that of Protestantism ; ... to pos-
sess themselves of your riches as if the right of ownership were un-
known among you. . . . The aggressors shall not profane the tombs
of your fathers ; they shall not satisfy their impure passions at the
cost of the honor of your wives and daughters ; they shall not seize
the property that your self-denial had accumulated to maintain your
lives ; . . . your valor and your patriotism suffice to frighten and
overwhelm these people, who . . . have resorted to the extermina-
tion of the aborigines of North America without making the effort to
bring them to civilization. . . .

Archbishop Nozaleda was not to be left behind in this effort
to appeal to religious and race prejudice and to turn to advan-
tage the ignorance of the Filipinos as to the people of the
United States, at a time when the plans for obtaining Filipino
volunteers were under way. He addressed his " beloved sons"
to inform them that, if victorious, this " heterodox people, pos-
sessed by the blackest rancor and all the abject passions that
heresy engenders," would raze their temples, profane the altars
of the true God, rob them of their religion and treat them as
slaves ; he, however, assured them that God was with the Span-
iard in the coming battle, and that the enemy would therefore
find it of no avail to rest his assurance in his fleet.* With that
blissful, half-religious optimism and that cheerful delight in

^ For these allocutions and similar publications in the Manila newspapers of the
time, see Report of Philippine Commission^ 1901, part 1, pp. 1G8-72, especially the
allocution of Nozaleda following the destruction of the Spanish fleet, wherein he
elaborates to the Filipinos still more completely all the horrors that will come to
them if they do not join with Spain in repelling the invaders. The same dreadful
warnings, in even more rabid form, were preached to the pe(»plo from the friar
pulpits of Manila all during May, June, and July. For the Spanish text of Noza-
leda's pastorals, see his De/ensa obligadOf appendices 3 and 4.

156 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

wild and improbable tales and prophecy to their own advantage
which characterize the Spaniards in general, many of those in
Manila who were not on confidential terms with the facts were
exchanging expressions of commiseration for the poor Ameri-
cans upon the wretched fate which awaited them, and were cir-
culating stories that desertions at Hongkong were so numerous
that Dewey was in danger of being left without men. Others,
on the outskirts of official life or private citizens, but of saner
judgment and better posted, had been hustling their families
out of Manila (some refugees having gone to Spain on the
boat which took Primo de Rivera, and others moving to the
country along the railroad), and among this element there was
whispered talk about the folly of the authorities in not sepa-
rating the vessels of the fleet and scattering them among
various out-of-the-way harbors of the archipelago. The naval
officers could not object to this plan that it left Manila de-
fenseless, for several plans put forward by them had done the
same ; but there was the very potent fact that not to stand and
fight meant almost certain courtrmartial in Spain.

B. THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY

Commodore Dewey, awaiting final orders at Hongkong, on
April 24 received this message from Secretary Long : —

War has commenced between United States and Spain. Proceed
at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particu-
larly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy.
Use utmost endeavors.^

Dewey, however, waited a few days for the arrival of Con-
sul Williams from Manila, who was alleged to have infor-
mation worth while, and in the mean time, at the request of
the governor of Hongkong, that he leave the neutral waters of
that British bay, he went to Mirs Bay on the China coast. On

^ See Bureau of Navigation^ p. 67. It has been humorously remarked on the
floor of the United States Senate that " the Secretary of War was a humane man,
and therefore gave Dewey an option as to what to do with the Spanish ships."

EsTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 157

April 27, the consul appeared and Dewey's vessels at once set
sail. He arrived off Cape Bolinau, western Luzon, on the morn-
ing of April 30, and early in the afternoon passed by the mouth
of Subig Bay. The Boston and Concord had been sent ahead
to reconnoiter it, but could see no signs of life, although the
officers left with the guns of which Manila had been so use-
lessly deprived saw them and threw the breech-blocks of the
guns into the water. For a week all the navigation lights on
the coast had been out, by Spanish orders. For three nights, a
big bonfire had been kindled by natives on little Karabau
Island, close to the Cavite shore on the right of the wider
entrance to the bay. Whether or no the pilot whom Dewey
had on board the Olympia, who was perfectly familiar with
the entrance to the bay and with its waters, used or needed
to use this light, it was toward Karabau Island that the
American ships were directly headed when the Spaniards, who
had been on the lookout for them, caught sight of them just
after 11 o'clock.^ Suddenly changing her direction from
southeast to east, the Olympia started for the center of the
larger channel, passing between the little island El Fraile (The
Friar) and Pulo Caballo (next to Corregidor), followed by
the whole fleet in column formation, except the supply-ships,
which passed through nearer to the Cavite shore. The vessels
went in at a speed of eight knots, and, as a Spanish writer has
put it, " as if they owned those waters." They were over a
mile from the small guns on El Fraile and perhaps two miles
from those on Pulo Caballo ; and, as soon as it was well past
the line between the two islets, each ship, following the Olym-
piads lead, swiftly turned to the northward, flanking the bat-
teries. The Spaniards derived some satisfaction from saying
that a shot from El Fraile passed four fingers' length above
the head of the commander of the Raleigh (!). Three shots
were fired as the Raleigh and the Petrel, fourth and fifth in
line, came abreast of El Fraile, and were answered by those

1 Sastrdn, op. cU.f p. 385.

158 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

two vessels and the Boston, and one of those shots passed
over the Concord and between her masts.^ Tbe " torpedoes,"
for reasons which the reader will understand, but which were
at the time entirely unknown to Commodore Dewey and his
men, were not heard ; but the American vessels used their
searchlights energetically to sweep the waters and the islands
and unmask possible batteries or obstacles of any sort. The
nine vessels were all inside and out of the range of the guns
by 2 A.M., and, forming anew, proceeded slowly across the
bay in a northeasterly direction to where, in the gray and
misty dawn of Sunday morning. May 1, they were seen, well
off the mouth of the Pasig River, by the anxious watchers on
the walls of Manila, and shortly afterward by their still more
anxious countrymen who had in the night been called to
quarters on the vessels off Cavite peninsula and in the arsenal
of that place. Both sides had been ready for action, for some
hours ; the Americans since their arrival off the shores of
Luzon (since they left Hongkong, in fact), the Spaniards
since shortly after Montojo received telegraphic word at two
in the morning of the entrance of the enemy's vessels unhurt.'^
Admiral Montojo had brought his vessels limping back to
Cavite on the afternoon of April 29, and had at once disposed
them in the array in which they finally gave battle, in a line
across the mouth of shallow Caiiacao Bay, which lies be-
tween the two points of the Cavite peninsula. The Don Juan
de Austria, a gunboat of 1159 tons, recently overhauled, was
stationed farthest to the north and west, just off the little

^ Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 75, 77, and 80. The little McCuUoch, too, cour-
ageously set her guns to barking.

2 Joseph L. Stickney, op. cit., p. 477, thinks Dewey did not lay before his cap-
tains in the conference held on the Olympia at 5 p.m., after Subig Bay was found
to be empty, the question of entering Manila Bay at night, but decided of himself
to do so, because, he arg^ued from a general knowledge of Spanish character, the
Spaniards would not be looking for him to enter at night. This judgment was
quite correct; Spanish officers and Spanish writers have exclaimed about the mat-
ter since, almost in a tone that would seem to say it was " very ungentlemanly "
for the Americans to come in at night, when they were not expected.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 159

shore battery on Point Sangley. Behind her, in the shallower
water, still careened partly to one side in the process of clean-
ing her machinery, and anchored tight, was the gunboat Don
Antonio de Ulloa, of 1160 tons, all but two of her guns of
any size having been taken to strengthen the shore batteries.
Next the Austria, up on the line of battle, was the Castilla,
of 3260 tons, an unprotected cruiser with a wooden hull,
which had made water so rapidly on the trip to Subig Bay
that her engines were rendered useless, and she was towed
back and anchored fast in twenty-seven feet of water, broad-
side on, partly full of water, and with a line of lighters filled
with sand in front of her, so that her port batteries might be
brought into use.^ In the center of the line was the Reina
Cristina, the flagship, an unprotected cruiser of old style, of
3520 tons displacement ; and ranged to her right, closing the
line some distance off the Cavite Arsenal, were the so-called
protected cruisers, Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, each of
1045 tons, the most modern boats under Montojo, having
been finished in 1887. The gunboat Marques del Duero was
stationed behind the flagship as a dispatch-boat.

It was scarcely light enough for all his vessels to see the
signal, when Dewey's flagship displayed the order, " Prepare
for general action," and his ships turned southward toward
Cavite, leaving on the port side Manila and the few foreign
merchant vessels anchored in the bay (the inter-island steamers
and small craft under the Spanish flag having crowded into
the Pasig River and huddled up under Fort Santiago). The
two 15-centimeter guns on Point Sangley opened fire first, just
about five o'clock, and then the gunners behind the 24-centime-
ter guns on the Luneta followed suit; but the American vessels
proceeded on their way unheeding, perfecting their battle for-
mation as they went. The order established and maintained
throughout the first engagement was: Olympia, Baltimore,

* See translation of portion of ofiQciftl report of Admiral Montojo, Bureau of
Navigatumt pp. 89-90.

160 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, the McCulloch keeping
in call of the Olympia, and well within range of the shots that
passed over the American ships, with a hawser ready to pull
o£E any vessel that should ground in the shallow waters near
Cavite. When they were 5000 yards from Point Sangley, the
Olympia turned to the westward, and, in order named, the ves-
sels countermarched back and forth in a line approximately
parallel to the line of the Spanish fleet, three times to the west-
ward and twice to the eastward, each turn bringing them closer
in, the range of fire being most of the time from 3000 to
1800 yards. Captain Gridley of the Olympia did not receive
until 5.41, when well within range, and after shells had passed
over them, the order from Commodore Dewey: " You may
fire when you are ready." The firing at once became general
on the American side, and continued so for nearly two hours,
the 5-inch rapid-fire guns on the Olympia and Raleigh, the
6-inch guns on these and the other boats, and the 8-inch guns
on the Baltimore, Boston, and Olympia doing steady execution,
while the smaller guns of the secondary batteries were served
so rapidly that the American fire was pronounced by the Span-
iards to be "truly horrible " and to have been sustained "with
veritable craziness." Admiral Montojo himself has given a
graphic description of it : —

There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers
at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fighting
the Cristina, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced,
one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those
who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward
mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant
Josd Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest
commendation, steering until the end of the fight. . . . The enemy
shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered
us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7.30, one shell completely
destroyed the steering-gear. I gave orders to steer by hand while the
rudder was out of action. In the mean time, another shell exploded
on the poop. Another destroyed the mizzen-masthead, bringing down
the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 161

shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood,
destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another ex-
ploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke
and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. Als it was im-
possible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the
cartridges were beginning to explode. Amidships, several shells of
small caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones
penetrated the fire-room, putting out of action one master-gunner
and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the star-
board bow gun. While the fire astern increased, fire was started for-
ward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on
the deck. The guns which were not disabled continued firing ; only
one gunner's mate and one able seaman were left on their feet to
fire them as they were loaded by the men of the sailing crew, who
had repeatedly been called on to substitute the men of the gun crews.
The ship being out of control, the hull, smokestack and mast riddled
with shot, and the cries of the wounded [adding to] the confusion ;
half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I
gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines
should explode, at the same time signaling the Cuba and Luzon to
assist in saving the crew, which they did, aided by others from the
Duero and the arsenal.^

The fight had been on nearly two hours when the Spanish
commander transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba. The
Cristina received her worst punishment when, at 7 o'clock,
she desperately pushed forward from the line of battle, as if
with the intention of ramming the Baltimore or the Oljrmpia.
That was her final effort, and the work of destruction Montojo
describes was speedily completed by the concentrated fire of
the American ships, driving the Spanish flagship back almost
upon the guns of the arsenal. Yet even if the result were not
to be regarded as foregone from the moment the American
ships swung into position and started for Cavite, the battle had
been on but a short time before it was apparent, even to the
distant watchers on the walls of Manila and on the roofs of
Malate and Cavite, who would be the victor.*

^ Bureau of Namgationtjt. 91; the inistAkes in translation have been corrected
in the abore quotation from Montojo's official report.
* Says Sastrdn, op. cU.t p. 389 : " Half an hour after the battle opened, we who

162 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

As the American ships came closer and their gunnery be-
came more certain, effective opposition to them was less and
less possible. The Castilla's guns (those that had been left on
board her) were finally all rendered useless but one, and she
was both afire and sinking when her crew were given orders
to abandon her. The Austria had started to her aid, but had
been driven back behind the secondary line and set on fire.
Three guns on the Isla de Luzon were dismantled. Back on
the secondary line, the disabled Ulloa was struck by a shell
which opened her below the water-line, her commander and
half her crew had been put out of action, and the rest had to
escape to Point Sangley. The little Duero's engines and in-
effective guns were disabled. As the commander of the Cristina,
Luis Cadarso, was standing on board directing to the last the
operations of removing the wounded to the hospital on shore,
he was literally annihilated by a shell which struck him as if
he had been its target. The Olympia had caught the Cristina
as she swung about to limp back to her companions and raked
her fore and aft with a 250-pound shell, which killed or dis-
abled 60 men besides the commander.

This was the state of affairs when, at 7.35, a rumor that the
ammunition for the rapid-fire guns of the Olympia was nearly
exhausted caused Commodore Dewey to signal the fleet to
withdraw into the bay for an examination and redistribution
of ammunition. The actual state of destruction on board the
Spanish boats was, of course, not known to him, but he must
have felt quite sure of finishing his prey whenever he chose
to do so. Hence it was that, finding the report of a shortage
of ammunition on the flagship incorrect, he signaled the fleet
on the way back into the bay to " let the people go to break-
fast," while the commanding officers came aboard the Olym-
pia to talk things over with him. Equally, it was a conscious

were witnessing it, and from near or far were following anxionsly its incidents,
suffered the most mournful impression of seeing how the flames of a fire of im-
mense proportions had already invaded the Cristina, and how the Castilla and
Don Juan de Austria were also burning."

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 163

master of the situation who at this juncture sent word to the
governor-general in Manila that the batteries at the mouth of
the Pasig, on the Luneta, and at Malate, which had been keep-
ing up a random and futile fire at his fleet, must cease their
firing or the city would be shelled. These land batteries promptly
became silent (as it proved, for all future time).^

It was not only a beaten but an almost entirely abandoned
fleet which awaited the finishing touches of destruction when,
at 11.16, the American commander ordered the attack to be
renewed. The Cristina, whose magazine had exploded shortly
after the first engagement was over, and the water-logged
Castilla had sunk, wrapped in flames, in their positions off
the arsenal. The Cuba, Luzon, and Austria had moved around,
at Montojo's orders, to where the small vessels had been
sheltered behind the arsenal off Cavite, in Bakoor Bay. The
instructions were that they were to be sunk and abandoned
before they should be surrendered. The Baltimore had started
toward the entrance to the bay to intercept what was at first
thought to be a Spanish merchant vessel ; but it proved to be
flying a British flag, and she was recalled and, being nearest
Cavite, headed the second attack. She proceeded first to silence
the two-gun battery on Point Sangley, which had escaped at-
tention in the first engagement. She and the other boats, then
just coming up, devoted some shots to the Ulloa before it was
discovered that they were battering an abandoned and sunken
vessel. The circle of American ships then formed about the
arsenal, behind which were the remaining Spanish vessels.
The shots in reply were even fewer and more perfunctory than
the wretched plight of the Spaniards might have given cause

^ Joseph L. Stickney's account (op. ct/., pp. 476-77) makes it appear that Dewey
was actiially afraid he had run out of ammunition without materially damaging
the Spanish ships. Hence, according to Stickney, the breakfast story was invented
to cover the real reason for withdrawal. But Dewey had already plainly stated
the reason to be a mistake about ammunitioni in his official report of May 4. It
is true that the real state of the destruction wrought among the Spanish ships did
not become evident until, as the Americans were withdrawing into the bay, the
Cristina's magazine exploded and the Cutilla burst into flames.

164 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

for expecting. The Cuba, Luzon, and Duero were already
being abandoned, their valves having been opened to the
water and the breech-plugs of their guns taken before their
crews retired to the arsenal. At 12.30, all firing had ceased on
either side, the white flag having been raised above Cavite
Arsenal, and Dewey withdrew his ships to the Manila side,
leaving the Petrel behind to destroy the vessels in Bakoor Bay.
A whaleboat's crew was sent to set fire to the Cuba, Luzon,
Austria, and Duero, which had been in the fight, and also the
disabled Lezo and the Velasco, gunboats which had taken no
part in it. The little Manila and the small coast-survey vessel
Argos were not burned where they lay aground with the rest,
but were later hauled off and made captures. Two gunboats
and three steam launches were towed off during the afternoon. ^
The Concord had meanwhile joined the Petrel in this work
of unresisted destruction and capture, having completed the
task assigned her by Dewey during the second engagement of
destroying a large Spanish merchant vessel, the Isla de Min-
danau of the Transatlantic Company (the subsidized colonial
shipping-line of Spain), which had been hovering under the
shelter of the Spanish fleet since it reached Manila on April
22, had gone with Montojo to Subig Bay, and, upon its re-
turn, had been beached off the coast near Las Pifias and its
compartments flooded to render it useless if captured by the
Americans. The Concord speedily set fire to it, and its crew
barely escaped with their lives.'^

^ In a letter printed in the Century Magaziney April, 1899, E. P. Wood, com-
mander of the Petrel, magnifies into heroism in the face of the enemy the burning
of these ships. The letter is only worthy of note as cumulative evidence of the
American failure fully to appreciate, even after it was all over, the demoralization
of their opponents and the actually wretched state of the Spanish naval equip-
ment.

2 The Spaniards have never been able to forgive Dewey for this finishing touch
to the day's destruction. Says Sastrdn, op. cit. p. 394 : " A most gloomy record will
always be for the Petrel [a mistake in the boats], the inconceivable fury with which
it cannonaded the sailors on the Isla de Mindanau, as well when they were rowing
to gain the beach as when already disembarked on it, at which time they received
five shots more from the American ship, although in spite of them they came out

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 165

The Spanish loss in killed and wounded, as given by Ad-
miral Montojo, was 381 officers and men, of whom 167 were
killed. Of these casualties (10 of which occurred in the arse-
nal), over one half were on the flagship Cristina, and, when the
Castilla was abandoned, she had suffered a loss of 23 killed and
80 wounded.^ When it was said that the casualties on the
American side were but nine, two of whom were not admitted
to the hospital, the only two serious cases being those of a man
who slipped on the Baltimore's deck and fractured his leg and
of another sailor on the Baltimore with a wounded right f oot,^
the question occurs whether the Spanish gunners aimed at any-
thing or simply fired to make a noise. Outside of the Balti-
more, the American vessels suffered more damage from the
concussion of their own guns than from the explosion of the
Spanish shells, in the smashing of crockery, shaking loose of
small boats, etc.^ Great comfort was derived in Spain by the
belief that the 15-centimeter guns on Point Sangley disabled

nnbarmed." The crew was, of course, in line of the Boston's fire, and her com-
mander states (Bureau of Navigation^ p. 77) that he continued firing after the
Mindanaa took fire, in obedience to orders. Dewej says (ibid.^ p. 72) that the
Mindanaa " was armed and took part in the fight," but this is a mistake, at least
if meant literally, though a small machine-gun on board may have fired some
f hots, quite uselessly, early in the first engagement.

^ In Commodore Dewey's official report already cited, the killed on the Cristina
were reported as numbering 160. The number as given by Montojo is 130, while she
bad 220 killed and wounded out of a total force of less than 400 men. (See Notes
on Spanish- American Wart Office of Naval Intelligence^ part v, p. 13. These Notest
issued separately during 1898-1900, most of them being translations of Spanish
documents, shed light upon the general state of unpreparedness of Spain in 1898.)
The skeletons of some eighty men were found in the old hulk of the Cristina,
when she was raised in April, 1903. It was easy to float the Isla de Cuba, Isla de
Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria, and they were added to the American navy in
November, 1898.

^ The detailed record of American casualties may be found in Report of the
Surgeon-General of Navy for 1898 ^ on pp. 1292 and 1302 of vol. n of Message of
the President and Accompanying Documents for 1898.

* The Olympia was hit half a dozen times, a hole was made in its frame by •
6-pound shot, a plate was dented, and its small boats damaged, but no men hurt ;
the Boston was hit four times, but suffered no damage, though one of her crew
was bruised by a splinter ; the Raleigh was hit once, a whaleboat sustaining the
damage ; the Petrel was struck once, with no damage ; and the Concord was not
■tmok at alL

166 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the Baltimore and compelled her to withdraw, and the artillery
lieutenant in command of them was hailed as a hero. The
Baltimore was struck five times, the only projectile which did
real damage disabling a 6-inch gun (which was easily repaired
the next day), and exploding a box of ammunition, which
wounded two officers and six men, none seriously. It was the
Baltimore herself which in the second engagement silenced the
Point Sangley guns. The Spanish fleet was unquestionably
short of good gunners, but their ammunition was also old and
defective, and many of their projectiles failed to explode at
all, or, when they did at rare intervals strike the mark and ex-
plode, caused no damage worth mention.^ What seemed to be
two submarine mines exploded in front of Cavite at 5.06 in
the morning, as the American vessels were starting in that
direction ; and Commodore Dewey reported that two launches
put out from the arsenal during the first engagement and fire
was concentrated upon them in the belief that they were at-
tempting to use torpedoes on the Olympia. As has already
been seen, the Spaniards probably had no torpedoes, or at least
none that could have been expected to do damage.^

Not the victory itself, but the workmanlike manner in which
it was achieved, and the wretched demoralization of the oppos-
ing foe, are the remarkable features of this day's events. Many
differing comparisons have been made between the two fleets.
The United States Court of Claims, in deciding the prize-
money cases of Admiral Dewey and his men on February 26,

^ Says Admiral Montojo (Bureau of Navigation, p. 92) : " The inefficiency of
the vessels which composed my little squadron ; the lack of all classes of the per-
sonnel, especially master-gunners and seaman-gunners ; the ineptitude of some of
the provisional machinists ; the scarcity of rapid-fire guns ; the strong crews of
the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all
ccmtributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country and
to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of
Manila. . . ."

^ Joseph L. Stickney {op. cit.) and the narrative of the battle by George A.
Loud (on the McCulloch), Charles P. Kindleberger (junior surgeon on the
Olympia), and Joel C. Evans (gunner of the Boston), in the Century Magazine,
August, 1898, make much of these incidents of the mines and torpedoes.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 167

1900, after extended comparison of the opposing forces, reached
some very remarkable conclusions, namely, that the number of
men on board the Spanish vessels was 2973, as compared with
1836 on the American vessels (and that the number of men
on board the vessels destroyed was 1914) ; and that, taking
into consideration the shore batteries at the bay entrance and
at Manila and Cavite, and the torpedoes and the mines, " the
enemy's force was superior to the vessels of the United States,"
and, excluding shore batteries and submarine defenses, it was
inferior. This may be good law as bearing on the question
whether Dewey and his men were entitled to bounty at the
rate for the victory over a superior force ; but, for a practical
comparison between the two forces, it must be disregarded.
A fair comparison between the two naval forces must leave
out of account, on the Spanish side, the gunboats which were
under cover, either in dry dock with their engines out or
grounded and abandoned, while the situation of the Ulloa,
careened and anchored, and of the Castilla, moored fast with
DO steam up, must be borne in mind ; and, on the American
side, the supply-ships must be disregarded, and also the non-
combatant McCulloch (as, for the same reason, the dispatch-
boat Duero*). Taking official figures, as far as available, we
find that the six American warships had a total tonnage of
19,098, a total horse-power of 46,177, an average speed of
17.5 knots at their maximum, and had on board 1709 officers
and men. The six vessels on the Spanish side (with the gun-
boat Ulloa) had a total tonnage of 11,271, a total horse-power
of 13,793 (4123 of this on the Castilla and Ulloa, without steam
up), an average maximum speed of 14.15 knots (disregarding
the Castilla and Ulloa), and a total force of 1875 men (as stated
by Montojo, who probably meant this number to include all
the men under him on all the vessels and in the arsenal). The
difference in steaming power and speed is at once noted.

> The Dnero, howeyer, o&rried one 6.3-mch Pallisser rifle, which may have
doue tome flring.

168 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

One other highly significant point of comparison remains to
be made, which is as to the guns of the opposing forces. The
American fleet had 129 or 130 guns, of which 34 were rapid-
fire guns (20 of these being 5-inch guns), 10 were 8-inch and
23 were 6-inch breech-loading rifles. The Spanish ships had
76 guns (counting 2 on the UUoa), of which 9 were rapid-fire
guns of small caliber (7 of 2.24 inches and 2 of 1.65 inches),
while 6 were 16-centimeter (6.3 inch), 4 were 13-centimeter
(5.12 inch), and 16 were 12-centimeter (4.72 inch) breech-
loading rifles. Put in another way, the six American ships
engaged had in their main batteries 53 guns, of which 10
were 8-inch, 23 were 6-inch, and 20 were 5-inch ; the six
Spanish ships engaged had in their main batteries 26 guns, of
which 6 were 6.3-inch and 20 were 5.1-inch or 4.7-inch ; the
Americans' secondary battery comprised 75 or 76 guns, rang-
ing from 3-inch rifles down to machine guns or mitrailleuses,
and the Spaniards' secondary battery comprised 50 guns rang-
ing from 3.4-inch down. The Court of Claims allowed for the
17 guns of from 4- to 6-inch caliber that had been placed at
the entrance to the bay, in range of 9 of which the American
vessels sailed (though of this number 3 were old muzzle-load-
ing guns) ; for the 6 guns in the Cavite shore batteries, of
which only the two 15-centimeter rifles on Point Sangley and
the single 12-centimeter rifle at the arsenal were modern
breech-loading pieces; and for 53 guns on the Manila side,
of which 41 were antique muzzle-loading pieces of 3 to 8.5
inches in caliber (a dozen or so incapable of being fired), while
of the more modern guns only the 4 24-centimeter rifles on
the Luneta and in front of the walls had really to be seriously
feared from their position and range, and they, as seen, were
so defectively mounted as not to possess their full range, even
if well handled. These are all figures that must be taken into
account in rendering any fair verdict upon the battle as a
naval performance.^

^ Aside from the reports of the opposing commanders, as given in Bureau of

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 169

The American fleet had begun the work of a blockader even
while the battle was on. From the first, the blockade was ef-

Navigation, for the above comparison fuller data have been obtained as to the
American ships from Report of Chief of Ordnance of the Navy, 1898 (pp. 1180-83
and 1188-91 of vol. n of Message of the President and Accompanying Documents
for 1898.) It is to be noted that five or six of the small machine-guns on the war-
vessels had been mounted on the noncombatant McCulIoch, Nanshan, and Zafiro.
For the Court of Claims decision, see Harper*s History of the War in the Philip-
pines, pp. 29-37. It allowed ^191,400 as bounty (under an old law, repealed on
March 3, 1899), or $100 for each of the 1914 men " found " to have been on the
vessels destroyed (barring the Cuba, Luzon, and Austria, which were raised and
restored). Prize money was afterward recovered by Dewey and his men for the
property captured (but not for the property on land, including the Cavite Arsenal,
appraised at S600,000 in Report of Secretary of Navy, Washington, 1902, pp. 240-
45), under a decision of the District of Columbia Supreme Court of February 23,
1903, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court (reported in Sen. Doc. 176,
67th Cong., 2d Sess.). This amounted to $828,677, of which, after deducting attor-
neys' fees, etc., the navy pension fund received one half, or $370,366, and Dewey
and his men received an equal amount. Dewey received 5 per cent of both bounty
and prize money, or $9570 and $18,500 respectively. The captains of ships each
received one tenth of his ship's total share, and the officers and men about two
months* and five months* pay from the bounty and prize awards respectively. (See
New York Evening Post, August 13, 1904.) For a comparison of the two fleets by
the Chief Intelligence Officer of the United States Navy, see Cong. Record, vol.
35, pp. 5374-75. The figures therein given as to the Spanish ships are taken from
Estado General de la Armada de Espafia for 1898 ; these official figures should be
checked by reference to Spanish sources of information as to the battle, which
reveal in part the alterations in armament of some of their ships, remountings of
guns on land, etc. Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 384, gives the equipment of the Spanish
vessels engaged, as taken from Spanish official sources. Obviously, vessels in dry
dock and unmanned, survey vessels, transports, etc., should not be taken into the
comparison, as has been done, however, in all the American sources here cited.
The full complement of men for the Spanish ships engaged would have been
1351. Montojo was short of men all around, and had enlisted merchantmen sailors
and other volunteers, having more than the usual complement, though his recruits
were of a rather nondescript sort ; in his total of 1875 men, he undoubtedly
meant to include all the men under him, at the arsenal and on board the fighting
vessels, and after most of the crews of the beached gunboats had been added to
his force (only about 40 men out of 96 being left on the Ulloa, for instance).
Nevertheless, on his own statement, he had more men engaged than had Dewey ;
though, to reach its total of 2973, the Court of Claims counted some of his men
two or three times. There were more than 53 guns in the fortifications of Manila,
if one counts all the antique bronze pieces, the rusting iron mortars, some guns
lying in ditches, and others rusting in obscure corners ; a table drawn up from
the Spanish plans after the city's capture lists 130 pieces in all {Report of War
Department, 1903, vol. in, p. 444), but shows only 28 rifled cannon, of which only
8 were breech-loaders. Besides the magazine accounts of the battle that have been
eit«d, the newspaper correspondence of John F. McCutcheon, correspondent of
the Chicago Record, also an eyewitness, and the dispatohei of J. L. Stiokney to

170 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

fective, though carried out with considerable leniency.^ The
American fleet on May 2 definitely took up station in front
of Cavite. The batteries on Sangley were destroyed by a land-
ing party that day, and the next the arsenal of Cavite was oc-
cupied and the Raleigh and the Baltimore went to Corregidor
to secure the surrender of the Spanish batteries at the bay's
entrance, paroling the men garrisoned there and destroying
the guns. In the interval that elapsed before American sailors
replaced the Spaniards, a horde of Tagalogs sacked the arsenal,
apparently leaderless, yet with discrimination enough to take
everything they could find in the way of old firearms, swords,
etc. Dewey's demand for surrender was also extended to cover
the town of Cavite, just back of the arsenal on the peninsula,
the seat of the provincial government, and in possession of
the Spanish army under General Garcia Pena. The Spaniards
opposed the claim that the white flag on the arsenal covered
also the " plaza," but yielded when the American ships covered
their retreat across the peninsula, though instead of surrender-
ing they hurriedly withdrew along the narrow peninsula and
Pena took up his quarters in San Francisco de Malabon, a few
miles inland. They were not molested during their not exactly
calm and dignified retreat in plain sight. Neither did Dewey
occupy the abandoned town, and almost immediately some
hundreds of natives armed with rifles were busy sacking the
Government buildings and the houses of Spaniards, from which

the New York Herald, are of especial interest. On the Spanish side, see also La
Politica de Espana en Filipinos, vol. viii (1898), nos. 184, 185, and 186, for the
Spanish press dispatches of April and May regarding Dewey's coming to Manila,
the battle, and the first stages of the siege of Manila. Sastrdn, op. cit., facing
p. 388, gives a fairly accurate plan of the battle, especially as regards the posi-
tions of the Spanish vessels. The similar plan given by Foreman, op. cit., p. 677,
is entirely incorrect, as are many of the data given by this writer about the battle.
A very fair defense of Montojo, as the victim of Spanish imprevision, is the pam-
phlet Ante la opinion y ante la historia (Madrid, 1900).

^ The Spaniards seemed to feel rather aggrieved because Dewey did not in-
dulge in proclamations and all the paraphernalia of a formal blockade on paper ;
they were quite ready to admit, however, that his blockade was effectively en-
forced.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 171

only the money had been removed. The parish priest of Cavite
was allowed to go in peace, but several other friars there found
the crowd threatening and took refuge in the military hospital,
pretending sickness. From here they were the next day trans-
ferred with the wounded soldiers to Manila (these men having
in the mean time had the solicitous attention of the American
surgeons). The natives were, for the time being, left in con-
trol of Cavite, the town not being formally occupied by the
Americans until General Anderson arrived with troops ; efforts
were, however, made to keep the new possessors of the town
within proper bounds and to have them maintain order, which
in the main they did, after the first few hours of sacking and
pillage.^

The authorities and inhabitants of Manila were in momen-
tary expectation of a bombardment. Their efforts to align the
Filipinos upon the side of their old sovereign had been crowned
with some apparent success, in the securing of volunteers and
protestations of loyalty from numerous native chiefs. For the
time being the principal thing was to get away from the
American shells. Four thousand fugitives, among them the
wife and children of Governor-General Augustin, had gone to

* The Spaniards were disposed to complain throughout of the lack of " formal-
ity " on the American side. They claim that the first commander who represented
Dewey in the conference on shore at Cavite, asked for by them, made them
understand that Dewey wished only to secure the destruction of the Spanish
vessels and of the shore batteries at Cavite and the assurance that his vessels
would not be molested at the entrance of the bay [if they went out again ?] ; but
that, by subsequent modifications, these demands were enlarged as stated above.
(Sastrdn, op. cit.y pp. 399-403.) The failure of the Americans to occupy and govern
the town of Cavite seems to have had some influence later in leading the Spaniards
to believe that, if Manila was captured or surrendered, the natives' armed forces
would be left free to pillage and massacre. Dewey, of course, felt that his prime
concern was with the state of affairs on the water, and, after manning the small
boftti he captured, and needing others to keep up communication with Hongkong,
be probably did not see how he could leave more men on land than was necessary
to take charge of the naval arsenal and do the repairing work which he had on
hand. He did keep the Olympia at work patrolling the peninsula, as well as could
be done from the deck of a vessel. His report of May 4, unfortunately, is most
meager of details, being the merest outline of the battle of May 1 and the inci-
dents immediately following.

172 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

interior points north on the railroad during the few days be-
fore the naval engagement. The walled city of Manila was
now abandoned by almost its entire population, which took
refuge in the city suburbs farthest inland. The stores were all
closed. It was said that Dewey had on May 2 demanded the
surrender of the city, and Augustin had refused in truly
Spanish formal style, which implied " resisting to the death,''
especially with a so-called fortified town. It is certain that the
foreign consuls, particularly the British, German, and Belgian,
were soon busily going back and forth between the Olympia
and the Manila shore, and communications, of a purely informal
sort on Dewey's part, were conveyed by them. Dewey was
quite willing, from his own testimony,^ that the authorities in
the city should be kept in sufficient awe of his guns, and prob-
ably made virtual threats as to what he would do if the shore
batteries attempted to injure his fleet. He also intimated, the
very evening of the battle, the surrender to him of the cable-
station in Malate; and, this being refused, cut the cable on
May 2.2

1 Sen. Doc. SSI, 57ih Cong., Ist Sesa., pp. 2927-28. Admiral Dewey's testimony
before the Senate Committee in 1902, contained in the foregoing document, as
well as his dispatch of May 4 to Washington, shows that he never entertained the
notion of taking the city, until he should be so instructed and troops to occupy it
should arrive, but only desired to warn the Spaniards that they must not use their
guns. There were, however, frequent rumors to the contrary in Manila, and the
inhabitants lived in momentary anticipation of a bombardment. The foreign colo-
nies in Manila were informed, through their consuls, that they would receive suffi-
cient notice before bombardment to get on board the vessels of their nations iu
the harbor, and would, if necessary, be accommodated at Cavite ; and there were
several times when these foreign vessels, under the eye of the American fleet,
were crowded with such fugitives, including many Spanish ladies and children.

* The Spaniards had at times, however, more direct communication with the
continent of Asia than the Americans. On May 22, Dewey reported that they were
using the land wires to Bolinau and the cable to Hongkong from there; the in-
surgents, however, soon cut them off from communication with Bolinau. Later,
they were reported to have communicated through Iloilo and thence to Borneo
and Singapore. Long before the city fell, they were dependent for news on the
mail which Dewey let pass through the foreign war-vessels which communicated
with Hongkong. For a while, he opened the Spanish mail.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 173

0. THE UNITED STATES PREPARES FOR A LAND CONQUEST

It is in entire agreement with the record of the times to as-
sert that the idea of a conquest of the Philippines was, up to
and even after Dewey*s victory, almost as remote from the
minds of the authorities at Washington as it was from the
minds of the American people, who were, when the news came,
half astonished at calling to mind that Spain had possessions
in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. President McKinley
has stated : " When Dewey sank the ships at Manila, as he
was ordered to do, it was not to capture the Philippines — it
was to destroy the Spanish fleet, the fleet of the nation against
which we were waging war, and we thought that the soonest
way to end that war was to destroy the power of Spain to make
war, and so we sent Dewey." ^ Yet there is the statement of
Secretary of War Alger that it had been decided to send an
army of occupation to the Philippines before Dewey's victory
occurred, and orders for the assembling of volunteers at San
Francisco had been given on May 4.^^ Simple obedience to the
rules by which war is waged, however, implies that every ef-
fort shall be made to cripple the enemy, and that every advan-
tage gained shall be followed up while war lasts ; and this step
of preparation was all the more natural at that early date, ii
we suppose that Dewey's letter of March 31, expressing his
confidence that the Spanish fleet could be taken and the de-

1 Speech at Youngstown, Ohio, October 18, 1899. (See Republican Campaign
Textbook, 1900, p. 331.)

« R. A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York, 1901), p. 326. The an-
ther's statement that the orders of May 4 for the assembling of volunteers at San
Francisco were g^ven three days before the receipt of Dewey's cablegram announc-
ing his victory (sent from Hongkong) loses some of its point from the fact that,
before the cable was cut on May 1, the Spaniards had communicated through
Hongkong report on the engagement which, though not accurate, established their
defeat, and President McKinley had on May 3 sent a message of congratulation to
Dewey at Hongkong. (Sec Bureau of Navigation, p. 68.) On p. 136 of the same
document is a telegram of May 4 from Secretary Long to the navy yard at Mare
Island, showing that the City of Peking was already chartered to send ammunition
and was to be prepared also to carry troops. On p. 176 of Report of the Major-
Otneral commanding the Army, 1898, will be found a statement that orders for
Mtembling volunteers at San FranciMO were given on May 3.

174 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

f enses of Manila reduced in one day, had reached Washington
before the news of the victory came. And in spite of this tes-
timony, as a foreign critical observer has put it : —

They seemed to be surprised at Washington by the demand for
reinforcements from Dewey. No troops were ready to be sent to him,
there was even discussion for several days in the Department of War
before the number of reinforcements was decided upon, and the first
expedition did not leave San Francisco until May 25. It did not
reach Manila until June 30. The hesitation which the President
showed in regard to the fate of the Philippines after the defeat of
Spain, comes to the support of the foregoing facts to prove that the
American Government had no line of conduct mapped out with re-
spect to this archipelago at the begifining of the war. The initial ob-
ject of Dewey's expedition seems, then, simply to have been, apart
from the destruction of the Spanish fleet, to create for the United
States rights that would warrant them claiming at the end of the
war a naval station in this part of the Pacific.^

When, on May 7, Commodore Dewey was notified by cable
that the President had named him acting rear-admiral (which
was made a regular appointment after a vote of thanks to
Dewey and his men was passed by Congress on May 10), he
was informed that troops were being got ready to go on the
Peking (which was to carry him ammunition and supplies),
and was asked how many troops ought to be sent. He replied
on May 13 that he could " take Manila any time," but 5000
troops were necessary to retain it, and thus, as he thought, to
" control the Philippine Islands." As seen, orders had been

^ A. Viallate, " Les pr^iminaircs de la guerre hispano-am^ricaine et rannexion
des Philippines par les Etats-Unis " (Revue Historique, Juillet-Aout, 1903, pp. 282—
83). This writer had already (p. 281) refused to believe that the officers and ex-
ecutive heads of a growing and ambitious navy would have done other than plan
for the securing of a needed coaliug and naval station in the Orient when war
brought this possibility to their very door. He says it is reported that the officers
of the Asiatic squadron of the United States had for a long time back been paying
particular attention to the study of the Philippine Islands, and he points to the
securing of naval stations in the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands as evidence of the
existing tendency to follow Captain Mahan's preachings. His article constitutes a
very good review, from American and Spanish official publications, of the steps
leading up to the war and of the treaty negotiations so far as these related to the
Philippines.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 175

given on May 4 to assemble at San Francisco the volunteers
being raised, under the call of April 23, in the Western States;
the first of these troops went into camp there on the 6th, and
recruiting was hurried forward in those states. In addition to
the Peking, under navy contract, vessels were hastily chartered
by the army and fitted up as best they could be for carrying
troops. The army staff was straining its resources to the ut-
most limit in the eastern part of the country at the time ; and,
with all the details as to clothing the volunteers, provisioning
the ships, and equipping the expeditions in general, three
weeks elapsed before the expedition sailed. Three merchant
vessels, the City of Peking, Sydney, and Australia, sailed from
San Francisco on May 25, bearing almost 2500 men, under
the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, who
had come down from Alaska with a detachment of the Four-
teenth Infantry. Five companies of these regulars and the
California and Oregon regiments of volunteer infantry, to-
gether with a detachment of volunteer heavy artillery raised
in California, constituted the force. At Honolulu they were
joined by the cruiser Charleston, under orders to proceed to
Cavite, consorting the troopships and navy supplies on the
way. This expedition did not, however, reach Cavite until June
30, having proceeded, under sealed orders to Captain Glass of
the Charleston, to the little island of Guam, in the Marianne
Islands. The Charleston entered the harbor of the latter place
on June 20, and her shots at the tumbling old fort were taken
by the half-dozen military authorities of this lonesome outpost
of Spain to be a courteous salute, which the subordinates at
once put out in a launch to return by a call. The arrival of a
ship in that part of the world was sufficient occasion for re-
joicing, in any event ; and^ not having heard from Manila for
about six months, they knew nothing of the outbreak of war.^

* The classic story told to illastrate the fact that, under the Spanish regime,
appointment to official position on Guam meant exile is that of a military governor
■OOM years back who boarded a tramp merchantman and made a trip incognito to
fiowpe, letuniing after a year's absence to be greeted by his secretary with the

176 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

They were apprised of their error and were told to convey
peremptory orders for surrender to the military governor of
the group. He sent his inevitable formal protest against " this
act of violence," when he had been given no information that
war was on ; but admitted his inability to resist the Charleston
with his four rusty old cast-iron cannon, unsafe even for salut-
ing, and acquiesced in the demand for surrender with a " God
be with you." The next morning Captain Braunersreuther and
a few marines on the Charleston went on shore and obtained
the surrender of the Spanish officials and garrison before the
landing party of Oregon troops which had been got ready had
reached the shore. That afternoon the little garrison was dis-
armed, the few native soldiers released, the American flag was
hoisted, and the six Spanish army and navy officers and fifty-
four enlisted men were taken on board and carried to Manila.'
Two more expeditions left for Manila in June, the first under
Brigadier-General Francis V. Greene, and the second under
Major-General Wesley E. Merritt, who had been designated
commander of the new " Department of the Pacific," he being
followed closely into Manila Bay by a shipload of troops under
Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur. The ten ships chartered
for these expeditions bore over 8000 men, and the total of
officers and men arriving at Manila up to July 31 was 10,924.
During the latter part of July, three more ships were dis-
patched, but of course none arrived until after the fall of
Manila on August 13. This fourth expedition was under com-
mand of Major-General Elwell S. Otis, though the ships trav-
eled some time apart, and its somewhat less than 5000 men
brought the total of troops sent to the Philippines until late
October of 1898 up to 15,689, exclusive of a few hundred re-
cruits and teamsters and other camp-followers sent out on small

report " Nothing new." The Spanish supply-vessels then went there from Manila
only once every year and a half.

^ For the official account of this comic-opera conquest, see Bureau of Navigation^
pp. 151-57. A good descriptive account is contained in Henry Cahot Lodge's The
War with Spain (New York, 1900).

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 177

boats with horses and equipments. Of the 11,000 troops arriv-
ing before the fall of Manila, only about 2500 were regulars,
these being two battalions each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-
third Infantry, five companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, four
batteries of the Third Artillery (serving as infantry and with-
out field guns), and detachments of the engineer, hospital, and
signal corps. The volunteers in these first expeditions com-
prised one infantry regiment each from California, Oregon,
Colorado, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Idaho, Wyoming, Minne-
sota, and North Dakota, volunteer artillerymen from Califor-
nia, two batteries of Utah light artillery, and the Astor Bat-
tery of New York. The Montana and South Dakota infantry
regiments followed them in August, and the regulars in Ma-
nila were reinforced by five more companies of the Fourteenth
Infantry, two more batteries of the Third Artillery, and six
troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the first men of that arm of the
service to arrive in the islands.^

^ The official data as to the number and organizations of the troops in these
expeditions will be foond in Report of Quartermaster'General of the Army^ 1898
(accompanying Report of Secretary of War^ vol. I of Message of the President and
Accompanying Documents^ 1898, p. 460), in Report of the Major-General command'
ing the Army, 1898, pp. 499-500, and in Major-General Otis's report for 1899
(Report of War Department, 1899, rol. i, part 4, p. 3). Much previously unpub-
lished information regarding the sending of the first expeditions to the Philippines
may be found on pp. 635-782 of vol. ii of Correspondence Relating to the War
with Spain from April 15, 1898 to July SO^ 1902. (This document published in 1902
for the use of the War Department, has not been made available for public distri-
bution. Volume n is entirely devoted to the teleg^phic correspondence regarding
the Philippine expeditions and subsequent cable messages to and from Manila.
The cable messages have in some cases been edited, in the way of omissions. This
document will hereafter be cited as Corr. Rel. War. In these pages may be seen
how, starting with Dewey's recommendations for 6000 troops, it had, by May 30,
been decided, largely upon (General Merritt's recommendations, to send 20,000
men to the Philippines. There was also some clash of opinion between Generals
Miles and Merritt as to the number and nature of the organization and equipment of
the troops to be sent, Oeneral Merritt being urgently desirous of having regulars
for half of the force (though eventually expressing satisfaction with the Western
volunteers). It is curious to note (pp. 654-56, 665, 675) how much more accurate
was the information prepared in the War Department (probably from secret serv-
ice reports from Spain) as to the Spanish forces in the Philippines and general
military conditions there than that cabled by Admiral Dewey or by Consul Wild-
man at Hongkong. Other interesting points herein to be noted are President Mo-

178 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

D. FILIPINO COOPEBATION AGAINST SPAIN IS INVITED

Another element had, however, been added to the situation,
even before the first expedition sailed from San Francisco.
What has been brought out in preceding pages, as to the con-
ditions in Luzon and the central islands from January to April
of 1898, has made it apparent that, regardless of what attitude
the exiled insurgent leaders might assume under the new war
status, the rebellious element of natives in various provinces
would have to be taken into account. Relying upon the in-
formation of Consul Williams, Dewey had assumed that the
native population would at once, regardless of leadership, ally
itself with the Americans, and was disappointed that thousands
of them did not at once revolt in Cavite alone, within sight of
his ships. It is at this date idle to speculate as to what would
have been the outcome of the Spanish efforts to conciliate the
native population, had not Aguinaldo and his associates in
Hongkong returned to organize opposition to Spain with the
apparent authorization and good wishes of the chief repre-
sentative of the United States on the scene, though it may be
recorded as unquestionable that, up to the arrival of Aguinaldo,
the tardily adopted Spanish "policy of attraction," accom-
panied by indefinite promises, was making headway among
the most troublesome natives, the Tagalogs. But Aguinaldo

Kinley's cautionsness in calling the new department the " Department of the Pa-
cific " (hence the public impression of the times that the Philippines were to be at-
tached temporarily, so far as regards military organization, to California, though it
was from the first intended to be an independent military command, and was on June
21 made a separate army corps; also the reference, in this connection, to the Pres-
ident's confidential instructions to General Merritt. (Ibid.f p. 649: " The department
[of the Pacific] is intended to include Philippine Islands only ; but this fact is not
mentioned in orders, and will be communicated to you in confidential letter of in-
structions " — telegram May 16 to Merritt.) The President's written instructions
of May 19 to General Merritt (ibid.j pp. 676-78) were, for some reason, not in-
cluded in the formal military reports of that year ; they outline the duties of a
military occupant of foreign territory, as prescribed by international law, and their
most essential features were repeated by General Merritt in his proclamation of
August 14 in Manila. (They are also to be found on p. 85 of Sen. Doc. 208, 66th
Cong. 1st Sess.)

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 179

arrived, brought by one of Dewey's vessels ; he set up head-
quarters for himself in Cavite, obtained a few more arms from
the American commander, besides those which his former fol-
lowers had already been careful to seize upon the departure
of the Spaniards, and soon another lot of arms arrived for
him, bought with the assistance of the American consul at
Hongkong ; he and his assistants sent the news far and wide
that they had an " alliance" with the Americans and were going
to have their independence; they surrounded and captured
the Spanish armed forces in Cavite, and laid the plans for as
complete an uprising to the northward of Manila ; and within
two weeks from the arrival of the insurgent leader of 1897,
there were actively or secretly associated with him more Fili-
pinos of prominence, entitled to be considered leaders among
their people, than ever had been the case in 1896 or 1897,
and the governor-general's plan of a united resistance of
the two people to save the sovereignty of the islands to Spain
had become an illusion and was clearly recognized as such by
all save a few Spanish optimists.

There had been some communication between Dewey and
the insurgents in Hongkong during March and April, sup-
posedly with regard to the latter accompanying the fleet to
Manila for the purpose of stimulating the native opposition to
the Spaniards. Whatever were the propositions then discussed,
it came to nothing on either side. Dewey did not take the
" little brown men " very seriously ; and the desire to go with
the fleet, on the part of Aguinaldo at least, was not strong
enough to prevent him departing hurriedly and secretly via
Saigon for Singapore on the 7th of April, in order to escape
service in the suit that had been brought against him by
Sen or Artacho for a division of the money received from
Primo de Rivera.^ His original intention, it has been claimed,

^ Dewey laji that he himself law some of Agnina1do*s associates two or three
times, that " they seemed to be all very young, earnest boys," and he did not at-
tach much importance to what they said, and that, though he later wired Consul

180 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

was to proceed from Singapore to Europe.* But there was in
Singapore a certain British subject who had resided in the
Philippines. This Mr. H. W. Bray sought out Aguinaldo im-
mediately upon his arrival, on April 21, and two days later he
had arranged for an interview between the insurgent leader
and Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States
in Singapore. Two (Aguinaldo says three) interviews were
held with great secrecy and formality between these parties,
Mr. Bray serving as Spanish interpreter, while one of Agui-
naldo's Filipino companions understood English a very little.
Just exactly what passed between the two principals to
the interviews perhaps only the interpreter could tell, as
the stories of the principals conflict. Consul-General Pratt
reported officially at the time, and has always maintained, that

Pratt at Singapore to have Aguinaldo come on, he did not think of delaying his
expedition for him, as his information led him to believe that the people would all
rise against the Spaniards anyway and these few Filipinos at Hongkong would have
little to do with it (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2927, 2932). Wlien the time came to leave
for Manila, says Admiral Dewey, none of the Filipinos who had been talking about
it were " ready " to go with him, one excusing himself " because he did n't have any
toothbrush." The " little men " kept taking up his time and " bothering " him at a
period when his hands were full with his preparations to meet the Spaniards. (One
Filipino, Jos^ Alejandrino, did, however, go with Dewey's fleet to Manila Bay, on
board of one of the supply-ships ; but he returned to Hongkong without landing at
Cavite.) Aguinaldo's side of the story, told, it is to be noticed, in 1899, and then
written by another than himself, is to be found in his Reseha veridica^ already
cited. He claims that he had personal interviews with the commander of the Pet-
rel, between March 16 and April 6; that these interviews were sought by the Amer-
ican officer at the instructions of Dewey; that the Petrel's commander, in answer
to his express query as to what the United States would concede to the Filipinos,
said that " the United States were a rich and great nation and did not need colo-
nies"; that he asked that the "agreement " be put in writing, and the American
officer promised to lay it before his superior. The Resena veridica is so inaccurate
and uncandid that it will not do to accept any statement resting on its authority.
Admiral Dewey may have become in 1902 somewhat inclined to minimize the im-
portance which he originally placed upon the plan of using the Filipinos at least
to hold the Spaniards in check. Still, it is plain from his deeds as well as from his
testimony that he never took the Filipino insurgents very seriously; his attitude
toward the " little men " who took up his time is too typically Anglo-Saxon.

^ Sastr6n, op. cit. p. 415-16. This statement has also been made by persons who
met Aguinaldo at this time in Saigon and Singapore. See also La Politica de Espana
eti Filipinas, vol. vm, p. 62, for reports coming to Madrid papers to this effect in
January, 1898.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 181

he limited himself to endeavoring to secure the cooperation of
Aguinaldo as a leader of insurgents with the American fleet ;
that this cooperation was, so far as his negotiations went, to be
unconditional ; and that he declined to discuss the future policy
of the United States with regard to the Philippines. Aguinaldo
claims that he was promised in these interviews that the United
States "would at least recognize the independence of the
Philippines under a naval protectorate," and that there was
no need for putting the agreement in writing, as he asked,
since " the words of Admiral Dewey and the American consul
were sacred." The definite outcome of the conferences was
that, in response to a cablegram of Mr. Pratt on April 24 that
Aguinaldo was ready to come to Hongkong and arrange for
" insurgent cooperation," Dewey at once replied : " Tell Agui-
naldo come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo and his two Fili-
pino companions left for Hongkong two days later; hence, of
course, arrived there too late for any conference with Dewey.*

^ Aguinaldo's authorized version of the Singapore conferences is to be found in
his Resena veridical in which are made the statements quoted above. Cousul-Geueral
Pratt's official reports of the conferences and his subsequent correspondence with
the State Department regarding the whole matter are to be found on pp. 341-58
of Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Disregarding entirely Aguinaldo's ex parte
statements, it is apparent from Mr. Pratt's own dispatches to the State Depart-
ment that he plainly enough understood Aguinaldo and his companions to assert
that independence was their object in mind in cooperating with the Americans.
Aside from his statement of Aguinaldo's desires contained in his dispatch of April
30, he sent the Department on May 5 a clipping from the Singapore Free Press of
May 4, giving an account of the whole Bray-Pratt-Aguinaldo episode, which account
stated Aguinaldo's policy to embrace the independence of the Philippines, with
American or European advisers [the chief of them to be Mr. Howard W. Bray ?].
On June 8, up to which date Mr. Pratt had continued to be very self-complncent
over his part in the affair (having, on June 2, in a dispatch to Washington, virtu-
ally claimed for himself the intimacy with Philippine affairs which Mr. Bray as-
sumed to possess, and praising himself for having ''assisted the cause of the
United States by securing Aguinaldo's cooperation "), he sent to Washington an-
other clipping from the Singapore Free Press of that date, in which Mr. Bray,
who had constitutecl himself in the columns of that journal an oracle on Philippine
matters, and who at about the same time addressed President McKinley in behalf
of Aguinaldo, states that " independence is the only possible solution of the Philippine
question." On June 9, Mr. Pratt fraternized enthusiastically with the Filipino
colony in Singapore, exchanging toasts with them in a demonstration made by
them in his honor, and passing over without protest the statement of their leader

182 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

No word had been left by Dewey as to sending Aguiualdo
on if he should arrive at Hongkong, and consequently the in-
surgent chief waited in the latter port sixteen days, until the
McCuUoch had brought, on her second trip thither, permission
for him and various of his followers to come to Cavite. Consul-
General Wildman and Mr. John Barrett (ex-United States
minister resident and consul-general in Siam, who soon after
engaged as a newspaper correspondent in the Philippines) put
Aguinaldo and thirteen companions on board the McCuUoch
at night, on May 16.^ Meanwhile, Mr. Wildman had had many

that they came to thank him for bringing about the arrangement whereby their
people were to have independence under American protection. Indeed, in a con-
tribution over his own signature in Collier*s Weekly for April 13, 1901, Mr. Pratt
plainly states that he inferred from his interviews with Aguinaldo that the latter
was thinking of Filipino independence and only feared that the United States
forces would abandon them before they could establish it, never dreaming that
the United States would permanently occupy the islands; the inference is that Mr.
Pratt himself then felt that no such notion need be entertained. A very fair ac-
count of the episode from the Spanish side is to be found in Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp.
415-19. This writer claims that Mr. Bray engineered the whole proceeding; that
he spent some time in argument with Aguinaldo before he could convince him that
he was justified in disregarding the pact of Biak-na-bat6 and returning to raise
insurrection against Spain; that, this accomplished, Mr. Bray was the instrument
in bringing Messrs. Pratt and Aguinaldo together; and that, in order to pass judg-
ment upon what occurred between them, one must know what sort of an interpreter
Mr. Bray was. He says : " What is difficult to explain ... is that Aguinaldo and
Consul Spencer Pratt were, at the end of the interview, perfectly satisfied : the
latter, because he believed that Aguinaldo would simply cooperate with the Ameri-
can forces to put an end to the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippine Islands ; the
former, because he was convinced that the reward of his cooperation would be
nothing else but the attainment of independence for his land." Mr. Bray promptly
gave the news of his achievement to his friend the editor of the Singapore Free
Press, and the Spanish consul at Singapore entered a protest to the British au-
thorities of the colony against this violation by the American consul of the pro-
clamation of neutrality which had just been issued there. Messrs. Pratt and Bray
later had a disagreement, the former claiming that the Englishman had misrepre-
sented him. In his testimony at Washington in 1902, Felipe Buencamino said that
the insurgent treasury was asked to pay S6000 to settle a judgment for libel ob-
tained by Consul Pratt in a suit against Mr. Bray in Singapore. (See Hearings,
etc., Committee on Insular Affairs, 1901-03, p. 283.) In his testimony before the
Peace Commission at Paris, General C. A. Whittier stated that Pratt offered
Aguinaldo money for his expenses to Hongkong, but the latter refused (Sen. Doc.
6fS, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 499).

1 The Republican Campaign Text Book for 1900, quoting from one of Mr. Bar-
rett's accounts of early relations with Aguinaldo, cites (p. 220) his statement that

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 183

talks with Aguinaldo and his associates, and had put them in
touch with two Americans in Hongkong who were to act as
their agents in the purchase of arms and ammunition. Of
the money paid to the insurgents by the Spaniards the pre-
ceding December, deposits amounting to $117,000 (Mexi-
can) were, according to Aguinaldo, made with Mr. Wildman,
of which the first payment of $50,000 was expended for rifles,
ammunition, and a small boat, while he claims the subsequent
payment of $67,000 was embargoed. What is known of a cer-
tainty is that arms were bought, with the more or less active
assistance of the consul-general at Hongkong, and that the
first consignment, amounting to 2000 Mauser rifles and 200,-
000 cartridges, was allowed to be landed at Cavite, close by the
arsenal.^

Lieutenant Caldwell, of Dewey's staff, who came to Hongkong on the McCulloch,
was rather averse than otherwise to taking Aguinaldo and his companions to
Cavite.

^ Consnl-General Wildman, who was drowned in the nnfortnnate accident to
the steamship Rio de Janeiro in the hay of San Francisco in 1901, seems never to
have reported his action in regard to securing arms for the insurgents. Indeed,
outside of cable messages in May, with regard to various Filipino exiles of wealth in
Hongkong desiring to proclaim their allegiance to the United States after Dewey'g
victory, he seems to have made no report on his dealings with the insurgents
until July 18, 1898, when he sent a dispatch assuring the authorities at Washington
that the Filipinos were " fighting for annexation to the United States first " ; and
that, if the United States did not keep the islands, it was certain that Spain could
not again assert her sovereignty. (See Sen. Doc. 62 f pp. 336-38.) This dispatch
contains several misstatements, and makes it appear that Wildroan's reason for not
communicating previously his negotiations with the insurgents was the instruction
he had received the previous December not to hold such negotiations. By July,
1898, however, various reports were being circulated in the newspapers of Europe
and the United States as to there having been some secret agreement between
Aguinaldo and the United States consuls. Aguinaldo's version of his relations with
the Hongkong consulate will be found in the Resefia veridica. Letters from Mr.
Wildman to the insurgent chief, not elsewhere published, particularly with refer-
ence to the endeavors to send arms in June and July, were made public, on be*
half of Aguinaldo, among the inclosures to an addrens to the Cong^ss of the
United States, written by Felipe Bnencamino on August 20, 1899, the said letters
being printed on p. 6180, Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. In the letter of June
21 from Mr. Wildman, some rather remarkable advice is given to Aguinaldo as
to his treatment of the Spanish prisoners he had taken, the consul being therein
made to say: " Never mind about feeding them three meals a day. Rice and water
will be a good diet They have been living too high for the past few years." And

184 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The McCulloch arrived off Cavite on the afternoon of May
19, and Aguinaldo was at once taken to the Olympia for an
interview with Admiral Dewey. It is in this interview that
Aguinaldo claims the American admiral assured him that he
*' must have no doubt concerning the recognition of Philippine
independence on the part of the United States " ; that " Amer-
ica was rich in lands and money and did not need colonies."
That any such specific declaration was ever made by Admiral
Dewey rests upon the unsupported testimony of Aguinaldo ; it
has been many times expressly denied by Admiral Dewey/
and all the contributory circumstances support the denial. In
a cablegram written at Cavite on May 20, which dealt princi-
pally with the matter of maintaining the blockade and of pre-
paring to meet a second Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey reported
the arrival of Aguinaldo and said he was " organizing forces
near Cavite, and may render assistance that will be valuable."
The reply of Secretary Long, under date of May 26, was that
full discretionary powers were reposed in Admiral Dewey to
deal with circumstances which Washington could not know,
but it was added : " It is desirable, as far as possible, and con-
sistent for your success and safety, not to have political alli-
ances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that
would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future."
Dewey's reply to this, on June 3, was : " Have acted according
to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the be-
ginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insur-
gents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the de-

again : " Let them have a taste of real war. Do not be so tender with them.
Handle them as they would treat you." The letters with the Buencamino docu-
ment, relative to the little souvenirs to be sent by Aguinaldo to the consuls at Sin-
gapore and Hongkong, also shed some light upon the latter gentlemen's person-
alities. Aguinaldo claims (Resena veridicd) that Mr. Pratt wished to be made
representative of the Philippines in the United States, and that he promised him a
high post in the custom-house or something equally good.

^ Notably in a personal letter to Senator H. C. Lodge, quoted in Cong. Record ,
56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1329, and in a memorandum written by Admiral Dewey
for the first Philippine Commission, of which he was a member, to be found in its
Report, voL I, p. 171. See also ibid.y p. 121.

mTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 185

fenses of Manila at any time, but it is considered useless until
the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain posses-
sion." Again, after the authorities at Washington had, on ac-
count of various newspaper stories emanating from the Orient,
begun to worry over what assurances or impressions might
have been given to the insurgents by the consuls at Singapore
and Hongkong, the Navy Department called for a full report
from Dewey on his conferences with Aguinaldo. The latter
replied at length on June 27, reiterating his statement that
the United States had not been compromised with the insur-
gents in any way, denying that he had given them direct as-
sistance, and saying that Aguinaldo was acting independently
of the squadron. At the same time, he stated that Aguinaldo
had been allowed to organize his army under the American
fleet's guns, that he had conferred personally with the insur-
gent leader, and had "given him to understand that he consid-
ered the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common
enemy," and that he had allowed recruits, arms, and ammuni-
tion for Aguinaldo to pass the blockade and had let him take
Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal.^

^ Bureau of Navigation^ p. 103. This dispatch contains also the many times
qaoted remark of Dewey : " In my opinion, these people are far superior in their
intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I
am familiar with both races." (The familiarity with the Filipinos does not appear ;
Dewey had had a very small acquaintance upon which to base any generalization.)
This opinion is nullified, so far as Admiral Dewey is concerned, by his testimony,
{Sen. Doc. SSI, 67th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2983) in 1902 to the effect that he thought
neither the Cubans nor the Filipinos were capable of self-government. In this last
document will be found very definite statements by Dewey that he never made
any pledges to Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo's very suspiciously worded account of the
first interview with Dewey will be found in the Resena veridica. It is worth noting
that Aguinaldo could in 1899 show only a few purely informal notes from Dewey
(see Buencamino's address to Congress, above referred to, Cong. Recordy 57th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180), the latter informing him, on June 16, that his letter to
President McKinley had been forwarded to Washing^n, and, later in June, at the
request of the British consul in Manila, asking him for passes through his lines for
certain British subjects. The harsh judgments upon Aguinaldo passed by Admiral
Dewey in his testimony before the Senate Committee {Sen, Doc. SSI) seem rather
testy, and perhaps acquired some of their harshness from the partisan prodding
which the admiral underwent in the committee. Uo has remained always some-
what of a Filipino idol.

186 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The first official mention of Filipino insurgents by the Gov-
ernment at Washington, after Consul-General Wildman "was
instructed in December, 1897, to have no dealings with those
in Hongkong, would appear to have been the cable message
of May 26 to Admiral Dewey, above quoted. Yet on April 27,
the same day Dewey cabled his departure from Hongkong for
Manila, Consul-General Pratt wired to the State Department
from Singapore : " General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hong-
kong arrange with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila."
Dewey's victory was known in Washington on May 3, and,
when his own message was sent from Hongkong on the 7th,
there was already awaiting him there a message of congratu-
lations from the President, which was borne back to him by
the McCulloch on her first trip. Hence there had been time to
instruct Dewey not to ally himself with the insurgents in any
way. We have never been told whether the question was ever
considered in the Cabinet at Washington. The matter of prime
concern at the time was to get direct news from Dewey him-
self, the news through Spain and Hongkong being both in-
definite and suspicious. When it was fully assured that he
commanded the situation, it was nevertheless to be borne in
mind at Washington that he was a great distance from the
base of supplies, was unsupported on land, and had to meet a
situation that might be full of complexities which could only
be surmised at Washington. Before the message of May 26
was sent, moreover, it had been repeatedly rumored that a fleet
of armored cruisers and perhaps a battleship was being pre-
pared to go from Spain to the relief of Manila. While, there-
fore, the desire was expressed not to incur any political alliance
with any faction in the Philippines, tacit permission to do so,
if necessary for his safety, was implied in the wording of that
message. It is difficult to draw from it anything but the in-
ference that Washington was chiefly concerned at the time
with the safety of Dewey's men and ships, and to insure them
would incur responsibilities, to some degree at least, as regards

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 187

the future disposition of the Philippines. If a policy of " con-
quest " was in the background, and was beginning to find
some popular expression in newspapers and other periodicals
(which had turned their inquisitorial talents loose to forage for
Philippine material), it certainly as yet lacked definiteness of
aim and coherency of details. It is noticeable also that when,
in June and July, the newspaper stories about pledges made
to Aguinaldo by the consuls had assumed quite definite shape,
and the dispatches received from Consul-General Pratt were
themselves sufficient to cause uneasiness on this score, the
State Department was at pains formally to disown any idea of
alliance. Cable instructions were sent to Mr. Pratt on June 17
to " avoid unauthorized negotiations with insurgents." In a
mailed dispatch of June 16, Secretary of State Day said to
him : —

To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Agui-
naldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was
not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify.
This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as dis-
contented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with
their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter
ef public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this
Government any recognition.^ The United States, in entering upon
the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations
in that quarter, will do in the exercise of the rights which the state
of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to
their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of your con-
ferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that
this Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any
plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would con-
sider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might
put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.^

* This WM, M already seen, not strictlj correct, so far as re^rds the new Secre-
tary of State's assertion that the insurgents had not " asked " recognition.

* Sen. Doc. 6i, p. 354. The following four pages contain the subsequent corre-
spondence and the various explicit denials of Mr. Pratt that he had discussed
the policy of the United States with Aguinaldo. How far these two were from
onderttanding each other may be leen from this statement in the former's dif-

188 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

' Some weeks later, in consequence of dispatches to London
papers with regard to promises being made to Aguinaldo by
Consul Wildman, the latter was by cable "forbidden to make
pledges or discuss policy " ; and he was still later cabled to
" take no action respecting Aguinaldo without specific instruc-
tions from this Department." ^ At about the same time, Con-
sul Williams of Manila was also told by mail : " Your course,
while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in
abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-
called provisional government, is approved."^

patch of April 30 (a dispatch which at first reassured the State Department on
the score of the alleged unauthorized negotiations at Singapore) : " The general
[Aguinaldo] further stated that he hoped the United States would assume pro-
tection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to
establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire
American advice and assistance. These questions I told him I had no authority to
discuss." Admiral Dewey, in his blunt fashion, told the Senate Committee in 1902
(Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2932) : « I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters, as I
did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there
and interfering in other people's business, and I don't think his letters impressed
me. ... I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible
people."

^ The correspondence here cited will be found on pp. 330, 338-40 of Sen. Doc.
62. In quoting, on p. 339, from his letter to Aguinaldo of July 25, which had been
the basis of the London stories, Mr. Wildman made some important omissions.
At any rate, the same letter, as quoted in the Aguinaldo-Buencamino document
{Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180, the date here showing a mistake in
the months, as the letter is clearly of July instead of June), contains the clauses :
" Your reward from my country will be sure and lasting." " It will require all
the power of the United States and Great Britain [in the face of a European
coalition] to keep your islands intact and to hold you as the first man in them."
" I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness of purpose to the President of
the United States and to our people, and they are ready to extend their hand to
you as a brother and aid you in every laudable ambition." Mr. Wildman also for-
got to report his letters about the securing of arms, and his remark in the letter
of June 28 : "I suppose you have taken Manila by this time. I hope so." His last
rebuke from Washington, that of August 15, was in consequence of his suggestion
that he be sent to the Philippines, on the ground that he could " be of service to
Dewey should Aguinaldo make trouble."

* Except for the warning cited above. Consul Williams managed to escape the
censure that was being passed around at the time. (He did not come into contact
with Aguinaldo until the same time that Dewey did.) He made the very remark-
able statement in a dispatch of June 16 (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 329) that, immediately
after the Philippine provisional government was formed and independence had
been proclaimed and reiterated, Aguinaldo told him that "his friends all hoped

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 189

B. A NEW REVOLT THE SPANIARDS ROUTED IN CENTRAL

LUZON

AsTuinaldo went on shore the afternoon of his arrival, but
after interviews with some Filipinos at the arsenal, returned to
sleep on the McCulloch that night. He had met some of his
old companions and intimates in Cavite, and had not been
encouraged by the news they gave him of the success of the
Spaniards in allying themselves with former insurgent lead-
ers.^ The truth is, the Biak-na-bat(5 affair had greatly injured
the prestige of those who were commonly reputed to have
reaped the greatest advantage from it (as, indeed, General
Primo de Rivera had thought it would). Aguinaldo claims
that it was agreed by most of the exiles to Hongkong that
they should live economically, keep the money intact, and use
it to organize another and more effective resistance to Spain,
in case she did not provide better government ; ^ and there is

that the Pbilippiues would be held as a colony of the United States." This may
have been a reference by Aguinaldo to the undoubted attitude and feeling of cer-
tain of the wealthier Filipinos not formerly associated with him in favor of an ex-
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States ; but it is a sufficiently
strange statement to raise doubts as to the ability of Mr. Williams's interpreter.
On August 4, he reported " friendly but unofficial " conferences with Aguinaldo
and his associates, wherein " they traversed the entire ground of government,"
he urging upon Aguinaldo the advantages of annexation to the United States. Mr.
Williams was never bashful about his annexation sentiments ; he told the State
Department on July 2 that he hoped to see an influx of ten thousand Americans
at once, and he thought " early and strenuous efforts should be made to bring
here from the United States men and women of many occupations" — among
them mechanics, blacksmiths, and shipbuilders (I). See Sen. Doc. 6S, p. 307, for a
letter written by Aguinaldo to Consul Williams on August 1, 1898 (about the time
the Filipinos were preparing their note to the foreign powers), wherein the former
says that his people wish to see *' active " instead of " passive cooperation " on the
part of the Americans, and that they are opposed to annexation.

1 Admiral Dewey testified (Sen. Doc. 557, p. 2928) tl>at Aguinaldo returned to
htm from his first visit ashore, much downcast, and informed him that he wished
to leave the islands and go to Japan, and that he (Dewey) urged him not to give
up, but try again.

* See his Renefia veridica. See also Sen. Doe. 90S, 66th Cong., Ist Sess., part 2,
pp. 2-4, for a meeting of the insurgent leaders in Hongkong on February 24, 1898,
wherein the "contract" made at Biak-na-bat<5 was declared "null and void," be-
eftose Spain would not make the third payment of 8200,000 and was supposed to

190 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

much in the facts as known to bear out this claim, it being cer-
tain that the bulk of the money had been kept intact (in
Aguinaldo's name) up to the time of his leaving Hongkong
for Manila. This was not at the time the understanding of the
people of the Philippines, however ; * and it was far from cer-
tain how the insurgent leaders who had come to look upon the
whole Biak-na-bato affair as a big " grab game " would re-
ceive the man commonly supposed to be the greatest individual
beneficiary. It was with the knowledge that various of these
leaders had already allied themselves with the Spaniards for
defense against the Americans that the Filipino colony at
Hongkong (a number of whose most prominent members had
turned pro-American) sent to the Philippines prior to the de-
parture of Dewey's fleet the proclamation beginning " Com-
patriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
within our reach ^; wherein the idea of alliance with the
Spaniards is repelled, and the Filipinos are urged to organize
resistance on land, while the Americans cut off Spanish rein-
forcements by sea, a closing exhortation being: "There, where
you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers ; they
are our redeemers."^ There was for the moment, however,

have given the second payment to Artacho and his associates, it being resolved
that the original payment of S400,000 should be kept intact, in Aguinaldo's name,
and to be spent only "for the common good." It is significant that no mention is
made in this document of " reforms " promised by Spain; they are mentioned
only when, in the meeting of May 4 follovring (ibid.j pp. 6-9), it was debated
whether Aguinaldo ought to return to the Philippines and make common cause with
the United States against Spain.

1 Yet the Spanish authorities had, though apparently rather late in the day,
bethought them of the danger involved in the accumulation of so much money in
the hands of the insurgents in Hongkong, and this was one reason for the refusal
of Primo de Rivera to pay over any further instalment of the sum agreed upon
in December. (See his Memoria, p. 139.) It was claimed, too, by some of the in-
surgents that the suit begun by Artacho for a division of the money was the
result of the intrigues of the Spanish friars resident in Hongkong, who had been
commissioned by their brothers in Manila to use every effort to break up this
accumulation of money.

* This manifesto has had a much wider circulation in Sen. Doc. 62 (where it is
to be found on p. 346) than it ever did in the Philippines. Foreman (p. 682)
wrongly ascribes it to Aguinaldo.

I

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 191

something more positive about the Spanish programme of con-
ciliation, offered by men with whom the Filipinos had had
more or less intimate relationships, while the Americans were
strangers, and, aside from the protection their guns afforded
to the half-organized insurgent horde at Cavite, their attitude
towards the Filipinos had nowhere else been shown. But when
once the anti-Spanish propaganda was begun among the na-
tives, with the prestige which Dewey's apparent championship
of Aguinaldo gave it, it was speedily apparent, in spite of ties of
blood between Spaniards and the upper-class Filipinos and
of an acquaintanceship of centuries and some degree of unity
in forms of government and community of speech, how weak
was the allegiance of the native population to their former
sovereign. Still, Aguinaldo made from the first the utmost
use that was possible of the fiction that he had an " alliance "
with the Americans. It is peculiar to note how, at the outset
and for two months thereafter, he issued no proclamation of
any sort in which pains was not taken to set before the people
the fact that he and they could count upon the protection and
the friendship of the Americans for the realization of their
aims. The private evidences that he repeatedly gave definite
verbal assurances that there was an alliance are plentiful.

Already, on the afternoon of the 19th, Aguinaldo had seen
in the bay natives of Bataan province, which lies on its north
shore, and had communicated to them verbally the word to
prepare for an uprising in the provinces north of Manila. His
arrival had been whispered about, and he probably felt more
cheerful at meeting delegations from elsewhere than his native
town of Old Cavite, when he went to land again the next day.
His companions busied themselves in writing any number of
copies of the first proclamation of the insurrection, assigning
May 31 at noon as the time for a simultaneous uprising, urg-
ing the Filipinos to ^^ expel from among themselves all trea-
son," giving the implication that the Americans would help
them establish their independence, and warning against all acts

192 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

contrary to the laws of civilized warfare.^ He remained, how-
ever, for four days within the limited American territory on
land (which was confined to the arsenal and surrounding navy
buildings), and started to conduct his recruiting and his cam-
paign of proclamations from there, not even going into the
half-governed town of Cavite, which his compatriots held, un-
til Admiral Dewey requested him to move outside of the Amer-
ican lines to conduct his campaign.^

The admiral turned over to him some sixty Mauser rifles and
considerable ammunition for them, which had been taken from
the Spaniards at the entrance of the bay. His followers on the
little peninsula of Cavite had at the time probably no more
than 200 miscellaneous rifles. But on the 27th, the first con-
signment (2000 Mausers and 200,000 cartridges) arrived from
Amoy, and some were furnished at once to the volunteers of
Aguinaldo's town of Old Cavite, just off the peninsula.^ It was

1 This first proclamation seems never to have been published in English, and
the decree of May 24 establishing a dictatorial government is usually called the
first of Aguinaldo's series of 1898. This proclamation of May 20 was in the form
of a personal letter to the " Revolutionary Chiefs of the Philippines." A few sen-
tences are worth quoting. He urges those to whom the letter is sent to confer to-
gether with regard " to the manner in which we may capture our enemies, employ-
ing astuteness to realize that end. I therefore beg all our brothers to unite, expel
from among themselves all treason, let there not happen what in former times has
happened with regard to other brothers. . . . Bear in mind that as soon as the
Spaniards know we are here, they will order the arrest of all our companions. Per-
haps we shall never find an opportunity so propitious as this. . . . Seduce the force
of native infantry, employing the means that you think suitable." [He gives the
impression that he has had a four-hour conference with the American admiral]
" with reference to what we all aspire to for the attainment of our liberty. . . .
I have promised, not only the American admiral, but also the representatives of
other nations with whom I have conferred, that the war they will see here shall
be of the sort that is called war among the most civilized nations, to that end that
we may be the admiration of the civilized powers and they may concede us inde-
pendence." [The Spanish is bad.] Again : " Many nations are on our side.** The
full Spanish text of this document will be found in Sastrdn op. cit., pp. 419-20.

* See Sen. Doc. SSl^ p. 2928. Aguinaldo virtually admits this in the Resena
veridica. He made his headquarters thereafter in Cavite, until the first American
troops arrived, and General Anderson requested him to give up that place.

• The arrival of these arms was reported by Admiral Dewey in a cablegram to
Washington on May 27, he adding that Aguinaldo's " force is increasing constantly."
So far as arms went, the small consignment above mentioned is the only one ever

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 193

the sending of a detachment of Spanish marines to capture
these arms that brought on the first engagement between Fil-
ipinos and Spaniards, on May 28, resulting in the surrounding
and capture of the marines and their arms. This was but the
forerunner of a succession of similar events occurring in Cavite
within the next week. General Pena had 2800 troops scattered
in small detachments about Cavite province, and the orders to
concentrate them came to him from Manila when they were
already cut off and surrounded. They held out from one day
to seven, before surrendering or being captured, the prompt-
ness with which the native military or police forces with them
deserted or turned against them having something to do in
each case with the amount of their resistance, which must, in
any event, be accounted very weak. So rapidly did the out-
ward state of affairs change that, within a week's time, the
population of Manila, which had left the walled town almost
deserted to flee to the districts farther inland, in fear of a bom-
bardment, now began flocking back within the walls for ref-
uge, lest their land enemies should make a successful attack
upon Manila's outer lines of defense.

Even at the first, and while the official optimism as to native
cooperation lasted, most attention had been devoted by the
defenders to establishing a line of fifteen blockhouses around
the outer districts of Manila and to preparing for a land rather
than a sea defense. The plans for allying the natives with the
sovereign power had, before the arrival of the American men-
of-war, centered about two things; namely, the organization of
Filipino volunteer militia and the introduction of a " Consult-
ative Assembly," composed of prominent Filipinos, into the
scheme of insular government. The " Board of Authorities,"
enlarged by various new members called in to consult upon

fornisbed to Aguinaldo directly by Dewey. He told bim be was welcome to tbe few
old sroootbbore pieces of artillery at tbe Cavite arsenal ; and right after tbe battle
of Manila Bay, the natives of Cavite bad taken two or three small pieces of artil-
lery o£F tbe boats sunk in Rakoor Bay, and had later fished out some of the Mau-
ser ammunition which had been thrown into the water by tbe Americans.

194 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

measures to meet the situation/ had, as early as April 24,
adopted these two plans of the insular administration, with
only two opposing votes, Archbishop Nozaleda being one of
the chief advocates of the idea of organizing native militia.
The day after the destruction of the fleet, this advisory board
met for the last time. Both plans again received a favorable
vote, but the opposition of several officials, who were sure that
the native volunteers would not be loyal to the old sovereignty,
and who urged instead that the Spanish troops both to the
north and south of Manila be at once concentrated there for
a defense of the city, had been so pointed that from that time
Augustin and his personal cabinet of advisers determined to
carry the plans through without so much discussion. On May 4,
the governor-general published two decrees, the first of which
prescribed the details under which the recruiting of volunteers
was to be pushed forward in the provinces and in Manila. The
other announced the Consultative Assembly of Filipinos, at
the head of which was to be the " Gentleman of the Grand
Cross of Isabella the Catholic," Don Pedro A. Paterno ; the
seventeen other members were announced a few days later,
and it was planned also to add some twenty more Filipinos of
prominence in the provinces.^

The purpose of the Consultative Assembly was announced
in the decree organizing it to be to " deliberate and report to
the governor-general upon matters of political, governmental,
or administrative character upon which the said superior au-
thority may deem it proper to consult them." It was given

* Among them the provincials of the religious orders and certain of the Spanish
civil authorities of Manila.

^ The other members were : Cayetano Arellano, Isaac Fernando de los Rios,
Joaquin Gonzalez, Maximino Paterno, Antonio Rianzares Bautista, T. H. Pardo de
Tavera, Manuel Genato, Gregorio Araneta, Juan Rodriguez, Bonifacio Ar^valo,
Ariston Bautista, Josd Luna Novicio, Jos^ Lozada, Ricardo Esteban Barretto,
Teodoro Gonzalez, Pantale6n Garcia, and Pedro Serrano. With two or three ex-
ceptions, these men were all Spanish half-castes of families of prominence in the
Philippine capital. Most of them were conservatives, and the list was quite repre-
sentative of Filipino leadership in professional and commercial affairs.

I

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 195

the faculty of "placing before the governor-general the
advisability of measures affecting the interests of the towns,
always provided that it does not invade the functions of
other organizations nor infringe the laws." On May 28, the
Assembly held its first meeting, which consisted principally
of the reading of the address of Governor-General Augustin
and of the oratorical reply of Pedro Paterno. A subcommittee
spent some time in drawing up a scheme of Philippine gov-
ernment which virtually meant autonomy. The whole project
for an assembly had been bitterly criticized from the first by
those who called themselves "patriotic Spaniards"; and the
governor-general's own secretary protested against its pre-
tending to advocate governmental measures which, he de-
clared, were far outside its jurisdiction as defined in the decree
of organization, and were, besides, only in the competence of
the Government at Madrid to decide. At the very moment of
the first meeting of the Assembly, one of its best-known mem-
bers, a lawyer, was with Aguinaldo at Cavite, whence he was
caUing urgently upon friends in Manila to send him treatises
on international law and documents showing " how other coun-
tries declared their independence." Some of the members never
attended the sessions of the Assembly, and others identified
themselves with it only through motives of prudence. By June
13, Paterno and his personal followers were about all that was
left of the Assembly as an active organization, and they went
outside of its ranks to get together a delegation of natives
which called on the governor-general that day and laid before
him propositions for governmental reform amounting to au-
tonomy, or at least aimed at that. The rapid change in the
state of affairs, by which the Spaniards had lost all the neigh-
boring provinces of Luzon and were besieged in Manila, had
opened the eyes of Augustin, and he replied that he would
undertake to secure what they wanted, provided they would
induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. That had al-
ready been tried and had failed^ and the revolutionists at

196 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Cavite had threatened with death all who came to them as
emissaries with such a proposition.^

The first special emissary whom Augustin sent to Aguinaldo
never returned, and very shortly afterward appeared as one of
the chief propagandists at insurgent headquarters, instead of
a colonel of Pampanga volunteers protecting the south line
of Manila. After General Pena and his men were captured,
there was no good reason to expect that Filipinos who had
been given commissions would resist their own brothers. By
the middle of June, there were only two of these commanders
of any note remaining with the Spaniards.'^ There should have

1 Information as to the conciliatory policy of Augustin, and especially as to th«
Consultative Assembly, may be found in the Manila newspapers of the time, nota-
bly La Voz Espanola and El Diario de Manila. Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a mem-
ber of the Assembly, gave testimony in regard to it before the first Philippine
Commission {Report of same, vol. n, p. 389). Accounts of these events from the
standpoint of the Spaniards who were bitter against the natives may be found in
Sastrbn, op. cit., pp. 406-10, 434-36, 463. Paterno's speech at the opening of the
Assembly is the manifesto which he addressed to his countrymen a few days later;
it is quoted by Foreman (op. cit., pp. 590-97), together with the reply of the revo-
lutionists of Cavite. It may be imagined how sarcastic the recalcitrant Spanish
party in Manila would become over Paterno's apostrophes to his people to " ally "
themselves with Spain, just as other " nations " sought allies. Paterno's plan of
autonomous government, which he put forth unheeded in Manila on June 19, as a
"graphic explanation in a synoptic form" of autonomy (a sort of attempt to
achieve Philippine happiness and prosperity on a diagram, while the war-dogs
were unleashed outside), is Exhibit vii to vol. i of the Report of Philippine Com'
mission^ 1900. According to a diary kept by the Belgian consul in Manila, Gen-
eral Augustin allowed Paterno to issue this manifesto because it was hoped at the
time to get the insurgents to give up the Spanish prisoners captured in Pampanga
(see McClure*s Magazine, June, 1899, p. 172).

■ These were Licerio Gerdnimo and Enrique Flores, in arras on the north line
in Bulakdn, where things had not moved quite so rapidly as in Cavite. Mariano
Trias, the personal friend of Aguinaldo in Cavite, and his closest military associ-
ate in the former rebellion, was one of those who held out longest; he had shown
his loyalty to his Spanish commission, and had also given the Spaniards a sufficient
indication of what was his judgment as to the situation, when he refused to dis-
tribute the rifles that had been sent out to him for the Cavite volunteers it was
planned to raise, lest he might subsequently be charged with having betrayed the
Spaniards who trusted him. Felipe" Buencamino, the Filipino referred to above as
the emissary to Augustin from Aguinaldo, charges that General Peiia made no real
defense,through his unwillingness to "defend the causeof the friars." (See Hearings,
etc., Committee on Insular A fairs, 1901-03, p. 276.) Buencamino there says he was
made a prisoner by Aguinaldo even before he had a chance to present the concili-
atory propositions of General Augustin. His statements that he was assured by

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197

been a sufficient warning to the Spanish authorities of what
was going on under the surface in the Tagalog provinces in
the fact that the provincials of the religious orders felt it ne-
cessary, upon their information, to call into Manila all the
friars then in charge of parishes in the provinces, if not in the
further fact that, when General Pena started to fortify the
positions held by his troops, he could not even hire the natives
of Cavite to work on the intrenchments, where formerly the
Spaniards had been wont to impress their labor. The orders
for the concentration of the friars came a little before that of
the governor-general for the concentration upon Manila of the
troops both upon the north and south lines; but the orders in
both cases were sent too late to prevent most of the friars and
practically all the soldiers from being made prisoners. The
situation had become so threatening, by the time the order
was sent to General Pena, that a column of 500 troops was
started at the same time from Manila to relieve him in his
position at Imus ; but Paciano Eizal had already effected an
organization of the Tagalogs of the Laguna province, and the
last of the native volunteers south of Manila had deserted the
Spaniards under the leadership of Pio del Pilar, making it
impossible for this column to get through to Imus at all, much

Againaldo that Admiral Dewey had pledged him (though not in writing) the sap-
port of the United States to secure Philippine independence are to be found in the
same document, on pp. 231, 275, 276, and 292. When Buencamino joined the in-
surgent forces, he issued a manifesto to the Filipino people explaining his deser-
tion of the Spaniards, couched in the same terms as those of a letter which he
then addressed to Grovernor-General Augustin calling upon him to surrender (por-
tions of which are quoted in Sastrdn, op. cit.y p. 4G0). These clauses are worth
quoting : ^ Manila being besieged by sea and land, without hope of help from
anywhere, and Aguinaldo being disposed to make use of the squadron to bombardj I
don't know, frankly, any other recourse than to give up to death ; for Your Excel-
lenoy knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians, flushed with fighting, drunk
with victory and with blood, would produce a hecatomb from which not even
women, nor children, nor priests, especially the friars, would escape." And also:
** We hold at this date seven provinces, with various seaports, namely, Taal, Ba-
tangaa, Balayiin, Cavite, Subig, and Mariveles, and we possess three steamers and
various launches, with many small boats, to conduct our communications, aside
from disposing, when it it desired, o/tht North American squadron" [Italics inserted
by editor.]

108 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

less to prevent the surrender of that town upon the third attack
on it in numbers. Thus, on May 31, Manila was actually be-
sieged, up to its very suburbs, at all points south of the Pasig
River. The Spanish outposts were driven in upon Santa Ana
on June 3, and on the same day the Spanish garrison at
Kalookan, just north of Manila on the railroad, retreated
toward the city. From June 1 to the day of the surrender to
the Americans, rifle-fire could be heard in Manila every day,
especially at night and in the early morning. The walled town
soon held 80,000 to 100,000 people at night. Including the
convents, seven infirmaries, with sick and wounded, were soon
established there ; and the Augustinian convent at least was
made a great repository of rice and other provisions, while
here were sheltered numbers of women and children, and here
also for a time were the virtual headquarters of the governor-
general and his closest attendants.^

The revolt in Bulak^n,just to the northward of Manila, had
to some extent been organized from the Cavite insurgent head-
quarters, and arms had been sent across the bay from there, in
one of the small boats that had been donated to Aguinaldo for
his use by Filipino merchants of Manila. With the surround-
ing and taking of the town of Malabon on June 12,^ the

^ Early in the siege, a great commotion was created one day by the appearance
in the courtyard of the Augastinian convent of two of&cers from the northern out>
posts, hatless and almost speechless in overwrought, nervous excitement, calling
on the friars, " for whom we are fighting," to put off their " skirts," take rifles,
and assume places of defense on the outer line. This was one of the many dramatic
and curious incidents connected with the Spanish defense, for most of which courts-
martial were promptly held. The commander of the little gunboat which came
into the bay on May 12, ignorant of what had taken place, and having, of course,
had no choice but to surrender to Dewey's fleet, was court-martialed for doing so.
Another mysterious episode was the suicide, at the door of the governor-general's
headquarters, of the Spanish colonel of artillery who had charge of the guns of the
Luneta and walled city. His friends in Spain claim that he committed suicide be-
cause of a reprimand just received from his superiors for firing on one of Dewey's
vessels. Foreman {pp. cit., p. 579) says it was in despair because he was ordered
to prepare the old guns of the fort for defense, and the rust could not be scraped
off them.

2 A description of this affair and of the uprising in Bulakdn will be found in
no. 1 of La Libertad, the first periodical of the insurrection, a few numbers of which

i

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 199

Spaniards were once for all driven back upon their line of
outer defense, running through the fifteen blockhouses they
had constructed in April and May. They had about 7000 men,
mostly Spanish troops, for this outer line of defense ; but the
total number of their available troops within the city was steadily
being reduced by the desertions of native troops constantly
going on.*

The Spanish troops further away from the city, along and
near the railroad, were cut off from their capital almost as
suddenly as the forces in Cavite. When General Monet, in com-
mand on the north, got his orders to bring his forces to Manila,
and started to do so on May 27, he found the road between
Angeles and San Fernando, Pampanga province, already in-
trenched.2 Between him and Manila, an evidence of the atti- \
tude of the population had already been afforded by their at- '
tack upon a p^rty of Augustinian friars and of Spanish men \

were got oat, nnder the direction of Clemente J. Zulueta (late Collecting Librarian
of the Philippine Government, engaged in procuring from the archives of Spain
and of other countries manuscript material bearing on the history of the Philip-
pines), at the printing establishment run in connection with the orphanage of the
Augustinian order at Tambobong (Malabon). The first number is principally made
up of contributions from Messrs. Zulueta and Epifanio Santos (now provincial
governor of Nueva ficija), the latter writing, among other things, a letter from
Manila which described the situation of affairs within the city. It contains a pro-
clamation of war, based upon a decree of the dictatorial government of May 24,
wherein it was stated that, among others, all those " who directly or indirectly op-
pose obstacles to the realization of our aspirations," and " who abuse, either in word
or act, the enemies who surrender," will be summarily executed. We are informed
that it was not necessary to carry out any of these provisions in connection with the
taking of Malabon. This first periodical of the insurrection was very soon sup-
pressed by the "kitchen-cabinet" of Aguinaldo, who wished to keep the entire
direction of affairs at the headquarters in Cavite.

1 An official list of May 29 showed 6760 Spanish and 4332 native soldiers in
Manila on that date. That was about the number supposed to be surrendered when
the city fell, but the native force had then shrunk by over thirty per cent.

' It was a very open secret in Manila that both Generals Monet and Peiia had
urged concentration of the troops long after the authorities in Manila continued
to plan on holding all the Spanish territory through the aid of native volunteers.
In a telegram as early as May 2, General Monet had expressed his objections to
distributing arms among the Filipinos, and had asked reinforcements if he was
expected to hold so much territory; General Augnstin replied that Monet had
" forces enough with the 7000 volunteers " organized and to be organized. (See
Hittoria NegrOf per el** Capitan Verdades," Barcelona, 1899, pp. 73-74.)

200 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

and women on their way to the railroad station at Giginto,
Bulakan province, several being killed and others wounded.
His northernmost column of a few hundred men was unable
to obey his orders for concentration, and retreated on Dagu-
pan, where it was later captured. Already, in the last days of
May, an uprising in Pangasinan had resulted in the assassina-
tion of several officers of the native militia and of a Spanish
friar and a Spanish civil official. Pampanga — in which some
of the earliest preparatory work of the new revolution had
been done, and where Maximino Hizon, named "commanding
general of central Luzon," had gone immediately after Agui-
naldo's arrival as the direct representative of the latter — was
ripe for insurrection at the appointed time. From June 1 to 8,
every town in the province rose in revolt, with a single excep-
tion, and in the outlying towns the friar curates were all cap-
tured, one of them being assassinated. The single exception
was the town of Makabebe, in the extreme southern part of
the province, near the bayous of the river delta. Most of the
land here was owned by a prominent Spanish family, the
Blancos, to whom the people bore feudal relations, and, or-
ganized by the sons of this family, the Makabebes had re-
mained loyal to Spain when all the other native troops deserted.
It was toward this town that Monet felt it necessary to with-
draw his column, for sheltered in the Blanco mansion were the
wife and children of Governor-General Augustin. Similarly, he
could not abandon the Spanish women and children nor the
wounded soldiers caught by the outbreak in the province of
Pampanga ; and the movements of his 700 soldiers were seri-
ously handicapped by these burdens. He reached Makabebe
with comparatively few losses, though facing some opposition
all the way to the river above, whence steamers were taken ;
but he would have sustained much greater losses, had he not
threatened to burn the towns as he went through them if he
was "sniped" from them. Makabebe was speedily besieged
and bombarded with old cannon after his arrival, but eventu-

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 201

ally held out until July 3. He had the women, children, and
friars placed on board a river steamer flying the red cross, and
it reached Manila from the mouth of the Rio Grande de Pam-
panga without attention from the American vessels, this per-
haps being due to the thick fog at the time. Placing the Au-
gustin family in a large native canoe. General Monet boarded
it himself, and under cover of the darkness succeeded in landing
on the shores of the Tondo district of Manila without being ob-
served. He was speedily court-martialed for his desertion of his
troops. The latter were loaded upon large canoes at Makabebe
and pulled out into the bay in tow of the little river steamer Leite,
on which their officers had taken passage. As the Leite ap
peared at the mouth of the river flying the white flag, she was
sighted by the Concord, and was speedily made a capture and
the officers on board taken prisoners. They had cut loose the
canoes bearing the soldiers (they claim, because they intended
to "make parley" with the Americans); the canoes were driven
on shore by the wind, and their inmates were speedily made
prisoners by insurgents of Bataan and Pampanga. In the
course of but a few days, the territory from Manila to the
northern end of the railroad, the great valley of central Luzon,
had thus passed almost without opposition from the possession
of the panic-stricken Spaniards to that of the Filipinos, who
had only to complete their control by the capture of the sur-
rounded garrison at Dagupan.

F. HDTTS OF A "PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC"

In the Filipino camp, the principal activities were, of course,
devoted to the extension of the insurgent propaganda, and to
organizing armed opposition to Spain. Their easy victories,
however, speedily laid upon them the burden of the control
in a governmental way of vastly more territory than they had
ever held, even for a moment, in the previous insurrection. It
is significant that, nearly from the first, they had laid their
plans more or less comprehensively with this result in view.

\

202 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Without attempting at this point an exposition of the form or
character of the insurgent organization as a government, an
outline of their undertakings must be presented. The call to
^ \ arms of May 20 had speedily been followed on May 24 by
three proclamations over Aguinaldo's name. The first pro-
claimed the establishment of a Dictatorial Government, " to
be administered by decrees promulgated upon my responsi-
bility solely," until the islands shall be " completely conquered
and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a
President and a Cabinet, in whose favor I will duly resign the
authority." In this proclamation also Spain was accused of
lack of faith in not extending the reforms promised in the
** treaty " negotiated by Paterno, Japan was declared to be
the pattern for the Filipinos, and it was asserted that the
" great and powerful North American nation has come to offer
disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country."
The first decree of the dictatorship thus assumed dealt with
the manner of conducting the war, it being distinctly stated
that the Filipinos must make a good showing in this respect
before the nations of the world, and particularly the United
States, which, it was reiterated, had come to offer its protec-
tion, " considering us sufficiently civilized and fit to govern
for ourselves our unfortunate country." The lives of all
foreigners including Chinese, as well as of those Spaniards not
taking up arms against them or who should surrender tc them,
must therefore be respected, as also the medical corps of the
enemy ; the penalty for disobedience was to be execution after
summary trial, if the disobedience resulted in murder, incendi-
arism, robbery, or rape. There followed this decree, drawn in
consequence of the sending by Augustin of one emissary to
Aguinaldo and the rumors that a mixed commission of Span-
ish military men and civilian Filipinos was soon to be sent to
him from Manila ; all persons who appeared for such purposes,
unless under a flag of truce and with proper credentials
to " negotiate," should be executed as spies, and any Filipino

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 203

accepting such a mission should be hanged with a label as traitor
on him.^

In these documents of May 24, it will be observed, " inde-
pendence " was implied by the words used, but not formally
stated, as in the private call to arms of May 20. Similarly,
when the "flag of the Philippines" was formally acclaimed in
Old Cavite on June 12, everything about the elaborate cere-
monies got up for the occasion was made to center about the
idea of independence, and the affair was bruited abroad among
the natives far and wide as the " proclamation of independ-
ence." The significance of such an occurrence, close under
the guns of the American men-of-war, is evident; yet the
formal documentation of the Filipino "declaration of inde-
pendence" was still delayed.^ The succeeding month was,

^ Aguinaldo asserts (Keseha veridicd) that such a commission did afterward
come to him in the names of Archbishop Nozaleda and Governor-General Au-
gnstin, offering him and his companions recognitions as generals with " a million
pesos," besides " great gratifications and salaries in the assembly of representa-
tives," if they would join forces with the Spaniards. According to his story, he dis-
cussed the situation very fully with them, but sent them back to say they were not
received because they did not present official credentials. He also asserts that Noza-
leda and Augiistin had commissioned four Grermans and five Frenchmen to assassi-
nate him. It is true that there was some communication back and forth between
Manila and the insurgent headquarters, and there is no doubt that Augustin au-
thorized certain Filipinos (and perhaps some of the German naval officers) to offer
conciliatory propositions to Aguinaldo at various times during May and June. The
conversation which Aguinaldo here reports as having taken place, and as having
been detailed by him to Admiral Dewey, probably has no basis in fact except the
visit to his headquarters on June 19 of a committee of Spanish military surgeons,
who bore passports from Augustin to accredit them to the commander of the
American fleet and were charged with conducting to Manila 185 wounded soldiers
and sailors who were in the hospital under Aguina1do*s control in Cavite. At the
instigation of the British consul and with the appro^ of Admiral Dewey, Agui-
naldo had consented to the transfer of these wounded men to their own lines, and
had written a letter to Augustin to that effect. He was greatly chagrined that the
latter did not reply directly to him, thus giving him something upon which he
might set up the claim that he had been " officially recognized " by the Spanish
authority. (Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp. 46^-^.) On July 6, Aguinaldo commissioned two
of hiB officers, " in my name and that of the Filipino people," to treat with Au-
guttin for the surrender of Manila, promising treatment in accordance with the
laws of war (Sen. Doc, 208, part 3, pp. 3-4).

• The •' Act of Independence," indeed, was not promulgated until August 1,
after a number of towna had been organized under the rules laid down bj the

204 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

however, a period of great activity in the making of decrees,
etc. On June 18, there was promulgated a scheme for the
civil organization of the towns and provinces, as soon as the
Spaniards should have been captured or expelled from them,
and providing also for the election by each province of three
representatives in the Revolutionary Congress which was to
be formed. Again Aguinaldo declared that he knew inde-
pendence to be his people's aspiration, and he assured them
that he had made it so known to the world. On June 20, as
supplementary to the foregoing scheme of government, which
was the merest outline, forty-five rules for the conduct of the
municipal and the provincial governments were promulgated,
the Spanish word pueblo (town) being proclaimed to be sub-
stituted by the Tagalog word sangunian (council). On June
23, a decree was issued organizing the "Revolutionary Gov-
ernment of the Philippines," which it was hoped would become

Dictatorial Goyernment, and the chiefs of these towns joined at Bakoor in a pro-
ceeding which seemed to be designed mainly to prepare the way for the appeal to
foreign Governments for the recognition of independence, dated August 6. This
act was afterwards ratified by the Congress at Malolos on September 29, and the
latter date was proclaimed to be that of the Filipino " Independence Day." The
desire to imitate the procedure of other nations which had attained independence,
by making the formal process at least appear to be the act of a representative
assembly, of course had something to do with the procedure followed by these
Filipinos. Yet one can hardly escape the conclusion that one thing in mind at the
outset was to commit no overt act which might cause a break with Admiral
Dewey and thus interfere with the use of the fiction of an " alliance " with the
United States as the most effective campaign-cry for the time being. Admiral
Dewey was, as if casually, invited to the celebration of June 12, and in an even
more informal way sent his secretary on shore to excuse him because it was
"mail-day." Yet there were scattered among the Filipinos outside of Cavite
copies of a decree of Aguinaldo, dated June 9 (a copy of which was not furnished
to the Americans with the others of the time), appointing June 12 " for the procla-
mation of the independence of our loved country "; and this curious language was
used in hinting to the people at large the full participation in the event of the
Americans : " There may attend also as many as wish of the notables who figure
in our political communion, as the admiral of the North American squadron, the
commanders and officers under him, to whom a courteous invitation will be sent,
and all present will sign the record which will be drawn up by the official whom
I may commission." (See Sastrdn, op. cit.f p. 459.) Admiral Dewey did not report
the occurrence to Washington, but cabled on that same day that on his advice the
instirgents would not attack Manila mitil American troops should arrive.

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 205

the new central government of the islands. Aguinaldo dis-
carded the title of "Dictator" for that of "President," and
his cabinet was to be composed of four secretaries (under
whom were to be combined such mixed functions as "war and
public works" and "police and education"). The members of
the Revolutionary Congress were, in general, to be elected,
but the President could appoint for provinces not entirely
freed from the Spanish domination. A large part of the decree
was devoted to the matter of trials for "military offenses."
The object of the Revolutionary Government was declared to
be "to strive for the independence of the Philippines, until
the free nations, including the Spanish, expressly recognize it,
and to prepare the country to the end that it may be possible
to set up a real Republic." (This last clause held an im-
portance, in the plans of the insurgent leaders of the time,
which has never been properly recognized.) This decree was
accompanied by the "Message of the President" of the same
date, which asserted that the Filipinos' effort to secure a liberal
government from Spain had always been frustrated by the
friars, and that now " it does not restrict itself to asking as-
similation or the Spanish political constitution, but asks defini-
tive separation and strives for its independence, in the full
certainty that the time has come when it can and ought to
govern itself." Rules for the conduct of executive business at
the headquarters of the Central Government were put forth
in a decree of June 27 ; but the members of the Cabinet
were not named until July 15, in a decree which prescribed
"Seiior" or "Maguinoo" (Tagalog for "noble," a title which
Pedro A. Patemo had dug up from antiquity and assumed
for himself) as the proper form of address to officials, and
which detailed the kinds of canes to be carried or of triangular
plates of gold or silver to be hung from the necks of pro-
vincial and municipal officers respectively. Aguinaldo was to
wear as his distinguishing emblem " a collar of gold, from
which hangs a similar triangle and a whistle, also of gold,"

206 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

and could carry also a cane with gold head and gold tas-
sels. On July 18, a strictly military decree was issued, pre-
scribing the number of adjutants the various general ofl&cers
might appoint (assigning twelve to the President, the first of
whom might be a brigadier-general.^

It was after the appointment of his Cabinet on July 15 that
Aguinaldo addressed Admiral Dewey, inclosing the decrees of
June 18 to 27 and asking him to forward them to the Govern-
ment at Washington, with the statement that " the desires of
this Government are to remain always in friendship with the
great North American nation, to which we are under many obli-
gations."^ By this time, the first expedition of American soldiers

1 The delay over the naming of the cabinet members had been occasioned by
the customary jealousies in camp. The Department of Foreign Relations was left
under the charge of Aguinaldo, until the " most fit " person could be selected.
The President's cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, was made Secretary of War ; Le-
andro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior, and Mariano Trias, Secretary of the
Treasury. The organization of the insurgent government, as well as the details of
the internal administration of the provinces controlled by it, will be hereinafter
treated. All the documents referred to above are to be found in a little pamphlet,
entitled Disposiciones del Gobiemo Revolucionario de Filipinos, printed on the press
set up at Bakoor, Cavite, in July, to publish El Heraldo de la Revolucion, the
ofBcial organ of the new government (the establishment of which had coincided
with the suppression of the newspaper started independently, as hereinbefore
mentioned, by the Filipinos who had taken Malabon). English versions of these
documents are in part to be found in Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 431-39 ; Sen. Doc. 208^
56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 88-101, and part 3, p. 2 ; Bureau of Naviga-
tion, pp. 104-05 and 111-19, and in various other books and documents. The de-
tailed decrees of June 20 and 27 it was, unfortunately, not deemed necessary
to translate in connection with the work of the Peace Commission at Paris {Sen.
Doc. 62), and no English version of them seems ever to have been provided, ex-
cept in a document of the War Department entitled Report on the Organization for
the Adminvitration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and His Fol-
lowers in the Philippine Archipelago, compiled by Captain John R. M. Taylor in
1903, for use in connection with a suit brought against the Government, and not
available for public distribution.

^ Bureau of Navigation, p. 111. Two days later. Admiral Dewey sent the docu-
ments to the Navy Department, with this simple indorsement: "Respectfully
forwarded for the information of the Department." He never cabled to Washing-
ton anything about the pretensions of the Filipinos to independent government.
He testified before the Senate Committee (Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 2928): " This was the
first intimation, the first I had ever heard, of independence of the Philippines. . . .
I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its
contents to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed
that they wanted independence." This will serve to indicate how well the admiral

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 207

had arrived and had taken possession of Cavite, and more were
arriving and on the way, to the undoubted displeasure of the
Filipino leaders. Talk of the United States retaining the
Philippines had already become common in the American and
European press, and had been communicated to Aguinaldo's
camp by his informants in Hongkong and Singapore.^ In-
surgent documents captured in 1899 brought to light the
fact that, at a meeting of Filipinos, held in Hongkong before
Aguinaldo's departure for the PhiHppines, consideration was
given to the possibility that the Americans might decide to
impose their sovereignty upon the archipelago and to the pos-
sibility of fighting them also.^ Either the arrival of American

was posted on what was going on under the shadow of his own guns. On the other
hand, it is rather hard to reconcile this with the statement of General Anderson
(North American Review, February, 1900, p. 276) that he " was the first to tell Ad-
miral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people
to hold the Philippines if they were captured," as well as with the statement of
Aguinaldo (Resena veridicd) that, in their first conversation, he told Dewey that,
before he left Hongkong, the Filipinos there had discussed the possibility of a war
with the Americans, after they had conquered the Spaniards, because of the
Americans' refusal " to recognize our independence," and that the admiral replied
that he was " delighted with Aguinaldo's sincerity." Statements made in the i?e-
teha veridica are to be regarded as suspicious, but this one, at least, had foundation
in the fact that, as will hereinafter be seen, such a meeting was held in Hongkong
and the possibility of a war with the Americans was there discussed. Moreover,
except that they were more pretentious in form and specifically mentioned " inde-
pendence," without it being formally declared, the decrees of June did not involve
any greater assumption of authority on Agumaldo's part than that of May 24,
which Admiral Dewey had forwarded to Washington in a letter of June 12.

> Through the conduct of Mr. Bray, Aguinaldo had, on June 10, addressed a
letter to President McKinley, protesting against the rumored intention of the United
States (as reported in the London Times of May 5) either to demand an indemnity
from Spain or to transfer the Philippines to some other power, preferably Great
Britain. He protested " one and a thousand times" against such a project, and de-
clared that the Filipino people trusted blindly in the United States " not to aban-
don them to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave them free and independent." (See
Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 359-61.)

* Sen. Doc. S08, 56th Cong., Ist Sess., part 2, pp. 5-9. A smoother translation
of the minutes of that meeting than the one there given was recently made by
Captain J. R. M. Taylor, the significant passage in which it : " There would be no
better occasion than that afiforded them to injure the landing of the expeditionary
forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans,
and to assure against those very people the situation of the Philippines with regard
to oar legitimate aspirations. The Filipino people, ouprovidcd with arms, would be

208 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

troops or the extraordinary success which the insurgent forces
had had in "wresting from Spain the most important parts of
Luzon, or both these attending circumstances, made them
ready to adopt in July a very much more independent attitude
than hitherto, which was manifest even to Admiral Dewey,
much as their petty affairs " bothered '* him.^ The glowing
phrases of gratitude to the United States disappeared from
the insurgent proclamations.'^ Such documents ceased to make

the Tictims of the demands and the exactions of the United States, but, provided
with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for independ-
ence, in which consists the true happiness of the Philippines." This declaration
appears in the minutes as the argument used by the chief speakers of the occasion
to overcome Aguinaldo's objections to going to the Philippines without a written
agreement with Dewey for the recognition of Philippine independence by the
United States — a fact in itself sufQciently illuminating as to the later claims re-
garding an " alliance." Back of the reasons given by Aguinaldo for his hesitancy
there was evidently some sense of a moral obligation to return to Spain the $400,-
000 he held, if he joined the United States in fighting Spain. These scruples were
overcome. It is also interesting to note that he wanted to send the members of the
"junta" to prepare the way, instead of going himself. This document of May 4,
even if unsupported by other bits of evidence, disposes of that view of the case which
has regarded the Filipinos as poor, misguided souls, who, through their scanty ex-
perience in the ways of government and in international affairs, were led astray
by the belief that the consuls of the United States, or even the admiral of its vic-
torious fleet, could pledge their nation to a political course of action (whatever
view is taken of Aguinaldo's interviews with the Americans). As a matter of fact,
this is only the first of a series of events and documents which show that the Fili-
pinos, during 1898 and early 1899, looked into the future more shrewdly, and
mapped out their course of action in a less haphazard way, than did the Americans.

^ Notwithstanding the very noteworthy surface change that took place in
American and Filipino relations at this time, it is difBcult to see how the first
Philippine Commission came to make in its preliminary report of November 2,
1899 (vol. I, p. 172), this extraordinary statement : " Now for the first time arose
the idea of national independence," speaking of the period just after General
Anderson's arrival.

2 The one exception to the uniformity with which the insurgent documents
up to July 1 made use of the boast of American protection is the answer to Pa-
terno's manifesto in behalf of alliance with Spain, which Foreman cites on pages
692-97 of his book, wherein it is stated that the revolutionists " make war with-
out the help of any one, not even the North Americans." But this was an anony-
mous document of little circulation, not put forth from insurgent headquarters at
Cavite, though doubtless written with their cognizance, as it employed the argu-
ments then being used among them to assure the doubting Filipinos that the
United States could not go back on its " promises " to Aguinaldo, namely, " that
its own constitution prohibits the absorption of territory outside of America," in
accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and that the independent countries of South

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES 209

ostentation, in one mysterious f onn or another, of the " alli-
ance" with the United States; henceforth, that "alliance"
would be only for the purpose of extending the propaganda in
provinces other than Tagalog, while in the Tagalog camp it-
self the more radical spirits would freely discuss the time when
they might have to fight the United States.

America owed their existence largely to this fact. This view of the Monroe Doc-
trine, which has filtered through to the Filipinos from the many random and mis-
informed comments on that " doctrine " then being made in Europe, was what led
Aguinaldo to make to Greneral Anderson in their first interview what seemed to
the latter the " remarkable statement " that he found " no authority for colonies "
in the American Constitution. (North American RevieWy February, 1900, p. 277.)

CHAPTER V

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST IN AMERICA'S INTENTIONS

The relations which the Americans proposed to bear toward
the Philippines and the Filipinos had become a matter of keen
speculation among foreign nations other than Spain long
before the first American soldiers arrived to continue the con-
quest. Among the members of the various foreign colonies at
Manila, speculation on this question took on the form of
anxiety, stimulated by the practical interest which the posses-
sion of property in the islands gave them. Naturally this anx-
iety was reflected, in quasi-official form, on the part of their
respective consular representatives and the officers of their
men-of-war which had followed Dewey to the scene to protect
national interests. Not less in the natural order of events was
it that national, as well as sometimes personal, prejudices
should manifest themselves in this connection. With a min-
gling of jealousy and of ignorance of American motives and
character, continental Europe undoubtedly sympathized with
Spain in the war of 1898 and regarded the United States as a
brutal aggressor ; and this attitude was reflected more or less
plainly by the acts of the European representatives on the
spot. Partly through the Englishman's constitutional antipa-
thy to most of the ways and beliefs of the Spaniard, and partly
through greater community of interest and better knowledge
of American aims and character. Englishmen everywhere, and
particularly in the Orient, wished their kinsmen well. No-
where were the opposing sympathies of these outside observers
more clearly brought out than in the respective attitudes of the
British and the German naval representatives in Manila Bay.

Admiral Dewey reported to Washington, on May 13, that
there were in Manila Harbor five foreign men-of-war, — two

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 211

German, one British, one French, and one Japanese. On June
25, he reported five German vessels, three British, one French,
and one Japanese ; and soon after a second German battleship
arrived, making six of the seven vessels then constituting the
Asiatic Squadron of Germany. Considering that German in-
terests in the whole Philippine Archipelago were practically
confined to Manila and were not to be compared in impor-
tance with those of British citizens, while subordinate also to
those of the French and even of the Swiss colony, the Ger-
man naval representation, which was at times superior to the
blockading squadron, was disproportionate. There was friction
between the German and American naval officers and men, in
small ways, most of the time, of the sort inevitable where two
navies, which have grown to think, in some indefinite fashion,
" that they don't like each other," are thrown into close con-
tact. This feeling, which affected the fleets from the youngest
apprentice up to the admirals in command, was responsible for
considerable bluster and braggadocio on both sides. Techni-
cally, however, the right lay entirely on the side of the Amer-
icans ; for they were the blockaders in command of the situa-
tion, and it was for them, within the limits of international
law, to lay down the rules under which they would enforce
their supervision. There were many little things to justify the
reported message of Admiral Dewey to Admiral von Diede-
rich that the latter's ships were acting as if they were the
blockaders, and not the Americans.^ On the other hand, from
the German point of view, there was excuse for certain actions
of a more conspicuous character, which were, to naval men
with the traditional " chip on the shoulder," evidences of hos-
tile intent, and which were magnified into ugly episodes by an
over-patriotic press in the United States, then in the full tide
of triumphant proclamation of victories. Germany was more

' This incident, as well as the messaj^ sent to Von Diederich by Dewey, after
he learned that a German ressel had landed supplies for Manila, to the e£Fect that
" if he wanted war, he coald hare it right now," are reported by Joseph L. Stick*
ney {Harper^i Magazine^ February, 1899, pp. 483-84).

212 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

or less avowedly on the lookout for colonies in the Asiatic
Orient; the United States supposedly was not. Only in
1885-86, Germany, which had long had her eye on the Caro-
line Islands, had, through the over^zealous action of naval
officers in the alleged protection of traders' and missionaries'
rights in those islands, seriously offended Spanish dignity,
and had withdrawn with apologies from an awkward situa-
tion.^ Europe was much quicker than the United States to
perceive that the end of Spain's domination had come in the
Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, with the peculiar complica-
tion of events following upon the outbreak of war over Cuba.
In the absence of any definite attitude on the part of the Gov-
ernment at Washington as to the future of the Philippines,
there was more than a little in the history and traditional pol-
icy of the United States (especially as interpreted in Europe)
and in the discussions of its press at the time, to warrant the
belief that the United States would not retain hold upon the
PhiUppines. And very much more important than this, to the
Germans on the spot, the attitude of our naval representatives
toward the insurgents, and toward the claims the latter put
forth with regard to the Americans having no intention of
keeping the islands, might afford easy confirmation of the
conclusion that the Americans were simply making war on the
Spaniards for the time being, and had no intention of involv-
ing themselves in the future control of the archipelago. It is
to be remembered that, with Germany, the deciding upon a
course of action under such circumstances would have lain

^ The idea of foreign intervention in the Philippines had been exploited by friar
organs, anxious to place an anti-Spain brand upon the advocates of Philippine
reform, before ever the Filipino revolutionary party talked of intervention by
Japan. The Caroline Islands affair, especially so far as Protestant missionaries*
rights were put forward by Germany and other nations, was long used as a bug-
aboo by these organs (as was also the victory of Japan over China in 1895). The
fact that Rizal and other propagandists had been to Germany for education was
made much of ; also the writings of Blumentritt in behalf of the Filipinos (Blu-
mentritt, being, however, an Austrian subject). The German press protested vig-
orously against insinuations in the press of Spain that the revolt of 1896 was
secretly instigated by Germany.

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 213

virtually with one man and would iiave been speedily an-
nounced or at least made fairly manifest ; and German naval
officers were scarcely to be expected to reason that the consti-
tution and methods of government of the United States made
any such one-man action out of the question. They were not
slow to reach the conclusion that the world would not tolerate
a Filipino Government. There was much in the attitude of
the American naval commander to justify the conclusion that
his home authorities were willing to see such a government
instituted. They may have thought that a pro-Spanish, anti-
insurgent attitude on their part would help Germany to step
into the place of Spain when the Americans washed their
hands of the affair. Naval men are rarely equipped with the
training of statesmen ; and these naval men overlooked the
fact that, if Spain must go, the conquering power would in-
evitably become the chief factor in determining the future fate
of the Philippines. If we assume, therefore, that such thoughts
were in their minds, and not merely an anti-American preju-
dice, they were none the less shortsighted, as well as techni-
cally wrong, in the innumerable things, both important and
petty, which they did during the siege of Manila, and which,
whether so intended or not, operated to raise the hope con-
tinually among the optimistic Spaniards of Manila that a Euro-
pean coalition would come to relieve their situation, or that
Germany at least would constitute herself their active protector
against the Americans.^

1 Admiral Dewey's information that the German yeuels supplied flour to the
city of Manila was correct, as may be seen by a reference to the work of a Span-
ish official among the besieged in Manila (Sastr<5n, op. d/., p. 413). When Ad-
miral Ton Diederich visited the German consulate in Manila, he was the object of
a spontaneous reception on the part of the crowds of Spaniards. Two officials of the
Irene who risited the city for some days were taken about the lines of defense
and banqueted at the Spanish Club. German vessels brought women and children
and wounded men to Manila from the besieged town of Dagtipan, and received
Spanish refugees from the city whenever there was fear of bombardment (ibid.,
pp. 413-14 and 405-66). Foreman relates (op, cit.^ p. 584), as a rumor, that a
German naval officer, at a lawn-party in Manila, " declared that so long as Wil-
liam II was Emperor of Germany, the Philippines should never come under

214 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

As we have seen, Aguinaldo had repeatedly claimed to be
operating under the formally pledged protection of the United
States; no protest against such pretensions on his part had
come from the chief representative of the United States on the
spot. Arms bought for him by Americans had been landed
under the American guns at Cavite, and he had received some
few guns directly from the American naval commander. Until
the arrival of the American troops, he was allowed to retain
possession of the town of Cavite, surrendered by the Spaniards
to the Americans. When the small steamers bought with his
funds in China and the steam launches donated to him by Fil-
ipino adherents began to move about the bay, they flew the
new Filipino flag, with the tacit consent of the Americans. In-
deed, when the German admiral sought to obtain from Ad-
miral Dewey a definite statement as to whether or no that flag
was officially recognized by the latter's home government, the
American commander evaded the question by saying that it
was "only a little flag," and anybody could fly a little flag or
pennant.^

When the river steamer Leite, bearing the Spanish officers
from Makabebe, was captured in the bay, the prisoners were
turned over to Aguinaldo to keep, though the steamer was re-
tained by Admiral Dewey. Just after that, the inter-island
steamer, Compaiiia de Filipinas, of about 800 tons burden, the
property of the leading tobacco company of the islands, owned

American sway." But rumor among the British residents of Manila, whose sym-
pathy with the Americans was not concealed, may easily have exaggerated what
he did say.

1 This is Admiral Dewey's own testimony (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2929 and 2941) :
" I said [in response to Von Diederich] : ' That is not a Filipino flag ; ... no gov-
ernment has recognized them ; they have a little bit of bunting that anybody could
hoist.* . . . They called this a Filipino flag, but I did not." The official denial of
Admiral Dewey that he or any of his vessels ever saluted " the flag of the so-called
Philippine Republic " is contained in Sen. Doc. S87, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. Yet Oscar
King Davis, one of the best-informed American newspaper correspondents on the
ground in 1898, says {Everybody's Magazine, August, 1901, p. 141): "Admiral
Dewey had caused the marine guard to be turned out for him [Aguinaldo] and
had given him a general's salute."

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 215

by French and Spanish capital, appeared in the bay flying the
insurgent flag and was allowed to add herself to the "mos-
quito fleet " of the insurgents. On receipt of the news of the
American victory at Manila, she had been ordered by her owners
to leave Aparri to go and take refuge in Formosa. Just out of
Aparri, her crew, led by a Cuban Spaniard, had mutinied and
murdered her Spanish officers, taken charge of the vessel,
hoisted the insurgent flag, and soon afterwards arrived at Ca-
vite and placed themselves and the vessel they had captured
under Aguinaldo's orders. Technically, they were subject,
under international law, to the full penalties for mutiny and
piracy, at least unless it was to be assumed that their act was
a poHtical one, performed in behalf of a governmental organi-
zation already recognized or with a right to be recognized by
the nations of the world. Through the French consul, the
French officers of the tobacco company, which had its head-
quarters at Manila, demanded of Admiral Dewey the seizure
of the vessel and its return to them. It had, however, flown
the Spanish flag in the inter-island service, and at the time of
its capture by Filipinos, and Admiral Dewey replied to the
French consul that "the forces under his command were in no
way concerned in this affair, but that he would transmit his
letter to Aguinaldo with a request that the latter show due
regard for French interests." * Meanwhile, the Filipinos had
loaded this vessel with armed men and had placed one or two
small pieces of artillery on her. She was then dispatched to
Subig Bay, to aid on the water side in the capture of the
Spanish garrison of marines and 600 or 700 Spanish fugitives
who had been driven into Olongapci on the outbreak of insur-
rection in Sambales province. When the Compaiiia de Fili-
pinas arrived, these fugitives had all been transferred to Isla
Grande in front of Olongaprf, where, under protection of the

' This is Admiral Dewey's own stRtemeDt, in an informal letter to Agninaldo
under date of Jalj 16, 1898, which letter is reproduced in Cong. Record^ 57th
Cong^ 1st Sess., pp. 6180-81. Aguinaldo also reUtei the incident in his Resefia
vtriiiea.

216 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

trenches thrown up by the marines, they were safe from any
attack that could be made against them by the insurgents from
the Sambales shore, who must come over in small boats. The
Cuban commander, who had assumed the title of "Admiral of
the Filipino Navy," ordered them to surrender, and when they
refused, prepared to open on their positions with the little ar-
tillery he had. The German cruiser Irene appeared in the bay
at the moment, and ordered the Compania de Filipinas to haul
down the insurgent flag which it was flying. The latter vessel
thereupon withdrew and reported the occurrence to Aguinaldo
at Cavite. The German commander supplied the Spaniards
on the little island with what stores he could spare, and took
on board the women and children to carry them to Manila. As
soon as the incident was reported by Aguinaldo to Admiral
Dewey, the latter sent the Raleigh and Concord direct to Subig
Bay, because, he afterward stated, he " did n't want any other
power to interfere in the Philippines." The Irene retired from
the bay on their arrival, on the morning of July 8, and the
Spaniards on the little island speedily capitulated to the sen-
ior American officer in command, Captain Coghlan, of the
Raleigh. There were over 600 of them in all, about one third
of whom were marines and the rest Spanish civilians and friars.
The Compania de Filipinas had followed the American vessels
to Subig Bay, and Captain Coghlan, acting upon the instruc-
tions of Admiral Dewey, turned these prisoners and what arms
they had over to the Filipinos on that boat, against the pro-
test of the captured Spaniards. The Compania de Filipinas im-
mediately steamed over to 01ongap(5 with them, where they
were put on shore and left under charge of the insurgent com-
mander a't that point. Fifty-two of them, including the friars,
remained in the town, and the rest were marched inland with
the insurgent forces.^

^ The American official version of this affair is very meager. Admiral Dewey's
cablegram of July 10 reports the bare facts, with the obvious inference that
he looked upon the affair chiefly as an instance of German ill-will and acted upon
that basis (Bureau of Navigation, p. 110), His testimony in 1902 {Sen. Doc. 381,

\

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 217

Viewed from the standpoint of Spaniards and foreigners in
Manila who looked upon the capture of the Compania de Fil-
ipinas in the first place as an act of piracy and assassination,
and who had in the preceding twenty months had only too
serious reason to fear what might happen to Spanish prisoners
who fell into the hands of the insurgents, especially in Sam-
bales, the act of the German commander was not only justifi-
able, but highly commendable, upon broad grounds of hu-
manity. Aside from Admiral Dewey's resentment of German
officiousness, already sufficiently stimulated by minor incidents
during the blockade, his justification for taking some hun-
dreds of prisoners, who by their military code were forbidden
to accept parole and who must be handed over to the insur-
gents or turned loose for the latter to capture, must rest upon
his acceptance in good faith of Aguinaldo's promise that such

p. 2942) was wholly to the effect that it was German interference which led him to
act. In Sen. Doc. 887^ 56th Cong., 1st Sess., he says that the Spanish garrison
" WKS turned over to the Filipinos for safekeeping. . . . The prisoners had refused
to give parole, and there were no facilities at my command for their care. Agui-
naldo had promised that they should be treated humanely and according to the laws
of war." The report of Captain Coghlan upon the incident (there stated to be on
file in the Navy Department) has not been published. Various unauthorized ver-
sions of the affair appeared at the time in American periodicals, always in connection
with the question of Germany's attitude, hence presenting the matter from one
side only. A very g^ood account from the American standpoint of the whole trouble
between the Germans and the Americans was contained in a letter of July 18, 1898,
written from Cavite by Oscar King Davis {Harper's History, pp. 40-43). American
journalistic comment at the time was wholly commendatory of Dewey (see, e.g.^
The Outlook^ July 23, 1898), as the idea of German interference loomed large in
the American mind (see also Public Opinion^ June 30 and July 7, 1898, for press
comments before this incident). Just before sailing for the Philippines on July 29,
General Merritt wired to Washington: " In view of possibility of foreign interfer-
ence with my troops landing at the Philippines, I desire instructions as to how far,
in the opinion of the Government, force should be used to enforce our rights." He
was informed that the inquiry *' was not understood," and replied that it was made
" in view of the many reports that Germany was negotiating for control of the
Philippines," but was "perhaps not important." (Corr. Rel. War, pp. 710, 713.)
Spaniards viewed the 01ongap<) episode as a piece of barbarity on the part of the
Americans, in turning over to the insurgents of Sambales, where assassinations had
already occurred, Spanish prisoners (the majority of them non combatants) who
had surrendered not to the Filipinos, but to the American naval commander. For
the Spanish side of it, see Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp. 471-75.

218 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

prisoners should be properly treated. He had already reported
to Washington (in a cablegram of June 12) that the insur-
gents were treating their prisoners " most humanely," and he
seems to have been convinced that not only was this the case
with prisoners who were confined close to the insurgent head-
quarters in Cavite, but that Aguinaldo's injunctions on this
point would be obeyed in the more remote parts of the island.
A knowledge of the history of the events of the two preceding
years and of the bitterness excited by acts of retaliation and
of race hatred on both sides would have raised with him very
grave doubts on this point. The Spaniards assert that the
friars put on shore at Olongapd were hitched to carts and
made to do the work of karahaus, while Spanish civilians were
made to follow them and drive them along with whips, and
that all these prisoners were given but scant rations of rice
which had been wet in salt water.^ As a matter of fact, there
were some things about the treatment of the Spanish soldiers
under Aguinaldo's own eyes in Cavite which were not in ac-
cord with his decrees or his protestations of humanity to Ad-
miral Dewey. Except for their receiving scanty food, they
were not seriously mistreated, but were subjected to many
minor humiliations, doubly injurious to the proud spirit of the
Spaniard, whose own previous haughty attitude toward the
natives (the "Indians," as he was wont to call them) inevitably
stimulated the latter to retaliation under such unforeseen cir-
cumstances of power. Unfortunately, the record of the Fili-
pinos in their treatment of Spanish prisoners in some other
places is not so pleasant to contemplate.'^ Many of the prison-

^ Sastrdn, op. cit.y p. 474,

* Between 8000 and 10,000 prisoners, of all sorts and conditions and of both
sexes, fell into the hands of the insurgents during 1898, nearly all in Luzon. The
record of their treatment will receive discussion later on. Those in Cavite com-
plained mostly of the humiliation of being turned into servants of the native fam-
ilies upon whom they had formerly looked with contempt, of being made to work
on the roads and intrenchments in the hot sun, and of being underfed, unless they
had money concealed about their persons with which to bribe their captors. A
typical complaint of these prisoners is contained in a letter of the artillery lieuten-

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 219

ers in Cavite were transferred across the bay to Bulak^n late
in June, when American troops were expected to arrive. Others
were transferred after the arrival of General Merritt, in con-
sequence of endeavors made to issue American army rations
to them, which Aguinaldo seemed to resent.^ The first intima-
tion received at Washington that the insurgents were not
treating their prisoners as promised seems to have come to the
Government from the Vatican, which was solicitous for the
lives of the captured friars. In accordance with this intima-
tion, both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt were instructed
by cable on August 1 to prevent the friars being put to death,
if possible to do so.^

COOLNESS BETWEEN FILIPINOS AND AMERICANS — PREPARA-
TIONS FOR CAPTURE OF MANILA

General Anderson and the troops of the first expedition ar-
rived off Cavite on June 30. The Filipinos knew, probably
through Admiral Dewey, that these troops would want some
place along the Cavite shore. General Anderson called upon
Aguinaldo in company with Admiral Dewey the day after his
arrival ; and both this and a subsequent interview between the
same parties were most amicable.' Nevertheless, the changed
attitude of the insurgents toward the Americans, as soon as

ant who had commanded the guns of Point Sangley on May 1 (cited in Historia
Negrat por Capitan Verdades, p. 62).

^ For General Anderson's report of this incident, with his message to Agui-
naldo that, if the prisoners remained in Cavite, they must be fed, see Sen. Doc.
t98, 5Cth Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, p. 15. At that time, also, the Americans de-
manded from Aguinaldo the Spanish officers whom they had taken prisoners from
the gunboat Leite.

* The cable correspondence on this subject at the time is found in the Bureau
of Navigation^ p. 118, and in Corr. Rel. War^ p. 743. On July 31, Cardinal Ram-
polla cabled to Apostolic Delegate Martinelli at Washington that the vicar-apos-
tolic at Hongkong reported that the friars imprisoned at Cavite were in danger of
death and " the Holy Father wishes that you take steps at once to have the Gov-
ernment of the United States prevent this evil." The instructions to Dewey and
Merritt were identical in terms : " This should not be permitted, if you are in
position to prevent it."

■ Aguinaldo again (Resefia veridica) makes the claim that what amounted to
Authoritative promises that the United States would recognize Filipino independ*

f

220 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the latter became a land as well as a sea force in the Philip-
pines, was speedily made apparent. Two of Anderson's officers
were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo for passing from
the arsenal into the insurgent lines in Cavite. The American
forces were disembarked on July 2, and Aguinaldo was in-
vited to a Fourth of July celebration in Cavite, but did not
come, because the invitation was not extended to him officially
as President.^ The unfriendly attitude of himself and his fol-
lowers seems, more than anything else, to have been the occa-
sion for the first letter written to him by General Anderson on
July 4 ; for, after courteous phrases about the " friendly sen-
timents " of the American people " for the native people of
the Philippines," and about the desire to have them " cooper-
ate with us in military operations against Spain," the letter
comes to the point with a formal notice to Aguinaldo that
Anderson feels it necessary to take Cavite as a base of opera-
tions and hints that there must be no interference with his of-
ficers. Aguinaldo's reply was conciliatory and studiedly cour-
teous, and the next day Anderson wrote again, in rather
indefinite terms, about the desirability of an agreement in
advance as to the territory which the American troops should
occupy on shore, since they would move promptly against
** our common enemy." After that, except for several notes
virtually forming passports for American officers to go through
the insurgent lines and reconnoiter the country south of Ma-

ence were made to him by Dewey and ratified by Anderson in these interviews.
Fortunately, General Anderson has given us a somewhat detailed account of the
conversations, as he recalled them, in his article in the North American Review iov
February, 1900. In a letter to the Secretary of War in February, 1900, General
Anderson also categorically denied the statements of the Resena veridica, declaring
that, in answer to Aguinaldo's request for recognition, he answered that he " was
there simply in a military capacity, and could not acknowledge his [Aguinaldo's]
Government because he had no authority to do so." (See Sen. Doc. 208, part 5,
pp. 4-5.) Admiral Dewey says that he and General Anderson went in an informal
way, not wearing swords or full uniform. {Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2976.)

» North American Review, February, 1900, p. 276. In his official report, General
Anderson has also touched briefly upon the hostile attitude of the Filipinos at the
time of bis arrival {Report of Major-General Commanding Army, 1898, p. 54).

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 221

nila, Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo related to the
difficulties which seemed to be purposely put in the way of
the American army securing supplies or transportation from
the people, and it was more or less peremptory in tone. To
some extent, of course, the disposition of the natives of Cayite
not to comply with the Americans' demands for labor and to
conceal their means of transportation and their supplies was
due to their ignorance as to how they would be treated, their
doubt as to whether they would be paid, and their non-eager-
ness to work, as well as to the way in which the province had
been scourged by war under the Spaniards and to the fact
that the able-bodied population was already pretty effectually
commandeered by the insurgent organization. Doubtless, too,
the American quartermasters did not make proper allowance
for the strength of the " manana " habit and wanted things
done rather more quickly than immediately, as is the Ameri-
can way. But the hiding of the wheels of carts, the sending
of animals farther into the interior, and the exorbitant demand
for such services and supplies as were furnished, are not alto-
gether explained by these conditions. Admiral Dewey's naval
officers had a pretty good force of natives at work at the arse-
nal by this time, receiving double their former pay and better
treatment than ever before had been the case with them, and
having no disposition to leave the service of the Americans
and be commandeered by men of their own race ; they were
literally forced to give up a good portion of their pay in reg^
ular contributions to the insurgent treasury. General Ander-
son's communications of the latter part of July are virtually
threats to Aguinaldo that, if orders understood to have been
given by him were not countermanded and transportation fa-
cilities and men were not available at the points where the
Americans were encamped, the latter would " pass him and
make requisition directly on the people." Aguinaldo's reply
of July 24 is virtually an admission that he controlled the
attitude of his people in this respect.

S2S THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

General Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo has
been criticized in somewhat guarded terms by his own supe-
riors and by Admiral Dewey. He may derive satisfaction from
the knowledge that he was the first American officer to come
in contact with the revolutionary party who reported to Wash-
ington, without indefiniteness or ambiguities of any sort, that
what they wanted and expected was independence, and that
an attempt to set up an American Government in the Philip-
pines would very likely bring on a conflict with them. On July
9, he wrote a letter to the Adjutant-General of the army (re-
ceived in Washington on August 29) to the effect that Agui-
naldo, at first suspicious, was now friendly and " willing to
cooperate," but if, as seemed improbable, he could take Ma-
nila without American help, " he will, I apprehend, antagonize
any attempt on our part to establish a provisional govern-
ment." On July 18, he cabled, through the conduct of Ad-
miral Dewey : " Aguinaldo declares dictator and martial law
over all the islands. The people expect independence." The
same day he wrote to the Adjutant-General that " the estab-
lishment of a provisional government on our part will probably
bring us in conflict with the insurgents, now in active hostility
to Spain," and that, in spite of the friendly declarations of
the latter, they " in many ways obstruct our purposes and are
using every effort to take Manila without us." ^ Three days
later, he wrote again that he had let Aguinaldo know verbally
that he had only military authority and could not recognize
his assumption of civil authority, but that he had made no for-
mal protest against the declaration of dictatorship, this being
at Admiral Dewey's request, though he had written such a
protest.^

^ General Anderson had then read the instmctions of the President of May 19,
relative to establishing a provisional military government. This docimaent was
brought by General Greene, who arrived with the second expedition on July 16.

* On July 22, in a letter to Aguinaldo relative to the property of a wealthy Fil-
ipino half-caste of Cavite (which Aguinaldo claimed had been donated to the in-
surgent cause, and which he sought to recover from the Americans), Anderson did

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 223

General Anderson had been but three days in San Fran-
cisco between his arrival from Alaska and his departure with
the first expedition, but in those few days he had heard enough
of the discussion then going on in the United States about the
future policy toward the Philippines to have the query arise
in his mind as to what course of action the Government had
decided upon. His instructions before departure did not men-
tion the Filipinos. He was on arrival to confer fully with Ad-
miral Dewey and dispose his troops so as to have them under
the protection of the navy's guns. Hearty cooperation with
Dewey was enjoined, and it was stated that he was not de-
prived of the "fullest discretion" after such consultation, as
"he must be governed by events and circumstances of which
we can have no knowledge." He has said that he supposed
that, on arrival at Cavite, "all he had to do was to consult
Dewey," but the latter " had no more definite orders " than he
himself, and "matters were seriously complicated because he
had set Aguinaldo up in business."^

take the responsibilitj of putting it on record that he could not, without orders,
recognize Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority. Aguinaldo's reply was the
usual protest of friendliness, but conyeyed the warning that American troops
should not be disembarked without previous notice to him " in writing," stating,
" the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation " ; other-
wise he could not answer for what his people might do, because, " as no formal
agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might con-
sider the occupation of its territories by North Ajnerican troops as a violation of
its rights." (See Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 9-11.)

^ The Anderson-Ag^inaldo correspondence may be found in its most complete
form in Sen. Doc. 208, 66th Cong., Ist Sess., part 1, pp. 4-20, it being there made
up from the less complete records of it in Report of Major-General Commanding
Army, 1809, part 2 (same as part 4 of Report of War Department, 1899), pp. 335-
44, and in Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 390-99. All but an abstract of Aguinaldo's letter of
July 15 (transmitting to Anderson, at the same time as to Dewey, the decrees of
the new Revolutionary Government) seems to have been lost. (See Sen. Doc. 2^4*
56 Cong., 1st Sess.) Anderson's letters from Cavite to Washington are also found
in Sen. Doc. 208, and his cablegram of July 18 in Bureau of Navigation, p. 117.
His instructions before departure are summarized by him in his article in the Feb- ^
mary, 1900, number of the North American Review, and are quoted in full in a
letter written by him to the Chicago Record-Herald and published in its issue of
July 11, 1902. They are also given, in the form of a telegram to General Otis at
San Francisco, on p. 668 of Corr. Rel. War. Therein it appears that the stars,
which have been thought to point to significant omissions in Sen. Doc. 208 f from

224 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

General Greene and the troops of the second expedition ar-
rived in Manila Bay on July 16 and 17, and these troops were
within the week disembarked and encamped in one of the few
thicketless spots on the Cavite beach.^ General Greene brought
instructions to General Anderson, as senior officer, that if he
and Admiral Dewey wished to attack the city and were sure
of success, they might do so in advance of General Merritt's
arrival.^ It was decided that an attack by some 6000 men on
perhaps twice their number behind fortifications and in-
trenchments was hardly authorized by these instructions, even
though the fleet could speedily reduce the city walls. It was
not possible to invite the cooperation of the 10,000 to 15,000
insurgents intrenched about the city, because, in General An-
derson's words, "if Manila had been taken with his [Agui-
naldo's] cooperation, it would have been his capture as much
as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a
force, and it would therefore have been practically under Fili-
pino control."^ ^E

his letter of July 9, do not take the place of any other statements by him
with reference to the insurgents, but indicate long passages of criticism of the
transport service and the equipment, especially as regards clothing, of the first
expedition, in connection with his transmission of the reports of the commanding
officers of the regiments comprising this expedition. His letter of July 21, from
which passages are also omitted in the Senate document, is not given at all in
Corr. Rel. War. The preceding letters from him were all received at Washington
on August 29. Admiral Dewey's disapproval of Greneral Anderson's relations with
the insurgents is most plainly indicated in his testimony before the Senate Commit-
tee. (See Sen. Doc. S31, pp. 2976-80.) Dewey then said (p. 2937) that he had no
recollection of requesting Anderson not to make formal protest against Agui-
naldo's assumption of civil authority. He said, however, that " one's hindsight is
better than his foresight," and if he had it to do over, he would not have anything
to do with the insurgents. Similarly, General Anderson says, in the letter to the
Chicago Record-Herald (cited above), which was written in protest against some
of the statements in Admiral Dewey's testimony: "If I had known as much about
him [Aguinaldo] then as everybody seems to know now, I might have arrested
him then without correspondence."

^ This was called " Camp Dewey." Some preparation for the location of troops
there had been made before Greene's arrival, and Anderson had sent over from
Cavite a battalion of Californians. (Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, pp. 54-55, 61.)

* See General Greene's contribution to the Century Magadne, March, 1899,
p. 790.

3 North American Review, February, 1900, p. 275.

i

GERIVIANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 225

General Merritt, who arrived on July 25, evidently bore
instructions to avoid, as far as possible, all complications with
the insurgents. He himself remained on shipboard, but the
commanding officers on shore were in numerous instances ex-
plicitly instructed to keep as free as possible from the entan-
glements with the Filipinos who were investing Manila, while
at the same time pushing forward the preparations for the
capture of the city without their assistance.^ These prepara-
tions were considerably delayed by the insufficient equipment
of the first expeditions ; the troops disembarked under Greene
were poorly provided with shelter, and, because of the lack of
land transportation in their own possession (no wagons or
horses having been brought) and the difficulty of securing it
on shore, the problem of supplying them was no small one to
cope with. The rainy season had then begun, and the frequent
typhoons outside kept the bay stirred up, while only the hardi-
ness of the Western volunteers preserved their good temper and
enthusiasm in the daily drenchings they received on shore,
they having no change of clothing. The high surf running on
the shallow beach and the lack of available small boats, except

' In his official report, General Merritt says: ''As Aguinaldo did not visit me
on mj arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my
instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands
by the American land forces, and stated that ' the powers of the military occupant
are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of
the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with
the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially
as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my
authority, in the erent that his pretensions should clash with my designs." (Rept,
MaJ.-Gen. Comm.t 1898^ p. 40. This report also forms vol. iii of Message of the
President and Accompanying Documents^ 1898.) General Merritt here refers to his
formal instructions of May 19 (Sen. Doc. 208^ part 1, p. 85). In his testimony be-
fore the Peace Commission at Paris, he said : " It was part of my policy that we should
keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much ai possible, because we knew trouble
would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender." {Sen.
Doc. 62t p. 362.) And again (t6u/., p. 367) : "The whole correspondence [of General
Anderson] was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed
the whole thing after I arrived, because it was not the wish of the Government to
make promises to the insurgents or act in any way with them. Admiral Dewey
cabled to Washington the day after Merritt's arrival {Bureau of Navigation^ p. 118):
*' [Aguinaldo] has become aggreuive and even threatening."

226 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the cumbersome native lighters (the insurgents having most
of the launches, etc., that were not tied up inside the city on
the river banks or in the possession of foreigners of Manila
other than Spaniards), also made the landing of the 5000
troops arriving at the end of July a slow process.^ But the
chief problem from the outset was how to get the American
troops in position for a decisive attack on Manila without in
some manner joining with the insurgents or being compromised
by some sort of recognition of them. The Americans held a
comparatively small tract of land on the beach, but between
this position and the Spanish line of defense on the south,
terminating in the little old fort of San Antonio de Abad just
south of Malate, the insurgents had themselves well intrenched.
And from this point, running in an irregular line northeast
to the river, and from the river near San Juan del Monte
around the city on the north to the bay west of the Ton do
district, their besieging line was fairly complete, and they had
the country pretty thoroughly dug up with trenches, in
some places approaching to within two hundred yards or so of
the line of Spanish blockhouses. Sharp little engagements of
no consequence occurred along these lines now and then,

^ The brigade under General MacArthnr, which had arrived on July 31, could
not all be landed until August 9. The criticisms of General Anderson and his regi-
mental commanders on the equipment and transportation of the first expedition
have been cited above. For the criticisms of a naval officer on the second and sub-
sequent expeditions (only the first being under the more or less direct supervision
of naval officers) see Bureau of Navigation, pp. 137-41. The Springfield Republican
of September 30, 1898, raised the query why the China was kept waiting in Manila
Bay for forty days at the expense of 81500 per day to the Government. General
Anderson, however, says that he retained the Sydney and Australia (which he had
been charged to send back as soon as possible) at Admiral Dewey's advice (letter
of July 14, Corr. Rel. War, p. 780), as it might have been desirable to transport
his troops to some other point in Luzon if the second Spanish fleet came to Manila;
also (letter of July 9, ibid., p. 778) that he was advised by Dewey, on the above
account, not to land anything at first but absolutely necessary supplies and impedi-
menta. Admiral Dewey cabled on July 17 that he retained the China and Peking
as auxiliaries, in view of tlie rumors about C^mara's fleet being en route to Manila.
General Greene {Century Magazine, March, 1899) very vigorously defends the
records made in equipping the first expeditions, and says that the troops encamped
outside of Manila were made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances.

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 227

mostly early in the morning or after nightfall; but there had
been nothing like a general engagement inaugurated on the
part of the insurgents, nor any evidence that they could drive
in the Spanish outposts, defended by artillery, at any point,
though the bullets might rattle about the roofs in Malate at
intervals. Supplies in Manila were commanding four times the
usual price, and horse meat had come to take the place of the
tough flesh of the karabau; but the inhabitants were never
in a desperate condition, or anything like it, as regards food,
in part because of the provisions of the governing authorities
with regard to the storing and sale of supplies, but principally
because the Germans had supplied them with flour at several
critical times, and because the insurgents' cordon was easily
penetrated by bribery, and supplies were easily brought in
from up the river and elsewhere.* The Spaniards within suf-
fered principally from the barometric alternations of their
changeful dispositions, now being raised to the heavens of op-
timism by the latest tale of European intervention (to be in-
augurated by the naval forces of Germany and France in the
harbor), by word that Admiral C^mara would soon arrive and
sweep the Americans off the seas, or by a fully detailed cable-
gram announcing the destruction of the American fleet off
Santiago de Cuba; and, again, they were cast into the pessi-
mism of despair by new rumors of a bombardment, or tales
of an uprising in the city and the sacking and massacre to
coincide with the entry of the insurgents from outside.

One of the Spanish delusions, which was rather more than

^ On June 27, the insurgents gained possession of the pamping-pl&nt of the citj
water-tupplj, up the Marikina River. The Spaniards, however, retained the reser-
voir, near the city; and by allowing the water to run from it but three hours a day,
and utilizing the rain water then falling so abundantly, the inhabitants were never
in straits for water. The appeal to the insurgent commander Montenegro in the
name of humanity, to let the pumping-plant continue its operations, was answered
by him with a refusal to do so and a demand upon the Spaniards to surrender the
etty to the insurgents and thus avert the 8u£Fering they feared (Sastrdn, op. cit.,
p. 471). Most of the red wine in the city was embargoed for the rations of the
•oldiert in the trenches. Chickens rote to a price of four pesos each.

228 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

a delusion, gave the Americans themselves no little concern,
and had something to do with the postponement of the capture
of the city. The Spanish squadron under Admiral Camara,
which, it was rumored, both in the United States and Manila,
had started for the Orient about the middle of May, did leave
Spain's coasts a month or so later, and on July 5 passed the
Suez Canal. The three torpedo-boat destroyers with it were
there turned back, supposedly that the fleet might make speed.
The battleship Pelayo, protected cruiser Carlos V, three cruis-
ers, and three transports with several thousand troops were,
for several weeks thereafter, expected by Admiral Dewey, with
some anxiety, since the Pelayo was so much more powerful a
vessel than any that he had. Inasmuch as it seemed quite cer-
tain that this squadron would arrive at Manila before either
of the slow-steaming monitors Monterey and Monadnock, which
had been started from the Pacific Coast in June to add their
powerful guns and protective armor to Dewey's force, could
reach there, the latter considered various plans, it being finally
decided that he would leave the close waters of Manila Bay,
and, after uniting with the monitors, meet the Spaniards in
the open waters, or else would await them inside the landlocked
entrance of Subig Bay, while the American troops would either
be transported to the northern end of the railroad at Dagupan
/I or would strike inland with their thirty days' supplies. But the
^^^ Spaniards did not come, and on August 4 the Monterey ar-
rived, settling for once and all Dewey's apprehensions as to
what he would do for defense against the rumored squadron ;
also as to the damage which might be done to his ships, in an
attack on the city, by the few powerful modern guns on the
Luneta.^

^ The cablegrams which passed back and forth between Dewey and the Navy
Department in May, June, and July, on the subject of the Spanish relief squadron,
may be found in Bureau of Navigation, pp. 97-118. On May 20, Dewey said, if it
came, his squadron " would attempt to give a good account of itself." In June,
when the strength of the Spanish reinforcements was known more in detail, and
after the American admiral had begun to entertain suspicions of the future pur>

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 229

It had been decided to make the attack on Manila from the
south side and along the beach, where the navy could cooper-
ate, and the chief problem was to get hold of the trenches
held by the Filipinos between the American camp and the
Spanish outer line. General Merritt instructed General Greene
to endeavor by informal conference to secure these positions
peaceably; if he could not, he was authorized, as a last ex-
treme, to use force, as it was absolutely necessary to have this
foothold for an attack. With the authority of Aguinaldo, the
insurgent commander at this point moved out his troops, and
the Americans moved in quietly on July 29, at once construct-
ing new intrenchments a Httle in front of the old line. Subse-
quently, insurgent positions extending farther to the eastward
and inland were also yielded to the Americans, Aguinaldo
stipulating only that formal requests in writing be sent to him.*

poses of the German fleet facing him, he suggested (June 25) that an American
fleet be sent to threaten the coast of Spain. This had already been amiouuced as
the intention of the Washington Grovernraent. (For American press comment on
this incident of the war, see Public Opinion^ July 7, 1898.) The official reports of
Generals Merritt and Greene both bring out the delay that was occasioned by
waiting for the Monterey. This was due, after Merritt's arrival, to Dewey's desire
to have the monitor's heavier guns to cope with the Luneta battery, if the city re-
sisted; he had heard, on July 22, of Ciimara's fleet having turned back. A letter
of Merritt of July 26 (Corr. Rel. Watt p. 781) brings out very plainly Dewey's
attitude at the time, as does Anderson's letter of July 14 (tfeirf., p. 780). See also
Anderson's and Greene's magazine contributions, already cited. It has never been
made clear why the Spanish ships did not continue on their course ; whether the
threat to send an American fleet to the coasts of Spain caused their recall, whether
their start was merely intended to frighten the Americans and prevent the fall of
Manila until the inevitable truce was sued for, whether it was a false move of the
latter sort but designed principally to relieve the Ministry from charges that
might be made of abandoning Manila to its fate, or simply that Cdmara's " nerve
did not hold out " (as General Greene hints). The probabilities are that the Pelayo
and Carlos V — boats hastily completed after the beginning of the war — were
not in fit condition to fight.

^ The formal request of General Anderson of August 10 for the trenches facing
Blockhouse 14, and Aguinaldo's reply consenting to this, are cited in Sen. Doc.
t08t part 1, p. 17. The letter of General Greene to General Noriel, making the
first request of this sort on July 29, is to be found on p. 8 of Telegraphic Corrt'
spondence of E. Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899 (War Department,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, 19(X3). That force was authorized, if necessary, to get
the firat trenches, was the testimony of General Merritt at Paris (Sen. Doc. 62,
pp. 3C3 and 367). The article of General Greene in the Century Magazine^ April,

k

280 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

It was at this time that the insurgents were putting forth
their first formal appeal for recognition by foreign powers.^
There were at the time various instances of friction between
the two attacking armies. The American Signal Corps, striving
to meet the imperative demands made upon it to prepare a sys-
tem of communication not only between the land forces at
Cavite and those around the beach about Manila, but also be-
tween the sea and shore forces which were to cooperate in the
attack, all with very scanty means of transportation, clashed
more or less with Filipino detachments in places where it oper-
ated, and also with Aguinaldo himself; the peremptory fashion
in which the Americans assumed possession of municipal build-
ings, etc., and their way of cutting in on the wires of the in-
surgent organization and temporarily disrupting its system of

1899, shows, however, that it was distinctly forbidden by General Merritt to nse
force in securing the trenches farther inland which Mac Arthur's troops occupied
after August 9 (as before by the consent of Aguinaldo, through Noriel). Mac-
Arthur and Greene had proposed a plan of attack on the city, based on securing
the insurgent trenches, " by removing the insurgents " if necessary, in a memo-
randum of August 9, and Merritt's reply on August 10 was specific : " No rupture with
insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for per-
mission to occupy their trenches, but if refused, not to use force." (Rept. MaJ."
Gen. Comm.t 1898 , pp. 72-73; also Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, p. 14.)

1 See Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 438-39 ; also Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 99-101. Certain
municipal presidents, elected under the decrees of June 18 and 20, met at Cavite
on August 1, to receive from Aguinaldo, as provided in those decrees, his approval
of their election, without which they could not take office. Immediately thereafter
they proceeded to " recognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as
President of the Revolutionary Government," and the validity of his decrees, and
to " proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the
Philippines." This was Mabini's project, that independence might appear to be
declared by a representative assembly of Filipinos. These men, were, however,
only a handful of village presidents from various towns in Cavite and Batangas,
with perhaps a few from the north side of the bay, all of whom had been carefully
selected in advance by Aguinaldo and his immediate followers. The proclamation
of August 6, accondpanying this document, was Aguinaldo's formal request to for-
eign powers for recognition, " since they are the means designated by Providence
to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining
the strong." It contains exaggerations in the statements that the insurgents then
had 9000 prisoners and 30,000 troops " in the form of a regular army." It declared
that " the revolution now rules " in the Tagalog provinces and in Pampanga,
Tarlak, Pang^sinan, Uni6n, and Sambales, a statement which was in a sense cor-
rect, though most of these provinces had as yet no civil organization.

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST 231

communication, injured the dignity of the Filipinos, besides ^
jarring their leisureliness.^ Also, the Spaniards feared a bom-
bardment of the city by the war- vessels, there was also some
feeling about the Americans' efforts to restrain the Filipinos
from doing their customary firing nights and mornings and
thus running the risk of prematurely bringing on a more or
less general engagement, besides wasting lives uselessly.'^

The Spaniards had not noticed, or at least had not given
any attention to, the presence of the Americans in front of
their trenches until the night of July 31- August 1, when, for
a time after midnight and also after dawn, they opened with ar-
tillery and infantry a very vigorous fire against the American
positions, on the first occasion also attempting to advance and
drive the latter out of the trenches. Ten men were killed and
43 wounded on the American side. There were a score more of
casualties in similar but lesser engagements (merely picket-
firing) during the next four days. Finally, the Monterey having
arrived, the Spaniards were notified that bombardment might
begin at any time after forty-eight hours, or sooner, if they
indulged in further hostilities. From the time of this notice,
on August 7, no shots were exchanged between the Ameri-
cans and Spaniards until the advance was made on the city.^

* See Sen. Doc. 208y part 1, p. 14, for Agtiinaldo's complaint to General Ander-
son about this. The reports of the American signal service officers (Kept. Maj."
Gen. Comm., 1808, pp. 127-36) also confirm quite fully what he says. See also Tel,
Corr. AgiUnaldo, pp. 8-9.

■ The claim of Aguinaldo (Resefia verxdicd) that Noriel's troops one night came
to the assistance of the Americans and repulsed the Spaniards, who had left their
trenches and driven in the American outposts by a sudden attack, and that the
Filipinos thus saved six cannon which the Americans had been compelled to aban-
don, has been categorically denied by Generals Anderson, Greene, and MaoArthur
and the colonels of the American regiments engaged {Sen. Doc. SOS, part 5, and
Sen* Doc. SSI, p. 1902). Richard Brinsley Sheridan, " barrister-at-law," who calls
himself an *• eyewitness " of American aggreMion against the Filipinos, makes some-
thing of this incident in his book. The Filipino Martyrs (New York, 1900), p. 63 ;
but this book is of no service in getting at the real history of affairs. The account
of this episode by Foreman, op. cit., p. 615, is wholly erroneous; there was no
soch engagement as he relates on August 12.

* See General Greene's o£Bcial report and magazine article, already cited.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAPTURE OF MANILA BY "THREAT"

Admiral Dewey had not only been waiting for the arrival
of the monitor, but also was hopeful that negotiations then
being carried on between him and the Spanish authorities in
Manila would result in the surrender of the city without blood-
shed. It had been apparent, even to the Spaniards, that they
were really at the mercy of Dewey's guns at any time after
May 1 when he might choose to direct them upon the city.
The foreigners who had property in the business section of
Manila were naturally very anxious that there should be no use-
less bombardment of the city. It was through the English and
Belgian consuls (the latter a business man in Manila) that the
proposal to arrange for a peaceful surrender of the city first
came to Dewey ; and it was through the Belgian that a quasi-
agreement was finally reached in August, an agreement which
more than gives color to the claim that Manila was really
surrendered and not captured. However, the obstacle which
prevented Consul Andre from securing the consent of the
Spanish governor-general to surrender without further fighting
(namely, the fact that, under the Spanish military code, the
capitulation of a fortified town, unless it can be shown that all
means of defense have been employed, involves court-martial
and liability to severe penalties) made it impossible for any
definite agreement to be conveyed by the consul to Admiral
Dewey, other than that, after a certain amount of resistance
had been offered, the walled city would capitulate under a
white flag, provided it was not previously bombarded. In other
words, " Spanish honor," as incorporated in the Spanish mili-
tary law, required on this occasion that a number of Spanish
lives should be uselessly sacrificed on the outer lines (where

i

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 233

the soldiers fought bravely for a time, in ignorance, except
for a few superior of&cers, of the surrender previously agreed
upon in their rear) before the inevitable verdict of stern neces-
sity could be accepted. The other side of the picture presents
also the loss of four American lives ; but it is to be remembered
that, although General Merrittwas cognizant of the negotiations
conducted by Dewey through Consul Andr^, he did not think
the Spaniards in authority were dealing in good faith, and
that on the part of the American troops on shore, the attack on
the city was planned and carried out in good faith as a bona-
fide attack. The net result for the Americans was that the
stipulated yielding of the Spaniards after a show of resistance
had been made saved some hundreds of lives, which would
have been lost had the resistance been real and been prolonged
as it might have been. All this, however, makes talk of the
" capture by assault " of Manila seem rather bombastic. The
decisive factor in the situation throughout was the guns of the
navy.

The verbal negotiations between Admiral Dewey and the
governor-general, which had been conducted through the Bel-
gian consul in a desultory fashion for two weeks, came to a
head very quickly after Dewey and Merritt joined, on August 7,
in the formal notice of bombardment at any time after forty-
eight hours had passed. To the intimation that he remove non-
combatants from the city, the governor-general replied that it
was impossible to do this, he being " surrounded by insurrec-
tionary forces." On August 9, when the forty-eight hours were
about to expire, the vessels of the foreign fleets withdrew
from in front of Manila, and private launches brought away
from the city members of the foreign colonies.^ Then Dewey

^ The condition inside the city is deioribed bj Sastr<5n (op. eit.t pp. 490-96).
The people crowded into the churches and conrents, where supplies had been col-
lected, even brinfi^ing their household treasures and furniture also, until the fi^v-
•mor-general ordered this stopped. He forbade all carriage traffic in the walled city,
and only two gates were left open. His own headquarters were transferred to the
Angnsttnian monastery, which was very strongly built of stone. Places of shelter
eUwe under the walls and in earihqnalu ruins near by were Msigned to the aged

284 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

and Merritt joined in a formal demand upon the governor-
general to surrender the city and avert sacrifice of life.
He replied that he was without authority to do this, but would
communicate the situation and their demand to his Govern-
ment, if given time to send to Hongkong and get an answer
by cable. This request the American commanders refused on
the following day. So much for the formal intercourse between
American and Spanish headquarters, which was conducted
through the British consul in Manila.^ The Belgian consul now
brought almost to a head the somewhat vague and indefinite
proposals which he had been extracting, bit by bit, from the
Spanish superior authority in the city. The incident can be fully
appreciated only in the light of the change in administration
which at that moment took place in Manila, by order of Ma-
drid. Toward the close of July, it had become definitely known
in Manila that the Spanish fleet had been disastrously defeated
off the coast of Cuba, and, what was more immediately im-
portant to them, that Admiral C^mara and his long-expected
relief squadron had repassed the Suez Canal. Thereupon,
Governor-General Augustin sent a long cablegram to his Gov-
ernment explaining the difficulties of his situation, stating that
the American forces were steadily being increased, and closing
by declaring that he " declined the responsibility of the situ-
ation " produced by the return of the relief squadron and that
there was " no possibility of resisting unless they had assist-
ance." The reply from Madrid was an order to Augustin to
turn over his office to the second in command, General Fermin
Jaudenes, with virtual instructions to the latter to "preserve
the Philippines to the sovereignty of Spain." This was received

and sick and to women and children. This crowding of the principal Spanish people
into the places which would most quickly suffer bombardment, if bombardment
there was, indicates that the Spaniards expected to yield without it, and also shows
that their chief fear was that the Tagalogs would enter the parts of the city out-
side of the walls.

1 This formal correspondence may be found in Admiral Dewey's report of
August 16 (Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 120-22) and in General Merritt's report of
August 31 (Rept. MaJ.-Oen. Comm.y 1898 , pp. 46-48).

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 235

at Manila on August 3 or 4, there being received at the same
time with it a telegram from Premier Sagasta of earlier date
commending Augustin's efforts and stating that he must
hold out at all hazards, as peace negotiations were being hur-
ried forward.^ On August 5, Jaudenes assumed command, with
the inevitable " allocution." Quite naturally, the news received
from Spain of peace negotiations being under way, and the
instructions he had received to hold out at all costs, interposed
a new obstacle to the hopes that had been entertained of a
peaceful surrender. However, the facts that faced the Spaniards,
particularly in the shape of a fleet which could readily reduce
their works and cause great destruction of life and property,
were as stubborn as ever ; hence, the endeavor to gain time, in
response to the demand of August 9 for surrender. According
to the notes kept by Consul Andr^ the chief concern of Au-
gustin, who had, before August 3, almost consented to a mere
show of resistance, was as to whether the Americans would
allow the Tagalogs to enter and sack the city, and possibly
massacre its Spanish inhabitants."

Upon Dewey's authority, Andr^ had been able to reassure
the Spaniard on this point. He now found that this was his
strongest card to play with Jaudenes in getting the latter to
promise that the Luneta guns would not be fired at the Amer-
ican ships, which was the condition stipulated by Dewey for
refraining from bombarding the city. According to Andr^
himself, he, on August 9, on his own responsibihty, virtually
threatened Jaudenes that the Americans would permit the

> Data regarding the substitntion of Jandenes for Augnstin will be found in Saa-
tr<5n, op, cit.f pp. 478-79 and 485-86, and in McClure's Magazine for June, 1899,
wherein Oscar King Davin giyes a very full abstract of the diarj kept by Consul
Andr^. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile with this episode the dates assigned in
these two sources to the cablegrams, but the fact that Angustin's pessimistic mes-
sage of late July is what caused his dismissal is Tery well established by current
Spanish comment.

* On July 29, Dewey cabled to Washington that he had reliable information
that Manila would be surrendered to the Americana *' if it were not for the insur-
gent complication " {Bureau of Navigation, p. 118).

236 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Tagalogs to enter and do as they pleased when the city was
taken. The threat worked so effectively that Jaudenes at once
submitted to a council of war the question whether they should
surrender or should make a show of resistance to the Ameri-
cans.^ The formal reply given after this meeting to Andre (at
the same time that Dewey was asked to permit communication
with Madrid) was that the Spaniards must " defend their
honor" and make the most of their resources; but after that
and subsequent conferences, he was allowed to convey to
Dewey rather indefinite promises to the effect that the Luneta
guns would not be fired " if he did not come too close " ; that
the resistance on the outer line of defense would not be pro-
longed if the Spaniards had sufficient chance to withdraw after
the fleet had shelled the fort and their trenches on the south ;
and that a white flag would be displayed on the city wall
when the Americans could come in to conduct the capitula-
tion. The Spaniards wanted definite assurances that the insur-
gents would be kept out, and that they would be given honor-

^ The best account of the discussion of this question in Spanish official circles
in Manila is contained on pp. 14-24 of Defensa obligada (Madrid, 1904), a pam-
phlet by Archbishop Nozaleda containing answers to the charges against himself,
quoting quite fully from the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Authorities
on August 8 and from the records of the later courts-martial in Spain, which tried
Jaudenes, Tejeiro, and others for surrendering Manila. We find the civilians of
the Board of Authorities, including the archbishop, practically advising surrender,
as being the wish of the inhabitants, with the exception of the chief judge of the
Audiencia, who thought the Government's cablegrams required resistance to the
last. A touch of Spanish character is found in the statement of the governor of
Manila province, who, as a civil officer, reported that the people thought resist-
ance to the last could be of no practical use, but who declined to speak for a sur-
render " in his capacity as a military officer." This meeting of civilians was a
mere formality, calculated to put it on record that the inhabitants urged surrender
upon the military authorities, thus protecting the latter in the inevitable trial they
would have to face. The meeting on August 9 was that of the " military council
of defense." According to Nozaleda, seven officers voted for conducting negotia-
tions for an honorable capitulation and seven for resistance " until the outer line
should be broken ," and it is said that Jaudenes settled the tie in favor of the latter
procedure. See also Sastrdn (op. cit., p. 495) ; he says it was also put on record
that " military honor is already completely satisfied by the hundred combats so
brilliantly sustained during the blockade and siege." The account of this meeting
in Historia Negra, p. 98, differs somewhat from that of Nozaleda, but is there based
upon rumors outside.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 237

able terms of surrender ; but they received no more decisive
pledges on these matters than they had themselves given on
their part. The whole matter, then, hung on contingencies ;
but the Americans were reasonably well assured in advance
that they would have an easy victory.^

Aside from the communications through Andr^, somewhat
similar messages had probably been exchanged through the
British consul and through an American chaplain, a Roman
Catholic priest,^ who entered Manila some four or five days
before the capture of the city and had interviews with Arch-
bishop Nozaleda and with the Chief of Staff, Tejeiro, who was
really the power behind the throne both under Augustin and
Jaudenes, and was at the same time in command of the Span-
ish troops.

^ The chief source of authority on this dramatic affair is the diarj of Consul
Andrtf, already cited (McClure*s Magazine, June, 1899). Consul Andre's part in
the affair there assumes an exaggerated importance, in view of the failure of the
other principal actors to state their share in it as minutely as he has done. Ad-
miral Dewey touched briefly, but unsatisfactorily, upon it in his testimony before
the Senate Committee (Sen, Doc. 331, pp. 2929, 2943-47, 2961), saying that " it
was a part of the history which he was reserving to write for himself." His testi-
mony left room for the inference that the part of the army in the capture of Manila
was a sort of op^ra-bouffe role; and it was in protest against this inference that
General Anderson wrote his letter in the Chicago Record-Herald of July 11, 1902,
wherein he points out very plainly that, if any such definite agreement had been
made, it would have implied that " American soldiers were to be sacrificed for the
honor of Spain." Admiral Dewey feels sure (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2927-28) that the
Spanish governor-general was ready to surrender the city to him in this same
fashion at any time in May, and that at various times he desired to surrender to
the navy ; this is hardly possible, in view of the Spanish military code, and it must
be assumed that the communications of the consuls were misunderstood by Dewey.
In Century Magazine, April, 1899, John T. McCutcheon gives further data on the
matter, mostly confirmatory of the proceeding. The magazine contributions of
Generals Anderson and Greene, already very frequently cited, make it plain that
the army's attack was bona fide, regardless of the knowledge, by some at least of
the general officers, that a quasi-agreement with the Spanish authorities had been
reached. General MacArthur says (Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 1407) that he knew nothing
about a prearranged surrender. General Whittier testified at Paris (Sen. Doc. G^,
p. 391) to a full knowledge; he was on General Merritt's staff and was one of the
commissioners to arrange the capitulation.

* This chaplain was Father William D. McKinnon, serving at the time with the
First California, who afterward was made a regular army chaplain, and, under
detail in Manila, served for a long time as a medium of communication between

238 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The American troops had been organized by an order of
General Merritt on August 1 into the " Second Division of
the Eighth Army Corps," under command of General Ander-
son, composed of two brigades under command respectively
of Generals MacArthur and Greene. The navy was all ready
for the attack on August 9; but, besides the pending negotia-
tions with the Spanish authorities, delay seems to have been
caused by General Merritt's request that the attack be made
on Saturday, August 13, when the tide in the estuaries be-
tween the American forces and the Spanish trenches and Fort
Antonio de Abad would be most favorable for fording. Mean-

the Spanish archbishop and the American military occupants. He also first reor-
ganized the Manila schools under General Otis. He died in Manila in 1902, in the
midst of his labors in behalf of cholera victims. The only mention by any Amer-
ican of his mission to the city in early August of 1898 appears to be in General
Anderson's letter to the Chicago Record-Herald of July 11, 1902, wherein the latter
says that the chaplain reported that the Spaniards " would not surrender without
a fight." It is altogether possible that this visit had something to do with a prop^
osition to transport to Hongkong the friars then concentrated in the monasteries
of the walled city, thus removing a possible source of embarrassment between
Americans and Filipinos; the friars, it appears, were at that time anxious to leave.
(See cablegrams of Dewey and Consul Williams, Bureau of Navigation, p. 126;
Washington's permission to carry out the plan with army transports, Corr. Rel. War,
p. 782; also Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 11, for a rumor of the plan.) In his Defensa
obligada, pp. 10-14, Archbishop Nozaleda describes his meeting with McKinnon,
and says the latter came merely to present to him a letter in Latin from the Arch-
bishop of California, which served as a basis for his request for authority to exer-
cise his ministrations on land, within the jurisdiction of Nozaleda, and that they
did not discuss the question of a surrender. In his Historia Negra (pp. 21,97-98),
"Captain Verdades " (who was Juan de Urquia, a Spanish volunteer officer in
Manila) makes much mystery of this incident. This book, already cited several
times, is of value chiefly as showing the sort of semi-libelous attacks that were
made in the Spanish newspapers of 1898 and 1899 on all who had had any part in
the loss of the Philippines to Spain. There was plenty of room for charges of in-
competence, and probably no little foundation for the insinuations of official scan-
dals at the time. But Spanish public criticism is scarcely ever either temperate or
well-reasoned, and the attitude of the Spanish officers who surrendered Manila
was sufficiently quixotic without their being pilloried for not preventing the inev-
itable. The attacks on Archbishop Nozaleda in early 1904 (in connection with his
nomination to the archbishopric of Valladolid) would have been much more to the
point if, instead of accusing him of urging the surrender of Manila, or of there-
after being polite to the Americans, they had been devoted to showing how his
bitter pursuit of Josd Rizal in 1896 played a leading part in bringing about the
downfall of Spain in the Philippines.

' CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 239

while, the ground was thoroughly reconnoitered by various
daring American officers and privates.^ On August 12, Gen-
eral Anderson prepared the formal plan of attack for the
8500 troops who were in position in the two brigades south of
Manila. Merritt himself did not come on shore, but kept his
headquarters on the navy transport Zafiro, from which he
could watch the operations and move promptly into the city
when the time should come. His instructions to his forces on
shore were sent over on the night before the attack, in the
form of a "memorandum for general officers in camp regard-
ing the possible action of Saturday, August 13," and the next
morning his adjutant landed with precise instructions as to
the posting of troops in the various parts of the city after it
was entered. The wording of these instructions makes it evi-
dent that the chief thought in mind was not merely the ordi-
nary policing of a city whose capture was regarded as a fore-
gone conclusion, but was the keeping of the insurgents out.
General Merritt sent a signal officer ashore in the surf late at
night on the 12th, with instructions to General Anderson to
let Aguinaldo know that his troops must not enter the city,
and the following message was accordingly sent to the latter:
"Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission
of the American commander. On this side of the Pasig River
you will be under our fire." ^

^ The most notable reconnoissance, made by Major James Franklin Bell, an
engineer officer, on August 10, revealed that the estuary was easily fordable at
certain points, and delay on that account was unnecessary. Major Bell and Lieu-
tenant Means, of Colorado, crawled and swam to within one hundred and fifty
yards of the Spaniards on the walls of the fort, after being discovered. An ac-
count of this exploit is given in Harper't History^ pp. 80-81 ; the official account,
in Rept. Maj.'Gen. C<mm.,1898t pp. 124-26. Under Colonel Irving Hale, the
Colorado troops cut Spanish wire entanglements dose to the enemy's intrenoh-
ments the night before the attack.

* This telegram seems to be on record only in the Buencamino document here-
tofore cited (Cong. Record. 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6181). The memorandum of
Merritt to the general officers and the verbal instructions of Adjutant-General
Baboook are in Rept. Maj.-Oen. Comm., 1S98, pp. 82-83. The instructions to
MacArthnr were, if he could move forward rapidly enough to the eastward, " to
permit no armed bodies other than American troope to erose the irenchei in the

240 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The morning of August 13 was misty and cloudy, hamper-
ing signal communication between the vessels and the shore.
At nine o'clock the Olympia led most of the fleet into position
off the fort below Malate. The Monterey, however, steamed
in as close as the shallow water would permit in front of the
walled city, and trained her guns on the Luneta battery ; while
the Concord took position off the mouth of the Pasig, ready to
open on the battery there or to meet any movement to escape
on the part of the vessels in the river. The Olympia opened fire
on Fort Antonio at half past nine, followed by the Raleigh and
Petrel and the little captured gunboat Callao. The navy fire,
which continued more or less spasmodically during an hour,
did no great damage to the Spanish fort or other works, and
probably was not meant to do so.^ The guns of the Utah ar-
tillery, firing from a thousand yards on land, raked the para-
pet of the crumbling old fort, and finally a shell from one of
the vessels exploded its magazine ; but this was all wasted am-
munition, for the fort never fired in return, and was abandoned
almost at the first shot, in accordance with the plans which

direction of Manila." Greene, who was to proceed through Malate and Ermita,
was to place a guard at the Spauish trenches near the bay for the same purpose.
While " forcible encounters with the insurgents " were to be " very carefully
guarded against," yet " pillage, rapine, or violence " must be prevented at any
cost. The memorandum signed by Merritt stated that, even though the navy
might be delayed in destroying the enemy's works, no advance should be made
unless ordered by headquarters. " In the event of a white flag being displayed by
the enemy on the angle of the city wall," its meaning would be surrender, and the
troops should advance quietly and in good order. Finally: " It is intended that
these results shall be accomplished without the loss of life." This memorandum
was modified by verbal instructions to Greene in the morning that he might ad-
vance a regiment ou the Spanish position as soon as the navy shells had made any
effect, without waiting for the signal of surrender. The formal orders organizing
the army and providing for the attack will be found in ibid., pp. 59-60, 73-74.

1 Oscar King Davis says (McClure^s Magazine, June, 1899, p. 183) that the range
with which the Raleigh gunners were set to work was officially given as 7000
yards, but a gun-captain soon found it to be actually 1700 yards. Sastrdn (op. cit.t
p. 499) says the projectiles fell thickly about Santa Ana, three miles inland from
the fort. General Greene noted the inaccuracy of the fire, but charged it to the
clouds and mists (Century Magazine, April, 1899, p. 926). John T. McCutchcon,
on board the Olympia, makes the same comment as to the failure to do much
damage to the fort (ibid.f p. 940).

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 241

General Tejeiro had secretly promulgated for a retreat. The
Spaniards had, however, expected to make their retreat an
orderly and, of course, a "dignified" performance, the troops
of the entire line south of the Pasig to be withdrawn so as to
come simultaneously upon a " second line," close in toward the
walled city, into which, with or without resistance as might be
ordered, they could then all be withdrawn.^ Various circum-
stances combined to interfere with this programme of outward
show : among them, the withdrawal of the Spanish right more
rapidly than had been expected, under the Utah artillery fire and
the advance of the Colorado infantry ; the raising of the red
flag on the fort somewhat earlier, therefore, than the troops far-
ther inland were expecting it, while they had become occupied
also quite vigorously with MacArthur's brigade in front of
Singalong and with the insurgents at Santa Ana; the fact
also that the Spanish plans of retreat had been confided to but
a few of the general officers, and one or two of them were
incensed and quite ready to take some comfort out of a short-
lived resistance to the Americans.

Acting under his modified instructions. General Greene had
started the Colorado volunteers forward upon the Spanish
position about three quarters of an hour after the bombard-
ment began, and the navy was then signaled to cease firing.
The Colorado troops went gayly to the attack, rapidly fording
the estuary, rushing into the old fort from behind, raising the
American flag over it, and then starting to follow up the Span-
iards who were withdrawing into Malate.^ Opposition, how-

^ For a r^sum^ of the scattered items of information on this morning's eventSy
M gleaned from Spanish officials' reports, tee Sastr6n, op. cit.^ pp. 497-503.

* The flag waa raised over the fort by Lieatenant-Colonel H. B. McCoj. One
of the most amasing incidents of the siege and capture of Manila was the way in
which the Colorado regimental band followed at the heels of its advancing fellows,
•plashing through the ford, the muddy marshes, and along the beach, to the tune
of "There '11 Be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night." Says the correspondent
John Bass, who was with the Colorado advance, and had taken refuge with it in
the Spanish trenches when firing from the right began : " Suddenly we heard the
•onnd of martial music, and what was our aKtonishment to see the Colorado band
eome around the comer of the fort, the fat bandmaster blowing his comet with

242 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHH^IPPINES

ever, had developed from the Spanish trenches on the right,
and bullets also came from the Spaniards who had retreated
into Malate ; one man was killed while raising a flag over a
house, and several were wounded. But the Eighteenth In-
fantry and Third Artillery had been ordered forward against
the trenches on the right near the beach, and their occupants
were speedily in full retreat. At the same time. General Mac-
Arthur's brigade farther eastward had begun its advance, the
Astor and one of the Utah batteries dragging their guns along
by hand, after they had driven the Spaniards out of the block-
houses on that part of the line. The resistance for Greene's
brigade, such as there was, was all over. The troops held in
reserve came along up the beach ; the Nebraskans marched in
toward the walled city on the sand, the gunboat Callao guard-
ing them ; the California and Colorado troops were reformed
in the streets of Malate and, together with the Eighteenth
Infantry, proceeded slowly through that suburb and Ermita,
toward the open space between the latter and the walled
town; while along the two parallel streets of the suburbs
the Third Artillery battery and the Tenth Pennsylvania fol-
lowed them. A battalion of the Eighteenth Regulars elicited
some spirited firing for a few moments from the Spanish
troops ; there was also some stray shooting from the houses,
and Mauser bullets were heard at intervals coming from the
right, where the insurgents were pressing into the city, around
the right of MacArthur's troops ; these circumstances made
the advance through the suburbs somewhat slow. General
Greene himself had ridden forward and came out into the open
space in front of the Luneta at one o'clock, to see the white
flag flying conspicuously on the southwest angle of the city
walls, where it had been displayed since eleven o'clock, — the
hour at which the American soldiers had entered the fort at

might and main in the lead. . . . With difficnlty the valiant band was persuaded
to take refuge behind the earthworks and stop their patriotic but dangerous blow-
ing, which drew the enemy's fire. (Harper's History f p. 55.)

i

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 24S

Malate, — and perhaps longer. Admiral Dewey had at that
hour signaled the city, " Do you surrender ? " and the reply
in the international code had been a request for conference.
The personal representatives of the American chiefs in com-
mand, Flag-Lieutenant Brumby and Colonel Whittier, had at
once gone ashore, and were in conference with the Spanish
authorities inside the walls when Greene's troops arrived out-
side these old fortifications and faced the Spanish soldiers who
lined their top and other Spanish troops who were retreating
confusedly from the southeastward, each side uncertain as to
what should be its attitude toward the other.^

When the Spanish troops in the suburb of Santa Ana ini-
tiated their rather premature retreat, they were pressed closely
by the insurgents, and one or two small detachments with offi-
cers were captured. This force of insurgents was now pushing
on toward the walled city, and up the Pako road toward the
walls there came also a large force of Filipinos who had moved
with no resistance around MacArthur's right. Shots between
them and the troops on the walls and those retreating to the
gates were being exchanged, and, as the American regiments
came out into the open space stretching back from the bay,
they also joined in. Several men of the California regiment,
which, under General Smith, was endeavoring to block the
Pako road to the insurgents, were hit. Most of all, there was
danger of a promiscuous engagement, in the then bewildered
state of mind of the various troops and their commanders ; the
only decisive-minded force was that of the Filipinos, who were
bent on firing at the Spaniards as much as possible and on
getting inside the walls if there was a chance.^ The Spanish

^ The white flag had been raised for tome time before it wai first seen by
Admiral Dewej himself ; the clouds had prevented it being seen, and the vessels
fired some shots after it was raised. See Sastr<Sn, op. cit., p. 501 ; Century Maga»
tine, April, 1899, p. 942 ; and Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 2043.

* The part of the California troops in preventing a fight between Filipinos and
Spaniards, or a promiscuous engagement, is related in Hept. Afaj.-Gen. Comm., 1898^
pp. 69, 96, 102, 678. Just before that. Major S. R. Jones, division quartermaster,
and Private Francis Finla/, of Califoroia, had, all alone, stood off a crowd of in-

244 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

officers were as eager to prevent this indiscriminate firing as
were the Americans, and communicated to General Greene
from the walls that negotiations for the capitulation were going
on at headquarters. He thereupon went inside, improving the
opportunity to communicate with General Merritt, through
Colonel Whittier, the condition of the forces on land.^ The
Spaniards offered no great objections to the general conditions
of the capitulation as proposed by the Americans, although
the specific terms were not agreed upon until the following
day. Meanwhile, their consent to surrender caused the Oregon
troops, who were awaiting on small transports at Cavite, to be
sent for, that they might enter and police the walled city. It
was General Greene's prescribed duty to march his troops
across the river and distribute them as guards in the business
and residence sections north of the Pasig. In order to do this,
he had to form the Nebraska regiment in close order at "port
arms " and virtually push out of the road a body of 2000 or
more insurgents which had come in from the southeast and
was massed between his troops and the bridge. Similarly, the
forces which he sent southeastward to prevent the entrance
of more insurgents from that quarter narrowly escaped getting
into trouble with the latter and were fired on a number of
times from cover.^

snrgent troops and prevented them advancing farther toward the walls (see ibid.,
p. 62, and Harper^s History, p. 52). The strangest experience of the day was that
of Captain Stephen O'Conner and a company of the Twenty-third Regulars, who,
moving forward with the advance on MacArthur's extreme left, met no serious
resistance, and pressed on till they arrived at one of the gates of the city, some
minutes in advance of Greene's troops. There they held their position, quietly
awaiting orders, with several thousand Spanish troops around them and on the
walls above them (see Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 58, and Century Magazine,
April, 1899, p. 929). The Third Artillery battalion had fired only one shot all day,
" and that in disregard of orders," remarked Captain Birkhimer, its commander.

^ The Spanish officers in highest authority, clothed in all the regalia of full
uniform, were rather stunned when the mud-splashed American general and his
special aide. Major Frank S. Bourns, entered the stately office in the Ayunta-
miento, and, not having had anything to eat since four in the morning, offered to
share with them some hard-tack and a flask of American whiskey. (Century Mag-
azine, April, 1899, p. 929.)

* See Century Magazine, April, 1899, p. 930, and Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898,
pp. 70, 102.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 245

General MacArthur's troops had been assigned to occupy
all suburbs of the city south of the Pasig. But, as has been
seen, they had met some resistance, through the failure of the
plans for a united withdrawal of the Spanish outer line, and
perhaps also through a desire of the Spanish officers facing
them to have the satisfaction of a fight. The terrain in which
this brigade had to operate was much more difficult than that
nearer the bay, while the unwillingness of Merritt to ask for
more insurgent trenches or to extend the line farther inland
had made it impossible to prepare as well as might have been
done for an attack. The firing of insurgents on their right,
where they had massed in numbers for several days, brought
MacArthur's men under the Spanish fire early in the morning.
They held their places, however, until the artillery had com-
pelled the abandonment of the Spanish blockhouses in front
and the American flag had gone up on Fort San Antonio. In
the thickets near Singalong, they met vigorous resistance to
their advance from intrenched troops who were under cover.
General Anderson authorized them to move around to the left
and follow Greene's men into the city, but they were too
heavily engaged. An advance party of Minnesota volunteers
and of Astor Battery men, with no arms but revolvers, charged
the Spanish position against considerable odds; the main body
of the Twenty-third Infantry and Minnesota volunteers sup-
ported them, and the resistance was soon over. The brigade
moved on cautiously, however, through the uncertain territory,
and it was 1.30 before it was discovered that all the Spaniards
had withdrawn from the front — some time before, in fact.
These forces then pushed on to occupy the districts assigned
to them, and thus made contact with the troops which Greene
had sent to keep the insurgents out on the southeast. The lat-
ter had, however, fully established themselves in some of the
southern districts of the city, and were helping themselves to
the Spanish military barracks.*
> The oMualties in MaoArihur*i brigade for the day were 4 men killed and 38

U6 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Oregon troops were policing the walled city and had
begun to receive the surrender of arms from the Spanish soldiers
who had retreated thither, and also to occupy their military
quarters, before the bases of the capitulation were finally
agreed upon, late in the afternoon, upon the arrival of General
Merritt at the new headquarters. It was only after the an-
nouncement of its terms that the Spanish flag was hauled down
from over Fort Santiago, in the corner of the walled town,
and the American flag went up in its place, at 5.30 p.m.i
Even then, the capitulation was not put into formal shape
until the following day. The Spaniards were conceded a sur-
render with the honors of war (which was in agreement with
their previous stipulation and with the hypothesis that this
was a surrender rather than a capture) ; but there were some
difficulties about minor points, particularly as to the return of
the arms of the troops, to which the Americans finally con-
sented, in case either party should afterward evacuate the city.
The most important difficulty lay in their desire to interpose
a preamble, much in the form of the preliminaries to a formal
treaty, prescribing especially conditions as to the public and
private property of the city. The Americans insisted that all
public property and public funds should be surrendered to

wounded, including 3 Minnesota officers wounded. This made the total of casual-
ties for the day 5 men killed and 44 wounded, of whom 3 afterward died. Includ-
ing 1 man killed by a stray shot on August 14, the total of casualties for the entire
campaign before and in Manila was 123, of whom 17 were killed outright, 7 died
from wounds, and 99, including 10 officers, were wounded but recovered. (The
figures given in Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898, pp. 58, 84, 503, have here been cor-
rected by reference to General Merritt's cablegrams of August 9, 20, and 30 in
Corr. Rel. War.)

^ Flag-Lieutenant Brumby represented Admiral Dewey, and he himself hoisted
the American flag. The confusion existing at Spanish headquarters may be indicated
by the fact that no Spanish officer or guard was on hand to observe the customary
military honors at the time or to receive the Spanish flag as it was lowered, and
it was borne away as a souvenir by the Oregon troops. When the Spanish soldiers
came forward at the arsenal to deposit their arms before the Americans there
drawn up, many of them threw their rifles on the ground so hard as to break them.
The Spanish officer of a battery near the walls stayed by his post for some time
after the surrender, having received no formal notification, until his wife finally
telephoned to him news of the surrender (Sastrduj oj>. cit.f p. 503).

k

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 247

them, pending peace negotiations, and closed the articles of
capitulation as adopted with this declaration (on the lines of
those governing General Scott's occupancy of Mexico City) :
" This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship,
its educational establishments, and its private property of all
descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith
and honor of the American army." *

All the Spanish troops defending the city did not surrender
until the afternoon of Sunday, August 14. That morning word
was sent out to the commanders of the outer Spanish line
running from the river near Santa Mesa northwest to the bay,
who had been holding off insurgent attacks, to come in and
lay down their arms, and the American line was pushed out
to cover practically the ground which they had held. The
Spaniards stated that they would surrender over 13,000 troops,
and they did eventually turn over about that many Mauser
and Remington rifles; but most of their native troops had
been lost by desertion, and there were fewer than 9000 soldiers
under arms in the city, including two practically complete
regiments of native troops.^ Nearly $900,000 (value in Mexi-
can silver) were captured, $750,000 being in the public treas-
ury and the rest in the custom-house and other dependencies
of the administration.^ The Americans had taken possession,

^ For the text of the articles of capitulation and the official reports on the same,
fee Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm.t 1898^ pp. 43, 49, 70-72. See also the account by General
Greene, who headed the American commission to negotiate capitulation, in Century
Magazine, April, 1899, p. 931 ; also Sastrdn, op. cit., pp. 504-06.

* For more detailed account of the men, arms, ammunition, supplies, etc., that
were surrendered, see Sen. Doc. 6B, pp. 364 and 413; also the scant report of
Colonel Summers (Oregon), who received the surrenders (Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.^
1S98, p. 136).

* Of the sums in the central treasury, more than twice the total found there
WM owed by the Spaninh Goyemment of the Philippines to the Spanish-Philippine
Bank of Manila for recent loans. The bank had advanced to the Spanish authori-
tiet 9600,000 silver on Monday of the week the city was taken, the record being
that this was a loan ** to cover confidential operations." (See Sastrdn, op. cit., p.
219.) Many dark hints have been made in Spain about the financial operations of
the dosing days in Manila. The bank and other private claimants sought to recover
from the American military government the iumi to their credit in the treasury.

r

248 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

on the afternoon of the 13th, of the captain-of-the-port's office,
this over the protest of the Spanish officer in charge, who, in
spite of the overwhelming military force surrounding him, de-
clared that he dared not surrender the office unless given a
written statement that he had yielded only to superior force,
as otherwise he would subject himself to court-martial. The
same process was gone through, only in more dramatic form,
on the 19th, when the Americans took possession of the cus-
tom-house almost at the point of bayonets; and similar for-
malities, though less of theatric display, were connected with
the transfer of control over the treasury, the mint, and internal-
revenue office.^ There was naturally delay in assuming charge
of the affairs of civil administration, as the first days were
occupied with the posting of the troops and the miHtary and
the provost organization necessary to control the situation and
police the city. For a few days, the so-called Veteran Civil
Guard (native soldiers organized to serve as police in the city
of Manila) were retained in their places under their Spanish
officers; but this was impracticable for various reasons, not
the least being the bitter hostility of the native population to
this organization, which was only too justly accused of past
abuses. The fact also that, at first, from very necessity, Spanish
civil officers and employees were, when they would consent to

bat of course could only be referred to Spain with their claims, as this money was
captured in war. However, the American Peace Commission at Paris conceded the
return of these and other public funds to Spain.

* General Greene describes these events, with which he was connected, in the
Century Magazine^ April, 1899, pp. 930-34. The custom-house episode has been
most humorously described, from the point of view of the American who had no
great reverence for forms and formalities, by Collector James F. Smith (now a
member of the Philippine Commission) in his annual report, appendix P to the re-
port of Military Governor MacArthur for 1901 (Report of War Department^ 1901,
vol. I, part 4, p. 282). Collector Smith says, however, that the conquerors were
like the man who caught the bear, " they hardly knew what to do with the custom-
house after they got it," for the little gray old Spaniard had departed, "firing
protests " and carrying most of his assistants with him. The formal protest of the
latter is cited in Historia Negra, p. 116. The viewpoint of another nationality is
given in this author's description of the document as an " act of energetic protest
formulated with all the characteristics of our race."

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 249

remain^ left in their places in the various administrative offices
was the cause of much criticism on the part of Filipinos. In
the main, however, there was very apparent a disposition, on
the part, at least, of the more important Spanish civil em-
ployees, to embarrass the Americans in their assumption of the
administration as far as might be done; and sheer necessity
compelled the reorganization of the post-office, the custom-
house, and other minor departments from the ranks of the
volunteers (among whom every sort of mechanic, clerk, and
professional man could be found), while also many FiHpino
employees, hitherto subordinates, found their services in de-
mand and their assistance recognized as of more importance
than formerly.^ The feeling alluded to as existing on the part
of most of the Spaniards of any prominence in the civil ad-
ministration was also manifested in other ways. The gunboat
which had been used to block the mouth of the Pasig was set
on fire, lest it might fall into the hands of the Americans, at
the very moment when the capitulation was being agreed
upon, and her flames lighted up the sunset sky when the new
flag was raised over the city. The spirit shown in this deed
was exhibited in many pettier ways; in some cases, it led to
the mutilation of public records, in others to the spiteful dis-
figurement of the furniture or fittings of the Government
buildings ere they passed into the conqueror's hands.'^ On the
whole, however, there was comparatively little friction between
Americans and Spaniards, and the latter have generally been
willing to testify to the effective way in which order was main-

^ Some of the employees of the United States postal serrioe in California had
accompanied the third expedition, and they took charge of the organization of the
post-office in Manila, conducting it yirtoally as an adjunct of the War Department.

* In some cases, the mutilation or absence of public records, only noted afteiw
ward, when the military authorities began to take systematic control of the ofRces
of the public administration, was due to the American soldiers, who were quartered
in the buildings where such records were lying loose and unguarded, and who
sometimes sold them to Chinese hucksters for waste-paper. Both sides bear their
share of blame for the carelessness which permitted some offices of the public ad-
ministration to be Tirtually unguarded and their oontenti to be scattered or mil-

250 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

tamed in the city by the Americans and to the considerate
treatment which Spaniards and their property received. There
was some feeling over the crowding of the Spanish soldiers
into the churches when the Americans took their quarters.
Spanish officers took advantage of the privilege allowed them
of retaining their sidearms to make themselves very prominent
in public places, with their swords clanking about them; and
there was such a feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos that,
in order to avoid quarrels that might involve more serious con-
sequences, they were asked to desist from wearing their side-
arms. The conception which the Spaniards generally had held
of the Americans, as being no respecters of persons, property,
or religion, may be seen from the astonishment which they
expressed at the literal fulfillment of the clause of the capitu-
lation relating to the churches and other property pertaining
to the Catholic worship.^ As for the foreigners resident in
Manila, however much they might afterward criticize the taste
of the American soldiers in matters of drink, they have never
failed to render tribute to the effective way in which they
brought about and kept order in the city, with comparatively
few instances of disregard of private property.

^ It need not be remarked that, among the more ignorant Spaniards and Fili-
pinos, the allocutions of the governor-general and the archbishop in April and
May (see p. 155), in which the Americans were held up as profaners of tem-
ples and brutes generally, had had their effect in causing most of the inhabi-
tants of the city to expect especially outrageous conduct on the part of the Amer-
ican troops, while at the same time they reveal what is unfortunately a too com-
mon Spanish idea about Americans, though somewhat overdrawn to suit the
purpose of the moment. Sastr6n (op. cit., p. 516), who has small tolerance for
Americans, found himself compelled to exclaim : " It is a great pity that, among
not all civilized peoples, and very much in spite of what has been written in all
political constitutions, and very contrary (though not so considered) to the true
liberal principles, religious interests fail to find such effective evidence of the con-
sideration and respect as the Americans displayed in the Philippines for those
there existent." Sastr6n also (p. 518) has to admit that the Americans, "practical
as they are wont to be," speedily made the city cleaner than it had ever been be-
fore. For accounts of the capture of Manila from the American point of view,
aside from those herein cited, see the current letters of John F. Bass, in Harper^s
History, pp. 50-67. Another Spanish account is El Sitio de Manila, by Juan and
Jos^ Toral (Manila, 1898).

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 251

Both Merritt and Dewey had dispatched cablegrams to
Hongkong, for transmission thence to Washington, as soon as
the city fell. These messages did not reach Washington until
the morning of August 18. But Washington had meanwhile
received word of the arrival at Hongkong on August 15 of
the Kaiserin Augusta, a German battleship, bearing there ex-
Governor-General Augustin and news of the capture of Manila,
this vessel having taken the Spanish general on board and
started for Hongkong just before the flag was changed over
the city.^ The peace protocol had been signed on behalf of
Spain by Ambassador Cambon of France at about 4.15 p.m.
on August 12 in Washington, or at the same time that the
American troops were drawn up in their trenches, all ready for
the attack, on the dawn of the 13th at Manila. The orders to
suspend hostilities, cabled from Washington on the 12th, to-
gether with the text of the protocol, which provided for the
occupation by the forces of the United States of the city, bay,
and harbor of Manila, pending the negotiation of a definitive
treaty, did not reach Dewey and Merritt, through Hongkong,

> This episode caased a renewal of the attacks upon Germany in American news-
papers. It coincided with news that Admiral Chichester, in command of the Brit-
ish forces in Manila Bay, had, on the morning of the bombardment of the Malate
fort, steamed over with the battleship Immortality and taken a position squarely
between the German vessels and the American attacking squadron. (See Century
Magazine^ April, 1899, p. 910, for Correspondent McCutcheon's account of this.)
The British news-agencies also sought to impress upon the Americans that the
friendship of their nation had helped avert European intervention. The criticisms
of Germany in regard to the Augustin episode were based on the supposition that
he was still governor-general in Manila instead of being a private citizen, virtually
under orders to come home (see Public Opinion^ Ang^ist 25, 1898) ; also, that the
Germans took him away surreptitiously. The writer had it upon the authority of
Dr. F. Krttger, then consul of Germany at Manila, that the arrangement for Angus-
tin's departure was made by the former with Admiral Dewey, who gave full con-
sent to it. The Grermans in the Philippines observed afterward that there was
eonsiderable hostility toward them among the Filipinos, on account of their pro-
Spanish attitude during the summer of 1898, and in consequence addressed a
letter of explanation to one of the insurgent newspapers (see La Independenciaf
Malolos, October 17, 1898). On November 7, (reneral Otis cabled Washington that
a (rerman battleship, just arrived in harbor, bad not sainted the flag on the city
wall, but later gave the Admiral's salute, and that the cruiser Irene, coming in
At the same time, had not saluted at all {Corr. Rel. War^ p. 833).

252' THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

until August 16. The Spanish governor-general at once sought
to have the terms of the capitulation nullified and the Ameri-
can occupation of the city based upon the protocol ; but the
American official attitude at Manila, as also later at Paris in
negotiating the treaty of peace, was that Manila was captured,
and was not surrendered in consequence of the protocol.^ By
the operations of the United States Signal Corps, cable com-
munication between Manila and Hongkong was restored late
on the night of August 20, and the first message that it bore
direct from Washington was one of congratulations from Pres-
ident McKinley.^ On the 26th, General Merritt was instructed
to turn over the command to General Elwell S. Otis, who had
arrived on August 21, at the head of the fourth expedition,
comprising nearly 5000 troops on four transports,^ and him-

1 See General Merritt's report {Rept Maj.-Gen. Comm.f 1898, p. 44). The cir-
cumstances of the signing of the protocol and the bearing which they had after-
ward upon the negotiations regarding the Philippines will be discussed below, in
connection with the Paris Treaty. In his executive proclamation of August 12,
announcing the signing of the protocol, President McKinley said: *•!... de-
clare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and
do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels
to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain
from any acts inconsistent with this proclamation."

* Communication was restored by the consent of Spain, as her consul at Hong-
kong had that end of the cable (a subsidized enterprise) sealed up (see Century
Magaziney April, 1899, p. 935). For previous diplomatic correspondence relative to
the opening of this cable see Foreign Relations of United States, 1898, pp. 976-80.
It therein appears that the United States, after ascertaining tliat the British com-
pany which held the concession could not operate this cable contrary to the per-
mission of Spain, without forfeiting the concession, wished in May to obtain
permission from Great Britain to land a new cable, run from Cavite to Hongkong;
bat this was refused by Great Britain, on the ground that it would be a violation
of neutrality. In July, Spain consented to the operation of the cable from Manila,
if fully neutralized and open to the messages of both parties, pressure having been
brought to bear at Hongkong and Madrid, because of the desire of maritime in-
terests at Hongkong to have the typhoon warnings of the Jesuit observatory at
Manila. This time, however, the United States Government objected. (Ibid., p. 979.)

* For an account of this expedition and his assignment to duty, see General
Otis's report (in Report of War Department, 1899, vol. i, part 4, p. 3). For the orders
both of a military and a civil nature, given by Merritt during his two weeks of
command at Manila, see Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.,1898, pp. 50-54. General Otis had
<Mriginally been selected as the officer to command the first expedition to the Phil-
ippines (Corr. Rel, War, pp. 639, 661-69). Before he sailed from San Francisco,

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 253

self to proceed to Paris, after consulting fully with Admiral
Dewey, in order to present his information and views and those
of the admiral to the Peace Commission there.^

A. DUAL OCCUPATION REJECTED, AND FILIPINO DISTRUST

INCREASED

The first official act of General Merritt, after the capitula-
tion was arranged, was the publication, as commander of the
American forces, of a proclamation "to the people of the

Greneral Merritt had obtained authority to transfer the command of the Eighth
Army Corps (made a corps at his request) to some one else, if he desired to do so,
retaining for himself the place of military governor, " so as to devote attention to
the important matters of the government of the vast territory and the general
military operations." (Ibid.j pp. 705-08.) He had availed himself of this authority
CD August 23, assigning General Otis to the command of the corps; and, with his
departure on August 30, the positions of military governor and of commanding officer
of the American troops in the Philippines were united under one man, and so re-
mained until 1902.

^ The cables exchanged between Merritt and Dewey at Manila and the Govern-
ment at Washington, in connection with the capture of Manila, will be found in
Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 118-24, and in Carr. Rel. War^ pp. 742-67. Admiral
Dewey answered the intimation of the President that he might be summoned to
Washington to give advice and information by saying: "Should regret very much
to leave here while matters remain in present critical condition." He was
thereupon told to stay, as he desired. On the other hand, it would appear that it
was not originally intended to call Merritt home, as he was instructed on August
25 to cable fully the information he possessed. But he at the same time intimated
that he would like to be on the Paris Peace Commission (perhaps having heard of
military men being on the evacuation commissions of Porto Rico and Cuba), or at
any rate wanted to come home (iWrf., p. 764). Before he sailed from San Francisco,
also, General Merritt had been quite insistent on having a navy vessel assigned to
take him, as thus "the prestige and importance of his mission would be more
clearly indicated." (Ibid., pp. 703, 710.) This record of army cablegrams also shows
•ome discussion between Washington and San Francisco as to whether, after the
Bgning of the protocol, the troops then ready for shipment could be sent. Washing-
too seems at first to have been disposed to send them, in case it was learned that
Merritt needed more troops to control the situation; but even before his answer
arrived showing that he did not need them, the protocol had been interpreted to
forbid the sending of retnforcementa, though the organizations already in the islands
might be completed by recruits. The Arizona (afterward the transport Hancock)
took the New York volunteers and California troops to Hawaii, and she and a
ho^ital-ship and horse-boat made trips to Manila with supplies. Hospital Corps
m«D, transportation facilities, etc. The day before the protocol was signed, however,
Washington had sought to haiten the dispatch of the troopt then ready for the
Pfailippbei. (Ihid.f p.749.)

254 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Philippines/' on Sunday, August 14. This followed the lines
and phraseology of the President's formal instructions to him
of May 19, and was chiefly occupied with laying down the
more fundamental rules of international law as to the rights
and duties of a military occupant, relative to public and pri-
vate property, to the maintenance of public order, to the
continuance of municipal laws except as modified by special
orders, to the resumption of trade, collection of duties, etc.
The Filipinos were assured that the United States forces had
not come to " wage war upon them, nor upon any party or
faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in
their employments, and in their personal and religious rights " ;
that " all persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co-
operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to
this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support
and protection " ; and that, so long as they should " preserve
the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives
of the United States," they should not be " disturbed in their
persons and property, except in so far as may be found neces-
sary for the good of the service of the United States and the
benefit of the people of the Philippines." ^ The United States,
as a military occupant merely, could not presume to provide
for anything more than temporary conditions ; but the Fili-
pinos were already raising the troublesome queries as to
whether the Americans intended to return Manila to the Span-
iards, or intended to retain it and seek possession of the entire
archipelago, or would wrest it all from Spain only to estab-
lish them in possession and guarantee their status before the
world.

More important for the moment to the Americans than the
embarrassing questions as to their future policy was the prac-

^ This proclamation has been frequently reproduced in official documents. It is
cited, in conjunction with the President's instructions, in Sen. Doc. SOS, part i,
pp. 85-87; also by General Merritt in Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 49. For the
general order by Merritt, congratulating the soldiers in his command on having
" captured by assault " the city of Manila, see ibid., p. 61.

CAPTUBE OF MANILA BY THREAT 255

tical difficulty which confronted them simultaneously in the
shape of the 4000 or so insurgents who had got into the city
on the south side and established themselves in the Spanish
barracks and other Government buildings of the suburbs.
They had come in, as seen, around the right of MacArthur's
brigade, despite the battalion which Anderson had sent to a
bridge east of Pasai to intercept such a movement ; and before
the troops of this brigade were posted on the afternoon of the
13th, the insurgents who had followed Greene's troops into
Malate and Ermita had estabhshed themselves in Spanish bar-
racks and other Government buildings. Aside from the ques-
tion of pillage, to prevent which the Americans were somewhat
informally compromised with the Spaniards, but more espe-
cially compromised before the world, there was danger of
friction between Americans and Filipinos in these two suburbs,
and in Pako friction actually did arise, and threatened serious
trouble on that evening and the next day.^

There is no evidence that insurgent headquarters either
sought or desired trouble with the Americans at this time,
although some of the American officers thought so. Some of
the subordinate insurgent officers, in command of troops which
were pressing into the city, were, however, much more bitter
enemies of the Americans than of the Spaniards, and were
ready to make trouble. And the insurgent organization itself
had laid full plans for a vigorous attack on the city through-
out the full length of its besieging lines, and hoped, if not
able to capture parts of it before the Americans entered, at
least not to be behind the latter in getting inside. From their
point of view, this was merely an intention to prevent their
siege of a month and a half going for nothing. When Mer-
ritt's orders to remain outside were received just before the at-
tack by the Americans, the insurgent commands had all been
forewarned of the Americans' intentions to capture the city
unaided (indeed, they were fully posted as to there being some

> See Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1808, pp. 79, 88, 121, and 678.

256 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

sort of plan on foot for the surrender of the city, for they
received information from inside), and had been instructed to
press their own attacks. This order from the Americans prob-
ably was received too late for these instructions to be changed
had the insurgent headquarters entertained any notion of chang-
ing them ; but it did serve one purpose, namely, to arouse all
the more the growing resentment toward the Americans.^

The Tagalog lines about the city had been reinforced on
all sides for several days prior to the 13th. The commander
of the forces along the river above the city had, indeed, some
days before the Americans were ready to attack, used the fact
that the latter were getting into position for assault in an at-
tempt to coerce the Spaniards at Santa Ana into surrendering
their position to him.^ It was here that the insurgents had

» Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 12, shows that Aguinaldo gave orders late the night of
the 12th for General Ricarte's troops (stationed just east of MacArthur's at Pasai)
to attack at four o'clock the next morning. It is not certain that this order was
given after the receipt of the message from Anderson. Ricarte's men did begin
firing early in the morning, and thus drew Spanish fire upon the Americans, lead-
ing to feeling between Americans and insurgents and to some interchange of
threats. (Ibid., p. 12; also Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.j 1898, p. 79.)

2 This was Pio del Pilar, an ignorant fellow of bad antecedents, who had risen
from house-servant to chief of ladrones, and from chief of ladrones to insurgent
general, in which position he earned for himself a very dark record during 1897,
1898, 1899, and 1900, after which he was exiled to Guam. (He is never to be con-
fused with Marcelo del Pilar, the intellectual propagandist, or Gregorio del Pilar,
a young general of the Filipino aristocracy, who lost his life at Tilad Pass in Janu-
ary, 1900, in a chivalrous attempt to cover the retreat of Aguinaldo.) He was
always a consistent hater of Americans. The letter in which he intimated to Major
Ac^vedo, the Spanish commander at Santa Ana, the advisability of a surrender
to him before the Americans began to attack, which he asserted would be on Au-
gust 2, was dated July 30, and may be found in Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 484. He claimed
to have this information through Aguinaldo, who charged him to inform the
Spaniards and to tell them " not to be afraid or become disheartened, but, on the
contrary, to take courage, fortify themselves well, and not yield before their
[Americans'] cannon." It has already been seen (Sen. Doc. 208, part 3, pp. 3-4),
that Aguinaldo had commissioned officers on July 6 with the futile notion that
they might be able to negotiate the surrender of Manila, disregarding the Ameri-
cans. Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo (p. 19) shows also that he knew something of this
dickering with Ac^vedo. The same document shows that, on August 10, Pio had
telegraphed to Aguinaldo an absurd tale about 10,000 Germans having disem-
barked at Subig to seize the country ; and that, on August 14, Pio said he was
constructing trenches ready for a fight with the Americans.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 257

most easily got into the city on August 13, the Spanish re-
treat being so confused, as already seen, that the insurgents
cut off and captured five columns.^ There is, however, no rea-
son for supposing that, except for the preconcerted Spanish
withdrawal upon the walled city, they could have driven the
latter in and taken Santa Ana and part of Pako any more on
this occasion than during their many preceding attacks, espe-
cially as they were at the time short of ammunition.^ In spite
of the confusion prevailing on the south side of the Pasig all
day of the 13th, and of the surrender of the walled city to the
Americans, together with the occupancy by the latter of the
business section on the north side of the river, the Spanish
troops on the north line of defense virtually held their posi-
tions from the river near Santa Mesa to the bay west of Tondo,
losing, indeed, the waterworks reservoir, a little outside of
their lines, and temporarily being driven in at various points,
but surrendering to the Americans their outer line almost intact
the following day. Some of their troops were in the trenches
until the following afternoon. The artillery in the blockhouses
and at other points had, as always before, repelled the unusually
fierce attacks of the insurgents north of Tondo and at La Loma,
as well as the repeated attacks in numbers on Sampalok and
Nagtahan. The following day, when the Spaniards withdrew
from the north of Tondo, the Americans moved quietly into
their places and reached an amicable agreement with the in-
surgents facing them. The capture the previous day of Santa
Ana and Pandakan by the insurgents had facilitated their cross-
ing the river at the latter point and reinforcing their com-
patriots from Santa Mesa in their renewed attempts to take
the rotunda at Sampalok ; and, when the Spaniards withdrew
with the two cannon they had bad at this point, the troops of

* Tbesa were four eolamni of rolanteen and one of nmrinei. Af^in&Ido's as-
•ertion in refj^rd to tbia capture (in Rtieha veridica) ia corroborated bj Sastrdn
(op. cit., p. 600).

• Tel. Corr. Agumaldo, p. la

«58 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Pio del Pilar pressed forward so rapidly as to become engaged
in an attack on the Americans going to take outpost at Santa
Mesa. One hundred and fifty of them were surrounded and
disarmed by the Americans on the afternoon of the 14:th.
Other insurgents pressed on, in disordered bands, as far into
the city as Kiapo.^

Under instructions from Merritt, Anderson had telegraphed
to Aguinaldo at Bakoor on the evening of the 13th : " Serious
trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it.
Your forces should not force themselves into the city until we
have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with
you." Aguinaldo had already, earlier in the day, in reply to
Anderson's telegram of the night before, ordering him to
keep his troops out of the city, complained that his troops were
being threatened with force by the Americans in the trenches
outside, before the attack, and had intimated that the two
forces should cooperate. He had also directed Felipe Buenca-
mino and other Fihpinos at Cavite to see General Anderson or
some other American commander and " demand an explana-
tion " of the order, but they could find no one in authority.
The next morning, Aguinaldo wrote to Anderson, reminding
him of his cession of the trenches to the Americans and
claiming that he could not order his troops to withdraw from

^ See Sastrdn, op. cit., pp. 612-13 ; also Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ pp. 12, 15, 16.
The latter contains the unintelligible telegram of Gregorio del Pilar, insurgent
commander at Kalookan, saying trouble was threatening with the " Napotas " peo-
ple there. This can be interpreted as referring to the Americans only on the sup-
position that he thought the position taken by one of the American gunboats off
Tondo indicated an intention to attack there ; for no American troops were dis-
embarked on the north side of the Pasig. Aguinaldo seemed to have guessed his
meaning to be that trouble was threatened with the Americans, for he answered:
" We must avoid conflicts with the Americans by every means possible." Gregorio
del Pilar, in immediate command just outside of Tondo, reported on August 15
the withdrawal of the Spaniards the afternoon before and the apparently amicable
arrangement of a line between Americans and Filipinos. The disarming of the in-
surgents at Santa Mesa was reported on the same date by Colonel San Miguel.
There is a report by Colonel Irving Hale on the same incident {Rept. Maj.-Gen.
Comm.f 1898, p. 77). These arms were afterward returned to the insurgents. This
was the place where the trouble occurred between Filipinos and Americans the
following February, and the insurgent commander was the same.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 259

Manila in their present state of mind, as they had *^ always been
promised that they should appear in it " ; yet he thought some
arrangement might be possible, and sent as commissioners
Messrs. Buencamino, Araneta, Legarda, and Sandiko, the first
two of whom were Filipino lawyers of Manila, the third a
prominent Filipino business man of the capital, and the last
a young Filipino revolutionist who had come over from Hong-
kong. Anderson took them in to see Merritt. Their instruc-
tions were to consent to the withdrawal of the insurgent troops
from the city, if the Americans would make a formal promise to
reinstate them where they were in case the United States should
withdraw from the islands on making peace with Spain. Gen-
eral Merritt had no instructions on the latter point,^ and could

^ See Sen. Doc. 62^ p. 367, for Greneral Merritt's statement about this interriew
before the Peace Commission at Paris. He says he " had to mix diplomacy with
force in order to avoid a tilt," not having received any reply from Washington to
his request for instructions as to how he should treat the insurgents. He referg
here to his cablegrams received at Washington August 1 (Corr. Rel. War, p. 743),
wherein he did not specifically ask instructions, but said : " Situation difficult. In-
surgents have announced independent government ; some are unfriendly, fearing
they will not be permitted to enter Manila with my troops. Will join Dewey in
note demanding surrender, with assurance of protection [to Spaniards] from insur*
gents. May be important to have my whole force before attacking, if necessary to
hold insurgents while we fight Spanish." On August 13, he sent, through Dewey,
a message stating that the insurgents were demanding joint occupation, and asking
immediate instructions as to how far he might go in ** forcing obedience," conclud-
ing: " Is Government willing to use all means to make the natives submit to the
authority of the United States ? " (Ibid., p. 754.) This message reached Washing-
ton late on the night of the 17th (in advance of Merritt's formal message about
the capture of the city), and a reply was at once sent : " The President directs
that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. . . . Use whatever
means in your judgment are necessary to this end." This message reached General
Merritt on the 22d, and was acknowledged at once, with the remark that the instruo-
tions had been anticipated. (Ibid., p. 760.) For Dewey's side of this correspond-
ence, see Bureau of Navigation, pp. 123-24. Said President McKinley in his mes-
sage to Congress in December, 1898 : " [The insurgent forces] were constrained
by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt from attempting an assault. It was fit-
ting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter
should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone. Obeying
the stem precept of war, which enjoins the overcoming of the adversary and the
extinction of his power wherever assailable as the speedy and sure means to win
a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and re-
sponsibilities attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be
ihonght of/'

260 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

only hold before them the impracticability of a dual occupation,
emphasizing the likelihood of conflicts between Spaniards and
Filipinos. At the same time he furnished them his proclama-
tion of that date, outlining in a general way the duties of a
military occupant and the intentions of the United States.
The Filipinos were already greatly concerned over whether
the Spaniards were to retain their governmental offices in the
city, and were watching with jealousy the use by the Ameri-
cans of the Veteran Civil Guard in portions of the city. Mer-
ritt's proclamation of military rule evidently inspired the more
definite and numerous demands which the commission pre-
sented when it returned the following day. As conditions
precedent to the withdrawal of their troops from the city, they
stipulated for such a statement of the limits of Manila as would
leave them Pandakan and Santa Ana (on the river beyond
Pako), for free entrance for themselves and their products to
Manila (but Americans to pass through their lines only by
permission) ; for possession of the governor-generars palace at
Malakanang and the convents they were occupying in the sub-
urbs ; for the return of the arms taken at Santa Mesa ; for
the ousting of the Spaniards from office and the recognition of
Filipinos nominated by themselves ; and for " a part of the
booty of war " ; all which they wished to have incorporated in
a formal agreement in writing. In return, they would have
the waterworks started up again and would be responsible for
order there, provided the Americans would bear the expense ;
but they desired it recorded that such action did not " signify
acknowledgment on their part of North American sovereignty
for any longer than during the necessity of the present war-
fare." General Merritt, for the first time addressing himself di-
rectly to the " Commanding General of the Philippine Forces,"
accepted the city boundaries as outlined by the insurgents, and
agreed to their stipulations about the waterworks and free tran-
sit to and from the city on the river (the Americans being, in
fact, eager to have the country products brought in), and that

b

CAPTUBE OF MANILA BY THREAT 261

unarmed Filipinos should have free access and entrance to the
city, while the same privilege must be conceded to Americans
going outside. Aguinaldo promptly stated that his request
had been for free navigation for all his boats, and in all ports
controlled by the Americans, and also put in a claim for part
of the Pako district, well inside the city. General Merritt re-
ferred Aguinaldo to Dewey as to navigation matters, refused
to concede occupancy of what Americans then adopted as ter-
ritory within the city's limits, and made the assurance to Agui-
naldo that, in case the Americans should withdraw from
Manila, they would " leave him in as good condition as he was >l
found by the forces of the Government." The insurgent troops
in Malate and Ermita were mostly withdrawn, but at Merritt's
departure Aguinaldo was still clinging to his claim to part of
Pako, having on August 27 proposed a new line of delimination
which would give him an excellent foothold in Manila south of
the Pasig and enable him to move freely on Malate and Ermita,
if not the walled city. He also stated that his concession of
the waterworks was only an evidence of good will, not an
indication that he could yield the other points offered, unless
he could have a written agreement with the Americans.*

1 Nevertheless, General Merritt, in writing his report on his way to Paris, said
that he anticipated no trouble with the insurgents, because the leaders were " suf-
ficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States
would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement." (See
Rept. Maj.'Gen. Comm.f 1898, p. 44.) He had, of course, only come in contact with
the better-educated men who had been sent to see him. They were constantly
urging conciliation upon the insurgent authorities at Bakoor, and it was the radical,
Mabini, always close at Aguinaldo's side and the adviser who for months dictated
almost every move of importance, who was now pressing the demands upon Agui-
naldo. Tel. Con. Aguinaldo^ pp. 12-18, sheds much light on these negotiations.
On the 13th, Buencamino and Araneta had teleg^phed from Cavite that it was
impossible to see Anderson or Dewey; hence they advised to " continue hostilities
while we ask for an explanation." They knew of the prearranged capitulation,
ftod anticipated that it would be pleaded as an objection to joint occupation, but
suggested the answer : " We do not suspend onr attempt to enter Manila. Its
capitulation not favorable to our independence." Mabini was more than agreeable
to this, but urged the securing of a definite answer from the Americans, in order,
if they refused joint occupation, to " lay a protest before the foreign consuls."
Mabini wa« alwaji more particular about written forms than he was about meet-
ing th« piMtioal tzigVDciet of a situation, and for the succeeding few days he con-

262 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

During the first week in September, Aguinaldo transferred
his headquarters to Malolos, some twenty miles northward of

stantly held this idea of a protest to the consuls before the commissioners who
went to Merritt. As soon as these men of legal training had been presented with
the difficulties in the way of joint occupation, especially after the terms of the proto-
col were known, they admitted the force of the American argument ; at the outset
they told Aguinaldo that it was " prudent to yield " ; especially as the Americans
refused further negotiations until Noriel's troops were withdrawn from Malate
and Ermita. The conservatives eventually prevailed, under the necessities of the
situation. American engineers were allowed to start the pumps at the waterworks
on August 23, and later to construct a telegraph line to the pumping-plant ; but
Mabini insisted they must take no troops there. (Ibid., pp. 18, 20 ; also Sen. Doc.
S31, p. 814.) The sources of information from the American side as to these nego>
tiations are : Report of War Department, 1898, vol. I, part 4, pp. 342-450 ; Sen'
Doc. 62, pp. 399, 400-03; and General Anderson, in North American Review,Feh'
ruary, 1900. The data from the foregoing official reports were presented in nearly
complete form, with a few errors of position, in Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 17-28.
The Americans resented especially the pretension that they could not pass outside
the city without permission from the Filipinos. On August 15, Merritt instructed
Anderson that the insurgents must be made to understand that he would not
" tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our
troops were hemmed in by a besieging force." (Yet this is exactly what afterward
came to pass.) After the first few days, Merritt conducted negotiations directly by
letters or through Major J. F. Bell of his staff. According to Bell's memoranda
(made afterward for the information of General Otis), the assurance to the Filipinos
that, if the Americans withdrew, " they would be left in as good condition as they
were found by the Government," excited distrust in Aguiualdo's headquarters;
also, Merritt intended, if necessary, to interpret this subsequently to mean in the
same condition in which they were found by Dewey. When Merritt made this
offer and wrote his letter of August 24, he had not received the instructions from
Washington not to permit joint occupation. He accompanied this offer with some
flattering remarks on Aguiualdo's personality, with the promise to speak well of the
Filipinos before his Government, and with the suggestion that it would be a good
idea for Aguinaldo to visit Washington with some of his leaders (which was
an informal authorization for Agoncillo, then preparing to go to the United
States, to represent Aguinaldo at the American capital). Aguinaldo kept urging
that Merritt secure from Dewey a pledge as to the free navigation of Filipino
boats, and Bell thinks that Aguinaldo already felt himself " at outs " with Dewey;
the latter soon after seized all his small boats in the bay. The Spanish text of the
Filipino memorandimi of Augpist 15 has not been published, hence it is unsafe to
assert just what might have been meant by the words translated as " booty of war."
(The early American translations of Filipino documents were quite commonly made
by incompetent translators.) Benito Legarda, one of the first commissioners to
Merritt on behalf of Aguinaldo, testified positively in 1899 (Report Philippine Com-
mission, 1900, vol. n, p. 383) that there was a plan to sack the city, known to
Aguinaldo. Sastrtfn asserts (op. cit., p. 514) that the insurgents in Malate and
Ermita did pillage to some extent public and private property. Before the entrance
into the city, Merritt had communicated to Aguinaldo his order to the American
soldiers forbidding pillage and looting. (Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 50.)

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 263

Manila and near the railroad.^ His commanders south of Ma-
nila were still keeping possession of most of the Pako suburb
and part of Malate, and Filipino officers were attempting to
exercise civil authority withm those limits, when, on Septem-
ber 8, General Otis sent a long formal reply to Aguinaldo's
proposals to Merritt. He went, in some detail, into the obhga-
tions which international law imposed upon the Americans as
occupants ; pointed to the friction there had already been as
indicating the impracticability of joint occupation ; informed
Aguinaldo that the United States Government had never rec-
ognized " booty " in war, and severely penalized the convert-
ing of property to private uses at such times ; stated that all
people would be treated alike as regarded commerce and navi-
gation ; said that he had " not been informed as to what
policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its
legitimate holdings here " (inferentially a reply to Aguinaldo's
requests for a formal agreement as to the reinstatement of the
Filipinos in the positions surrendered, in case the United
States left the islands) ; assured Aguinaldo that he realized
that his forces had made " many sacrifices in behalf of civil
liberty and for the welfare of their people," but reminded
him also that the United States had made sacrifices in taking
up war with Spain in behalf of the latter's colonies; and,
finally, while hinting that more troops were ready to come
from the United States, though he hoped this would not be
Decessary, he ordered that the insurgents " withdraw beyond
the line of the city's defenses " before the 15th, or he would
be " obliged to resort to forcible action." Aguinaldo again
commissioned some of the conservatives, men of education and
property, who were now associated more or less closely with
the insurgent organization, to discuss the matter with the
American commander. He was ready to concede the with-

^ Already, in Jnlj and Angnst, the iniurgenU had Tirtually put the railroad
under their control, the English manager apparently reaching •ome sort of work-
tog agreement with them. See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ p. 18, for an order to him on
Aogott 22 not to transport troops without Aguinaldo'i consent.

264 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHH^IPPINES

drawal, as he had in fact already done, but the point of all
their discussions was that he could not do this under a virtual
threat, as it would compromise him before his people/ Otis
did not withdraw his letter, but wrote an informal one in the
nature of a request on the 16th, the day after the insurgent
troops had withdrawn from Malate and part of Pako nearest
the walled city, marching up past the Luneta and being cheered
by groups of American soldiers as they went out. General Otis
had not specifically stated what districts were to be evacuated ;
hence the insurgents continued to keep the portions of Pako
lying on the river and all the south bank above that point,
giving them a frontage on the river which for over a mile faced
the American territory on the north bank. They exercised the
right to stop traffic here, and finally, by order of Pio del
Pilar, General Anderson and a party were stopped and told
they could not pass up the river without permission from
Aguinaldo. In all their correspondence and negotiations, the
Americans had been more concerned with laying down inter-
national law and assuring the Filipinos in general terms of
their good intentions than with definitely prescribing the lim-
its of the city as they interpreted them ; so General Otis finally
had to have the records searched for an official delimitation of
the boundaries, and even to have his engineers construct a new
map of the city in place of the faulty Spanish maps.^ Thus

^ Already Aguinaldo was playing the conservatives against the radicals in his
camp, or wavering between the alternate councils of the two groups, as one chooses
to see it. The conservatives had made him see that insistence on joint occupation
was legally untenable, and moreover was unwise ; but he wished to " keep face "
before the radicals (especially commanders like Pio del Pilar, whose allegiance
was never very stable), and hence wished to have his yielding appear like the
granting of a request from the Americans, if he could not obtain from the latter
some sort of formal agreement as to the future.

^ Manila, as a city, was originally, and, until quite recent years, considered to
be, the only walled town in which, even as late as 1844, natives, half-castes, op
Chinese were forbidden to have their residences. The outlying posts on the north
and south of the river, once separate villages, gradually grew together, though
some open stretches still intervene. As business grew during the last half-century,
making Binondo particularly, and to some extent Tondo, Santa Cruz, and Kiapo,
the most important section of the city, while the walled town became merely the

CAPTURE OF MANILA _BY THREAT 265

fortified, he again opened correspondence with Aguinaldo on
October 14, demanding the withdrawal of the Filipinos not
only from all Pako but also from Pandakan, lying just beyond
and along the river. He intimated that force would be used
on the 20th, if necessary ; but the tenor of the letter was con-
ciliatory, and it broached the idea of establishing, with Agui-
naldo's good will, a convalescent camp for sick Americans
on higher ground outside the city. As Pandakan had been
omitted by Aguinaldo in his list of suburbs included within
the city, and Merritt had accepted this list, it was now vigor-
ously claimed by the insurgents. There was really much doubt
about it ever having been included technically within the city ;
but it was well within the lines of defense the Spaniards had
maintained ; and moreover it held a commanding position at
a turn of the river facing the territory held by the Americans
on the north side at Sampalok and Santa Mesa, and Otis had
to insist on its being evacuated. The insurgents finally with-
drew on October 25, and from that time forward occupied
virtually the same positions which they had held against the
Spaniards from early July to August 13, sometimes encroach-
ing inside the blockhouses, which the Americans did not use.^

goTemmental and religions headquarters, it was necessary to effect a better con-
solidation of the city under one government; yet the various districts outside the
walls were to some extent separately governed until 1898. There was no great pre-
cision about the boundaries of the city as included under the AyuntamientOy because
of a certain Spanish aversion to precision in such matters, as well as because there
had been some recent rather confusing provisions of law as to boundary extensions,
and accurate maps had not been made. Moreover, since the city government was
to a large extent united to the province of Manila, there was not an urgent neces-
sity for precision as to the more scattered outlying sections.

^ The published sources as to these negotiations between Otis and the insur-
gents are all from the American side, though some of the captured documents
from the War Department shed light upon the attitude of the different insurgent
factions at the time and as to preparations for resistance on the part of their mili-
tary leaders. The correspondence and Otis's statements as to the interviews are
given, as forwarded by him to Washington in Kept. War Dept. 1899, vol. I, part 4,
pp. 6-10, 15-22, 334, 350-54, and these were brought together in order in Sen,
Doe. 208, pp. 28-41. See also Sen. Doc. S31, pp. 742-56, for Otis's testimotiy about
these negotiations in 1902. The idea of a convalescent camp was dropped by Otis
in November; Aguinaldo appeared iuspiciooi about it, and claimed to be afraid it

866 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

That the military Filipinos were ready to fight the Ameri-
cans as early as September, and on various occasions before it
was definitely known that the Americans would take the Phil-
ippines from Spain, as well as before their own organization
had been well established in Luzon or extended to other parts
of the archipelago, is fairly well shown by evidence left by
themselves. Before the withdrawal of troops on September 15,
Aguinaldo issued instructions to Generals Noriel, Garcia, and
Pio del Pilar, commanding the troops about the city, to be
prepared to resist the Americans, though waiting for them to
give the provocation.^ Already, on September 10, when it was
reported that the Americans on the north of the river were
pressing forward their lines toward Kalookan and La Loma,
Aguinaldo had authorized resistance to secure these positions
again and had given instructions to " warn the Sandatahan "
(a sort of Katipunan militia inside the city) to be ready to
cooperate with the troops outside when trouble began. '^ Again,
in October, when Otis delivered a second quasi-ultimatum as
to the withdrawal of the insurgents from the city, he noticed

would excite his people, unless the Americans would first conclude a formal agree-
ment with them. (Perhaps also the sight of insurgent trenches going up around
the city did not invite the placing of sick Americans where they would be subject
to capture.) In closing these negotiations in November, Aguinaldo brought up
again the absence of a " fixed basis of agpreement " as a reason for the lack of con-
fidence on the part of his countrymen. These negotiations marked the appearance
for the first time of Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera (later a member of the Philippine
Commission, and one of the foremost " Americanistas " among the Filipinos from
the time it became apparent that the Filipinos would resort to war) as a medium
of communication between Filipinos and Americans in the interest of peace. He
misunderstood Otis as to the blockhouses, thinking the latter gave permission for
the Filipinos to occupy them; and there was a little friction over this matter later
on, though not serious.

1 See Cmxg. Record^ vol. 35, part 6, p. 6107, for captured insurgent documents
containing these instructions, stated by the editor of the insurgent documents in
the War Department to be in the handwriting of Aguinaldo, though unsigned. It
is curious to note that, in cautioning him to save ammunition, Aguinaldo tells Pio
that " there are occasions when one shot kills as many as four men."

* See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 28. General Garcfa's report leading to these in-
structions was to the effect that the Americans had sought to push the Filipinos
back ; and there had been trouble between the outposts. The Filipinos, however,
were at the time inside the line of blockhouses.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 267

that their forces on the north were being recruited by troops
brought down the railroad, and upon his protest this was
stopped for the time being.* On November 30, upon a rumor
that American troops were to be landed on the shores of Pam-
panga along the bay, Aguinaldo authorized the commander
there to fire on them.^

The American correspondents in the Philippines were from
the first disposed to discount the official optimism prevailing
with regard to their country's relations with the insurgents.
They and the subordinate army of&cers who sought to satisfy
their curiosity as to the Philippines and the Filipinos soon
found themselves objects of suspicion whenever they went out-
side the city, and they constantly acquired evidence that the
military Fihpinos at least were preparing for a fight, and that
a great many of them were using every means to excite the
masses to distrust the Americans. They had to run the gant-
let of a troublesome system of permits, and the possession of
photographic cameras subjected them frequently to detention
or other interference. They were also inclined to lay more
stress upon the growing animosity between the American
soldiers and the natives in Manila than were the superior offi-
cers of these troops, who were confronted daily in their offices
with questions of administration that seemed more important
for the moment than psychological questions as to the attitude
of the Filipino populace. The American — already well adver-
tised to the Filipinos by the Spaniards as an intemperate, irre-
ligious product of mixed ancestry, who had ruthlessly slaugh-
tered the red man of his continent and was engaged in
lynching the black men whom he had held in slavery till late
in the century — was not slow in putting in evidence his
Anglo-Saxon contempt for people of any other color than
white. He also (in a very conspicuous minority of cases, that

» See Oti$*M Rept.,1899 (Rept. War Dept., 1S99, toI. i, part 4), p. 19. This docu-
mt will hereafter be cited by the aboye foregoing short title.
• TeL. Corr. AguinaldOf p. 31.

ftes THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

is) succeeded in justifying the reputation that had been given
to him for intemperance, and, being confined within the limits
of a tropical city, was quite commonly most obtrusive about
it, which latter feature probably seemed to the average Filipino
more a sign of weakness than the intemperance itself. What-
ever may be the faults of the Spaniard, his race is a most
temperate one, taking its stimulating drinks mostly in the form
of wine with meals ; and neither by disposition nor by example
are the Filipinos themselves intemperate. Moreover, the
Western volunteers, sometimes the officers as well as privates,
regarded the fighting as over and the rest of their Philippine
experience as justifiably a sort of " lark '' : perhaps the least
offensive manifestation of this disposition was the mania for
acquiring souvenirs of this semi-mediaeval outpost of Spain,
though this not infrequently led to abuses well within the
meaning of the proclamations against looting and misconduct
generally.^ For, as indicated, there was no lack of official ef-

1 The letters of John F. Bass and F. D. Millet {Harper's History, pp. 56-57,
"t 65) are typical of contributions to the American press of that time, showing that
the correspondents appreciated the seriousness of the trend of thought and action
among the Filipinos. Says Mr. Bass, in a later article {Everybody's Magazinet
August, 1901, p. 142) : " An hour after [Aguinaldo made his triumphant entry
into Malolos in September], I was discussing with two of his most important cab-
inet officials what would happen when the Filipinos tried to fight the Americans.
More than four months later, General Otis telegraphed to Washington his opinion
that there would be no conflict of arms." A contemporary letter of the same
writer (dated at Manila, August 30, 1898, cited above in Harper's History) gives
the typical American attitude toward the Filipino masses at that time : " There
can be no doubt that our soldiers are spoiling for a fight. They hate and despise
the native for the manner in which he has lied to and cheated them, and on the
whole they are inclined to treat the Filipino the way a burly policeman treats a
ragged street urchin. The native is like a child, unreasonable and easily affected
by small things. Unable to appreciate the benefits of a good government, he
fiercely resents the rough manner in which the soldier jostles him out of the way."
The common opinion of foreigners in Manila is expressed by Frederic H. Sawyer,
though himself not an eyewitness : " I have no doubt that they [the American
volunteers] are good fighting men, but from all I can hear about them, they are
not conspicuous for military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas
as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate." {The Inhabitants of the Phil-
ippines, p. 114.) In the Resena veridica, Aguinaldo charges abuses by the Ameri-
can soldiers. He claims that the soldier killed at Cavite before Merritt's depar-
ture was killed in a drunken quarrel with his own companions ; this matter was
not satisfactorily cleared up. General Anderson {North American Review^ Febru-

[CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT, 269

fort to check abuses or misconduct on the part of the Ameri-
can forces. This was not merely limited to orders from above,
but extended to informal instructions to commanders of regi-
ments and of companies, which were quite generally acted
upon, and to the operations of military courts, which as a rule
treated offenses by soldiers, mostly of a minor character, with
all due severity. In the main, the things which were only too
constantly operating to produce friction and animosity between
the native people and the Americans were too small in them-
selves to be reached either by general orders about the con-
duct of the war or specific regulations as to military discipline.
They were of the sort inevitably incident to the quartering of
a restless body of troops in a strange and tropical city, after a
brief campaign that seemed somewhat like the " picnic " many
of the men were after and which had not been calculated to
sober them to a reahzation of war. Add to this a prejudice
against all other ways and customs but those of " good Amer-
ican citizens," and a disposition to look upon being born to
any other color than white as in some degree a crime^ and the
situation is pictured.^

ary, 1900, p. 282) says the attitude and conduct of the American soldiers bad
some part in bringing on the trouble. The numbers of La Independenda reveal
many of the things, unimportant in themselves, which were at the time causing
comment and criticism among Filipinos about the Americans and their admin-
istration of affairs in Manila. On November 16, 1898, it says the native street-
venders are being interfered with and complain about the licenses they have to
pay ; it also says the residence-streets of the pleasant suburbs of Ermita and
Malate are being invaded by unseemly laundries, tailor-shops, etc., springing up
around the barracks. In the issue of November 30, 1898, there is an enlightening
advertisement : a partner is wanted for a new saloon in the walled city, and he is
assured profits of one hundred and fifty per cent; for, says the advertiser, "In
the present historic moment there are no business undertakings offering as positive
gain as restaurants, bars and taverns, caf^s and saloons of recreation. For here
are the Americans, the most practical men in business matters, and has any of
them started here any other business than that? "

* General Anderson, on July 5, had issued an order reciting the paragraphs of
the Army Regulations relative to respect for private property and for noncom-
batants, with some strong remarks upon the subject, and had directed them to be
reed before each company daily for one week ; be repeated this order in Septem-
ber. Before attacking Manila, General Merritt, in a general order, stated to the
troops that they had " come not as despoilers and oppressors, bat simply as the

jero THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

B. FIRST STEPS IN AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

More or less constant friction was also necessarily involved
in the attempt to administer affairs in Manila, as military
occupation presumes, under the municipal (as distinguished
from international) law previously obtaining there, except as
specially modified by the conqueror. The Spanish system was
in many ways an anomalous one for Americans, whether mili-
tary men or civilians, to undertake to carry out; and in this
instance there was the further anomaly of American possession
being Hmited to the capital and to some general supervision
over navigation, while the remainder of the archipelago, al-
ready to a considerable extent lost to the Spaniards when
Manila fell, was, before the treaty came to confer upon the
United States sovereignty over the whole group, in the hands
of Filipinos, more or less openly hostile to the United States
and to some degree in possession of a governmental organiza-
tion. Inside the city itself, the Spanish prisoners, who were to
a very slight extent deprived of their liberty, more and more
came to be an unnecessary menace to the peace and the health
of the city as it became apparent that Spain was not to retain the
Philippines. Coincidently with the course of events, the hostil-
ity of the native population was gradually being transferred
from Spaniards to Americans, and there was a tendency to

instmments of a strong, free Government, whose purposes are beneficent, and
which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish
misrule " ; and acts of pillage, rapine, or violence were to be punished " on the
spot with the maximum penalties known to military law." This order was fur-
nished to Aguinaldo before the city was taken, as a statement of the attitude of
the United States with regard to private property in time of war. In January, it
became necessary for General Otis to publish some instances where soldiers had
made purchases from native tradesmen and refused to pay, and thereafter during
the course of military operations frequent orders were issued as to respect for
private property and for noncombatants. (See Sen. Doc. 331, pp. 982-89, for such
orders; there also follows a list of trials of officers and soldiers for abuse of na-
tives, mostly in 1899 and 1900.) The orders from Washington at the beginning
of the war, being one of May 17 announcing the adherence of the United States
to the Geneva Convention, and one of May 30 enjoining strict military discipline,
are found in Rq)t, Maj.-Gen. Comm.t 1898, pp. 612-13, 617.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT/ 271

fraternize between the former foes, stimulated by some com-
munity of speech and customs.^

The sanitary condition of the city, overcrowded with troops,
was worse than usual ; and the hygienic conditions prevailing
in Manila under Spanish rule were never other than wretched.
One of the first steps in the reorganization of the city govern-
ment was the estabUshment of a board of health composed of
American army surgeons, which set out at once to vaccinate
the inhabitants of the city more effectively than had ever be-
fore been done. It had also to round up again the 200 or so
lepers who had, at the time of the taking of the city, been
allowed to escape and mingle with the population.^

The Spanish newspapers of Manila, which had resumed pub-
lication a few days after the occupation, adopted the policy,

1 General Otis secured authority from Washington to permit the departure
for the Bisayas of some of the Spanish troops, under the pledges of their officers
that they would not resume hostilities against the United States if a treaty should
not be concluded. He was also glad, under similar authorization, to permit the
sailing for Spain of officers certified to be sick.

• The city health board was organized on September 10, its head being Major Frank
S. Bourns, who had in previous years accompanied two scientific expeditions to the
Philippines and had come with Greneral Merritt to the islands as chief surgeon
of volunteers. The vaccination campaign was vigorously conducted by him. Some
notes on the organization of sanitary work in the city may be found in Dr. Boums's
Report of 1899, exhibit B with appendix M to Otis*s Kept., 1899 (pp. 260-61), and
in appendix UU to General MacArthur's Report for 1900 {Rept. War Dept.^ 1900^
Tol. I, part 10). From the first, prominent Filipino physicians were associated
with the board as advisory members, the first being Drs. T. H. Pardo de Tavera and
Aristdn Bautista Lim. For an account of how the lepers were neglected and al-
lowed to scatter at the time the city was taken, see this subject in appendix AA
to Mac Arthur* $ 1901 Report (Rept. War Dept., 1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 248-60).
The Franciscan friars had been in charge of the leper hospital and of the estate
near Manila which supported it ; on May 23, 1898, they had asked the Spanish
governor-general to release them from their charge, thus admitting, what was a
well-known fact, that the institution was a public one, belonging to the crown of
Spain. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the lepers at the time of the sur-
render of the city and the fact that the Americans subsequently took the hospital
•ad the estate in charge, the following January the Franciscans petitioned that it
bt restored to them, alleging that it belonged to their order. They were, of
course, refused. A most thorough r^surod of the provost-marshal government of
Manila up to August 7, 1901, when the city was again given a civil government,
wae made by Major-General George W. Davis at that time (see Rept. War Dept,
190t, vol. I, part 7, pp. 77-274). Appended to it are all the laws and regulations
promulgated by military authority in this eonnection.

272 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

which, with one or two exceptions, they have steadily followed
ever since, of stimulating hostility between Americans and
Filipinos, principally by holding constantly before the latter,
in the many ways of insinuation in which their editors excel,
the fear of a ruthless "exploitation" by the Americans and
of a fate like that of the red man and the black man in North
America. Finally, one Spanish editor was tried by military
commission and fined heavily and his paper suspended, though
afterward permitted by General Otis to resume publication ;
but in the main, the carefully worded insinuations of these
writers were beyond the reach of the military censor's blud-
geon-like pen, and could only have been prevented by the ab-
solute suppression of their periodicals. Two insurgent papers
also sprang up in Manila; they were at first more cautious,
also more friendly to the Americans ; but when the cables from
Paris showed a determination on the part of the United States
to take over Spain's sovereignty, their political articles began
to be directed chiefly at the Americans and in behalf of Fili-
pino independence, and they removed to Malolos for greater
safety.^ Besides the editor mentioned, two other Spaniards,
officers of the army, were tried by miHtary commission and
convicted of conspiracy and embezzlement of funds of Bili-
bid Prison, which they had been allowed to continue to man-
age for three months under the provost-marshal ; they were
heavily fined, but the imprisonment for three years in each
case was reduced by General Otis to six months.'^

1 See Otis^s RepU^ 1899, pp. 52-53, and Military Secretary Crowder's r^sum^
of the activity and attitude of the Spanish press up to 1901, in Rept. War Dept.f
1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 250-62.

* See Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 51-52; also the Historia Negra of "Capitan Verda-
des," pp. 179-84, for the full findings of the military commission in these trials,
translated into Spanish. The two officers convicted were subordinates; their supe-
rior, who was in direct charge of the prison, escaped conviction, with which finding
of the commission General Otis disagreed. Their prosecution was due to the in-
vestigations of Brigadier-General R. P. Hughes, the very active provost-marshal-
general of Manila from early in September 1898, to late in May, 1899. After the
action was well under way, the Spanish authorities made a demand that they be
allowed to try and punish the offenders, which was refused. Later, one of the

' CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 273

When the Americans entered the city, Bilibid Prison con-
tained about two thousand prisoners, neariy all Filipinos, and
about half of them charged with political offenses under the
Spanish regime, while of those supposed to be held on purely
criminal charges a large proportion had no definitely formulated
cases against them, and some had been awaiting trial in the slow-
going courts for not only months but years. The political of-
fenders were soon released, and on July 1, 1899, the prison
contained only about one thousand prisoners, of whom two
himdred were there upon conviction under the operations of
American military courts. In this " jail-delivery " some few bad
criminals escaped, mainly owing to the faulty character of the
Spanish records or the absence of records, and the Spaniards
had a good deal to say about the turning of these criminals
loose upon the population.^

The question was also raised by Filipinos as to the return
by the American Government of property which had been em-
bargoed by Spain, under the decree by General Blanco, during
1896 and 1897. Under the law of military occupancy, it not
yet being certain what would be the future sovereignty over
the islands, it had to be held that the United States might
be responsible to Spain for retaining and administrating these
possessions; and, though the properties and all their proceeds
under American control were subsequently turned over to the
owners by order of the Secretary of War, considerable criti-
cism was meanwhile excited among the Filipinos.^

prisoners, who had prominent social connections, was released on payment of his
fine, subscribed by Spaniards, and upon presentation of a petition headed by Arch-
bishop Nozaleda.

* See Rept. War Dept^ 1901 1 vol. I, part 7, p. 79 (the previonsly cited report of
General G. W. Dayis). Also, Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 12-13. That the 1898 " jaO-
delivery" was not complete as to prisoners held in Bilibid without the proper
formulation of charts against them was indicated by the release of nearly one hun-
dred more in 1900, through the writ of haheoi cnrptut.

« See Otis't Rept., 1899, pp. 38-39, 288. The particular case in point was that of the
estate of a prominent family of half-casten, most of them in Hongkong since 1896
or 1897, who had in May induced Consul-General Wildman to cable to Washinq^ton
their " allegiance *' to the United states, and later to implore Senator Hanna in their

274 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The attempts of the Spanish judges of lower courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction, in several instances plainly in behalf of inter-
ested parties, compelled the military authority to intervene and
suspend their operations. General Merritt's proclamation of
military government had contemplated the continuance of the
civil courts already in existence in the city, and, in organizing
provost courts on August 22, he had exempted from the oper-
ations of the civil courts only those cases in which one or more
of the parties should be connected with the American army.
General Otis found it necessary to modify the inferential jur-
isdiction thus left residing in the existing civil courts by pro-
viding, on October 7, that they should have no jurisdiction
whatever in criminal cases, and should exercise jurisdiction in
civil cases " subject to such supervision as the interests [of the
military government] might demand." The judges of the Au-
diencia (Spanish supreme court) refused to act under such su-
pervision, and, from that time until the following May, Manila
was without civil courts.*

Operating in another branch of the former administration,
certain Spanish officials and other Europeans, as well as a few
Americans, undertook to carry through a very badly conceived
plan for plastering over with fictitious mining claims a goodly
portion of the public domain of the archipelago. The mining
bureau, a branch of the Spanish Directorate of Civil Admin-
istration, was not formally taken over by the American author-
ities until March, 1899, and in the interval from May 1, 1898,
when not only were the officials in Manila effectually " bottled
up," but mining prospectors had small chance to do any work
in the rest of the archipelago, three times as many claims

behalf (Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 334, 361). General Otis remarks that Consuls Wildman
and Williams were very active in their behalf.

* Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 11-12, 35-36. See also the r^sumd of «' Military Com-
missions and Provost Courts," by Military Secretary Crowder, in Rept. War Dept.,
1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 245-4:7. A summary of the more important military orders
afEeoting governmental administration, up to the time of civil government, is given
in the preliminary number of the Official Gazette of the Philippines, published at
Manila under date of January 1, 1903.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 275

were denounced as had ever been established in all the pre*
ceding years. These frauds were readily discovered by the
American officer who, in 1900, took charge of the bureau, but
meantime and thereafter attempts were made to float fictitious
mining companies on the strength of the recognition which
had been obtained from the Spanish officials.^

Anticipating the military occupation of Manila, if not of
other portions of the archipelago, the Government at Wash-
ington had, on July 19, sent out to General Merritt transla-
tions of the Spanish customs tariffs in the islands, only modi-
fying them by making them applicable against Spain as
against other nations and by imposing an internal-revenue tax
on tobacco and its manufactures. When this document arrived,
the new customs authorities were already administering the
old laws, with their cumbersome surcharges and faulty classi-
fications, as best they could ; and, partly on the ground that
the status quo ante had already been proclaimed, Spanish and
other foreign merchants in the city were quick to protest
against the comparatively few changes made. Finally, after
several postponements to permit shipments contracted for in
Spain under the old privilege of free entry of goods from

^ Lieutenant C. H. Burritt, the industrioas o£Bcer in charge of the mining bureau
during 1900 to 1903, made a moit entertaining report on this matter to General
MacArthur in 1900 (Rept. War Dept., 1900, vol. i, part 10, appendix II). He shows
that the claims filed from May 1, 1898, to March 29, 1899, numbered 1618 and
oovered almost 150,000,000 square meters, while those established during all the
preceding years of Spanish rule numbered 594 and covered about 50,000,000
•quare meters of territory. One of the steps taken in the effort to comply, osten-
■ibiy, with the very precise Spanish provisions as to proof of claim, surveys, etc.,
WM to get the certificate of United States Consul Williams in Manila to the au-
thenticity of the documents used in filing. In one case, at least, the report shows
the consul's certificate to state that, " because of want of custody of Spanish books
of record in such matters, I, as representing whatever of Spanish authority that
remains, do hereby recognize," etc. With the definite transfer of sovereignty to
the United States, the post of United States consul at Manila became, of course,
an anomaly; in January, 1901, Mr. Williams was made consul-general at Singa-
pore. Other points brought out in Lieutenant Burritt's report are the plundering
of the survey maps of the mining bureau and the malicious destruction of a micro-
scope and of other property, during the time the Spanish officials remained ia
charge.

k

276 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

there (with the payment merely of the surcharges for harbor
improvement, etc.) to be received by these merchants, the
tariff was put into effect on November 10 ; the new excise kid
upon tobacco had, however, been omitted from it, as it was
devised without knowledge of the conditions in the Philip-
pines, and was virtually prohibitive of the manufacture and
sale of cigarettes.^

The difficulties attendant upon the resumption of inter-
island trade were yet more embarrassing. The foreign busi-
ness houses were anxious to obtain the waiting hemp and
tobacco crops upon which their money had been advanced, and
the Government was also desirous of having this commerce
renewed, with its influence toward the normalization of condi-
tions throughout the archipelago. But there were two other
factors to be taken into account : the Spanish military author-
ities held possession of the principal ports of the central is-
lands, and theoretically asserted the sovereignty of Spain over
all the archipelago outside of Manila ; and the Filipinos were in
possession of practically all Luzon, as well as of some of the
hemp ports in the Bisayas, while the Government at Malolos,
everywhere more or less obediently recognized by them, had
imposed a 10 per-cent tax on all inter-island shipments, be-
sides establishing various regulations which gave wide oppor-
tunity for "squeeze." As between the Spaniards and Americans,
it was easily agreed that vessels flying the American flag

1 See Otis's Rept., 1899y pp. 14, 30, 48-49; also, Collector James F. Smith's
humorous report of 1901 {Rept. War DepL^ 1901 y vol. I, part 4, p. 283). There was,
in some cases, very serious doubt of the good faith of merchants who claimed to have
contracted for goods from Spain before the outbreak of war and to have been pre-
vented from securing their free entry in Manila by the events of the war, as well
as a likelihood that some of the shipments had been purchased elsewhere than in
Spain and reinvoiced from there. Among the War Department documents are
Customs Tariff and Regulations of the Philippine Islands, 1898, and Tariff Circulars^
1898-1900 (Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines). The revised tariff, as put into
effect in November, 1898, was also republished in Manila under the foregoing
title. For a War Department ruling on a case of Spanish goods arriving after the
tariff went into effect against Spain, see Magoon's Reports (long title, Law of Civil
Government under Military Occupation: Washington, 1902), pp. 625-30.

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 277

should be permitted to enter the Spanish ports, in return for
a like privilege for vessels flying the Spanish flag and entering
Manila Bay. Most of the vessels in the inter-island trade had
hoisted the American flag, under fictitious transfers to Amer-
ican citizens (which transfers were winked at by the American
authorities, in order not to render inter-island traffic an impos-
sibility), as a vessel with the Spanish flag was liable to prompt
seizure in ports held by the FiHpinos. For fear of subsequent
claims for damages against their Government, the Spanish
authorities in the Bisayas refused to give clearances for such
ports ; and, as those vessels traded from port to port, and the
Filipinos were constantly gaining control of new points, with
the withdrawal of Spanish troops, they were frequently stopped
after having cleared satisfactorily from Manila. Complaints
and discontent, of course, succeeded, and the natural result
was that the foreign business houses were led more and more
to come to amicable terms with the insurgent authorities, a
thing which some of them had already been very forward in
doing, and which bore consequences of importance later on,
when some of these houses, in order to carry on their profit-
able trade in war-times, furnished the funds which maintained
insurrection against the United States.^

From the outset of American administration in the Philip-
pine Islands, the customs taxes have produced much the greater
portion of the revenue: this is now the consequence of the
governmental policy as adopted into laws, not of conditions
which, as at the outset, limited the operations of American
tax-collectors to Manila. As we have seen, the customs reve-
nues, due in large part to the discrimination in favor of im-
ports from Spain, and also in no small degree to both incom-
petent and corrupt administration of the customs service, were,

> See Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 45-48, 70-71. After November 26, the merchants
were warned that all inter-island traffic was at their own risk. A new aspect was
pat upon affairs with the outbreak of insurrection ap^ainst the United States, as
Aguinaldo forbade the entry of a ship flying the American flag into any Filipino
port

h

«78 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

up to 1898, secondary to the receipts from the personal taxes.
The cedula (personal registration certificate), reputedly so un-
popular with the Filipinos, was at first abolished; but the
people were so habituated to its use, and to the necessity of
having it as a means of establishing identity, that it was
restored, with only a nominal charge for issuance (at first, 20
cents Mexican). The tax on house-rents was continued in
Manila, as well as various forms of municipal licenses, with
some modifications ; but the internal-revenue taxes involved,
for the most part, the conduct of business of a general char-
acter throughout the archipelago, and all such were held un-
collectible by the military occupant of the capital city. The
public revenues obtained from these various sources were
made disbursable for purposes connected with the administra-
tion of government, as distinguished from purely military pur-
poses, and a military officer was appointed auditor of these
civil funds.^

The Manila branches of the two large English banking
concerns of the Orient were pressing to have the Spanish pro-
hibition of the importation of Mexican dollars removed, as the
amount of currency on hand was insufficient for the sudden
increase of trading operations in the city incident to the re-
opening of commerce and the occupation by an army from the
United States. They claimed that only thus could they be
sure of continuing to quote a rate of two Mexican dollars for
one American, or better; and upon their pledge to maintain
such a ratio, their request was granted.^

1 See Otis's Rept.^ 1899, pp. 30-33 ; also pp. 275-94 (appendix O, Report of the
Treasurer of Public Funds). From the first, there was a tendency among the mili-
tary officers to stretch the public civil funds to cover really military purposes,
notably for transportation of officers about the city, rent of quarters, etc.

• The banks continued to make a profitable business of exchange until July,
1900, when the tronble in China sent silver up and disturbed the ratio, causing these
banking concerns very speedily to seek relief from the Government. Until then,
they had continued to quote such rates as gave them a profit on exchange whichever
I way it was made. See Report of Taft Philippine Commissionf 1900, pp. 8o-87, for
a history of this matter.

J

CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THREAT 279

In another important respect, existing kws having an eco-
nomic bearing were modified, namely, by the abolition of
Spanish regulations as to Chinese immigration, registration,
etc., and the substitution for them in September of the United
States prohibitory laws and regulations, with some modifica-
tions in the latter designed to permit the entry of Chinese
who coiJd prove former residence in the islands. Supposedly,
this was a change dictated from Washington. The traditional
hostility between Filipinos and Chinese made it also a popular
measure in the islands. Inside the city, the military govern-
ment from the first employed the Chinese extensively as la-
borers. Outside, they were quite generally liable to become
the victims of native hostility or had to purchase immunity if
they continued their business operations ; the connection of
various wealthy Chinese half-castes with the revolution as con-
tributors, and in several instances their active association with
its military organization (notably in the case of General Paua,
of Albai province), did not signify anything in this respect, as
Chinese half-castes in the Philippines invariably are recognized
as Filipinos and assume that status.^

* Otis*8 Rept.f 1899f pp. 33-35. There seems to be no published evidence as to
whether or no Washington dictated the Chinese ezclosion order ; but it maj fairlj
be assumed that action in so important a matter was not taken without consulta-
tion. However, in February, 1899, when the Chinese Minister at Washington
made his first queries about this matter, Secretary of State Haj apparently did
not know of Otis's exclusion order. (See Foreign Relations^ United States^ 1899,
pp. 207-17, for the correspondence of that year on the subject, the exclusion order
iteelf, a circular of the Philippine customs administration dated September 28,
1898, being cited on p. 211.) In August, the State Department informed Minister
Wa that the exclusion order was a ** military measure," as yet not a settled policy
of the United States Grovemment ; the minister had entered formal protest
agmisft it.

CHAPTER Vn

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION

It is now necessary to turn back and examine the steps in
the formation of the rival organization of government which
was in active opposition to the remnant of Spanish power left
in the archipelago and was preparing for opposition to the
Americans, in case they attempted to take the place of Spain.
Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, the processes of
revolutionary organization and the character of the govern-
ment instituted by the Filipinos, obscured as they have been
by conflicting testimony and by the meagerness of the evi-
dence made public, become the queries of greatest importance
connected with the events of 1898. A resume of the insur-
gent proclamations up to the capture of Manila has already
been given, and enough was therein brought out to indicate
that the revolution was not organized from below, but im-
posed from above — this only with reference, for the moment,
to the civil organization of government, and leaving out of
consideration the question whether the masses were eager to
volunteer for military service or were coerced into it. For the
very reason that the spontaneity of the movement is somewhat
in doubt, it becomes important to discover the persons and
the personalities behind it and to inquire as to their repre-
sentative character.

The first thing made clear by the study of the records is
that Aguinaldo, whose name was always and everywhere em-
ployed, first in the Tagalog provinces and later in other parts
of Luzon and the Bisayas, and whose name has constantly ap-
peared in these pages as if he were the very soul of the move-
ment, was really a subordinate — though a gilded and insignia-
clad subordinate, to be sure — in the camp where the revolution

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 281

was making. Many partial explanations of this fact have been
offered : the view most favorable to Aguinaldo (which imphes,
too, that he was not really a subordinate) is that he was
shrewd enough to draw to himself all sorts and factions of
Filipinos and to balance them one against another, while at
the same time sufficiently disinterested and sincerely solicitous
for the welfare of his country and his people to take advice
and counsel from all sides and to subject his personal ambi-
tions and wishes to the opinions of men of greater education
and attainments ; a very common opinion, held by Filipinos of
discrimination as well as by Americans, is that he was the
merest figurehead. There is considerable truth, it is probable,
in both these views. The personal jealousies and factional dis-
sensions which seem inevitably to attend every purely Filipino
movement, and generally to its disruption, made it all the
more easy for a Filipino of not too decided views and of no
arrogance of intellectual attainments to gather about him his
prominent countrymen of different camps who would almost
surely have set up rival claims if one or the other of their
own number had assumed leadership. Moreover, if name and
prestige with the masses were essential, what more natural
than that the middle<;lass Filipino who had estabhshed him-
self as a quasi-divinity by his military operations in Cavite in
1896, who had been deemed by the Spaniards of sufficient
importance to balance the account, along with a mere hand-
ful of rifles and a score of companions, against $800,000
in 1897, and who now came back surrounded by all the
glamour which familiarity with the American conqueror in
Manila Bay could give him, should be regarded as the man of
the hour ?

If we were here passing judgment on Aguinaldo personally, it
would be necessary to note that there is no satisfactory proof
of his insincerity in the cause he espoused, and that he proved
at least capable of maintaining his position as the balance be-
tween the Filipino factions and as the idol of the masses until

282 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the insurrection and he himself were driven into hiding; but
that judgment we may well leave for the events themselves to
indicate.

The Aguinaldo, however, whom a great many Americans
have since 1898 been constructing from his proclamations, his
instruments of government, and the false prominence given to
his name in everything was really another man, whose name
was Apolinario Mabini. He was the Aguinaldo who devised
the schemes of government, afterward ostensibly ratified by
the representatives of the people ; who dictated nearly every
important move up to the transfer of the organization to
Malolos ; who thereafter, except when there were momentary
changes of oracle, continued to speak through the mouth of
Aguinaldo the President, in matters of civil organization, and
to a large extent even in the direction of military operations,
until his downfall from control in May, 1899. Mabini, though
a student-radical, was, as previous mention of him will have
disclosed, not the less a radical of radicals. A man of ideas
and not of action, he soon found himself the inspiring lever
of a machine created out of human masses stirred from
lethargy by the name and prestige of another, for whom in-
tellectually he had considerable contempt ; and some of the
analogies of his favorite study, the French Revolution, seemed
to have moved him to re-perpetrate it in the hitherto lethargic
tropical Orient. Obviously, here was a man whose friendship
or whose hostility to the United States might prove to be very
important to the Government, if its future poUcy was to in-
volve connection with the Philippines in one form or another.
Yet no American, whether of the army or of the navy, seemed
for a long time to have ascertained what position in the midst
of affairs was held by this paralytic who had been carried over
to Cavite soon after Aguinaldo arrived; and it was only
through Filipinos favorable to the Americans that it was
later discovered that he was the chief obstacle at Malolos to
their efforts toward conciliation. It suited Mabini's dispo-

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 283

sition as well as bis aims at the time to remain in the back-
ground. He seems to have been at least suspicious of the
Americans from the first, and, though he had been connected
•with the revolt of 1896 only as a sympathizer, he was now
fully bent on seeing his dream of an independent Filipino
republic realized.^

All the proclamations, decrees, and other published docu-
ments of Aguinaldo of May, June, July, and August, 1898,
were from the pen of Mabini, with the probable exception of
two or three of the shorter proclamations in which Aguinaldo
protests his unfitness for the position which he had just so
boldly assumed.'^ Besides those which have been found avail-
able for citation above, Mabini, whose pen scarcely ever
rested, edited a great many other documents and projects, some
of which attained printed form later as regulations of the exec-
utive department or as laws of the Congress, while others have
never seen the light.^ One of these, issued in pamphlet form

^ See above, p. 93, footnote, for Mabiui's own statement of his change of atti-
tude between 1896 and 1898. Contrary to the belief generally entertained in the
United States, Mabini was not an old man, but was barely thirty-three at the
time of his death from cholera at Manila in 1903, hence only about twenty-eight,
or slightly younger than Aguinaldo, when these two joined forces at Cavite in
1898 ; the paralysis of his lower limbs led to the belief that he was old, and he was
prematurely old, physically at least, though not altogether through the visitations
of Providence. He came of humble parents, pure Tagalogs, of Tana wan, Batan-
gai, and, after getting his bachelor's degree in arts, worked as an employee of the
Spanish civil administration and in a lawyer's office in order to be able to finish his
coarse in law, which he did in 1895. His connection with Liga Filipina was men-
tioned in the chapter m (footnote), p. 93, as cited above; after his release from
arrest in 1897, he returned to his native town of Tanawan, where he lived quietly
until shortly after Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. He was wide awake to all that
was going on, however, and had already, in April, before Dewey's arrival, ad-
dressed a manifesto to " the Filipino Revolutionists," taking sides against Spain at
the moment when some of the active participants in the revolt of 1896-97 were
protesting their loyalty.

* This Spanish habit of groveling in the dirt and protesting one's personal un-
fitness or incapacity for a task he is voluntarily taking upon himself has left its
mark upon almost all the Filipinos ; scarcely one of them ever opens a speech in
public or starts a contribution to a newspaper without wasting much time or space
by protesting his own inability to enlighten bis auditors or readers, so vastly
superior to him in wisdom.

' Some of these are now, in manuscript form, in the possession of Mabini's
brother at Manila, who has offered them for tale in order to secure funds with

284^ THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

from the official printing establishment which the revolu-
tionists set up at Bakoor in July, 1898, was perhaps the most
interesting document of the whole Filipino revolution. It con-
tained Mabini's " Constitutional Programme of the Philippine
Republic," and was so entitled. Many of the provisions of the
constitution as drafted by Mabini had already been promul-
gated in the Aguinaldo decrees, and this work formed the
basis of the constitution afterward adopted at Malolos. A dis-
cussion of the modifications subsequently made in this scheme
of government and of the practical workings of it constitutes
practically the whole history of the insurrection as a civil or-
ganization. Yet in some ways a more interesting and a more
significant document was that published under the same cover,
entitled " The True Decalogue." It is a sort of political Ten
Commandments, inculcating the Christian doctrine of love of
God and fellow-man, but proceeding therefrom to develop a
doctrine especially fitted to the circumstances, viz., that all
Filipinos should see in their fellow-countrymen " something
more than in their fellow-man," should cultivate their intelli-
gences, and should reject all authority but that which was sanc-
tioned by themselves. The significance of such a doctrine, given

which to publish the memoirs left by Mabini at his death (from two chapters of
which, as given advance publication in a Manila newspaper, citations have already
been made herein). Mabini's decree of July 30, 1898, providing for the organi-
zation of the revolutionary army, underwent various modifications, but it was the
basis of the similar decree of Aguinaldo (published only in El Heraldo de la Re~
vcluddri) and the regulations issued later on. The Library of Congress seems to
have only the reprints of a few of these documents made at Nueva Cflceres in
1899 (see A List of Books on the Philippine Islands in the Library of Congress^
p. 164) ; and, in general, American writers and American publications have given
but scant consideration to the documentation of the insurrection in the Philippines.
The appeal to foreign powers for recognition, under date of August 6, after the
presidents of a few towns could be got together to give the affair a representative
diaracter, was particularly Mabiniesque, and his manuscripts show that it was his
work. This, as seen above, has received wide publication ; quite the contrary is
true of his manifesto of August 18, 1898, " against the unjust procedure of the
American Army " (in refusing to share the occupation of Manila with the Fili-
pmos), which was intended only for Filipino circulation, and which the objections
of the Filipinos working for conciliation caused to be partially or wholly sup-
pressed.

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 285

to the masses in a semi-religious form at such a time, is ap-
parent enough ; it is not less interesting as shedding a strong
light upon the mental makeup of the new leader, Mabini.
His ideas, as set forth in the " True Decalogue " and in the
accompanying manifesto, for a revolution of customs and
habits along with the poUtical revolution, were excellent, though
he seemed to make scant allowance for the fact that such
internal revolution comes only by evolution. But over and
above all else in connection with this strange document, one
cannot but think of the unconscious intellectual egotism and
of the almost total lack of humor of the man who put it forth.*
Just how far Mabini was identified with the practical steps
taken for the extension of the revolution as a military organ-
ization, it is not easy to say ; and it is readily apparent that
herein lay the real work of the propaganda, and that, if he
was not supreme in this respect, it is easy to exaggerate the
importance of the leadership he exercised. He was always an
idealist and a man of theories, rather than a practical organ-
izer, much more of a political critic than of a statesman ; and
the work which was done in the Tagalog provinces in May
and June, in other parts of Luzon in the next three months,
and thereafter in the Bisayas, was by no means mere work of
the pen. Mabini, as we have seen, declared that he did not
belong to the Katipunan of 1896 and 1897, because, as he
says, he did not then think the time had come for armed
revolt, and because, as he does not frankly say, he was not

' This docament haa never, so far at the writer has noted, found any mention
in American publications. Even leaving aside the fact that the history of the con-
stitution adopted at Malolos in January, 1899, is only to be traced in the light of
Blabini's " Programme " and in his early decrees, it is strange also that the jour-
nalists in the Philippines should have overlooked such a " feature " as the *' True
Deealogne." Two versions of this document were printed at Bakoor in July,
1806 ; the Tagalog pamphlet was entitled PanxihUa ta Pagkahand nang Republica
nang PUipina»t and the Spanish Utle is a translation of this : Programa constitu*
eioruU de la Republica Filipina. Aguinaldo's name appears only as authorizing the
sale of these pamphlets among the people at a p«Mta apiece, to obtain funds for
the revolution. The author owes his copies of thtft Ttrtioos respectively to Messn.
Clecnente J. Zulueta and Florentino Torres.

«86 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the sort of man to employ some of the methods of the Kati-
punan. It is rather hard to conceiye of this idealist, who was
busy with efforts to teach the people their duties as patriots,
sanctioning a resort to such methods as were implied in Agui-
naldo's order including all Filipinos, regardless of their wishes,
in the Katipunan and threatening them with this organization's
severe penalties for disloyalty to it.^ The leaders who had in-
spired and maintained the Tagalog revolt of 1896-97 under-
stood, however, that the people with whom they had to deal
could not yet be held together simply by an appeal to ideals,
and that a resort to military coercion and to the methods of
secret organization was necessary. Yet Mabini himself, if not
actually inspiring such methods of organization, could not have
been without cognizance of them ; and, if he ever stopped to
reconcile them with his ideas of a revolution of conscience
and a propaganda of sentiment, it was probably on the basis
of his declaration that he had become satisfied that in 1898
the great majority of the people had turned against Spain be-
cause of her maladministration and her recent cruelties. And,
moreover, there are not lacking indications that Mabini was,
in the early months as well as later, closely identified with the
military programme.^ It was in connection with this pro-

^ This order, which was issned on July 15, the day when Aguinaldo forwarded
to Dewey the proclamations of independence and the decrees organizing the rev-
olutionary government, is among the captured documents now in the War Depart-
ment at Washington. A translation of its most significant paragraph was given in
Cong. Recordy 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6130, in a speech of Senator Spooner, and
reads as follows : " All Filipinos must understand that they are now in the Kati-
punan, whether they want to be or not, and hence it is the duty of all to contribute
life and property to the arduous enterprise of freeing the people, and he who
disobeys must stand ready to receive the corresponding punishment. We can not
free ourselves unless we move forward united in a single desire, and you must
understand that I shall severely punish the man who causes discord and dispute."

* Indeed, it is only too plain how well such appeals to the race instinct as Ma-
bini put in religious form in his " True Decalogue " concorded with the secret
propaganda of the Katipunan, which was founded more frankly on racial feeling
and contemplated the resort to more brutal methods. Many versions of the oath
of the Katipunan have been given, but they all practically amount to the same
thing, differing somewhat in phraseology. Here is the form of initiation and oath,
translated from the original Tagalog, from a document signed March 6, 1900, by

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 287

gramme, however, that Aguinaldo displayed his dominance ;
though it was not altogether undisputed, especially later on,
when the revolution had expanded to include a wider range
both of men and of territory. The influences of favoritism and
nepotism were again at work with Aguinaldo, as they had been
in 1896-97, and his relatives and personal associates of Cavite
were so prominent as to give the lie to Mabini's attractive pic-
ture of a government free from " spoils," founding its dis-
tinctions upon merit and achievements.^

** Moises Abueg," filed as " No. 514-15 of Captured Insurgent Documents " in
the War Department and reproduced here by the courtesy of Captain J. R. M.
Taylor : —

** 1st. From to-day yon will be a brother of the Katipunan, you will understand
your obligation to regard with esteem the true brother of the Katipunan, because
we are born in one and the same country, of one and the same people, descendants
of one and the same blood and color, that is to say, sons of one common mother.

** He who desires to become a brother will be asked the following questions : —

** 1st. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will never do injury to the
Philippines ?

" 2d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will help the Filipino people
in their aspirations ?

" 3d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will always esteem our
brothers of the Katipunan ?

" 4th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will be able to assassinate
your parents, brothers, wife, sons, relatives, friends, fellow-townsmen, or Katipu-
nan brothers should they forsake or betray our cause ?

" 6th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will shed your last drop of
blood in defense of our Mother Country ?

" 6th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will sacrifice your life and
goods when there is the slightest possibility of our brothers being in need of
help?

*' For all of this, that we, your brothers in the Katipunan, may have evidence
of all you have sworn, you will allow us to extract a drop of your blood with which
to write your name, so that we, your brothers of the Katipunan, may know that
you will never betray our cause.

*' This being done, and the blood being drawn, his name will be written in his
own blood, and although it is but a little drop, he will never up to the last hour
of hit life cease to remember to be on his guard as a true brother, for it is blood
drawn from his own body.

*<MoiBE8 Abueo.
•* March 4th, 1900."

^ Whether Mabini ever raised his voice against this favoritism at the time does
not appear ; others did later on, though guardedly, and with the entrance of new
elements into the revolution, especially men of education and position, it was some-
what onrbed. In hit posthumoui memoirs (in which Mabini, who wai deposed

«88 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Coincident with the transfer of the insurgent capital from
Cavite to Bulak^n province early in September, the revolution
entered upon a new phase. This was not, however, because of
the fact that the first revolutionary Congress assembled
and was formally opened at Malolos on September 15,^ but
because there were associated with the congress, and there
were coming into the executive councils of the revolution at
the time a number of men of wider experience and education,
conspicuous among whom were several distinctive conservatives
who unquestionably enjoyed great prestige and respect. As far
as the Assembly itself was concerned, it was representative in
character in no proper sense of the word ; its members had not
been chosen by the voice of the people, and they were to a
very slight degree real representatives of the provinces or the
different tribal divisions for which they were the nominal
spokesmen.^ Moreover, the Assembly was rarely ever more

from power in May, 1899, judges Aguinaldo very harshly), Mabini says : ** Be-
lieving that the aggrandizement of the people was only his own personal aggran-
dizement, he [Aguinaldo] did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, char-
acter, and patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which
united them to him ; and, desiring to have his favorites disposed to sacrifice them-
selves for him, he showed himself lenient toward even their faults." {El Corner^
do, Manila, July 23, 1903.)

1 For a description of this event, see a letter of F. D. Millet, Harper's History ,
pp. 65-72. Among the accompanying illustrations are also those of the menu of
the banquet given at Maloloa on September 29, which was declared " Philippine
Independence Day."

* No one seems ever to have analyzed carefully the membership of the Assem>
bly, though various general statements have been made about it. The Govern-
ment at Washington cabled in 1901 for a list of its members, showing those elected
and appointed, but the one on file in the War Department does not seem to be
final or authoritative. It is not of vital importance, in any event, to know just how
many were elected and how many were appointed directly by Aguinaldo; for, as
will be seen further along, the elections conducted in the provinces were held by
commissioners of his own appointing (usually by his military representatives), and
the men who were chosen in this way, whether as municipal or provincial officers
or as representatives at Malolos, could not be chosen unless acceptable to the per-
sons in charge at the center of insurgent affairs. The decrees of June 18 and 23
provided that the representatives should be chosen by the votes of the chiefs of
the towns of each province, but where the majority of the towns of a province had
not yet liberated themselves from Spanish control, " the Government shall have
power to appoint provisionally those persons who are most distinguished for high
character and social position." Most of the provinces of Luzon (which alone had

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 289

than the mouthpiece of the men who held executive positions,
either in the military or the civil organization or in both, and
such divisions as on rare occasions took place among the mem-
bers were, with one or two exceptions, merely the echoes of
dissensions among the principals of the insurrection. The dis-
cussions of the constitution of the new government occupied
the Assembly for over two months, and kept certain political
theorists quite busy ; it ended in the adoption of practically
the same instrument as Mabini had drawn up, and meanwhile
the government was administered by decrees as it had been
before the Assembly was convened, though that body was oc-
casionally consulted. The real contest going on for several
months at Malolos was not fought on the floor of the Assem-
bly, except as echoes of it were there heard. It was, at first, a
contest between conservatives and radicals to see which should
direct the framing of the plan of government and of a policy
to be adopted as to future relations with the United States ;
entering upon a new phase at about the time the treaty was

been civilly organized under Spain) were to have two representatives each, though
Cavite (which had not yet become a civil government under Spain) was, like Ma-
nila, to have three; the military governments, including all the provinces of the
fiisayaa, and the comandancias were to have one representative each. I have a copy
of the official list of the representatives, furnished by a member of the Assembly.
It contains ninety-four names, but the column headed provinces, which should
show the district supposed to be represented by each member, is blank. Of the
ninety-four members therein listed, forty-eeven are known to me to be Tag^Iogs,
of whom thirty-four live all or a part of the time in Manila; eight are Ilokanot
(one a resident of Manila) ; there are two each from the Kagayan Valley, Panga-
sinan and Pampanga, and two Bikols, the latter residents of Manila; only four are
certainly from Bisayan provinces, of whom one is probably Tagalog by descent;
and twenty-seven names I am unable to place, among whom there may be a few
Bisayans. The list includes such military men as Pio del Pilar and Isidoro Torres.
The majority are half-castes, and it is probable that some among the twenty-seven
unclassified are or were also residents of Manila. In January, 1899, Aguinaldo's
commissioners to treat of a modus vivendi with the Americans admitted that no
delegates to the assembly representing other islands than Luzon had been elected,
being appointed instead (Sen. Doe. SSlt 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2711). The list of
members which they furnished (ibid., p. 2760) is, with the change of one or two
names, the same as that analyzed above, as is also the list printed with the official
edition of the Constituci6n politico de la Repuhlicn Filipino, which contained ninety-
two names. lAter, appointees were added to make the number one hundred and

«90 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

signed at Paris, it became a contest between the partisans of
peace and those of war.

Long before the fall of Manila, the effort of the Span-
iards to draw the Filipino conservatives to themselves had
^^fracased," to use the expressive Spanish intransitive. Some
of these men were in the Filipino camp before the 13th of
August, and Aguinaldo seemed instinctively to feel that they
were the Filipinos whom he should put forward for negotia-
tions with the Americans following the events of that day.
There can be very little doubt that, with the exception of a
very few conspicuous sycophants and hirelings of the Span-
iards, this class of Filipinos were quite as glad to see the
downfall of Spain written upon the wall as were their brothers
who had taken a more decided position and had striven to
bring about that downfall. Those who were simply wait-
ing to see how events would turn, and then to cast their
fortunes on the winning side, were only too numerous, both
in Manila and in the provinces. But there was a handful of
men who, besides having property interests at stake, held very
decided opinions both as to the fitness of the masses for inde-
pendence and of their self-appointed leaders to guide them,
and who, furthermore, even had they felt satisfied on these
points, were sufficiently well posted on international politics
to predict failure for any attempt at that juncture to establish
an independent government in the Philippines. The fact that
these men were now willing to associate themselves to some
degree with the Aguinaldo organization is testimony to the
great importance which that organization had already assumed
among the people, at least of Luzon ; quite as much as that, it
is also evidence that Aguinaldo himself felt that it was im-
portant to have these men nominally if not actively iden-
tified with his cause. ^ In September, the place of Secretary of

1 General (then Major) J. F. Bell, who had been among the Filipinos a great
deal before August 13, in a special report to General Merritt (Sen. Doc. 62^
p. 381), remarked upon the efforts of Aguinaldo to ally with himself prominent
and wealthy Filipinos, as early as August 29.

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 291

Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet, which had been left open until
some one with prestige could be named for it, had been be-
stowed upon Cayetano S. Arellano, generally recognized as
the Filipino of most solid legal attainments and a man re-
spected by all, Spaniards as well as Filipinos. Judge Arel-
lano, who had been named by the Spaniards a member of the
"Consultative Assembly," and had for three months been
eagerly sought also by the Cavite organizers, had held himself
rigidly aloof from affairs until the fall of Manila somewhat
cleared the situation. He had, however, in private letters urged
upon the Filipinos the desirability of securing definitely the
aid and protection of the United States for whatever should
be the future government. This idea was actively pressed upon
Aguinaldo by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, himself the nephew
of a prominent deporte of 1872, a physician and a man of at-
tainments in Oriental linguistics and in the bibliography of
the Philippines, and who, after long residence in Paris and
Spain, returned to Manila a few years before the war between
Spain and the United States. Aguinaldo conferred upon him
the nomination of Director of Diplomacy in the Department
of Foreign Affairs. Gregorio Araneta, a prominent young
lawyer of Manila, of Bisayan birth, also of the conservative
party, was made Secretary of Justice, and Benito Legarda, a
wealthy half-caste business man of the capital, was named Di-
rector of Agriculture, Commerce, etc. Aguinaldo's military
associates, Baldomero Aguinaldo and Mariano Trias, retained
respectively the posts of Secretary of War and Secretary of
the Treasury, while Felipe Buencamino was for a time head
of the Bureau of Public Works. The membership of the
Cabinet shifted so often that it was afterward difficult at times
to say just who was who or what. The main thing to note is
that the more characteristic conservatives remained but a short
time in it. In the background was always Mabini ; and, though
Aguinaldo listened with deference and with every evidence of
agreement to the counsel of the men whose names he was glad

292 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

to make ostentatious display of, they soon discovered that he
was really giving his ear to some one else. The project of ad-
dressing to the United States Government a manifesto asking
the establishment of a protectorate on lines mutually accept-
able was the chief aim of the conservatives. Aguinaldo gave
his verbal assent, and ostensibly the foreign policy of the
Government was to be directed to that end; in fact, it seems
to have been so decided by a formal vote of the Cabinet; but
the representatives who had been empowered to speak for the
Malolos Government in Paris and London and those sent to
the United States were not instructed along those lines. " Ask
for the recognition of our independence," was their word from
Mabini; and to the conservatives at home, Mabini, though at
the outset not holding any official position at all, claimed that
he thought it would be more dignified to wait for the United
States to propose the idea of a protectorate. At the beginning
of November, the distinctive conservatives virtually dropped
their connection with the Malolos Government, though they
did not all formally renounce their relationship with it until
late in December. Whatever connection these gentlemen main-
tained with the Malolos organization from November to Feb-
ruary following was for the purpose of exerting their influ-
ence for peace, and, in some cases at least, this connection was
maintained at the express request of General Otis.^ The atti-

^ See Otis'i Report, 1899, for bis statements aboat how he kept in touch with all
that was going on at Malolos. The fact that these conservatives were so decidedly
favorable to a peaceful arrangement with the United States, and that it was only
this class of men with whom General Otis came in contact, seems to explain in
large part his remarkable optimism, lasting almost up to the outbreak of hostili-
ties ; he appears to have taken it for granted that tbe conservatives were going to
control. Senor Arellano has been, since 1899, the Chief Justice of the Philippine
Court; Senor Araneta was one of its members under the military government, and
is now Solicitor-General; Senores Pardo de Tavera and Legarda were members of
the Taft Philippine Commission. Felipe Buencamino is authority for the statement
that Arellano wrote him in June, 1898, from the province of Laguna, whither he
had retired and where he remained until after the fall of Manila, presenting the idea
of union with the United States, and saying: " Avoid all doing and undoing, and
when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough
to make laws." That remained consistently the political creed of this able jurist.

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 293

tude of the conservatives has been stated by one of them as
follows : —

As soon as it seemed highly probable that the sovereignty of Spain
in this archipelago would be transferred to America . . . the idea
occurred to certain of the wealthy and educated residents of this
capital and of some adjoining provinces of immediately accepting the
new sovereignty. As the absolute independence of the country was
impossible, owing to its peculiar conditions and those of its inhabi-
tants, on account of its situation and of the dangers to which it was
exposed by the conflicting interests of the foreign powers and the
ulterior designs which they might have upon any or all of the islands,
these people thought that this was the best thing that could be done.^

Against this class of men, ordinarily of the greatest pres-
tige and influence among their people, there was arrayed the
paralytic young ex-law clerk Mabini, firm in his ideal of racial
unity and independence, and becoming more and more bitter
toward the Americans every day that it seemed more likely
they would stand in the way of the realization of his dream ;
while behind him — yet for the most part not really in sym-
pathy with his intellectual aims — were the miUtary chiefs and

who, Governor Taft has repeatedly stated, would honor the highest bench of any
country. For testimony on these points, especially regarding the e£Port of the
conserratives in September and October of 1898 to address to the United States
an appeal for a protectorate, see exhibits B and C of Mac Arthur^ 8 Report of 1901
(Rept. War DepL, 1901, vol. i, part 4, pp. 117, 120); Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900, vol.
n, pp. 390-92 (Dr. Tavera's testimony); and Sen. Doc. 62, p. 604. The last cita-
tion is from the testimony at Paris of General Whittier, who stated that he had a
personal interview with Aguinaldo at Malolos on October 25, when the latter said
"that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute inde-
pendence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal;
that he is waiting to see who will have the majority ; in that case to take his posi-
tion." Dr. Tavera, testifying in Aug^ist, 1899, gave it as his opinion that Agui-
naldo merely pretended to accept the conciliatory policy in the early fall of 1898
and that he identified the conservatives with him to " keep them from forming a
party." In exhibit B of MacArthurU Report, Buencamino says that the plan of a
protectorate was adopted in the Cabinet meeting, but that at the same time the
youthful propagandist, Teodoro Sandiko, came to Aguinaldo from Manila and as-
iored him that the Japanese consul had told him his country would help the Fili-
pinos to their independence, and thereupon independence stock once more rose in
the Malolos market.

^ See exhibit C (statement of Florentine Torres, of MacArthur*t Report), cited
in preceding note.

294 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

civilian place-hunters, now occupying positions of greater
power, prestige, and gain than ever before, or than they might
expect to hold in any stable society, and having no desire to
relinquish these benefits. There was a large number of mod-
erately educated men, especially in the provinces, who, from
former association with the Filipino propaganda of reform, or
from having been made to suffer recently at the hand of Spain,
or from a natural sympathy of race, were inclined to go with
the Malolos Government in anything it might do ; if reached,
these men might readily fall in with the position of the out-
spoken conservatives, especially after the Malolos mihtary or-
ganization began to commit abuses in their localities, but
otherwise they would accept the decision of their compatriots
at the center of affairs, whether for independence, a protec-
torate, or even quite complete American control. As for the
great majority of the people, they, as always, awaited the word
from above ; it was to be taken into account, however, even
though their initiative in this or any other matter is com-
pletely out of the question, that the stories they had heard
about the Americans, first from the Spaniards and now from
the military Filipinos, made them quite ready to regard the
newcomers as a scourge to be averted if possible.

It is less important to make a detailed study of just what
were the ideals of government of certain Filipinos, as revealed
in the constitution and decrees of Mabini and the constitution
as modified in some degree by the Assembly, than it is to com-
pare these pretensions as to what government should be with
the practical workings of the institutions which the Filipinos
called into being. Of course, it is easy to be unfair to them in
doing so ; it was a time of war and social disturbance, and the
government they put in operation can in no sense be consid-
ered to have had a fair trial. On the other hand, we have, for
these present purposes, to deal with facts, not with written
proclamations, and it is also to be borne in mind that the the-
oretical constitutions of men like Mabini do not by any means

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 295

indicate what sort of government the Filipinos would conduct
for themselves if they had a fair start and were working under
normal conditions. Even with all allowance for the unsettled
state of affairs in 1898 and 1899, there are certain discrep-
ancies between the principles of the revolution as proclaimed
at Bakoor and Malolos and the actual operations of its various
branches which we cannot overlook.*

First, we have to note that the strict separation of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers, proclaimed both in the
Mabini and Malolos instruments in various ways, was a thesis
merely. It was not only infringed by various provisions for
expanded powers of the executive that were written into these
constitutions themselves, but was virtually rendered null and
void by the operations of the clique of men who directed the
Government and who could base almost any assumption of
power by the executive upon the reading of some of the vague
" provisional clauses " of the constitution. Mabini and the
others, who, to a lesser degree, dabbled in constitutional writ-
ing, were not at all familiar with the history of parliamentary
and constitutional government in those countries wherein in
modern times such government had been originated and car-
ried through to success. Their model was Spain and the Span-
ish-American countries, and the direct connection of the
Filipino constitution with those of Spanish or semi-Spanish
institutions, particularly with those of the Argentine Republic
and Mexico, may be easily traced. Part of the preamble to the
Constitution of the United States was copied literally ; but in
the main such influence as that constitution had upon the
Malolos document is seen in provisions which came to the lat-
ter filtered through the constitutions of Spanish-American

' As the Malolos Constitution has been widely circulated in Rept. Phil. Comm.f
1900 (vol. I, exhibit iv), and in Sen. Doc. t08 (part 1, p. 207 et teq.)^ and as this
document was so largely based upon the draft made by Mabini, it has been thonght
unnecessary to make either of these documents a part of this rolume. The Span-
ish text of the Malolos Constitution may be found in the official editions issued
from the Barasoain press in 1890, under the title Corutitucidn politica de la Repub-
Uca Filipina.

296 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

republics. Mabini provided for the election of the President
of the Republic by delegates, or electors, of the provinces,
themselves chosen by delegates from the municipalities, as in
Mexico ; at Malolos, this was altered so as to provide for the
election of the President by the Assembly itself — thus vio-
lating at the very outset the principle of mutual independence
of the three branches of the government. He had a four-year
term, and Mabini gave him an absolute veto, which the Malo-
los Assembly provided might be overruled by a two-thirds vote.
Whereas Mabini conferred upon the Assembly the specific
powers ordinarily considered vital to parliamentary govern-
ment, discussion at Malolos and the growing demand for ex-
ecutive control caused these powers to be sadly curtailed, and
they appeared only in a modified form, and negatively, as
prohibitions upon the power of the executive to negotiate
treaties, alienate territory, etc., except after the consent of the
Assembly.^

The qualifications, manner of election, and number of mem-
bers of the Assembly were not prescribed in the constitution,
but left to a special law, which had been passed upon the lines
laid down by Mabini in his draft. As for qualifications, aside
from that of being twenty-five years of age or more, there
were only certain general stipulations that the men chosen
must be fit and worthy, of which the most specific was a
property qualification (itself indefinite), to the effect that
every representative must possess a " steady income assuring
him a decorous and independent life." Plainly, the provision
of Mabini that, after the census had been taken, there should
be one representative for each 25,000 people (though not

^ One of the instances of the failure of the Filipino authorities to preserve the
separation of the powers of government (or, more probably, really to comprehend
what was so repeatedly proclaimed as a principle of their government) is seen in
Aguinaldo's instructions to the President of the Assembly on November 16, 1898,
that he should report weekly all members absent and the excuses given fop
absence. (See brief of same, p. 42 of the compilation of insurgent documents by
J. R. M. Taylor entitled Report on the Organization of Civil Government by Emilio
Aguinaldo and his FollowerSj which will be cited hereafter as Taylor's Rept.)

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 297

more than five to any one province) would require men of
property; the taxing capacity of the Filipino people would
make a congress of 250 men a heavy burden. The idea of a
permanent committee of the legislature to sit during its re-
cesses and see that the government is not looted by the execu-
tive (that seems to be its chief end) was copied from the legis-
lative schemes of Spain and the Spanish-American countries.
Though it was provided that no national debt should be in-
curred without the consent of the Assembly, and that this
body should also fix the size of the army, nevertheless the pro-
vision whereby it should pass on the budget annually presented
by the executive might easily warrant the incurring of ex-
penditures by the executive which the legislature would be
compelled to pay; the initiative in this respect lay with the
executive, not with the legislature. In providing for the right
of the members of the Cabinet to appear on the floor of the
Assembly and take part in the discussion, yet requiring them
to withdraw before the vote, there was some confusion of ideas
as to the separation of powers; apparently, the Filipinos halted
between a plan of responsible cabinet government and that of
which the United States is the principal example, as when
they proclaimed their government to be " popular, representa-
tive, alternative, and responsible."

Again, such a provision as that giving the President power
to " see that in the entire territory speedy and complete jus-
tice shall be administered " was open to all sorts of possibili-
ties for interference, not merely with local governments, but
also with the judiciary. As a matter of fact, the new Govern-
ment never came to possess a real judiciary, and therein lay
perhaps its chief defect, considering the opportunity which its
quasi-military tribunals afforded for abuses. No provision was
made for courts in the constitution, except that inferentially
there was to be a supreme court; its organization and that of
all subordinate courts was left to the Assembly to provide by
laws, except that the Chief-Justice and Attorney-General were

298 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

to be nominated by the Assembly " with the concurrence of
the President and his Cabinet," and it was asserted that these
judicial officers should have "absolute independence of the
executive and legislative powers." Mabini's constitution had
provided an elaborate system of courts, from the supreme court
to the justices of peace, including district audiencias and pro-
vincial courts. In spite of the oft-declared separation of the
branches of government, the courts were, according to him,
to "see to the execution of their judgments." Yet they were
strictly limited to the application of the particular law to the
particular case; there was, in repeated ways, the appearance
of the Spanish idea of hedging about the discretion of the
judge, who becomes, under that system, a sort of refined auto-
maton for the application of the haii^fine distinctions of a lit-
eral code to the adjudication of a specific right or the pre-
measured punishment of a criminal. Evidently having the
abuses of the Spanish summary courts in mind, Mabini strove
to throw about the individual the safeguards of such a bul-
wark as the writ of habeas corpus ; not knowing what that
procedure was, he but stabbed after it with his pen in the
dark. At Malolos they followed him in providing that every
man arrested must be arraigned within twenty-four hours, and
must be committed for trial or released within seventy-two
hours ;^ but no penalty was ever provided for the violation of
this guaranty, nor was any specific procedure provided as the
remedy for such violation. Similarly, with the declarations as
to the inviolability of domicile and other individual rights;
and Mabini's very definitely worded prohibition of the confis-
cation of property, except by the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain, was not closely copied in the Constitution of
Malolos, which would appear to have left the door open for
the embargo and enjoyment of the income of private prop-
erty, if not actually for its confiscation. Nor was Mabini fol-
lowed in his prohibition upon the entail of property (in line

' The full benefits of this guaranty were, however, accorded only to Filipinos.

THE FIUPINO ORGANIZATION 299

with his idea of a republic which should eventually place all
men upon an equaHty), nor in his prohibition of the pain of
death, except for military insubordination in the face of the
enemy, nor in his other rather vague efforts to do away with
the abuses of military courts. For, in the mean time, military
courts and the courts of civihans which might virtually be
called military courts were in full operation under the pro-
visional decrees of Aguinaldo, and these courts furnished
what administration of justice there was in most of the prov-
inces for a long time — except directly under the sword of
the district commander of the Filipino army. The decrees
of June gave the municipal and provincial executive officers
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, which were to be con-
ducted for the time being under the existing Spanish codes : in
criminal cases, the municipal chief was to conduct the prelim-
inary examination and remit prisoners for trial to the provin-
cial board of four members; in civil cases, the municipal coun-
cils of four members were to sit as a court of first instance,
and their decisions went on appeal to the provincial board; in
both civil and criminal cases, there was appeal to a permanent
committee of nine members of the Assembly of the central
government. As legal attainments were not specifically re-
quired for any of these offices, it may be supposed that such a
system, even though temporary, left a very large opening for
all sorts of abuses. Yet a distrust of courts and of judges, born
of years of experience under the thoroughly corrupt Spanish
judicial system in the islands, had spoken in a dozen generally
worded safeguards of Mabini's, and had appeared in the final
constitution as Article 81 : " Any citizen can institute a public
prosecution against any of the members of the judicial power
for the crimes they may commit in the exercise of their office.''
It is quite common in Spanish- American countries for local
executive officers to possess also the powers of a sort of police
judge; but here the entire judicial power, both in civil and
criminal matters, was turned over to the executive and legis-

300 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

lative branches of government. Perhaps it is even fortunate
that the events which brought one war upon the heels of
another in the PhiHppine provinces prevented this civil juris-
diction from being exercised. And even before the second
war brought the excuse for the proclamation of martial law,
the military power was almost invariably supreme in the prov-
inces, as well in judicial matters as in executive. Aguinaldo's
decree of June 23 had devoted a whole chapter to "Military
Courts and Procedure," wherein, in place of the strict prohibi-
tion on the trial of civilians by military courts which Mabini
was reserving for the future, the clauses as to what constituted
military offenses, not only in their definition of what consti-
tuted spies, but also in their inclusion of those who committed
robbery or arson, opened the way for the military commanders
most thoroughly to police the country and impose their ideas
of law through the military courts. And under the existence
of martial law, of course, Mabini's guaranties of individual
rights were relegated to the distant future.

Following Mabini, the Malolos Constitution guaranteed the
rights of petition and association and of freedom of speech and
of the press, but it omitted Mabini's clause " without previous
censure " in affirming the liberty of the press, which was some-
what significant, even had not all these rights been suspended
throughout the whole period of the revolution.* If the guar-

^ It has already been shown that the first periodical of the revolution was sup-
pressed because not under the immediate control of the authorities at Bakoor.
On July 4, 1898, Aguinaldo had issued a decree establishing El Heraldo de la Revo-
lucion (afterward Gaceta de Filipinas) as the official organ of the Revolutionary
Government, and providing further that " while the abnormal circumstances of war
continue, every kind of publication is prohibited unless licensed by the Govern-
ment." (See Disposiciones del Gobiemo Revolucionario de Filipinas, pp. 55-56 ; this
pamphlet was the first document issued by the press just established at fiakoor,
which was later transferred to Barasoain, near Malolos.) Mabini's idea had been
that each provincial government should as soon as possible publish a newspaper in
the local dialect, in order to enlighten and instruct the masses. Such periodi-
cals were later on started in Batangas, Camarines, and perhaps in one or two other
provinces ; but they had a brief existence, and were not altogether encouraged by
the Filipino military authorities. The official gazette above mentioned continued
in existence until the collapse of the insurgent organization at Tarlak, and during

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 801

anties of individual rights which only a well-organized and
respected judiciary could assure were nullified by the absorp-
tion of judicial power into the executive, it was hardly to be
expected that such liberties as depended largely or wholly
upon a subordination by the executive of its own powers to
the interests of individual freedom would be more carefully
preserved. The theoretical scheme of government which the
Filipinos put forth did not back its elaborate protestations and
assertions of individual rights by any specific safeguards and
forms of procedure designed to secure what was so generously
promised ; but we might waive all questions of their theory of
government, if we found that actually, regardless of forms em-
ployed, their local institutions assured to the people of the
provinces and of the municipalities the security from abuse and
the actual freedom of life which it was the announced aim of
the revolution against Spain to achieve. It is more important
to know what was the actual state of affairs in the provinces
between the time of the overthrow of Spain's authority and
that of the appearance of the American army than to analyze
the Constitution of Malolos or the manifestoes of Mabini. It
was in local government that Spain had started to make re-
forms, had achieved so little, and had left the people so gen-
erally dissatisfied and restless. We should expect a Filipino
government to set to work at once to remedy the defects of
the municipal and provincial regime, which touched the masses
of the people in their daily life, whereas the central Govern-
ment was far-removed and virtually non-existent to most of
them. What did the Filipino reformers of Bakoor and Malo-
los actually do?

the time from September, 1898, to November, 1899, sereral dailies openly or
•ecretly allied with the insurrection were printed at Manila and at the yarious insur-
gent capitals, the one of most note and of longest life being La Independencxa. They
were more properly newspapers than the ofBoial gazette, but were scarcely under
less close control of the authorities. Though La Independencia was for a time the
mouthpiece of General Luna, it never ventured to speak freely the criticisms oa
Aguioaldo's party which Lunm made io private.

S02 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

First, they made the entire scheme of local government,
clear down to the outlying barrios of the towns, center in
themselves, just as it had previously centered in the governor-
general. One might wonder why there should be in the Cabinet
a Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, when
there was already a Department of the Interior ; but it speedily
appears that the Department of the Interior was the clearing-
house of governmental operations in the provinces and muni-
cipalities, and that "intervention of the Government" in the
affairs of these local entities was provided for in the constitu-
tion, exactly as it was under the Spanish Directorate of
Civil Administration. The old Spanish system of municipal
and provincial organization was also retained ; and the few
modifications made in it by the decrees of June 18 and 20
were never actually carried into effect in the towns. Even
where some opportunity for local initiative was left to the local
officials, they did not improve it. It was enjoined upon the
municipal councils, for instance, that they must give especial
attention to keeping up and improving the schools, and the
Malolos Constitution made education "obligatory and gratui-
tous"; but it was not a time of devotion to matters of educa-
tion, and, while there were schools in most of the towns, at
least until active fighting came near at hand, the curriculum
and the methods continued to be the same as before, and the
teachers had either no pay at all or the same wretched pay as
ever, and resorted to the usual methods of squeezing it out of
the pupils in fees, to living in the schoolhouse or renting part
of it, and so on.^

In the matter of the suffrage, the new Filipino Government

^ Mabini had, as had most of the revolutionists of the intellectual type, great
dreams of future educational reforms. Under his provisional constitution, private
schools were to be allowed to flourish, but the Government should also adopt a
complete system, comprising a primary school in each town aud large barrio, a
" college " (Spanish secondary school) in each province, and a university in Manila.
Tagalog was to be the official language of instruction, but English and French (not
Spanish) should be taught in the secondary schools, and when the knowledge of
English became sufficiently common, it should be the official language.

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 303

was no more generous, if always as generous, with the people
whom it was supposed to represent as the Spanish Government
had been. The principalia of each town had included those
famihes in which village offices had been virtually hereditary,
and had in 1893 been extended to include also the principal
taxpayers ; this local aristocracy really comprised, as a rule,
all the Filipinos of education or property, and the chief defect
of the system lay in that it did not impose the test along those
lines, and thus use the franchise as a stimulus to advancement
(something of little consequence, however, in the Spanish sys-
tem, since the voters exercised no real influence in local af-
fairs, and government was a thing from above or was at the
dictation of the friar curate). The Aguinaldo decree of June
18 provided that the local officers should be elected by a gath-
ering of the " citizens most distinguished for their education,
social position, and honorable conduct," provided they were
twenty-one years old and were " lovers of PhiUppine independ-
ence." This was a new way of perpetuating the principalia ^
though it might, reasonably interpreted, have opened the way
for the exercise of the suffrage by those members of the new
middle class who had in some places begun to rise from the
ranks by virtue of possessing a degree of education. Such a
loose clause, however, left it in the power of the election au-
thorities to admit or exclude whom they pleased, especially in
view of the test of loyalty to the revolutionary government
which was implied in the phrase " lovers of Philippine inde-
pendence."* And it is a matter of fact that the elections were

1 Mabioi apparently planned for a broader basis of suffrage when conditions
should be more favorable ; but that might wait, as his entire provisional constitu-
tion waited, till the country was ** prepared " bj the revolutionary government " to
be a tnie republic." The clauses were, however, drawn loosely, as were nearly
all of Mabini's, and might have been so interpreted as to restrict the suffrage
very closely ; moreover, it is noticeable that he always put forth rather vague ed-
ucational and property qualifications for the holding of office. In the new muni-
cipal law which Mabini later drew in more definite form, and which was not
passed because of the outbreak of war, the lines were drawn more definitely in
favor of both education and property as qualifications not only for holding o£Bce
bat also for voting. The significant thing is that the man who was perhaps

304 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

managed as the authorities at Bakoor or Malolos had previ-
ously dictated ; in those places where there was reason to fear
that this would not be so easy, Aguinaldo's military represen-
tatives, almost invariably Tagalogs, simply took charge and
ran the civil organization, unless it was disposed to be amica-
ble and acknowledge their authority. From Bakoor, and later
from Malolos, Aguinaldo sent out commissioners to organize
the towns of each province, and municipal elections were held
under the control of these men, while provincial elections were
either so held or the electors were gathered at the Filipino
capital itself to choose their of&cers under the eye of authority.
In all cases, no civil officer could assume his functions until
his election had been formally accepted and promulgated by
Aguinaldo. There is plenty of evidence that the elections so
held no more expressed the free choice of the people interested
than did those which had previously been subject to the dic-
tation of the Spanish friar or the Spanish provincial governor.^

inclined to be most liberal about Filipino suffrage should have recognized the
necessity for its limitation to the comparatively few. And still he proposed in his
constitution that the chief executive officers of both towns and provinces should
not be chosen by vote, but be nominated by the President from lists prepared by
the local councils.

1 Taylor's Rept. says (pp. 11-13) : "The commissioner of elections was ap-
pointed by Aguinaldo, usually from the military commanders in the province
where the election was to be held. ... It is evident that the commissioner ap-
pointed to supervise really chose the municipal authorities ; a limited group of ad-
herents confirmed his selection. . . . Men who had been on friendly terms with the
Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. . . . Aguinaldo usually
approved the decision of his representative. One case of informality which led to
his disapproval of the election was that the presidente who had been certified to
him as elected was reported to have been on good terms with the Spanish author-
ities of the town. . . . The number of electors evidently depended upon the will
of the commissioner appointed to hold the election. ... In the town of Lipa, Ba-
tangas, with a population of 40,733, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente
was chosen for the town ; 25 votes were cast for him. On November 23, 1898,
at an election held at Bigan, Ilokos Sur, for presidente, to succeed one who had
been elected representative in Congress, 116 votes were cast ; the population of
Bigan is 16,000. October 5, 1898, at an election held at Gamu, Isabela province, 72
votes elected a presidente ; the population of Gamu is 6101. October 7, 1898, at
Echague, Isabela province, a presidente was elected for whom 54 votes were cast ;
the population is 5400. October 2, 1898, at Kabagan Nuevo, Isabela, 111 men
voted out of a population of 6240. . . . The town of San Jos^, Batangas, protested

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION 805

With a few changes of the names of officers, the system of
municipal and provincial government was merely a continua-
tion of that already in existence, conforming to the Maura law
of 1893. The only new features in local administration to be
borne in mind are that, in the towns, the police or quasi-mili-
tary control which had formerly been in the hands of Span-
iards was now in those of Filipino miUtary chiefs or of the
local officials themselves, and that the superior authorities of
the provinces, who had the same close supervision over the
towns as of old, were now Filipinos instead of Spaniards. The
friar was gone, or was a prisoner in his former place of power,
and this, to be sure, was in some respects the greatest change

unayailingly to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 p.m. in a storm
of rain being considered valid." On August 9, 1898, the local presidentes of Pam-
panga province had been assembled under Aguinaldo's eye at Bakoor to vote for
the four members of the provincial government ; and, on the very day that Ma-
nila fell, one of Aguinaldo's commissioners and Cavite friends was conducting at
Old Cavite a similar election for Bataan province. In December, 1898, over forty
presidents of towns in the Bikol province of Camarines, in southern Luzon, were
summoned all the way to Malolos to select their provincial officials. Similarly,
in the case of Fangasinan, a province of northern Luzon, of doubtful loyalty to
Aguinaldo, in the preceding September ; for the form of the act of this election
and Aguinaldo's approval, as well as a similar document in the case of a muni-
cipal election in Bataugas, see ibid.f pp. 34-37. Immediately thereafter (pp. 37-
51) follow briefs of various decrees and executive orders of the Revolutionary
Government. Among them is one of August 10, 1898, wherein, at the time of the
departure of a military expedition for the provinces of the Kagayan Valley, under
the command of Aguinaldo's associate, Daniel Tirona, the latter is endowed with
all the powers possessed by the President with reference to the appointment of
commissioners and approval of elections in northern Luzon. The central Govern-
ment used its power of " intervention " in the local governments : we find, for in-
stance, that permission to open a drug-store in one of the Cavite towns was passed
upon by the Secretary of the Interior ; we find decrees of Aguinaldo permitting
the annexation of new barrios to towns or of towns to provinces to which they
had not formerly belonged (one, allowing a town in Tayabas to be renamed
** Aguinaldo " ; another, declining the petition of the people of Paete, Laguna, to
rename their town *' Rizal" ) ; we find orders of the Secretary of the Interior to
the provincial governors to check abuses of authority being committed in their
towns, and a reminder of Spanish rule in the prohibition of the use of corporal
punishment by local officials ; similar orders for the inspection of municipal ac-
oonnts to prevent eml)ezzloment ; and, just before the outbreak of war with the
United States, an order from this source that the towns be cleaned up and better
police measures be taken, as it is desired to show strangers *' that the Filipinos
know what is customary among civilized people."

306 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

wrought by the new regime ; but his successor in the pulpit, the
once despised native coadjutor, usually sought to exercise the
same control over local affairs as had his Spanish predecessor,
and, where the municipal chief was a man of force enough to
resist his control, there was commonly a continual clash be-
tween the two. This contest, where the civil officers were not
disposed to be mere puppets, was made three-sided by the pre-
tensions of the military chiefs of the provinces and of their
subordinates to the exercise of powers over the people in all
sorts of ways. Between them all, it is a question if ever before
the humble Filipino had had so much bossing.

CHAPTER Vm

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT

Spain had, as we have seen, employed her taxing powers in
the Philippine Archipelago so as to create monopolies or favors
for herself and her own citizens; so as to bear unduly upon
the masses, thus tending to stifle ambition; so as to put a
handicap upon new industries and economic progress generally,
thus limiting the opportunities for the individual to rise; and
so as to restrict, if not wholly prevent, local improvement and
initiative, through the absorption by the central Government
of practically all the products of taxation. Here, then, there lay
open to the public economist so many opportunities for reform
as to embarrass his decision upon a comprehensive system
which should do more toward achieving the professed aim of
the revolutionists than the best constitution ever written, by
giving them economic freedom, the most real freedom there
is. It is hard to find any evidence, however, that there was
embarrassment in this particular way at Bakoor or Malolos.
Mabini had but a dim comprehension of the most simple prin-
ciples of public economy, and his thinking was wholly in another
line; to him, reform was merely a political charter. Those
Filipinos who had some definite ideas as to faults in the Span-
ish economic system were not in power. Doubtless in time,
had the insurgent organization survived, the system of taxa-
tion would have been changed, perhaps improved, and at any
rate it is quite sure that the more unpopular imposts would
have been abolished or reduced. All we know is that, so long
as it did rule, its first thought was for the products of taxa-
tion, and not for the forms in which it should be laid ; hence,
there was a disposition not to let go any of the imposts that
had produced money for Spain, and there was no little ingenu-

308 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

ity displayed in obtaining new and additional war taxes with-
out going on record as creating a new form of impost. Nor
■was the hold of the central Government relaxed; it continued
to control the financial administration clear down to the last
barrio. The municipalities had the same sorry privilege as
under Spain of levying and collecting for their own use what
they could obtain from market and fishery licenses, fees for
registering cattle, etc. All money collected under the general
levies must be reported quarterly to the provincial board, and
only so much of it was to be left in the town as was imme-
diately needed for current expenses. The provincial officers
must send all surpluses to the central Government, which ex-
ercised through its control of the local budgets the right of
deciding just how much should be spent in every town.^ The
new Government had sustained at the outset the loss of the
customs revenues of Spain; Manila, where much the greater
part of the foreign trade was carried on, remained in the hands
of the Spaniards, and the Filipinos succeeded the Spaniards
in the possession of Iloilo and Sebii only for a little while,
and when conditions forbade trade. They recouped them-
selves in some of the hemp and tobacco ports they held by
imposing a ten per cent ad valorem tax on exports from
the provinces to Manila, and in one form or another they
continued to make the hemp crop pay money to their or-

* This system was perpetuated in the Constitution of Malolos. which virtually
turned the entire control of the fiscal policy and administration into the hands of
the central executive. Mabini clung to the same idea of central control of all the
funds of government; in his constitution, he provided that one third of the money
collected in the towns should go to the provincial treasury and two thirds to the
central Government. That the insurgent organization should at first have con-
tinued the system already prevailing, and should have sought to draw from the
towns all the fimds possible, was not strange, especially as some of the Spanish
sources of revenue were now cut off; but the constitutions of Mabini and of Malo-
los expressed the ideas of their makers as to what the Government ought to be in
the future, and in them one discovers no evidence of a comprehension of where
Spain had most seriously crippled internal improvement. In the budget for 1899,
proclaimed by Aguinaldo without the intervention of Congress, the towns were al-
lowed, as a means of replacing the former revenues from cock-fights and gambling
games, to tax all meat sold one cent per pound.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 309

ganlzation for a long time after this organization had really
ceased to exist. But these were all really special war levies
rather than evidences of Filipino ideas upon methods of taxa-
tion.* Spain's other chief source of revenue, the cedula tax,
which produced more than the customs, was retained; its
unpopularity with the Tagalog masses led to its being re-
duced at first to a peseta (twenty cents Mexican) per quarter,
it being assessed only against males over eighteen years of age,
but it was restored in February, 1899, as a war tax, called
a " certificate of citizenship," but in reality imposed accord-
ing to the old Spanish regulations. ^ It could not, however,
even if well enforced, produce so much as formerly, owing
particularly to the loss of the collections from the Chinese
and others in Manila who paid higher rates for cidulas,^ So

1 Mabuii*s ideas on taxation, as revealed in his provisional constitution, are in-
teresting : ♦* Care will be taken to make the contributions direct and very easily
borne." . . . 0£Rce-holders are to be exempt from all forms of taxation [not so
confusing a provision as it might seem, as Mabini had in mind taxes assessed di-
rectly upon persons rather than upon possessions]. . . . He would have a sort of
income-tax, levied upon those who receive " an annual income more than covering
the necessities of a comfortable existence." . . . The urban tax was the only real-
property tax he had in mind, and that was a tax on rents, not on value, of real es-
tate. . . . There is much unconscious humor, therefore, in his reiteration of a be-
lief in direct taxation, especially when he also says as to customs duties: " Recourse
will be had to indirect taxation only to protect the industries of the country, or
when the burden it imposes is compensated by some benefit, or, at most, to restrain
undue luxury." After thus curtailing, as he apparently supposed, the opportuni-
ties for unduly expanding the Philippine tariflf system, he naively provides: "So
also the rates of duty will be fixed with regard to the tariffs established in the
neighboring ports and in the greater part of the other nations of the world."

* The old division of the population into eight classes was retained, but the
basis was made the ownership of real or personal property, not occupation: those
"owning, controlling, or managing a capital in money or property" of over
$25,000 were to pay 8100 a year; so on, down to 81000 capital; the sixth nnd
seventh classes, the most numeroiis, being those over eighteen years of age, with-
out property to the value of SIOOO, paid, as imder Spain, the males 82 and the
females 81.

* Methods were not lacking, however, for making the Chinese who came under
the jurisdiction of the Filipino (rovemment in the provinces pay at least their
full share. In authorizing the appointment of CapUanes de Sangleyes ('* Captains
of the Chinese," local officers who, under the Spanish regime, were invested
with anthority not only to collect the registration fees, but also to enforce certain
police and hygienic regulations among their ooantrymen) on October 20, 1898|

I

310 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

also the old Spanish system of forced labor was retained ; this
was perhaps because of the exigencies of a time of war, but
at any rate it was true that the humble Filipino had, in losing
his Spanish masters, retained the same Filipino masters in the
village caciques, whose power was unchecked, and had ac-
quired new military masters of his own race. The local chiefs
were already skilled in using him as their personal "fag," and
they now found no interference with their enjoyment of this
privilege from higher Spanish officials; if the public got any
greater benefits than formerly out of the use of the labor thus
embargoed in its name, there remained no evidence that this
was so/

The new Government voluntarily deprived itself of what
revenues it might have secured for the central treasury by the

Aguiiialdo stated that for the time being they would have no power but that of
collecting taxes from their fellows. See the brief of decrees, etc., already cited,
in Taylor* 8 Rept.

^ In consequence of the pressure of those Filipinos still remaining at Malolos
who had some comprehension of the fact that, if their reform did not begin with
the masses, it was no reform at all, Aguinaldo issued a decree on January 5, 1899,
abolishing the old fifteen-day tax of forced labor, and proclaiming that henceforth
the Government would pay wages for all the services rendered to it and all the
citizens would be treated alike. (It is supposed, also, that the fact that the Ameri-
cans at Manila and Cavite had from the first paid regularly, by the day or week,
high wages to their Filipino employees, had something to do with the issuance of
this decree.) But this remained a dead-letter; it was bound to be so, in view of
the inveterate caciquism of the Philippines (which virtually makes whole popula-
tions the peons of certain families), unless the central Government was able to
enforce it, and took stem measures to do so, and the central Government winked
at the violations of the decree. Indeed, on March 21, Aguinaldo, in response to
queries from the provinces, decreed that the revenue deficiencies produced by the
abolition of forced labor should be covered by the work of men who had not paid
their registration tax, and, if necessary, the people might be exhorted, on patriotic
grounds, to "work for the public good." On April 17, it was specifically provided
that those who had not paid the personal contribution could be forced to work;
but one familiar with Philippine conditions will understand that the loophole left
by the decree of March 21 was quite sufficient to insure the continuance of the
old abuse. The April 17 decree hints that the Spanish methods of 1897 were being
copied by the new Filipino authorities, in so far at least as concerns the charging
for military passes from town to town. Again, on June 9, 1899, we find Aguinaldo
instructing his provincial officers to secure donations of horses and carts for the
army, exempting those who donate them from " carrying baggage and doing other
personal services " for the army. (See Taylor^s Rept. for these decrees.)

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 311

continuance of the old Spanish system of selling monopolistic
privileges for conducting cockpits, lotteries and other gambling
games ; but it is to be feared that its subordinate provincial and
municipal officers not infrequently found it convenient to con-
vert revenue from these sources, in a more irregular manner,
to their own pockets/ The Spanish tax on the rental value of
town property, the nearest approach there had been to a tax
on real property, was retained, but it had never been produc-
tive of much revenue outside of Manila. It was in connection
with their efforts to expand the revenue by special war taxes
that the revolutionists made their only approach to basing
their impositions on real property. Mabini's idea for an as-
sessment of one per cent on all real property, land as
well as buildings, for the purpose of securing registration in
the land records, now in possession of the Filipino pro-
vincial governments, was expressed in a decree of Novem-
ber 7. How far, with the continuance of their rule, the
revolutionists would have gone on from this step to institute
a real-estate tax, it is impossible to say, as this provision was
apparently designed for employment only on the single occa-
sion and for the emergency. The issuance of Government
bonds seemed to offer a more easy way of raising money from
the provincial Filipinos who possessed much property; where
these bonds were not subscribed with real or feigned willing-

^ Mabini provided in his constitution that lotteries, raffles, gambling licenses,
and the cockpit monopolies should be " in the future onlj sad reminders of the
Spanish Government," though cock-fights could still be held on one Sunday of
each month and on civil holidays. Part of this provision was incorporated into the
Aguinaldo decree of June 20. But deep-rooted customs, however good or bad, are
not thus easily wiped out, and cock-fighting and card-gaming were interfered with
only by the operations of war and the depletion of the gamesters' pocketbooks.
Cock-fighting had, indeed, been absolutely prohibited, along with card games for
money, in a decree of Aguinaldo on August 16, 1898 ; the repetition of these pro-
visions on March 24, 1899, is some indication of how far they were obeyed. The
idea that Mabini had in mind, namely, that for such diversions there be substi-
tuted athletic exercises and village fairs, was a most salutary one ; but such re-
forms, these Filipinos were to learn, do not come by prohibitive laws. The opium
monopoly was retained, in a modified torm^ for the purpose of getting revenue
from the Chinese.

312 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

ness, there was no great hesitancy about applying virtual
coercion. " Loans " and " donations," with informal promises
to repay when the financial affairs of the new Government
should be in better shape, were also resorted to, as was the
seizure of property, mostly that of the religious orders and of
Spaniards, but sometimes of Filipinos not considered properly
zealous for the cause. A great many of the latter were in
Manila, and there can be no doubt that much of the money
raised from them, especially in 1899 and thereafter, was vir-
tually a sort of blackmail ; even assuming that the majority of
them were desirous of doing something to assist the revolu-
tionary campaign, it is quite certain that the size of their con-
tributions was, in very many, if not most cases, dictated by
an anxiety to protect their property interests in the provinces,
and later on even by fear for their own persons. On a par
with the compulsory subscriptions to bonds was the organiza-
tion of co5perative companies with high-sounding names, every
'' good Filipino " being supposed to take stock in them.^

^ Taylor^ s Rept, contains the only important data thus far published regarding
the sources of revenue of the Revolutionary Government (see pp. 15-19, 56-101 ;
also the briefs of decrees, 37-51) ; and these data are very incomplete. They show
that the revolutionary central Government should have received, from May 31,
1898, to September 1, 1899, 2,586,733.48 pesos ; but there is discrepancy between
this sum and the actual receipts, as recorded in the final ledgers, of some 530,000
pesos, while over 700,000 pesos are not traceable, in the accounts available, to any
particular province. Of the money traceable to provinces, it is significant that, ex-
cept for Samar and Leite (where tribute was laid on the exports of hemp), which
contributed about 200,000 pesos, practically all the rest came from Luzon, partic-
ularly from the tobacco and hemp provinces ; less than 5000 came from all Panai
and less than 3500 from Sebd or from Mindanau, while Negrog, the island most
important for its sugar crop, contributed a paltry 834 pesos. " Seizures " of one
sort and another represent nearly 432,000 pesos, of which 70,000 were in cash;
"loans," 143,000 and " donations," 76,000 pesos. Captain Taylor finds that 6 per
cent bonds for at least 500,000 pesos were issued, in denominations of 25 and 100
pesos ; the cash-books show that 388,500 should have been paid in on subscriptions
by September 1, 1899, but the ledgers reveal that only 233,000 had been recorded
as paid up to October 19, 1899, a very noticeable discrepancy, even for faulty
bookkeeping. The annual budget, approved by Aguinaldo, under his war powers,
on February 12, 1899, just after the outbreak of war with the United States (see
pp. 68-77), shows an approach to systematization of taxes and revenues; these
were estimated to be 6,324,729.38 pesos. Perhaps it was to this sum that Felipe
Buencamino had reference when he testified {Hearings Com. Inso Aff.^ p. 307) that

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 313

Ostensibly, the foreign merchants of the archipelago paid
the export and other taxes levied by the insurgent Govern-
ment on the trade of the provinces carried on by sea/ In fact,
it was, of course, paid in part by the foreign consumers of
Philippine products and in still larger part by the Filipino
producers and consumers themselves. Import duties were also
for a short time levied, but never worked satisfactorily ; and
there was much fluctuation in the minds of the revolutionary
authorities about the export dues, which were first five, then
ten per cent, and at intervals abolished entirely, while it is to
be feared that they were sometimes as much as the military
commander at a shipping-point thought the foreign merchants
would stand, or were gauged by "arrangements" made with
him by the latter. They were taken off in early 1899, upon
the representations of the foreign business men that they
did damage chiefly to Filipino interests, but were restored on
April 1 of that year, under the name of a " pilotage tax " (the

Againaldo's commissioners " to request donations from the rich in the provinces
. . . have assuredlj coUected more than $50,000,000, but the Philippine treas-
ury . . . reoeived nothing bat $7,000,000 " ; he declares also that the provincial
and municipal officials " appropriated to themselves all the public materials and
built their own houses." Among the decrees and orders of Aguinaldo were the
following of significance : One of September 23, 1898, ordering provincial gov-
ernors to arrest and punish men collecting funds for the insurrection without au-
thority ; one dated August 22, 1898 (probably issued in November and dated
back), appointing committees to collect contributions in Manila ; and one of No-
Tember 16, 1898, instructing the presidents of towns in Pampanga, where many
of the wealthier residents were not in sympathy with the Tagalog administration,
" to see that the national loan is subscribed for." One of the means by which Fil-
ipino patriotism was exploited at the time is cited by T. H. Pardo de Tavera (Bib-
lioteca JUipinOf p. 168), who says of the " Philippine Electricity Company " that it
was organized by an employee of the lighting-plant in Manila " who was suddenly
transformed into a general of Aguinaldo's army. The company was only an ex-
ploitation of the unfortunate stockholders." The project, a favorite of Aguinaldo's,
of organizing a bank with large capital, the shares to be subscribed only by Fili-
pinos, was abandoned at Malolos in December, 1898. War contributions were
levied not alone upon the rich or well-to-do ; when the insurrection began to
•offer the strain of fighting and defeat, the masses were everywhere called upon
for contributions in kind, sometimes even losing their entire crops.

^ At first, a duty of five per cent ad valorem was also laid on all goods shipped
from one point to another by rail or by river, as well as by sea ; but this part of the
decree of October 17, 1898, was repealed on November 15 (Taylor*s RqU., p. 57).

k

S14 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

amount being, however, ten per cent of cargo, not an assess-
ment upon tonnage). The foreign owners of vessels engaged
in the inter-island trade had already paid at Malolos (in one
case, at least, to Aguinaldo in person) license fees for these
vessels. The very remarkable decree of November 30, 1898,
that foreigners doing business in the provinces should pay an
amount anywhere from 100 to 5000 pesos for a license was
revoked on January 23, 1899, when war seemed imminent and
it was desired to use the foreign houses as bankers for the
revolutionary organization ; but it was not forbidden to the
foreigners to " gain favor " with the organization, or with its
chief agents, and the captured records reveal that the former
knew how most effectively to do so.^

The avowed chief aim of the revolution was to free the
Filipino people from the domination of unpopular ecclesiasti-
cal masters, and to secure for them the religious, political, and
social freedom which that domination had denied them. It
would, therefore, not be unfair to judge the organization
which had assumed the burden of this programme by what it
accomplished, and proposed to accomplish, in these respects.
The all-important religious question, underlying all others,
should be considered under two aspects: first, as to how
far the people were secured in the enjoyment of religious
freedom ; and, second, as to what attitude the Revolutionary
Government, which assumed to represent the people, adopted

1 Taylor's Rept. was written primarily to bring forth important evidence
showing the connection of a suit brought against the United States. The part
foreign business houses had in prolonging the opposition to the United States,
is especially full of data on this subject (see pp. 17-18, 56-101, particularly
pp. 80-81 for donations of rice to the insurgent army by one of the most promi-
nent companies of Manila). See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ p. 33, for the message of one
of his agents in Manila on December 22, 1898, to the effect that the high license
fee on foreigners doing business in the provinces was " impolitic at this time, when
we seek the sympathy of the powers." See ihid.j p. 18, for an indication that in the
preceding August the British railroad company operating the line to Dagupan was
already working in harmony with the Filipino Government. La IndependenciOf
November 16, 1898, presents the complaint of the Government collectors that
the railroad company bad not yet paid its taxes for September and October.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 315

toward the Roman Catholic Church, and particularly toward
the friars.

By "religious freedom " is here meant not so much a theo-
retical attitude as to the old questions of separation of Church
and State and of freedom of worship, which were not of great
or immediate practical importance among a people so uni-
formly Roman Catholic as the Filipinos. Rather is it of vital
concern to discover how far, with the forcible removal of their
former ecclesiastical masters, the people were liberated from
the petty tyranny that had been exercised over them in their
social life as well as in matters of conscience, and how far, if
at all, their new Government undertook to make sure that this
tyranny was no longer exercised. It need not occasion sur-
prise that decrees of the President, both before and after the
question was supposed to be settled at Malolos, violated the
principle of separation of Church and State; but it is of sig^
nificance that so little effort was made to reform abuses against
which outcry had been made, and that, both from govern-
mental provisions and from the testimony of individuals, we
obtain evidence that the people were subjected to dictation as
before* in their family and local affairs, though now by priests
of their own color, who had less prestige and undivided au-
thority than their predecessors and hence not uncommonly
clashed with the local officials. That the people preferred the
new masters to the old, especially in this time of the arousing
of racial sympathies, was most likely true ; but that they were
the actual gainers, except in this matter of sentiment, has at
least not been made plain. The establishment of civil marriage
and the revival of the schedule of fees for religious services
that had been promulgated by Archbishop Sancho de Santa
Justa y.Rufina in 1772 were, indeed, efforts at the reform of
abuses ; but aside from the fact that the schedule of fees was
by no means always observed by native priests, the Govern-
ment not only does not seem ever to have conceived any
broader plans for reform in the matter of ecclesiastical ca-

316 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

ciquism, but, had it promulgated such plans, they would have
been nullified by its repeated efforts to employ the priests to
serve its cause as propagandists or as instruments to restrain
the people or to incite them to do its will.^

The religious question was the subject of one of the few real
discussions which took place in the Assembly at Malolos. Prefer-
ential importance has herein been assigned to the deeds of the
Kevolutionary Government as showing how far it could have
been expected to guarantee a new era of freedom of thought
and action in religious as in other matters; yet the discussion
and final vote on this question at Malolos, which stand only
as an expression of Filipino theory as to what government
should be, has also its significance. When a vote was reached
on the question of recognizing the equality of all forms ©f
worship and proclaiming the separation of Church and State,
on November 29, 1898, the result was at first a tie, and the
friends of freedom of worship finally prevailed by a single
vote, cast by a general of the revolutionary army who had
been one of the secretaries of the meeting and at first refused

* Civil marriage and civil registry had been established by the decree of June
20, though not in the form in which they figured in the provisional constitution of
Mabini, nor afterwards in the Malolos Constitution, which put in effect the exact
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on this matter (simply nullifying, therefore,
the exceptions to that code as it was promulgated in the Philippines in 1889).
The decree of June 20 provided that civil marriage was obligatory, and ecclesi-
astical marriage, if performed, should follow it; it consisted simply, so far as re-
gards the ceremony, in the signing of a document before the municipal chief to the
effect that the marriage was by "mutual consent"; but the publication of notice
thereof was required to be made during three weeks in a manner very similar to
the proclaiming of banns by the Church. From July, 1898, to late 1899, the 1772
schedule of fees were so many times enjoined upon the native priests, in decrees,
circulars, letters, etc., as to confirm the information that it was not by any means
uniformly observed. Among the briefs of decrees and orders of Aguinaldo, al-
ready cited above, may be found these: July 26, 1898, the priests are to preach
loyalty to the insurrection; August 10, 1898, church questions are to be left to the
Congress; September 1 (also December 9), 1898, the civil authorities are to avoid
conflicts with the Filipino priests, and are again reminded that the decision as to a
religious policy is for the Congress; nevertheless they are to see that the July 26
decree is enforced; June 24 and August 10, 1899, provincial officials and certain
priests are to see that the parish funds in the hands of the Filipino priests are
invested in the national bonds, in order " to avoid loss."

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 817

to vote.^ Moreover, the article thus incorporated into the con-
stitution was a negative sort of clause, of the briefest sort,
quite in contrast with the specific clauses in which Mabini had
proclaimed his theories as to freedom of conscience, while
there was conspicuously lacking the clause whereby Mabini
had exempted all religious societies, not subject ecclesiasti-
cally to the jurisdiction of the ordinary, from the freedom of
association guaranteed to all others. And in January, when the
constitution was finally put in force with the clauses conferring
full dictatorial powers upon Aguinaldo in case of war, the en-
tire provision as to separation of Church and State was sus-
pended until the meeting of a "Constituent Assembly," and
it was provided that the municipaHties should employ and pay
the native priests. Certain circumstances make it difficult to
avoid the conclusion that there was, in late 1898 and early
1899, some sort of flirtation between the Roman Catholic

^ An acconnt of this day's session, with brief summaries of the discussion, wiU
be found in La Independencia for November 30, 1898. Only fifty-two representa-
tives were present, of the approximately one hundred members of the Assembly
as listed ; at least thirty-five of these were Tagalogs, six were Ilokans, and the
real representative of the Bisayas seems not to have had any part in the matter.
This was an unusually important meeting of the Assembly, and more interest had
been aroused over it than over almost any other day's session; yet the number
M above stated was swollen by eight officers of the army. The Manila attorney,
Felipe Calderdn, who was afterward to be identified very prominently with the
•nit against the Roman hierarchy at Manila for the possession of the estates of
St. Joseph's College, was the chief spokesman for making the Roman Catholic the
state religion. Some of his arguments are worth mentioning: he declared that aU
nations but Belgium have an established church, — disregarding the United States,
not to say Mexico, upon whose constitution a great deal of the document then
under discussion was based; England's trouble in Ireland he thought an example of
the disasters consequent upon doing away with the State Church; the separation of
Church and State be pronounced a " pure Utopia," possible in pure reason, but
never in practice; the Filipinos were united in one religion, and they ought not to
open the way for discord, but should foster national unity; and he considered that
the principle of majority rule implied also that the religious views of the majority
should prevail over those of the minority; while, to the objection that the Papacy
would interfere in the working of government, he retorted that it never had done
io. The session was rather disorderly, as the speakers were somewhat heated. The
first vote was 25 to 25. It was objected that the presiding officer had no power to
resolve the tie, and that officer, Pedro Patemo, was apparently not eager to do so.
Pablo Tekson, later governor of BulaklUi province, finally cast the deciding vote
in faTor of freedom of worship.

318 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

hierarchy at Manila and the clique in control at Malolos, or
some members of it. Perhaps, on the part of the friar hier-
archy, this was only an attempt to try diplomacy with the or-
ganization which had so rapidly extended its control through-
out the archipelago and which held in its power several
hundred members of the religious orders. Undoubtedly, the
Malolos dictators for a time entertained the notion of recog-
nition by the Vatican, in the same way that they bolstered
themselves up with hopes of recognition by Japan, by Ger-
many, or by other nations; and they crazily imagined that cling-
ing to the friar prisoners would help them secure such recog-
nition. Certainly, there was at no time anything in common
between these two parties, unless they regarded opposition to
the Americans as such. Yet the hierarchy allowed itself to
appear at times in 1898 to be dallying with men known to be
in the councils of Aguinaldo, and often appeared to be hostile,
passively if not actively, to American sovereignty, until the
arrival of an American archbishop as apostolic delegate in early
1900 caused a "right-about-face" in its attitude. And Fili-
pinos not hitherto distinguished for their friendliness to the
friars, or to the Church itself, were, in 1898, suspiciously fond
of dwelling upon "religious unity"; the new Filipino "chief
military chaplain " became a much more important figure in
the revolution than his predecessor in the office had been in
1896-97 ; and it was planned to negotiate at Rome for the
full recognition as parish priests of the Filipino coadjutors,
just as they were to be used as the effective political propa-
gandists of the insurrection in the field.^ Exactly what was

^ There are only certain suspicious circumstances upon which to base the hy-
pothesis that there was some sort of flirtation between Malolos and the arch-
bishop's palace in Manila; and all are explainable upon grounds indicated above.
Until all those concerned shall speak frankly, we shall not know the truth. Gre-
gorio Aglipai, the Filipino priest who, as " war chaplain," gradually assumed vir-
tually the control of a bishop over the native priests in most of northern Luzon,
who afterward organized and led the guerrilla warfare against the United States
in North Ilokos and Abra provinces, and who became the head of the " Independent
Philippine Church," the important schism from Catholic ranks in the Philppines,

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 31d

going on is not plain, and it may be that the revolutionists'
plans were simply incoherent on this point, as on some others,
and not capable of explanation. Whatever may have been the
truth, the Filipino Government claimed, in holding the friars
prisoners and in taking charge of their estates, to be acting in
behalf of and as representative of the people; and it is more
to the point to discover in what manner and in what degree
they thus benefited the people. By an "additional article" to
the constitution, appended at the time of the clauses providing
for war in January, 1899, all the property of any sort belong-
ing to the religious corporations was "understood to be re-
stored to the Filipino people" from May 24, 1898. This was,
as appears, simply a retroactive clause designed to give legal
authorization to the confiscations already carried out. So also
the clauses of the 1899 budget, adopted a few weeks later,
providing for the administration of the friar estates by respon-
sible parties or for their lease at auction, were measures de-
signed to give some show of regularity to the handling of this

is a central figure in the whole religions controversy from 1898 on. He has claimed
(in the Manila TimeSy January 1, 1903, and in the New York Independenty Octo-
ber 29, 1903) that in the summer of 1898 the Spanish archbishop and governor-
general in Manila enlisted his services to negotiate with the insurgents in the field
for cooperation with the Spaniards against the Americans ; that Bishop Hevia, of
the Nueva Segovia Diocese, a prisoner in 1898 and 1899 in the Kagayan Valley,
conferred upon him authority to perform the bishop's duties in that diocese; and
that his general authority over the native priests in the province, acting as " mili-
tary chaplain " under Aguinaldo, was recognized, and he was used as an agent by
Archbishop Nozaleda at Manila. It is true that Aglipai, like others, was asked
to nrge upon the Filipinos cooperation with the Spaniards. He is not snfiBciently
•pecific about his other statements. It is, however, worthy of note, that, in spite of
the virtually episcopal powers which he had assumed over the provincial clergy,
he was not declared excommunicated by Nozaleda until very late in the day. It
was Aglipai who was employed, in accordance with a decree of Agninaldo of June
24, 1899, to inspect all the parishes of northern Luzon and see that their funds
were invested in national bonds; the forwarding of funds by native priests to
Archbishop Nozaleda was declared to be a " highly nnpatriotic act" The Dic-
tator's decree of October 26, 1898, directing that appointments to parishes by Noza-
leda would not be recognized, shows that at least no formal entente was ever reached
on these matters, jiiRt as its implied requirement that preferment to parishes must
reside in the Revolutionary Government is another indication of bow far this 6ot-
•nunent came in practice from realizing Mabini's ideaL

S20 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

property by the comparatively small faction of revolutionists
who had exercised the authority all the time, but who had
just before shown that they dominated policy as well as prac-
tice at Malolos by rushing through the provisional clauses of
the constitution and framing up formal authorization for their
dictatorial control, virtually thrusting the conservative Fili-
pinos to one side.^ The property which it was claimed had in
times past been usurped from the people was not restored to
the people, who were instead to continue to pay the old rentals
to new landlords, though landlords of their own race. No de-
tailed accounts seem ever to have been kept to show in what
manner this property was administered, what were the pro-
ceeds from it, and how these proceeds were applied. Before
many months, most of the territory in which friar properties
lay was in the hands of the American army. Its tenants were
made thereafter (secretly) as before to pay their old rentals,
on the ground that they were contributing to the revolution ;
but there are serious reasons for suspecting that, as in 1898,
private parties were beneficiaries of the losses of the friars.
Certainly, the tenants themselves had no gain to report.'^

The 300 friars whom the Filipinos made captives were a very
conspicuous minority among the 8000 or 9000 Spaniards who
at one time or another were made prisoners of the Filipinos
in Luzon ; for not only was the Government of Spain con-

1 For the provisions regarding the lease or administration of the friar estates
by the Revolutionary Government, see Taylor's Rept., pp. 70-73. It may be sig-
nificant, in connection with the hints above as to the revolutionists trying to come
to terms with the Church, that the " additional article," formally confiscating the
friar property, was held in abeyance so long at Malolos.

2 Filipino gossip was busy in 1898, and later, with the intimate connection of
members of the Ag^inaldo family and close friends of Agninaldo with the han-
dling of friar property in Cavite and Mindoro. One of the first steps taken after the
revolution was organized in Cavite in May and June of 1898 was the sending of
an expedition from Batangas to seize the estates of the Recollects in Mindoro, in
which island some of the Aguinaldos had conducted business operations. The con-
cern of Fmilio Agninaldo over the sale of cattle seized on this estate is indicated
in Tel. Corr. Aguinaldos p. 27. It should be added that no part of the money thus
obtained had ever been traced to Emilio's hands; indeed, it is not now traceable
at all.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 321

cerned in their behalf, but the Vatican also on repeated occa-
sions evinced its solicitude, by representations made directly
at Washington or through the medium of France and Spain,
and the United States Government finally directed its com-
mander at Manila to use all efforts in their behalf. Washings
ton had at first stood upon Admiral Dewey's assurances that
the revolutionists accorded excellent treatment to the prison-
ers, and it had, after the occupation of Manila, for a long
time been indisposed to take any step that would seem to in-
terpose the Americans between the Spaniards and Filipinos.
But as the statements from Home about the treatment of the
friars became rather definite charges in place of rumors, and
as the question was interjected to a slight extent into the ne-
gotiations at Paris, Washington finally went so far as to
instruct Otis by cable on October 28 to " use every possible
means to secure their [the friars'] release and care for them." ^

^ The cable instrnctions of August 1 to Dewey and Merritt to prevent mis-
treatment of the friar prisoners, if possible to do so, has been noted above (see
p. 219). In this case, the complaint at Washington was made by Monsignor Marti-
nellif at the instigation of Cardinal Rampolla. On August 29, the Spanish Gov-
ernment complained, through the French ambassador at Washington, that the
friars and other prisoners were being barbarously treated in the Philippine prov-
inces. Admiral Dewey repeated in reply his previous information that the Span,
ish prisoners were not cruelly treated, though neglected, for want of proper food,
medical attendance, etc. The following instructions, sent on September 6 by Pres-
ident McKinley to both Dewey and Otis, are especially interesting and enlight-
ening (to the reader of to-day, though perhaps not to their recipients at the time) :
** YoQ will exert your influence during suspension of hostilities between United
States and Spain to restrain insurgent hostilities toward the Spaniards, and while
maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, pursue, as
far as possible, a conciliatory course to all." Rampolla renewed his charges on
September 13, making them specific as to the friars held prisoners in northern
Lnzon being brutally treated. On September 16, replying to Spain's complaint
through M. Cambon, Secretary Day said that the Government at Washington
understood that the prisoners were " well treated." Yet on September 20, the
War Department wired Otis : " If nnder control of your forces, protect [them]
from inhuman treatment." Upon the renewed representations of the Vatican and
of Cardinal Gibbons in October, along with further representations by Ambaa-
Cambon, Otis was on the 18th of that month instructed to " use his good
discreetly for the protection " of the friars, and finally the more urgent
of October 28 (quoted above) was sent. Otis replied, on October 30,
that Nneva Segovia' (the diocese of northern Luxon) did not recognize to any ex-
tent Aguinaldo's aothority. (It had, ai a matter of fact, been organized in insor-

322 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

This caused the correspondence which Otis held with Agui-
naldo in November, endeavoring to make the latter see that
the imprisonment of the friars was not justifiable according to
international law, besides urging their release upon humani-
tarian grounds. The contention of Aguinaldo, as drafted for
him by Manila lawyers then at Malolos, was that the Spanish
parish priests, as well as the civil officers, could be held pris-
oners under the laws of war because they had been virtually
or actually combatants against the Filipinos, the priests in or-
ganizing the opposition to the insurrection, and the civil offi-
cials by virtue of General Augustin's circular of April 23
enlisting them all in the volunteer forces. It was also stated
that the Spanish civil officers were being held " in order to
obtain from Spain the liberty of the imprisoned and deported
Filipinos," and the friars were being held both to assist in this
purpose and " in order to obtain from the Vatican the recog-

rection by troops sent from Cavite, and was in command of Aguinaldo's personal
military representative, Daniel Tirona, who gave minute orders regarding the
location and the treatment of Bishop Hevia and the friars with him.) The matter
had also been brought up by the Spanish treaty commissioners at Paris, they
asking for Spain the right to send reinforcements to deal with the Filipino insur-
gents, on the ground that the United States was reported to be sending out troops
and ships of war. The American commissioners denied these reports, but informed
President McKinley that they thought every effort should be made to restrain
the insurgents and maintain the status quo in the Philippines, since they could not
take very strong ground with the Spaniards in the face of Dewey's cablegram of
October 14. In this message, the admiral indicated how his attitude toward the
Filipinos had undergone a change ; he said : " Distressing reports have been re-
ceived of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authorities. . . . The
natives appear unable to govern." (For the complaints from the Vatican and the
instructions to Otis, see Corr. Rel. War, pp. 743, 788, 790, 793, 804, 831 ; for the
correspondence with Dewey, see Bureau of Navigation, p. 125 ; also Foreign Beta-
tions of the United States, 1898, p. 928 ; also ibid., pp. 808-11, 815-17 and 928-29,
and Seti. Doc. 62, p. 314, for the representations through the regular diplo-
matic channels and in course of the negotiations at Paris.) Some aspects of this
matter were within the ken of the American press at the time ; as early as Aug-
ust 11, 1898, the Nation treated editorially the question of American responsi-
bility for the conduct of the Filipinos toward their friar captives. The daily and
weekly press for the succeeding two months contains stray hints of informal inter-
changes of opinion and information between Washington and the Vatican, and we
find Archbishop Ireland, after conferences with President McKinley, setting out
for Rome.

i

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT S9S

nitionof the Philippine clergy."^ General Otis dropped the cor-
respondence, because satisfied, according to his own state-
ment, that the Filipinos would not give up the friars, while
he was privately assured that they would soon release the
Spanish civilians. Perhaps also the publicity which the Malo-
los authorities had at once given to the correspondence and
the indications that they were anxious to put him in the light
of a self-constituted defender of the friars had something to
do with the American commander's decision to let the matter
drop. At any rate, the only practical outcome of the entire
episode was that the Filipino leaders spread far and wide the
report that the American commander in Manila was, like the
Spanish governor-generals, under the control of the friars. A
Various promises were made during the next few months as to
the release of the religious and civil prisoners in the provinces,
upon the urgent representations not only of Archbishop Noza-
leda, who held some direct communication with Aguinaldo,
but also of Seiior Arellano, who still retained a nominal con-
nection with the Malolos Government, though actually re-
moved from it.^ Finally, on January 23, when preparations
were hastily being made for war, Aguinaldo decreed the re-
lease of these prisoners and of all Spanish military prisoners
who were sick. This decree was never meant to be carried out
(unless, by carrying it out, the Filipinos could secure foreign

* For the November correspondence on ibis subject, see Otis*8 Rept.f 1S99, pp.
22-29. The Spanish text of the Aguinaldo letter of November 18 may be found
in La Independmcia of November 22 ; it was considered final and unanswerable
io the Malolos camp, and it closed the correspondence, as Otis did not send the
reply which he had prepared. In La Independencia for November 16 will be
found a lengthy editorial exposition of the Filipino (rovemment's attitude on the
retention of the Spanish civilians and friars, quite likely prepared by the same
hand which wrote the letter ; it is even more outspoken with reference to the idea
that the retention of these prisoners would aid the Malolos Government in secor*
iug recognition.

* In his De/erua ohligada^ p. 37, Archbishop Nozaleda praises Chaplain Reaney
of the United States Navy for his efforts in behalf of the prisoners, and claims
that he (Nozaleda) induced Arellano to accept the place of Secretary of Foreign
Affairs at Malolos, " only with the patriotic purpose of freeing the prisoners," but
that the latter was forced to resign by the " Masons " who surrounded Aguinaldo.

324 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

recognition and intervention), as subsequent events showed.
It was repeated on July 5 and September 17 following ; but
the friars and other prisoners who survived were released
only as the advance of the American army set them free.

The accounts that have been given, both by Americans and
Spaniards, of the treatment accorded by the Filipinos to their
prisoners have been very diverse and conflicting. This is in part
due to the fact that in some places they were fairly well treated
and in other places they were very badly treated. To bring out
the facts, it is necessary to survey the operations connected
with the spread of the revolution throughout Luzon and then
to the central islands; in this way, we may at the same time
discover its modus operandi as a military organization and
somewhat about its character and the extent of its authority.
We have already seen how the revolt was organized in the
Tagalog provinces in June and July, also to some extent in
Pampanga and Pangasinan and Sambales, and how the Span-
iards were cut off and captured in an almost farcically easy
manner. We have also seen that in these provinces, even in
Cavite, close under the eyes of the revolutionary leaders, the
proclaimed intention to conduct the war according to the most
humane methods and civilized principles had not always been
followed. Still, there were comparatively few authenticated
eases of serious mistreatment of prisoners, most of these also
being popular outbursts against certain friar priests, and there
were some instances of scrupulously correct conduct toward
the Spaniards.^

1 La Independencia, November 16, 1898, contains a letter signed by the late
civil officials of the province of Pangasinan, including the governor and judge of
first instance, and by some thirty civilians, all at the time (July 31, 1898) prisoners
of Makabulos in Dagupan, and addressed to Governor-General Augustin at Manila,
informing him that they were most chivalrously treated by their captors, and pro-
testing against the reported shooting of Filipinos in Manila as being a possible
provocation for a change in the treatment accorded to Spaniards held prisoners
in the provinces. How far faith and credit are to be given to such a document is
a question ; there may very likely have been some compulsion about the signing
of it, and it could readily be interpreted as a threat on the part of the Filipinos
to retaliate upon their prisoners. On the other hand, there was not much bitterness

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 825

There had been no spontaneous uprising in the Ilokan
provinces or in the Kagayan Valley (the Kagayan natives not
being connected with the mutiny organized by a Cuban Span-
iard on the steamer Compania de Filipinas off Aparri), though
those districts which were most easily in communication with
the capital had, of course, been greatly stirred up over the inci-
dents occurring in Manila Bay, and there was some secret propa-
ganda on foot among the Ilokans. The Tagalog organization at
Bakoor did not feel ready to attempt any movement in northern
Luzon until about the first of August ; they were waiting for
more arms from China, they had their hands full in central
Luzon, and they were not sure what would be the popular
attitude in northern Luzon. When, finally, they had arms and
men to spare for the expeditions to the Ilokan and Kagayan
provinces, they entrusted the leadership entirely to Tagalogs,
and the latter were very greatly aided, both in compelling the
surrender of the small Spanish detachments and in winning
the native people of those regions to their cause, by the news
of the fall of Manila and of the naval rout of Spain in Cuban
waters.

The Spanish military commander in the Ilokan provinces
had, earlier in the course of the trouble, attempted to march
into Pangasinan and join forces with his countrymen there;

of feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos in Pangasinan, and there was unques-
tionably some fraternization between tbem, even under the peculiar circumstances.
Colonel Ceballos, the military commander captured when Dagupan surrendered
on June 22, was at this very time accompanying the troops of Makabulos in their
advance upon San Fernando de la Unidn, ostensibly as a mere observer, though
perhaps under compulsion. El detastre Filipino (Barcelona, 1899), written by
Carlos Ria-Baja, a prisoner of Makabulos, puts a rather di£Perent aspect upon the
letter's treatment of the Spaniards. A very rabid Spanish book on the treat-
ment of the Spanish prisoners, mostly Augustinian friars, in Pampanga is
EpisodioB de la revoliuk^n Jilipina (Manila, 1900), by Joaquin D. Durdn, one
of these friars; some of its charges have been proved well founded. See also
Nuestra priiti6n en poderde lot revUucionarioa Jilipinos (Manila, 1900), by Ulpiaiio
Herrero y Sampedro. Other Spanish l)Ooks and pamphlets on the subject, except
as subsequently mentioned, are of little value or reliability; the history of the
times may best be patched together from ioattered contributions and news items
in the Manila press in 1898 and 1899.

326 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

but he was cut off and made prisoner, as were they. His suc-
cessor in command at Bigan seems to have felt that there was
no great risk to his position, so long as the civil guard held in
check any uneasiness on the part of the Ilokan towns. The
same confidence must have prevailed among the Spanish civil
officials. This and the friction between the civil and military
authorities caused them to be caught off their guard when,
at the beginning of August, forces under the youthful
Tagalog leader, Manuel Tinio, started northward from the
important Spanish port of San Fernando de la Unidn (which
had been taken by a land movement from Dagupan, com-
bined with the sending of reinforcements by steamer from
Subig Bay) and rapidly threatened the scattered Spanish de-
tachments in South and North Ilokos. After Bigran was
abandoned, Tinio's advance was uninterrupted, and in Bangi,
North Ilokos, the main body of the Spanish military force in
that territory, numbering but 200 or 300 rifles, finding itself
entirely cut off, surrendered to him. Other smaller detach-
ments and scattered parties of civilians, who had hastily
attempted to concentrate and escape when the alarm was
spread early in August, were also captured at one and another
point. Most of the civilians in North and South Ilokos and
Abra, including particularly the friar priests of those regions,
had managed, after a series of exciting adventures, to escape
on small sailing-crafts, which rounded the capes of Northwest
Luzon in stormy waters and landed them finally at Aparri.
Thus Tinio missed the prize he especially sought, Bishop
Jose Hevia of the Diocese of Nueva Segovia, who had been
fleeing before his country's troops from Bigan, and who had
escaped at Aparri at the head of a party of about threescore
friar priests from those provinces, and a dozen nuns from the
convent at Bigan. In the towns through which these fugitives
had passed (along with other Spanish civilians, men and
women), the friars had received many demonstrations of sym-
pathy and evidences of regret that they were thus put to flight

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT S27

by the advance of the Tagalog forces ; unquestionably, these
demonstrations of sympathy were to some extent sincere, as
well as being mere outward expressions of Spanish-Filipino
courtesy. The prisoners, mostly military men, who were cap-
tured and held in the Ilokan provinces were, at least after
their transfer to Bigan, treated quite well ; this was in part
due to the fact that native residents of prominence frowned
on any display of harshness or cruelty toward them, and in
part to their being kept under the eye of Manuel Tinio, a
humane commander. We have to record, however, that Bigan
was promptly sacked, that Tinio proclaimed there a decree of
the Revolutionary Government embargoing not only public
property, but also that of the fugitives and prisoners, that the
Spanish troops who capitulated on condition that lives and
property be respected were searched and deprived of all their
personal possessions, and that a Spanish lieutenant was stripped
and publicly whipped before the house of the Filipino com-
mander, Tinio's brother, at Lauag.*

The Spanish fugitives who had managed to escape in boats
had reached Aparri on August 20, and they looked forward
every day to the arrival of a steamer which would bear them

^ See Sastrdn, op. cit.f p. 541. Sastrdn takes most of his data regarding the
spread of insurrection and treatment of prisoners in northern Luzon from Memorias
del CautiveriOf published at Manila in 1900 by Father Graciano Martinez (Augus-
tinian), one of the fugitives with Bishop Hevia. As I>anag was the scene of whip-
pings later on which led to a cause celkbre in the American army, this incident of
1898 may be remarked as bearing on the case of 1901. Whippings have been very
common in that section, as in most others of the Philippines. The Spanish lieu-
tenant in question was only getting a dose of his own medicine, which explains
how he came to be singled out for such treatment. The Aguedo Agbayani who
is mentioned (Father Martinez, p. 29, and SastT(Sn, p. 539) as being at the time so
desirous of having the Spaniards remain, promising to organize the Ilokans to the
number of 10,000 or 20,000, if necessary, to oppose the Tagalogs, was afterward as
ardent a friend of the American military commanders in North Ilokos. At their
urgent recommendation, he was made governor of the province by the Philippine
Commission, when civil government was organized therein in August, 1901. This
appointment was very bitt<;rly resented by the Ilokans who had been identified with
the late insurrection, and they repeatedly charged Agbayani with having conducted
ft sort of inquisition in his home, where men were beaten, one being killed, in order
to make them give information of benefit to the American forces.

328 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

to Hongkong. On the 25th, the Compania de Filipinas, which
had figured in the Olongapo episode in July and had later
been used in the successful attack upon San Fernando de la
Union, arrived off Aparri, almost direct from Cavite, where
300 or 400 soldiers had been loaded on board under the chief
command of Aguinaldo's friend, Daniel Tirona, with Agui-
naldo's former private secretary, Jose Leyba, and another
close associate, Simon Villa, as subordinate commanders,
under full instructions as to dividing between them the mili-
tary command of the Kagayan Valley and as to the civil or-
ganization of the provinces of Kagayan, Isabela, and Nueva
Vizcaya and their towns. As soon as this vessel had taken on
board the pilot sent out from Aparri at her signal, she lowered
the Spanish and raised the Filipino flag. Aparri was defended
only by soldiers of the civil guard and a few Spanish marines,
forty rifles in all, and their commanders surrendered at the
instance of the Spanish civilians, who thought that resistance
might earn a worse fate for them ; it had also been discovered
that the people, always considered loyal to Spain, would not
fight against their fellow-Filipinos, and two towns just above
Aparri on the Rio Grande were ready to surrender, if they
had not already done so, soldiers from the steamer having
disembarked and prepared to occupy them. The terms of ca-
pitulation provided that the lives and property of the Span-
iards were to be respected, and that they should be free to go
where they pleased, no exception being made of the friars,
while the Spanish military men were expressly included when
they should have yielded their arms.^ The promise of liberty

1 Such, at least, are the terms of the document which purports to be a literal
copy of the act of surrender, cited as appendix 1 to Father Martinez's El Cauti-
verio. It has been understood that Tirona afterward disclaimed this particular
agreement, or at any rate interpreted it as not including the friars, perhaps on the
ground that it was made without his sanction by the officers in command of the
100 soldiers who were landed on the opposite bank of the river from Aparri and
gave notice of an attack on the town in two hours. In describing the event Fa-
ther Martinez (pp. 44-52) says the Tagalogs declared they had 2000 men on
board the steamer, and be seems to beliere it ; any one who has ever seen thil

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 829

never was fulfilled with respect to any of the prisoners, and
that of respect for life and property was in many instances
violated both with the friars and with some of the Spanish
civilians. The friars were at once confined together, and their
money and jewels ( " watches," one of their number puts it)
taken from them ; one, who tried to conceal the money he
had, was beaten before the rest, and others suffered buffetings
at Aparri. They were at first not given food by their jailers,
but the soldiers on guard and some of the residents of Aparri
prevented their suffering any real distress on this account.
Some of the more prominent members, including the bishop,
were marched off, and salvos of blank cartridges at first
caused the others to believe they had been shot.^ The real
hardships and abuses began with the order to transport all
the friars and nuns and some few of the lay prisoners, women

600- or 800-ton boat will know how impossible that could be. On the other hand.
General Otis, in assuring Washington on September 4 (Corr. Rel. War, p. 787)
that the Filipinos had no boat that could carry over 250 men, either did not take
into account their possession of this vessel or overlooked the crowding capacity of
Filipino boats. This was the expedition of which Spain had complained, through
Ambassador Cambon, that it left Manila after the surrender to the Americans and
comprised 700 men. Otis's information was that it left the bay August 10, which
was probably incorrect, and that it bore only 100 or 200 men, which was certainly
incorrect, unless it stopped en route in Subig Bay and there recruited more men.
Secretary Hay's reply, based upon Otis's cablegram, was, therefore, somewhat
misleading (Foreign Relations of United States, i5P5,pp. 810-11). Otis's reference
in the message to the coming together of Aguinaldo and the northern Filipinos,
and to the former being in accord with the " chiefs of priest party," probably
sprang from the rumors he had heard of conferences recently had by Aguinaldo
with Ilokans and Pangasinans, and to the identification with the revolution of Fa-
ther Aglipai, who was soon to go north to organize the native priests and, through
them particularly, to make the Ilokans join hands with the Tagalogs.

^ See Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 65-72. This writer has been rather can-
tioQsIy followed, as his statement is wholly ex parte, and his pen, like that of
most of his fellow-friars, was too often dipped in gall to warrant nnqnestioning
acceptance even of his statements of fact. In the main, however, his testimony
haa been corroborated by that of other witnesses, and, allowing for some exagger-
ation, may safely be followed. Despite some of the worst abuses which he relates,
and which must figure in this text because of their seriousness and significance,
the reader will readily discover, between the lines of his book, that the actual
state of the friars imprisoned in the Kagayan Valley was in general not so bad
as he would make out, and some of the things he makes into martyrdom are very
petty.

330 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

as well as men, up the river and distribute them among the
various towns of Kagayan and Isabela. This happened about
the middle of September, by which time these provinces had,
by successive advances up the river, fallen under the control
of Leyba and Villa. The former then completed the conquest
of Northeast Luzon by pushing into Nueva Vizcaya, where
he captured the Spanish officers of Isabela province and some
few soldiers, who were cut ofE between the Filipino forces of
central Luzon and those of the Kagayan Valley. The Span-
ish provincial governor and register of deeds, who were brought
back to Ilagan, were beaten and put in the stocks at intervals
during eight days, Leyba himself, it is charged, finally taking
a musket and raining blows upon the father and upon the
governor, the former absolving the latter in what they thought
would be their final punishment. The register of deeds died
of further tortures at Tugegarau, whither he was taken at the
instance of enemies of his residing there. The captain of the
civil guard who had surrendered at Aparri, after enduring tor-
tures by being strung up and whipped for three days, disap-
peared one night and was, it is said, buried in some unknown
place.^ The worst passions were let loose for a time in certain
of the towns of that rich valley, the great tobacco-growing
region of the Philippines, where the Dominican friars had
reigned supreme in the moral and social realm, and first the
Government, then great private tobacco companies, had helped
rivet an economic slavery upon the sodden masses, and where
the Filipino who aspired to any independence of thought or

^ Fop these incidents, related with some very horrible details, mostly obtaiued
by hearsay, see Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 118-23. Martinez charges that Ley-
ba's wrath was aroused at the governor of Isabela because he had carried off the
provincial funds and had, before being captured in Bayombong, used them in pay-
ing the arrears of salaries to the abandoned Spanish soldiers who were left in the
mountainous regions. He states also that the captain of the Aparri civil guard had
declared, when he yielded to the request of his fellow-countrymen to surrender,
that he knew he was signing his own death-warrant. As he had been connected
with the very bitter persecution of certain prominent Filipinos of the valley, and
bad employed the weapons of torture and others of the reign of terror of 1896-
97, he had some reason for his fears.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 381

action, rare specimen though he was, was promptly squelched
if he would not be relegated to the place of a sycophant. Per-
sonal and business jealousies entered into these few cases of
barbarism, which were, after all, only imitations of similar
cruelties perpetrated by the ruling race during the preceding
two years, and which found echo later in several dark deeds
of revenge under the shadow of American control in the
valley. These were, moreover, exceptional instances among the
lay prisoners of the Filipinos in this region. The latter were
generally treated reasonably well. Not quite the same can be
said of the friars ; after they had been distributed among the
towns, unless they had come in some way under the direct
animosity of Leyba and Villa, they were treated according to
the attitude of the local civil officials, as a rule, which meant
sometimes fairly well, sometimes indifferently, and sometimes
badly. A few cases there were where the friars were beaten
publicly or privately; two were physically exposed in one town
where they had been parish priests ; and efforts were made by
torture to compel several to confess to improper conduct.
These cases were, however, mainly due to Tagalog subordinate
military officials in certain towns. Most of the cases of actual
physical abuse of the friars are said to have occurred under
the immediate knowledge, if not at the instigation, of Leyba
or Villa. Before advancing from Isabela on Nueva Vizcaya,
the former had the water-torture administered to two priests
caught in Isabela. The estate the Augustinians had cultivated
he promptly seized, putting up a sign naming it " Jos^ Leyba."
Three friars were given the water-torture there at the time of
its seizure, to make them confess to living with women, and
later on Villa had one of them strung up by the feet and
whipped in the endeavor to find out about money supposed to
be buried on the estate.^ But the first outbreaks of passion

* See Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 112-16. He says the water-torture was ad-
ministered to the friars of Ilagan in ** an unusual and brutal manner," melted wax
being dropped on the eyes at the same time that water was forced down the
throat.

SS2 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

and a certain brutal delight in the power of command seemed
soon to wear away, and the friars confined in the Isabela
towns, equally with those in Kagayan, had, after the first few
weeks, few things more serious to complain of than that they
were humiliated in various ways, such as being made to clean
streets, to carry water from the river, to form ranks and pa-
rade, military fashion, in the sun at the caprice of the men in
charge of them, etc.^ Though in some of the towns their food
was not always the most satisfying, they lived really well in
other towns, owing to the charity of prominent natives or of
the foreign representatives of a large tobacco company. Of
the one hundred and eighteen confined in the various towns
of the valley, eight died before their release in December,
1899 ; one or two of these were rather far advanced in illness
at the time of their capture, but the other deaths may fairly
be charged to exposure, hardships, and lack of proper food
and attention, and probably two or three of them also to phys-
ical abuse and torture.^

1 Father Martinez tells (p. 117) of the friars at Ilagan being compelled by Villa
to take the instruments of the town band and sally forth to salute Leyba as he re-
turned in triumph from Nueva Vizcaya. Also (p. 127), he charges that the latter
commander confiscated the forty boxes of food and comforts which a pious mestiza
of a prominent Manila family had got together in the capital and conveyed to
Aparri herself, to distribute among the friars in the valley ; and that Leyba im-
prisoned her and sent her overland to Malolos, her trip lasting three months.

^ Appendix 2 to Father Martinez's El Cautiverio gives the names and places of
confinement of 118 friars, of whom 60 were Dominicans, including Bishop He via
and the provisor and the secretary of his diocese, and 68 were Augustinians, in-
cluding the provincial, Father Zallo, who died from abuse and disease. This in-
cluded not only most of the friars who had parishes in North and South Ilokos,
but also all those having parishes in the Kagayan Valley, besides the few August-
inians on the estate mentioned, and a half-dozen or more Dominicans resident in
their convent college at Tugegarau. Moreover, in September, a Tagalog landing-
party had taken possession of the Batanes Islands, off the north end of Luzon,
and had carried away the Dominican fathers there, much to the undoubted regret
of the backward populace of these islands (one of the first places to which the
friars felt it safe to return in 1900-01), though they had refused to volunteer for
resistance under the Spanish governor, who was slain by the Tagalogs. The infor-
mation the Vatican furnished to Washington was that the captured religious num-
bered 130, but this included also the nuns of Bigan. Aguinaldo back-handedly
assured Otis in the November correspondence that the nuns were free to go where
they pleased, but it was some time later before they were actually allowed to
return to Manila.

I

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 333

News of Aguinaldo's first order for the release of the nou-
military prisoners reached this valley in February; but it was
only the first of a series of disappointments based on similar
rumors during 1899, and they were not reached by the Ameri-
can advance until December of that year. Aside from the hope
of forcing terms out of Spain or the Vatican by the retention
of these prisoners, there seems also to have been some efPort
on the part of the revolutionary leaders to profit more directly
by the possession in their power of Bishop Hevia. " Military
Vicar-General " Aglipai visited him at a time when the hier-
archy at Manila had not yet disowned him, but was showing
a disposition to use him, if possible, and, probably on this ac-
count, was very well received by the bishop. He brought with
him a number of seminarists who had pursued studies at Bigan
and whom the revolutionists were very anxious to have or-
dained to supply the visible lack of parish priests, and the
bishop ordained a number of them. He refused to do so in
the case of some of the students (including several who had
been tortured as revolutionists at Bigan in 1896), who he said
were not prepared for ordination ; and, when the order of re-
lease was reported in February, Tirona was instructed from
Malolos to secure the ordination of these seminarists in some
way before letting Hevia or the friars go. Villa accepted the
mission of pressing the matter on the bishop, and it is charged
that, when the latter refused to yield to arguments or threats,
he removed him to a private room and beat him with his
hands and with a cane, afterward keeping him three days on
rice and water in the effort to make him yield.* When such

» So Father Martinez, pp. 163-64. He cautiously finds fault with the bishop for
having been so compliant with Aglipaii but one cannot help wondering if letten
Aglipai bore from Manila did not have something to do with this. The latter to-
day claims that Hevia named him to discharge the duties of his bishopric for the
time being. This incident grows the more curious when we learn that Aglipai
made his visit as "Military Vioar^reneral " of the revolutionary organization
which held the bishop and bii aasoeiates captive, and that they saw the numbers
of La Independencia claiming for Aglipai all the powers of a bishop or of a Oftr*
diaal (Martinez, pp. 176-77).

S34 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

things as this happened with a man whose position was more
or less of a guaranty of safety, if not of respect, for him, we may
imagine that the Tagalog military leaders were restrained in
their dealings with the Kagayan populace only by the neces-
sity of being somewhat tactful at least with the leaders, to
prevent their becoming openly disloyal to Malolos, and we
may perceive one reason why these people were ready to turn
over their towns without resistance to the Americans when
they arrived.^

1 Reference may here be made to the report to Admiral Dewey and the various
magazine articles written by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet L. R. Sargent,
of the United States Navy, who in October and November, 1898, went on a trip
overland through Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Kagayan, North and South Ilokos prov-
inces. This report and these articles (published together as Sen. Doc. 66, 56th
Cong,, Ist Sess.) have not in this work been followed in regard to the status of
the prisoners, nor cited in connection with the discussion of the Filipino provincial
and municipal governments. They have been quoted times without number in the
United States, and on them alone very comprehensive conclusions have been
drawn as to the Filipino Government being entirely successful. They are, in
fact, remarkable, not for what the naval officers saw and learned, but for what
they did not see. Compare, for instance, with the facts related above their state-
ments (ibid., p. 35), that the friars " appeared in good health and we could detect
no evidence of ill-treatment," and that Josd Perez, the Spanish ez-Governor of
Isabela, "appeared to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts." They arrived at
Ilagan just after the scenes of torture under Leyba and Villa. Their statements
may, indeed, be taken as indicating that the Spaniards exaggerated the hardships
they suffered, and that the punishment administered to Senor Perez was at least
not such as to disfigure him; but it is plain that these Americans saw and learned
only what the Filipino military officials intended for them to learn. One wonders
how much Spanish they knew, and how much real investigating they did, when he
reads such a statement as this: "The Catholic Church itself seems to have very
little hold on the people of these provinces [Nueva ficij a, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela,
and Kagayan]." It was in these last two provinces precisely that the friars had
held the people in the most complete state of subjection and backwardness in the
islands, unless, perhaps, it might have been more complete in some parts of the
Bisayas. The American officers noted that the native priests were very conspicuous
in the Ilokan provinces, but not in the Kagayan Valley, hence this conclusion,
among others which also evidence that they were unduly influenced by the state-
ments of a few Filipinos of progressive ideas whom they met; they did not know
that the Tagalog machine was in undisputed control in the Kagayan Valley, and
that in the more advanced Ilokan country it had to temporize and to rely upon
the influence of the native priests, who were in consequence often more prominent
than the native civil officials, to the discontent of the latter. Some of the Americans'
observations are interesting and are valuable in a confirmatory way; but their report
is not a document upon which, by itself, to base conclusions of any importance.
They were very solemnly impressed by the ceremony at Aparri wherein Tirona

I

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 335

Practically all Luzon north of the Pasig River was thus in
the possession of the revolutionists by the middle of Septem-
ber, and they had established their control, so far as outward
forms go, in all except the most remote mountain regions ; the
conquest, too, had been most easy.^ Southern Luzon fell into

turned over his authority to the new civil officials of the valley, and Mr. Sargent re-
marks: " Had the Filipino Government been allowed to work out its own salvation,
this movement could hardly have failed to become historical (ibid., pp. 22, 36)."
The knowledge (which they could easily have obtained) that these officials were
chosen at the dictation of Tirona himself would have saved solemnity at this point.
The Wilcox and Sargent documents are only of value as interesting little bits of
travel at an interesting time ; their authors could only have been qualified to pass
upon the workings of the Filipino governmental machine had they previously been
familiar with conditions in these very provinces. They seem to have been astonished
at finding that the masses of the people were going about their business peacefully
and quietly, instead of living in a state of semi-anarchy. One might have found
as great peace and quiet in any Filipino village during 1899 and 1900, except
when a fight was occurring right near; the Filipinos are not in the habit of going
about things noisily, and they later conducted their operations of guerrilla warfare
in and about villages which pursued their ordinary daily life in the most orderly
fashion. Albert Sonnichsen's Ten Months a Captive among the Filipinos (New York,
1901) is also of small value in so far as it describes the workings of government
among the Filipinos, not alone because it is chock-full of errors about the system
actually in vogue at the time, but also because the writer was totally without a
basis of comparison with the preceding conditions. In the Philippine communities,
peacef ulness and tranquillity are the traditional outward state ; but they may cover,
and nearly always have covered, bossism of the most tyrannous sort, if not down-
right abuses and outrages. On this line, Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and Sounich-
sen do not seem to have been very competent, or at least energetic, observers.
Sonnichsen's book is more interesting than the writings of other Americans who
were captives of the Filipinos in 1899 and 1900, and his attempts to speak favor-
ably of the Filipinos g^ve it a judicial tone; but some of his statements compare
rather queerly with these sentences in letters which he left behind in San Isidro
on May 1, 1899, when General Lawton's advance was driving the Filipinos far-
ther to the north: ** We have been treated in a most barbaric manner, starved,
beaten and bound. . . . The Spaniards have been treated even worse than us,
being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery
and various other diseases, but, whether incapable or not, the Government does
nothing for them. . . . For God's sake, can nothing be done for us? We have
been starving, abused, and treated like animals." (Rept. War Dept., 1899, vol. i,
part 6, p. 243, and Sen. Doc. 208, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, pp. 10-11.)

^ The exceptions to this last statement are two : In the mountainous part of
Morong, but not far from Manila, one hnndred Spaniards held out until the fall
of Manila, surrendering on August 19. The other instance was the celebrated one
of Baler, the scene of vigorous resistance in 1897. Forty-seven Spanish soldiers
and three friars held this isolated port on the stormy east coast of Luzon from July,
1898, when they were besieged in it, until June, 1899, sustaining repeated attacki.

SS6 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

line with the insurrection almost as readily, though in a few
cases the Spanish resistance was not quite so easily overcome.
As for the Tagalog provinces, after Trias joined his old com-
rades in June and took with him the rest of the native soldiers
of Spain, it was only a question of capturing a few Spanish
strongholds in order to give the Bakoor leaders full sway over
Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas as well as Cavite. Again, the
Spanish officers started their efforts at concentration too late.
Near Lipa, six hundred men had to surrender, and Lipa itself
soon capitulated to Paciano Rizal ; the agreement that civilians
and wounded were not to be made prisoners was not respected.
Sixty more prisoners, Spanish civilians and troops, fell into this
leader's hands at Kalamba, after which he moved on the im-
portant town of Santa Cruz, on the Laguna de Bay. Six hun-
dred or more Spanish civilians and soldiers were shut up here,
including a half-dozen native members of the civil guard, the
only members of that organization in Laguna who had not
joined their fellow-countrymen. Before Manila fell, the Spanish
authorities had tried several times to get the river gunboats
through to the aid of the besieged towns of Kalamba and
Santa Cruz, but the Filipinos held the banks of the Pasig River
after the first week in June, and made it too warm for the
Spanish boats. Three rather determined attacks upon Santa
Cruz were repulsed before August 13 ; but after tlie capital
had surrendered to the Americans, the Spanish military and
civil officials of Laguna acceded to the terms of honorable
surrender offered to them by Rizal's brother, by which the men

They had stocked up with provisions, and refused all overtures made to them for
an honorable surrender after the fall of Manila ; indeed they still refused to yield
after they were assured that the archipelago had been transferred by Spain to the
United States and the treaty had finally been ratified, twice refusing to see emis-
saries whom General Diego de los Rios, the Spanish commander in authority in
Manila in 1899, sent to them to order them to surrender and accept the safe-conduct
of the Filipinos to Manila. They afterward declared that they thought the docu-
ments that were brought to them were forged, and they did not believe the prom-
ise of honorable surrender would be respected. They were treated as heroes upon
their arrival at Manila. The captain and sixteen soldiers had died in the siege.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 837

under arms were to be retained as prisoners of war, but the
civilians and a dozen friars were to be allowed to proceed to
Manila. Rizal performed his part of the contract, bearing the
noncombatant prisoners to the town of Pasig, the limit of his
jurisdiction ; but here they were met by orders from Filipino
headquarters to convey them as prisoners to Santa Ana, whence
they were later transferred to Pangasinan, suffering the same
fate as other Spanish civilians and friars.^ Into Batangas there
had already been brought some few prisoners and the plunder
obtained by the Aguinaldo family expedition to Mindoro, in-
cluding lay brothers of the order of Recollects, whose estate it
was the object of the expedition to seize ; several assassinations
marred still more seriously the record of this expedition. The
Spanish military commander in Tayabas ordered the concen-
tration of all his fellow-countrymen living in that province in
the capital in June, before the insurgent organization there
was well under way ; 443 soldiers and some few civilians, in-
cluding friars, were gathered in the church and convent and
one or two neighboring stone buildings of the town of Tayabas,
which were stocked with provisions, connected with covered
passageways, and prepared for defense by burning away all the
thatched structures encircling them. The attacks of the Fili-
pinos began on the 20th of June, and were frequent there-
after, the Spaniards several times repulsing them with bayonet
charges. The place held out for fifty-six days, and it fell then
because the malaria which causes so high a mortality in this
town was decimating the force of ill-fed defenders. The sur-
render was absolute, but the Spaniards marched out with the
honors of war, and the Filipino commander Malvar held their
defense before his troops as a model to imitate.^

> See the report of the Spanifh civil gorernor of Laguna, one of the parties to
the capitulation : Sitio y Rendici6n de Santa Crux de la Laguna (Manila, 1899), by
Antonio del Rio.

* In the Rept. Phil. Comm.t 1901, vol. i, opposite p. 11, may be seen a picture
of the convent of Tayabas, showing the effect of the Filipino rifle fire on this
building, one of those in which the Spaniards were besieged.

838 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The only place in the territory of the Bikols in which the
uprising in 1898 seems to have been entirely spontaneous was
at Nueva Caceres, the capital of the two provinces of the Cam-
arines and the seat of the bishopric and the friar colleges,
where feeling had run high in 1896 and 1897, several native
priests had been tried for treason, and certain of the leading
citizens had been executed and their property embargoed.
News from Cavite of American protection and of a new move-
ment for independence found eager recipients here, though at
the outset no really responsible leaders. The civil guard in
Nueva Caceres and near there revolted in June, and the de-
tachment in that town killed its superior oifficer, his wife and
four children, and the prosecuting attorney of the province,
besides wounding other Spaniards. Prisoners were released from
jail, and some dark deeds of personal revenge were enacted
for a few days. Still, the new local commanders gave the other
Spanish officers of the provincial government, against whom
there had been no personal resentment and who departed un-
molested, their pay up to the day "when the Philippine Republic
began to rule." Besides the captured public funds, they seized
all the property of the rather well-to-do Chinese storekeepers
there, and made the latter pay 150,000 pesos for the ransom
of their goods. After this first outbreak, which is fairly
chargeable to the long-pent-up feelings over the treatment this
community had received at the hands of the Spaniards in the
preceding two years, the Bikols themselves seemed quite
humanely disposed, as a general thing, toward the Spaniards
who had fallen into their power. As many of the latter as could
had fled at the first sign of trouble. One party from Nueva
Caceres, including a number of friars and some women, went
overland in June through the Bikol provinces of South Cama-
rines and Albai, finding the people digging trenches and pre-
paring for fighting everywhere, but being generally well
treated, though at one place they had to give up the few arms
they bore in the face of the hostile attitude of the small party of

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 339

native troops that had been organized. The native authorities at
the important hemp port of Legaspi, promised them protection
if they should remain there, but they thought it wiser to take
the first steamer that arrived and proceed to Manila. A similar
party of Spanish fugitives from the Bikol province of Sorsogon,
in the extreme southeast of Luzon, made its way overland to Le-
gaspi, being unmolested on the way and being allowed to leave
Legaspi in peace. This all happened before the leaders at
Bakoor had been able to get ready any commanders or troops
to send down to Legaspi or into the Camarines, or it is almost
certain that these Spaniards would not have been permitted
to reach Manila. Somewhat over 1500 prisoners, mostly Spanish
soldiers, eventually fell into the hands of the representatives
of the Malolos military authorities in the various parts of south-
ern Luzon, and the greater number were not released until the
American military operations for the capture of the hemp ports
in early 1900 drove the insurgent forces into the mountains.
On February 23, 1900, over 100 of these prisoners from the
Camarines were bound, fastened to trees, and slashed to pieces
by detachments of bolomen under the command of Francisco
Braganza, a Filipino commander sent down from northern
Luzon, because, in their weakened state, they could not move
rapidly enough to keep away from the American troops which
sought to rescue them.^

» The number is variously reported from 107 to 120. They were all Spanish
soldiers. The responsibility was never fastened upon any Filipino ofiBcer of high
rank. Braganza, who held the rank of major, and who was in immediate com-
mand, was brought to trial in June, 1901, at Nueva Cdceres, and was found gfuilty
of not only ordering but personally supervising the massacre. For the publication
of the findings and sentence in this case, see General Order^ no. 291, Headquarters
Division of the Philippines, 1901 (reproduced on pp. 1278-60 of Sen. Doc. SSI,
67th Cong., Ist Sess.). Braganza was also found guilty of robbing the persons of
the slaughtered prisoners, and of having their bodies stripped and, all mutilated,
left to be devoured by dogs. He was executed at Nueva C&ceres in November, 1901.
In approving the sentence, Major-General Adna R. ChafFee, then commanding in
the Philippines, said : " That these chiefs of the insurrection made the act of
the accused their own is evidenced by the fact that they did not bring him to
trial therefor nor cease to continue him in office. ... In this, it it believed, they
betrayed the better sentiments of the Filipino people, and demonstrated their lack

340 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Aside from the desire to have in command in all parts of the
archipelago men who would be loyal to the persons at the
center of the revolution, there was also a special reason for
the desire of the latter to control the new governmental organ-
ization in southern Luzon and in the other islands nearest it.
This was the fact that they would thus be able to obtain the
revenue from the shipments of hemp. They had to be content
at first with stimulating from a distance the movements of the
Bikols to rid themselves of the Spaniards, but before long the
direction of affairs in the Bikol provinces was taken mainly into
the hands of the Tagalogs. The first emissary sent into those
provinces was of Bikol origin, but of a Manila family, and this
commander, Vicente Lukban, later headed an expedition to
the Bisayan islands S^mar and Leite to take charge of the
hemp ports there. The next chief commander in the hemp
country of Luzon was a Philippine citizen of nearly or quite
Chinese blood, Paua by name, who had been with Aguinaldo
in 1897, but whose principal qualification for his task as " gen-
eral" seems to have been his ability to make the Chinese
business men of Albai and the Camarines contribute their full
share of taxes and "voluntary offerings." Lukban's first expe-
dition to the hemp regions had been planned in June, but it
was not until after the Filipinos at Bakoor had gained more
confidence in their freedom to sail the Philippine waters, from
the action of Admiral Dewey in the Olongapo matter and the
withdrawal farther from Luzon of the Spanish gunboats in
the central islands, that they ventured to use for expeditions
around southern Luzon the five small vessels they had, aside
from the Aparri steamer, that were larger than launches.
Marinduke, a progressive little island of five Tagalog towns,
close to Tayabas, had early organized itself. Masbate, less ad-
vanced, and less incHned to revolt, was quite readily stirred up

of comprehension of the means of governing humanely and wisely. History will
surely record against them large responsibility for this, the most barbarous and
revolting massacre of helpless prisoners known to the modem history of war."

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 841

by little expeditions from here and from Tayabas. Early in
September, the Spanish positions in the little Romblon-Tablas-
Sibuyan group of islands north of Panai were so threatened
that it was deemed advisable to withdraw their small garrisons.^
The move upon Samar and Leite had been begun in August,
both from Masbate and from the southern end of Luzon. It
was not entirely an afEair from without, however, as all northern
Leite and two or three towns in S^mar had been ripe for
trouble on their own account, since long before the return
of Aguinaldo from Hongkong (indeed, it is hardly probable
that they knew of this event until July or August), and the
Spanish miUtary authorities of the Bisayas had found it ad-
visable to concentrate and keep on concentrating their small
garrisons in these islands, and to abandon some of the towns
where the loyalty of the civil guard was more than suspicious.
This state of affairs did not, however, become acute until Sep-
tember or October ; for it was not until the virtual withdrawal
of the Spaniards from S^mar and Leite and the disappearance
of their gunboats from those waters that the Tagalog organiza-
tion ventured to send troops there, though emissaries had
been sent down to help stir things up.

Before May 1, as if in prevision of the victory of Dewey
and the isolation of Manila from the Bisayas, the Spanish
Government had appointed Diego de los Rios, its chief mili-
tary officer in Mindanau, governor-general and captain-general
of the Bisayas and Mindanau. On June 30, it gave him power
to adopt all reforms and measures of a political and adminis-
trative character that were conducive to the welfare of those
provinces, meaning those things that would help to unite the
people under Spain and preserve to her the sovereignty over
those islands at least. Subsequently he was made governor-
general of all parts of the archipelago that could not be

* See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ p. 22, for a report from Marinduke on September 10,
1898, of the " bombardinfi^ " of Romblon by the little Spanish f^inboata; the little
Romblon group was already in the hands of the Hisayans who inhabit this groap»
aided, however, by a few Tagalog soldiers from the mainland of Luzon.

342 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

reached by the commands of General Augustin; but, by that
time, all Luzon had passed, or was about to pass, from under
Spanish control. General Rios had in May abandoned the
campaign he was directing against the Moros in Mindanau,
and had proceeded to establish the new capital of the central
and southern islands in Hoilo, taking with him 100 Spanish
and 700 native soldiers. This gave him a force for all the cen-
tral islands (excluding Mindanau and the Sulu group, of
course) of less than 400 Spanish soldiers,^ many of them sick,
and, at the outset, 3500 or 4000 native soldiers. The uprisings
which occurred in the Bisayas in February and March had
been virtually quelled by May 1, on which day the Spaniards
had taken the town of Panai, in Kapis province, after an all-
day fight with the hordes of natives who had seized it from
the civil guard, and had burned the town "as a lesson." Ex-
cept for a few minor local disturbances, things were thence-
forward quiet in the central islands until October. There was
as yet no reflection of the Aguinaldo movement, and com-
munication of their plans by the Filipinos of Luzon, except
in S^mar and Leite and smaller islands near Luzon, had not
been easy. An evidence that something was going on under
the surface was afforded, however, by the fact that in October
the Spanish authorities discharged many of their native soldiers,
having discovered conspiracies among the garrisons, extend-

* John F. Bas8, who visited Iloilo in September, 1898, wrote from Manila on
October 8 {Harper's Hvft.^ p. 73) that there were 800 Spanish soldiers on the
island of Panai. Probably the Spanish officials and press of Iloilo exaggerated
the number, for political reasons. The figures above are stated after a compari-
son of Spanish sources. Bass quoted from an Iloilo newspaper the charges of
American brutality in Manila, the editor (who afterward, as an editor in Manila,
sedulously fostered suspicion and hatred of the Americans among the Filipinos)
claiming to know that the Americans had definitely adopted a policy of extermina-
tion. His charges read very much like those the Englishman, John Foreman,
made two, and even six, years later (National Review, September, 1900, and
Contemporary Review, September, 1904). Bass says, however, that the natives did
not seem to be much impressed by the newspaper campaign, but would, apparently,
" welcome an American Government enthusiastically. The inhabitants of the
island of Panai are not on friendly terms with those of Luzon, and at heart they
do not like the idea of being governed by Tagalogs from Luzon."

I

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 345

ing even into the Moro country; 117 of the conspirators be-
lieved most guilty were quite summarily shot. General Rios
soon followed this step by ordering the concentration in Iloilo
and Sebii of all Spaniards and Spanish troops in the Bisayas;
the friars had begun to concentrate upon their own initiative
before this. Small expeditions from Luzon had by this time
disembarked also upon the north and west coast of Panai, and
were making headway toward the capture of An tike and
Kapis provinces, though the people were in large part apa-
thetic, and in some instances actually hostile, and the Tagalog
commanders had met with some reverses before the Spanish
troops were all withdrawn to Iloilo.^ Some idea of the Spanish
resources in the central islands may be obtained from the fact
that General Rios had for the defense of Iloilo, the new Bi-
sayan capital, about 300 Spanish soldiers and three little
mountain guns, besides about 2500 native soldiers, many dis-
posed to desert when the favorable opportunity offered ; and
that Sebii was garrisoned by less than 100 Spanish soldiers
and a few marines, assisted by some small gunboats. In the
latter city, the Spaniards still had, however, some Moro war-
riors from Samboanga, Mindanau, who had been offered by
their chief, a Moro with Spanish blood, to help put down the
rebellion in Sebii during the preceding March and April. Sebii

* See the report of the governor of Antike province for 1901 (Sen. Doc. SSly
67th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 487) for some data about the expedition under Leandro
Fallon, which landed in the northwest part of Antike late in September with 140
soldiers from Cavite and 340 rifles. At first, some of the detachments of the civil
guard deserted to them. Then thej suffered a defeat at the hands of a detach-
ment of native troops of Spain, after which various of the local presidents, to
whom rifles had been given to arm their people, turned the guns over to the
Spaniards. FuUon had to take to the mountains, his force reduced to 100 rifles.
Angel Salazar, like Fullon, a Bisayan bj origin, with whom he had been sent
down from Luzon to organize a Filipino government in Antike, defeated a Spanish
detachment in October, and desertions of the native troops to the Filipino organ-
izers began again. Thus reinforced, and aided by the withdrawal of Spanish
troops to Iloilo, the Filipinos moved to occupy the southern and more poptilous
part of Antike, entering San Jos^, the capital, on November 22, and burning all
the oflBcial records, including land registration bookSi to ** wipe oat the last vestiges
of Spanish rale."

344 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

was perhaps as little disposed to rebel against Spanish rule as
any island in the group, the populace in general being very-
peaceable, though there was an element of educated men
heartily in sympathy with the movement for reform in the
Philippines. But Spain could not have chosen a better method
to alienate the sympathies she had in the island than by let-
ting loose, as she did, the fierce and uncivilized Moro bolo-
men to " regulate " the population, a task very much to their
taste. The presence of these Moros, and the zeal of the Span-
ish military officials in imprisoning prominent residents dur-
ing the fall of 1898, completed the work of the preceding
spring in gaining for Spain the ill-will of practically the entire
population of the island. But there was no open outbreak and
the island was externally at peace when the Spaniards with-
drew to Samboanga in December.^

For over a month before it was decided to abandon the
Bisayas, Iloilo had been beset, though at a safe distance, by a
cordon of Filipinos, at first mostly bolomen, but gradually be-
coming equipped with some hundreds of rifles;^ and General
Rios had been forced to give up all hopes of reaching a har-
monious agreement with the Bisayan leaders which might
assume Spanish sovereignty against the conspiracy of the
Tagalogs, and perhaps also against an attempt by the United
States. He had made use of the authority granted to him to
organize a " Reform Junta," composed of a few Spaniards or
mestizos addicted to Spain and also of certain of the more dis-
tinguished and wealthy lawyers and plantation owners among
the Filipinos. The membership of this committee gave no

* See La Independencia, November 16, 1898, for reports reaching Malolos about
the Moros and Spanish scouts around Sebii preventing the people going out to
gather their crops in the fields, and other abuses ; also ibid., November 22, 1898,
for a letter from Iloilo rehearsing tales from Sebd about these abuses and the
imprisonment and torture of prominent Sebiians. This letter also declares that
the Filipino forces under Martin Delgado have held Iloilo besieged since Novem-
ber 4, and contains one of the characteristic exaggerations of the time in the
statement that over 25,000 Filipinos are under arms in Panai.

* The Spanish writers expand them into thousands.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 345

promise for agreement on any measures of reform, or, indeed,
for any frankness of speech among themselves; and Rios's ap-
peal to the people to remain loyal, offering to submit all " suit-
able reforms" to his Government, had lost whatever effect it
might have had by being coupled with a request for the co-
operation of the friar priests and a eulogy of their work.^

It only remains to complete the picture of the Spanish col-
lapse of power in the Bisayas by relating how, on November
6, 1898, the Spanish garrison and Government ofi&cials of the
important sugar province of western Negros had formally
surrendered, at Bakolod, its capital, the government and all
its property to a Filipino commander whose men were armed
with more cornstalks and bolos than rifles.^ After the with-
drawal of the Sebii and Iloilo garrisons, on December 20 and
24 respectively, Spain held only her military posts at Sam-
boanga and Jolo, in the midst of the Moro country, where her
claims to sovereignty had never yet really been made good.

Outside of Negros, whence the Spaniards departed in peace,
there were no Spanish prisoners captured in the Bisayas, except
for a score or so in Antike, and perhaps here and there a stray

* See Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 624. The Spanish editor who had been temporarily
banished from Manila journalism in February, 1898, for broaching a campaign of
reform and putting Primo de Rivera in a rather ridiculous position, headed this
committee. With its Spanish and pro-Spanish members eliminated, it afterward
became the " Committee of the Bisayas," which for a time treated with the Amer-
ican authorities in Manila, and finally worked more or less in harmony with the
Malolos Government.

* See Rept. War DepL^ 1900^ vol. i, part 10, appendix XT, for some acconnt of
the overthrow of Spanish authority in Negros and the establishment of a Filipino
provincial government in November, 1898. The articles of capitulation at Bakolod
are cited in Captain Verdades's Historia Negra^ pp. 33-35. They copied quite liter-
ally the terras of the capitulation at Manila. The Spanish civil and military au-
thorities delivered up the government in true formal style, with its buildings and
funds and their arms, and in return were given their liberty and a daily allowance
of money, eventually being permitted to depart for Iloilo in peace. The friars,
however, were shut up, and some of them were put to work on the Government
farm at La Carlota. It is credibly stated that they were frightened into surrender
by the report of an officer who, from the church tower, surveyed the ** hosts " ad-
ranoing ng^inst them, which had for this purpose been provided with cornstalks
to bear as riflos, and reported that there were ** thousands of rifles." The Spaniards
had from 400 to 600 troops in Bakolod, but nearly all were native soldiers.

346 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

civilian. The record of the insurrection in those islands, such
as there was of it prior to the beginning of armed opposition
to the United States, was therefore quite free from deeds of
violence, and was conducted, indeed, on a dignified basis. It
was in Luzon, where alone the Filipino national movement had
gained good headway before the close of 1898, that deeds had
been committed which foreshadowed the more serious crimes
that were to stain the record of the revolution later on, when
it should find itself no longer triumphant, but in desperate
straits to maintain its dominance over the people. These crimes
of 1898 were altogether too frequent and too comprehensive,
as we have seen, to call them isolated cases. Moreover, the
whole conduct of the Malolos chieftains toward the question
of releasing their friar and civilian Spanish prisoners precludes
them from denying their share of responsibility for the darker
deeds of violence, as well as for the many minor abuses not
compatible with civilized warfare. And when we find the Sec-
retary of War, Aguinaldo's brother, at the time when the
Americans were beginning to drive the latter northward from
Manila, instructing an officer of high rank at Malolos to search
out an unhealthy town for the place of confinement of the
friars held by the revolutionists in central Luzon, we have an
infallible indication of the low moral tone of the sort of Fili-
pinos who unfortunately predominated in the counsels of the
would-be government.* Yet it is perhaps unfair to arraign a
whole population upon the basis of deeds done by their least
cultivated leaders, or for the instances of personal revenge
taken after fashions already shown them by their Spanish
victims. And aside from the more shocking incidents of crime,

1 Baldomero Aguinaldo had instructed General Isidore Torres to find an un-
healthy town for the concentration of the friars, as appears from the note the
latter wrote to him at Malolos on February 17, 1898, which is among the cap-
tured documents in the War Department, and which was cited by Senator Spooner
in a speech on May 29 and 31, 1902 {Cong. Record^ 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6130).
Torres recommended the town of La Paz, Tarlak, saying : " According to my ob-
servation, even the persons born there are attacked by malarial fever and ague,
and if they are strangers, very few will escape death."

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 847

the picture was not quite so dark as the Spanish prisoners have
painted it in their tales, which simulate martyrdom. It is
known that in many places the prisoners (except, as a general
rule, the friars) lived on quite amicable terms with their cap-
tors, and that frequently they had virtual freedom within local
limits — though how commonly this was due to the bribery of
the officers in command or to their enjoyment of the favor of
Filipino women is another question.

Tagalog military control had not been hard to maintain in
the Bikol and Kagayan provinces, hitherto generally most peace-
ful and submissive. The case was somewhat different with the
more advanced towns of the Ilokan provinces, where the Ma-
lolos commanders had to mix diplomacy with their show of
invading force and to employ the native priests to commandeer
the people, and with the provinces where the Pangasinan and
Pampangan dialects were spoken. The latter had had some
share in previous revolts, some of their leaders were discon-
tented over the Biak-na-bat(5 settlement and were not cheer-
fully disposed toward the head of the Malolos machine, while
there was also a strong pro-Spanish element, at least in Pan-
gasinan. This last took the form of an organization called the
" Guards of Honor," which had been called into being among
some of the more ignorant and fanatic populations of Panga-
sinan and Sambales the year before by friar priests, for the
purpose of combating the spread of Katipunan ideas, and
which was now being similarly employed by certain native
priests in Pangasinan and Tarlak who were addicted to the
friar hierarchy at Manila and opposed to the talk of a " Filipino
priesthood." Dealing with such ignorant masses, it is hard to
recognize anything like real " public opinion " in the clashes
of the opposing causes; they are only significant as indicating
the kind of division which existed, and still to some extent
exists in those regions, among the Filipinos of some degree of
education, both priests and laymen. The religious question
was undoubtedly in the background of the disturbances in

I

348 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Tarlak, Pangasinan, and to a certain extent in Sambales and
Union provinces, in November and December of 1898. Those
disturbances are also to a considerable extent evidence of op-
position to Tagalog dominance, of lack of sympathy with the
insurrection, and, more than either of these, of protest against
the abuses which the new provincial and municipal officials
were committing, right and left, in the first flush of their new-
found power. The insurrection at Malolos had, indeed, to
count in December with an insurrection against itself, which
assumed considerable proportions at one time and required
vigorous efforts to put it down.* Other dissensions in camp

1 See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, pp. 27, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, for telegrams of
November, December, and January with regard to the uprising against Agui-
naldo's subordinates in Tarlak and Fangasinan. On November 7, Colonel Hiz6n
reported that he had imprisoned certain rebellious local chiefs and confiscated
their property, which action Aguinaldo commended. On November 30 and De-
cember 18, General Makabulos, who had had to give the matter his personal at-
tention, minimized the trouble, charging it to tulisanes (bandits), but reporting
one four-hour fight. On December 27, Sandiko wired Aguinaldo from Manila his
information that affairs in the disturbed provinces were very serious, adding: " It
is impossible to describe the abuses committed by the military and civil authori-
ties of the said provinces." On December 27 and 28, reports of fighting came
from a number of places; Secretary of the Interior Ibarra sought to minimize the
importance of the outbreak, yet recommended the proclamation of martial law in
Tarlak. Within the next day or two prominent civil officials, including one Cabi-
net officer and various army officers, including General Luna, went to Tarlak to
quell the trouble; it was also planned to have Aglipai go there, to enlist the aid of
refractory native priests. In his Episodios de la revolucidn filipinay p. 71, Father
Durfln says this revolt in Tarlak was headed by an ex-sergeant of the civil guard,
who, with ten companions, was slaughtered at a feast to which he had been in-
vited by the president of Kamiling, Tarlak. La Independencia^ November 30,
1898, prints a sweeping denial of the reports published by Spanish papers in Ma-
nila to the effect that the people of central Luzon and the Bisayas were opposed
to the Malolos Government, and says the whole trouble in Luzon is caused by the
fanatic "Guards of Honor." On December 22, a decree of Aguinaldo forbade the
entry of people into Sambales from Fangasinan, Tarlak, Bataan, or Fampanga,
unless they had passes, in order " to prevent crimes being committed " in Sam-
bales. The echoes of the trouble lasted long after the outbreak of fighting with
the United States had come partially to unite the Filipinos; indeed, these dissen-
sions had something to do with the manner of the collapse of the Filipino organi-
zation. In March, Aguinaldo appointed commissioners to inspect the conditions
of local government in northern Luzon and bring offenders to trial; on March 21,
he appointed a delegate to hold entirely new elections in Tarlak ; and again, on
June 26, a commissioner was sent to Fangasinan to investigate abuses by the local
officials. (See again Taylor's Rept.)

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 349

during 1898 were mainly personal in character, though some-
times indicative of tribal feeling also. Ilokan half-castes had
been quite prominent in the reform propaganda in Spain, and it
was felt that this element must be placated by recognizing
some of its leaders. Besides this, Antonio Luna was said to have
dedicated himself to the study of military science in Europe,
with a view to its future use in the Philippines, and Filipino
sentiment quite generally demanded that he be given recogni-
tion in the programme of military organization.^ It was pre-
cisely here, however, that Aguinaldo felt himself to be pre-
eminent, and could not brook the thought of a rival. Luna
was appointed " Director of War," with a somewhat anoma-
lous combination of staff and field supervisory powers. But
Emilio Aguinaldo had no intention of yielding the supreme
command of military affairs, and his cousin Baldomero was
Secretary of War; even had there been no personal jealousy,
a clash would have come under this triple-headed arrangement
for military leadership, and there was from the first no cor-
diality between Luna and the Aguinaldos.^ The proscriptions
of the Cavite revolt of 1896-97 were recalled also by the vin-
dictiveness displayed at Bakoor toward certain Pampangan and
Pangasinan leaders of 1897 who had clashed with Aguinaldo
over the division of the Biak-na-bat<5 money, who had found
it was not safe to go into their own provinces after his mili-
tary organization had been set up there, and who for a time
before the fall of Manila took refuge on one of Dewey's ves-

^ AntoDio and Joan Lnna, mention of whose rather abject retractions of anti-
Spanish or anti-Catholio sentiments after their arrest and trial in 1896 has been
made in chapter iii (anUf pp. 113, 114), had been released after a brief imprisonment
in Spain. Juan, the painter, died in Hongkong in 1898, while awaiting a chance
to return to the Philippines. Antonio arrived there soon after the fall of Manila.

* See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ pp. 27-29, for messages exchanged in November
between Emilio and Baldomero Aguinaldo, indicating one of the first series of
clashes between them and Lima. Aguinaldo was always suspicious and afraid of
Lnna. Almost simultaneously with the latter's entry into the new military organi-
zation, La Indejmidencia, first published at Manila and then at Malolos, appeared
to rival tho official organ of Aguinaldo and it was generally recognised as Luna's
orgwi.

350 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

sels in the bay. Friction there was also, of a local sort, over
whether the military or civil officials should administer the
confiscated Spanish property and the " booty " of a more per-
sonal sort ; also over the requirement that the local officials
must quarter and supply the troops which passed through
their towns or were garrisoned in them.^

There were desertions among the Filipino troops, even before
the stress of warfare had begun, and even in the Tagalog
provinces.^ The enlistments had been to a large extent compul-
sory, military discipline under all but a very few commanders
was lax, and the people also wished to attend to the gathering
of their crops. Still, there were always more men on hand
than rifles. It has been estimated that the Filipinos had, when
the outbreak against the United States began, upwards of
25,000 rifles, and that they eventually possessed about 35,000,
of which not more than 2500 were in the Bisayan Islands: of
this total, they had obtained 10,000 or 12,000 from the Span-
iards whom they had made prisoners and from the desertions
with their weapons of native members of the Spanish army
and the civil guard; several thousand more firearms, of a non-
descript pattern, came forth from the hiding-places of those
who had them in the revolt of 1896-97 and from the retreats
of the motley band of outlaws in the mountains, whose con-
nection with the organized insurrection was sporadic; and the
rest were obtained by shipments from Asia.^ Whether or no

* See the decree of A^inaldo of Septembers, 1898 (Taylor'' s Rept.), entrastmg
the administration of all " booty " and confiscated property to the military and
not the civil officers, and requiring the local governments to quarter soldiers at
their own expense.

2 See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, pp. 28, 29, for reports of desertions in Tayabas and
Nueva jficija in November, 1898; in the former case, Lukban declared it was be-
cause of insufficient food.

* The number of arms in the possession of the Filipinos in 1899 and 1900 has
frequently been put at a higher figure than 35,000; but this is more likely an ovei^
than an under-estimate. General Merritt was probably about right when he told
the Peace Commission at Paris that they had 15,000 to 20,000 rifles when he left
Manila, although Major Bell, military-information officer, had reported to him a
total of 40,000, estimating that the Filipinos had 15,000 rifles left from the former

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT 351

Admiral Dewey had stated that he would seize these arms, the
Filipinos evidently feared that he would, and, after the Amer-
ican troops arrived in the bay, they never again ventured to
bring a shipment from Hongkong or Macau direct to Cavite.
Perhaps 10,000 rifles, with a large amount of ammunition, were
brought by contraband traders to Batangas, Aparri, and small
islands near Luzon during 1898; and it may be that an equal
number were surreptitiously introduced into these places and
the Bisayas during the succeeding year, when the navy gunboats
were patroling the coasts as well as might be, but the total
prevention of contraband trade was impossible. Some of the
funds which were on deposit in Aguinaldo's name in Hong-
kong were also used to start a large though crude sort of
arsenal and cartridge-factory at Imus in July, 1898; and the
revolutionary funds supported this and another in Bulak^n
until they fell into the hands of the American soldiers. In
October, Admiral Dewey had seized the five small steam vessels
which Aguinaldo had for inter-island communication and the
steam launches that plied about the bay flying the Filipino
flag.* Just before, one of Dewey's vessels had captured at

insurrection (which was three to five times as many as they had in 1896-97), and
had secured 20,000 by captures of Spanish troops and desertions of Filipinos
{Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 379-80).

* In a memorandum for General Otis on Aguinaldo's letter of August 27 to Gen-
eral Merritt, asking the latter, among other things, to " reclaim from Admiral
Dewey the protection of our ships for their free navigation," Major J. F. Bell said:
" Admiral Dewey . . . has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's
course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he hnd ceased to recognize
him in any way and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This
prayer to you to * reclaim' Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this
change of attitude on the admiraPs part, who, if permitted to follow his own incli-
nations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his boats and
launches at the first overt act" (See Sen. Doc. SOS, part 1, p. 26.) In " A Filipino
Appeal to the American People," contributed to the North American Review for
January, 1900, over Apolinario Mabini*s signature, it is stated that, when Agui-
naldo's commissioners went to Dewey in October, 1898, to ask the return of these
boats, they were received very haughtily by the latter, he scolding and berating
Aguinaldo, and treating the commissioners so brusquely that Major Bell, who ac-
companied them, openly expressed his disgust at the admiral's manner. (This al-
leged contribution by Mabini, which must have been written, if at all by him, whim

352 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Batangas a steamer which had brought arms shipped from
Macau by American agents of Aguinaldo there, though the
arms themselves had already been landed and taken inland.^
Later on, steamers engaged in the inter-island trade had to be
seized by the military authorities for distributing arms and
soldiers from island to island. The Malolos Government had
its quartermasters and shipping agents in the port of Manila
quite as it had a committee of tax-collectors and a number of
organizers of native militia in the various districts of the city.
As far back as September, Filipino "clubs" had begun to be
organized in Manila, and in November, when the result of
the negotiations at Paris was foreshadowed, the work of estab-
lishing these centers was pushed in all its districts. Ostensi-
bly, they were "popular clubs," for recreation, athletic exer-
cise, etc. ; but in reality they were even more than centers of
the revolutionary propaganda, for they were designed to form

he was in retirement in Pangasinan province in the fall of 1899, has not been
herein considered, in connection with its charges as to an " alliance " between the
United States and the Filipinos ; for, if it is Mabini's at all, its style has undergone
a complete change in translation, and it does not read like Mabini in substance.
As will be seen in chapter xi, pp. 404 jf., Mabini himself, early in 1899, put the
quietus to the claim of an " alliance.")

* See Bureau of Navigation, p. 126, for the Batangas seizure. See Tel. Corr.
Aguinaldo, p. 22, for evidence of the previous landing of arms at Batangas. The
design of the Filipinos later to make extensive shipments from Shanghai to Aparri,
at the northern end of Luzon, was pretty efiFectively prevented by the patrol the
navy maintained of the northern coasts of Luzon. Information of this attempt
came to Otis through the Filipino in Manila whom Aguinaldo desired to employ
as a banker to negotiate the purchases in Hongkong and Shanghai; he wished to
invest 8100,000 in a single purchase of arms. Corr. Rel. War contains messages
between Manila and Washington in November and December, 1898, regarding
these projects, and the injunctions of Washington that Dewey and Otis cooperate
to prevent the landing of contraband. Here the foundation was laid for the later
downright disagreements between the two commanders in the Philippines, regard-
ing the blockade, shipping in the archipelago, and things in general. Dewey thought
the permits for trade from Manila, and thence from island to island, neutralized
all his efforts to prevent the transportation of Filipino soldiers from one island to
another and the introduction of arms in places free from insurrection; evidence in
favor of this view is obtained in General Orders, Military Governor, Philippines,
no. 33, July 31, 1899, confiscating the inter-island steamer Toneng for a long series
of contraband operations in and near southern Luzon from October, 1898, to January,
1899.

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEIVIENT 85S

the nucleus of a militia to be used in an uprising inside the
city when the time should come.^

* The files of La Independencia for November, 1898, contain plenty of informa-
tion about these " clubs," sufficient to give more than a hint of their character.
On November 29, their " directors " went to Malolos to pay their respects to Agui-
Daldo. The chief organizer of these circles and of the Filipino militia in Manila
was Teodoro Sandiko, who was until December an employee of the American pro-
vost-marshal-general in Manila, who had, before resigning his post in the center
of American affairs, become Director of Diplomacy for the Malolos Government,
and who later became Secretary of the Interior at Malolos. He bad entered the
employ of the Americana solely to facilitate this work.

CHAPTER IX

THE TREATY OF PARIS

While in the Philippine Islands themselves Spain's house
was thus tumbling down about her like a stack of cards, abroad
her power of sovereignty was reduced to the mere utterance of
the feeble word which confirmed their alienation. The first offi-
cial indication of a determination on the part of the United
States Government to have a hand in deciding the future of
the Philippines was given at the same time that Spain was
compelled to renounce all her possessions in American waters^
in connection with the negotiation of a preliminary peace in
July and August. The spread of the revolution to the central
islands was simultaneous with the more definitive negotiations
for peace, wherein the sovereignty over the Philippines was
the real crux ; and Spain's giving way at Paris was followed by
her surrender of the slender foothold she still held in the
Bisayas. There are many reasons for thinking that she had
from the first abandoned the hope, if not the desire, of retain-
ing the Philippines, but that she proposed to use them to the
utmost advantage in securing a bargain for herself, and that,
if the United States did not insist upon their being surren-
dered, she was all ready to dispose of her rights in the highest
market. But, of course, the Spanish Government never pro-
claimed this intention abroad, and her attitude at Paris was,
indeed, carefully calculated to make her appear in the role of
a surprised and deceived victim of aggression.

On July 30, 1898, in reply to Spain's proposal for peace
made through the French ambassador at Washington on July
26, President McKinley demanded of Spain the immediate
relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba, the object of the
war, and, while waiving the claim of the United States to

I

THE TREATY OF PARIS 355

pecuniary indemnity for the costs of the war, inferentially
substituted for such indemnity the sovereignty of Porto Rico
and an island in the Ladrones group. The third of the terms
of peace as outlined by him read : " On similar grounds, the
United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay,
and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of
peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and gov-
ernment of the Philippines." Spain's Minister of State, the
Duke of Almodovar del Rio, replied on August 7, accepting
the first two conditions, but complaining that the terms re-
garding the Philippines seemed " quite indefinite." The Amer-
icans, in spite of the siege of their native allies, had not yet,
he declared, been able to take Manila, and he argued that
Spain's sovereignty over the entire archipelago was still unim-
paired. "As the intentions of the Federal Government by
regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government
must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do
not apriori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archi-
pelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms
as the conditions of these possessions and the level of the cul-
ture of their inhabitants may render desirable." The question
of the Philippines had already been the subject of consider-
able cabling between Ambassador Cambon and the Spanish
Ministry, and at the ambassador's request the words " control,
possession, and government of the Philippines " in the Ameri-
can note of July 30 had been changed to " control, disposi-
tion, and government of the Philippines " ; Spain did not wish
it to appear that the future sovereignty of the Philippines was
a prejudged matter, said M. Cambon, and the President and
Secretary of State had regarded the phrase as covering quite
as wide a scope in one form as the other, and had declared in
substance, that '' the case was not prejudged either as to the
United States or as to Spain." But the Spanish note of Au-
gust 7 was deemed by the President evasive and unsatisfac-
tory, and, although the ambassador assured him that his cor-

356 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

respondence showed Spain's intention to accept the conditions
outlined, he had a protocol drawn up, which should " state
precisely " the bases upon which the peace should be tempo-
rarily proclaimed and upon which the formal negotiations for
a treaty should proceed. Hostilities were, therefore, not pro-
claimed to be suspended until M. Cambon had on the 12th
received from Spain authority to sign the protocol in her
behalf ; and he and Secretary of State Day were putting their
pens to it at about the hour the American forces were prepar-
ing to enter Manila (about 5 p.m. on August 12 in Wash-
ington, and about 6 a.m. on August 13 in Manila). It said
simply, as to the Philippines : " The United States will occupy
and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the
conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the con-
trol, disposition, and government of the Philippines." ^

Spain was given permission to resume her shipping of mer-
chandise and her mail service to the Philippines, immediately
after the temporary peace was made. On August 29, and dur-
ing the two months following (until the United States had
made definite demand for the Philippines at Paris), Spain put
forth various protests against the treatment of Spanish pris-
oners in the Philippines, and demanded that the United States
recognize its own responsibility in the premises, or let Spain
use against the Filipinos the troops surrendered at Manila, or
at least let the Spanish Government send reinforcements to deal
with them. If there had been no other ground for refusal, the
United States must have declined thus to put itself in the light
of a protector of Spanish interests in the islands and an enemy

^ The fullest source of information in English on the diplomatic correspondence
regarding the war with Spain is, of course, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1898 (American Red Book, hereafter cited as For. Rel, 1898), which contains the
correspondence regarding the protocol, its text, etc., on pp. 819-30. Sen. Doc. 6B,
65th Cong., 3d Sess., which was published primarily to display the negotiations at
Paris, but which contains much other material already referred to herein, recites
the same documents on pp. 272-84 of part 2. The diflFerences between Spain and
the United States regarding the provisions about the Philippines in the protocol
were fully aired in the negotiations at Paris, and will be mentioned further on.

THE TREATY OF PARIS 357

of the Filipinos. All the demands of this sort, whether presented
through the French ambassador at Washington or through
the Spanish treaty commissioners at Paris, will not be judged
unfairly if it be stated that the Spanish Ministry had no ex-
pectation (indeed, strictly speaking, probably no desire) of see-
ing them fulfilled, but, having recovered their breath, were now
keeping up a show of sovereignty over the Philippines, for
reasons already suggested. The positions which they assumed
in this correspondence were clearly inconsistent with each
other. If the United States would not let them use fresh troops
or those in Manila against the insurgents, then, they argued,
the United States must itself rescue the prisoners from barbar-
ous treatment, must constitute itself policeman of the Filipinos
in the whole archipelago; yet, at the same time, Spain was
formally interposing the most comprehensive demands with
regard to strictly limiting the Americans in Manila to the ter-
ritory and the powers which the protocol conferred, instead
of those of a military conqueror. On September 11,
M. Cambon submitted at Washington a formal statement of
Spain's view of the protocol and its effect in the Philippines,
which was, in effect: (1) The Americans occupy Manila by
virtue of the protocol, not of the surrender made to them after
the protocol was signed, in consequence simply of the failure
of telegraphic communication ; (2) they cannot change the laws
and methods of administration there while they are in control,
as it is not a case of " military occupation," and the customs
laws, in particular, must not be changed or the customs rev-
enues diverted to other than the prescribed purposes ; (3) the
Spanish troops in the city of Manila must be set free, as the
terras of the capitulation are void ; (4) the United States must
secure from the Tagalogs the release of the Spanish prisoners
(all of whom were imprisoned outside of Manila, within which
place Spain sought to hold the United States so literally) ; (5)
the Filipino vessels ought not to be allowed to fly an unrecog-
nized flag and to clear from Manila for other ports of the

358 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

islands (something which never occurred after the Americans
occupied Manila), as otherwise Spain must arm her merchant-
vessels and treat them as pirates. The American reply, on Sep-
tember 16, called attention to the fact that this tardy protest
of Spain seemed to be an afterthought, and declined to concur
in the view that the occupation of Manila was in consequence
of the protocol and not of the Spanish capitulation, saying :
^^ It is the opinion of this Government that the suspension of
hostilities is to be considered as having taken effect at the date
of the receipt of notice." Spain entered a final formal protest
against this view of the occupation of Manila, in a note to
M. Cambon on October 4, pressing particularly to the front her
complaints about the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the archi-
pelago. Secretary Hay denied, on October 29, that the United
States was sending war-vessels to the archipelago, and the cor-
respondence came naturally to an end when the possession of
the Philippines became the center of the discussion at Paris.
At the first session of the treaty commissioners, on October 1,
the Spaniards had demanded that the status quo ante be re-
stored in Manila and that the protocol govern the American
occupation in every respect ; but the American commissioners
had insisted that this was properly a matter for direct nego-
tiation between the two Governments, and that the position of
the American Government had already been made plain. The
Spaniards reserved the right to refer to the matter again if the
status quo in the Philippines should be further altered in a
degree serious to them ; but they never again made a formal
protest on the matter, although complaining informally, on
October 17, of the American reinforcements reported as being
sent to the Philippines, in view of the fact that they were pre-
vented by the conditions of peace from enlarging their own
forces of opposition to the Filipinos.^

^ The dispatch in which this complaint was reported to Washington by Chairman
Day of the American Commission is given on pp. 928-29 of For. ReL, 1898. The
American Commission suggested: " Might not onr Government, in reply to repre-
sentations which it has received, or probably will receive, from Spanish Govern-

THE TREATY OF PARIS 859

The two peace commissions assembled at Paris the last of
September. The American Commission was composed of Mr.
William R. Day (who had just resigned the oJB&ce of Secretary
of State, in which he had been intimately connected with the
previous diplomatic correspondence relating to the war), Sen-
ators Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray,
and Mr. Whitelaw Reid. Its instructions from President
McKinley at the time of its departure were, of course, specific
as to Cuba and Porto Rico, and were more specific as to the
Philippines than was known at the time or could have been
guessed from anything in the attitude thus far publicly as-
sumed upon this phase of the problem by the Government at
Washington. Manila and its suburbs were "held by the
United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the proto-
col," said President McKinley; and after some observations
with regard to the righteousness of the American cause, to the
growth of the nation's responsibilities in consequence of the
enlargement of the war's sphere, to the duty resting upon it
to treat magnanimously a foe defeated in a war undertaken
upon humane considerations, he instructed his commissioners
that " the United States cannot accept less than the cession in
full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon," together
with commercial privileges in the other islands in the Philip-

ment, ofTer to take more active and positive measures than heretofore for preser-
Tation of order and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands ? " The
difficulty at Washington was that such action would promptly incur the enmity of
the Filipinos; it was logical to ask Spain to consent to the extension of American
authority outside of Manila, if she wished to hold the United States responsible for
the conduct of the Tagalog army, but she could not have given such consent with-
out virtually admitting her loss of sovereignty in the islands. The entire corre-
spondence conducted through the French embassy with regard to the Philippines
will be found in For. Rel.^ 1898^ pp. 784-818 (also, up to September 6, in Sen. Doe.
ett pp. 284-318). It centered more particuUrly about the treatment of the Span-
ish prisoners by the Filipinos, and its most important features have been summar-
ised in chapter vin, p. 328 /f., in discussing the subject of the Filipinos' prison-
ers. " The refusal of the United States to allow Spain to use her troops has contril)-
Qted to the spread of the insurrection," declared Spain, in the note of October 4.
This statement was undoubtedly true, but the complicated situation in the islands
was not to be described in any such simple fashion.

360 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

pine group.^ Nevertheless, the wording of the instructions with
reference to Luzon did not confine the commissioners to a de-
mand for that island alone, and the question was felt to be
still open at Washington. General Merritt had been ordered
to report at Paris, bringing also the views of Admiral Dewey
and the best information of military circles at Manila. On the
day after the protocol was signed. Admiral Dewey was asked
to cable any " important information " he had about the Phil-
ippines : " the desirability of the several islands ; the character
of their population ; coal and other mineral deposits ; their
harbor and commercial advantages, and in a naval and com-
mercial sense which would be the most advantageous." Dewey
of course replied that Luzon was the best island to take,
whether from commercial or strategical considerations.^ These
messages, taken in connection with the instructions to the

1 The President's instructions, together with the cable correspondence between
him and the commissioners in Paris, were submitted to the Senate, in response to
a resolution of inquiry, in January, 1899 ; but the injunction of secrecy was not
removed from these papers until January, 1901, after which they were ordered
printed as Sen. Doc. l^S^ 56th Cong., 2d Sess. At the same time, the volume on
Foreign Relations, for 1898, which had been held back for two years, was pre-
pared for publication; its pages 904-66 are identical with Sen. Doc. I48. A piquant
review of the negotiations at Paris, in the light of this new information, from the
pen of Sidney Webster, appeared in the North American Review for June, 1901,
under the title " Revelations of a Senate Document." These passages of the Pres-
ident's instructions indicate the workings of his mind at the time : —

"The presence and success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations
which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human ac-
tion. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our efforts, and
still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that without any desire or
design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which
we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and ca-
reer from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high com-
mand and pledge of civilization.

" Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to
which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate
means for the enlargement of American trade ; but we seek no advantages in the
Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we
are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which
is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large
territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad
and equal privileges."

^ See Bureau of Navigation, pp. 122-23, for both cablegrams.

THE TREATY OF PARIS 861

Peace Commission, are entirely consistent with the supposition
that President McKinley had in mind the securing of a naval
station and of a commercial depot at the doors of Asia, and,
while aware in an indefinite way of possible responsibilities
which the progress of the insurrection in the archipelago had
imposed upon the United States, was disinclined to make the
radical break with American traditions which the assumption
of sovereignty over this large and distant group of islands
would involve. But to set Luzon apart from its sister islands
of the group was to take two fifths of the territory of the archi-
pelago, including the metropolis and only important port in
the group, and the island upon which Uved seven of the eight
civilized tribes of Filipinos. For a naval station merely, some
other island could have been substituted. Commercially, Lu-
zon was either too much or too little to take ; in Manila cen-
tered the business of the whole archipelago, especially the
hemp shipments, and to a large degree the sugar shipments
from the Bisayas. Politically, to plant American power in the
very heart of the group and to assume control of the island
that was overshadowingly the most important, while leaving
Spain, or more likely Germany, as the sovereign of Luzon's
neighboring and dependent sisters, was to invite the possi-
bility of all sorts of complications. All these things began
very speedily to press themselves upon the attention not only
of the President, as he gained information from officers re-
turned from Manila and from private sources, but also partic-
ularly upon the attention of the commissioners at Paris, who
had been able to defer the formulation of any demands as to
the Philippines until they could make special inquiry as to the
conditions. Moreover, considerations of another sort soon came
to claim attention in preference to naval or commercial ad-
vantages : it was realized, rather tardily, that the setting on
foot of another rebellion in the Philippines had led to conse-
quences beyond the control, it might be also beyond the ken
as yet, of the American commanders in the islands ; to take

862 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

only Luzon, the head and front of the Filipino national move-
ment, was to assume all the responsibility for a delicate prob-
lem of adjustment, while voluntarily relinquishing that full
control of the situation which, it was dimly felt, would alone
make possible such a satisfactory adjustment of conditions to
Filipino aspirations as would acquit the United States of play-
ing first the blunderer and then the shirk. It was this view of
the case which forced itself more and more upon the atten-
tion, as the news from the islands told of the very great broad-
ening of what had been contemptuously regarded as the
** Aguinaldo movement." The witnesses before the Peace Com-
mission at Paris in October made it plain that the United
States could not evade a large share of responsibility for the
complicated state of affairs existing in the Philippines. With-
out exception, too, the testimony of those who had come into
touch with the situation was that the Filipinos would never
rest under Spanish sovereignty again. On the other hand, the
trend of all the oral and written testimony at Paris was to the
effect that it would be easy for the United States to come to
terms with the Filipinos ; this optimism was most marked in
the case of the superior commanders, who knew least about
the actual facts of the situation and were least cautious about
hazarding sweeping opinions, yet whose testimony carried
most weight at the time.^

^ Sen. Doc. 6S is the source as to the evidence regarding the Philippines pre-
sented at Paris and at Washington from September to November, 1898. General
Merritt's testimony and the papers he brought from Manila will be found on
pp. 362-89. He himself thought there was small possibility of serious trouble with
the Filipinos. Admiral Dewey presented a brief paper in favor of the choice of
Luzon, based on his assumption, from the cablegrams he had received, that the
United States meant to take only one island ; therefore, on October 4, the com-
missioners requested that Dewey be asked if he thought it best to take the whole
archipelago. The only clear-cut information came from General Greene, Major
Bourns, and Major Bell. Writing on August 27, General Greene had said : " If
the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately
ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and
the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obliga-
tions, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have im-
posed upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish

THE TREATY OF PARIS 363

The Spanish commissioners at Paris remained during Octo-
ber in a purely expectant attitude as to the American demand
regarding the Philippines. The American commissioners had
meanwhile disagreed among themselves as to what their de-
mand should be, and had, on October 25, cabled at length
their respective opinions, asking the President for final and
definite instructions. Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid believed it
impracticable to divide the archipelago; regarded the restora-
tion of Spanish power over it as a whole as being impossible ;
pointed out that the Bisayas were now in revolt, and Spain
would only sell them if left in possession, and were optimistic
as to the ease of ruling the Filipinos; pressing forward commer-
cial considerations, they would, if the whole archipelago was
not to be taken, demand in addition to Luzon the undeveloped

power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection." Upon bis return to Wasbington,
this same officer furnished a valuable memorandum (t'Airf., pp. 424-40) upon con-
ditions in the Philippines, in which he again plainly set forth the impossibility of
overlooking the insurgents as a factor in the situation, saying : " The United States
Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made use of them
for a distinctly military purpose, viz., to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to
wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as
much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our
troops. ..." Following Dewey and Merritt, the commissioners cabled to Wash-
ington on October 7 that General Anderson had at first " seemed to treat Agui-
naldo and his forces as allies," but that " Merritt and Dewey both kept dear of
any compromising communications." (As Anderson pointedly remarked in the
Chicago Record'Herald for July 11, 1902, " it did not require any correspondence
to induce Aguinaldo to start his insurrection.") John Foreman, who, for lack of
other recent treatises on the Philippines in English, was at the time assigned
fictitious value as an " authority," was summoned from England to testify, and
furnished a blend of information and misinformation {Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 441-71).
The other testimony obtained at this time, most of it comprised in written state-
ments or in articles from encyclopedias or periodicals, concerned mainly the re-
sources of the Philippine Islands. In this connection, the preliminary report on
the mineral resources of the Philippines (»7>iW., pp. 613-18) by Dr. G. F. Becker,
who accompanied the first military expedition to the Philippines at the request of
his chief, the Director of the United States Geological Survey; the notes on the
strategic importance and the mineral and other resources of the Philippines
prepared in the Navy Department in Augnst, 1898 {ibid., pp. 519-28) ; and
the article in the Century Magazine for August, 1898, by F. A. Vanderlip, then
Assistant Secretary of the Treanury {Sen. Doc. 6S, pp. 563-71), are interesting
as indicating how promptly the idea of commercial and territorial expansion had
come to the front.

364 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

islands of Mindoro and Palawan, commanding the entrance into
the group from the Asiatic side. This last proposition was
favored by Mr. Day, who steered a middle course between his
recognition of the responsibilities which the United States had
incurred in the Philippines and his desire to involve the
country as little as possible in colonial ventures. Mr. Gray
took position squarely upon the ground of opposition to colo-
nies in the Orient, saying he could not " agree that it was wise
to take the Philippines either in whole or in part."^ The fol-
lowing day. President McKinley replied that, since he had given
his previous instructions, it had become apparent to him that
" the cession must be of the whole archipelago or none," but
" the latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must there-
fore be required " ; and he indicated that he had come to this
conclusion mainly because of the interests of the Filipino
people, " for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility."
Before the American commissioners had made their demand
for the whole archipelago, an episode occurred outside of the
formal sessions to which attention must be directed in order to
understand the subsequent course of the negotiations. The Con-
tinental newspapers were full of talk of a rupture between the
two commissions and were apparently kept posted from inside

* Mr. Gray found no place for consideration of the argument that the United
States had, wittingly or unwittingly, incurred responsibilities in the Philippine
archipelago; his was the typically "anti-imperialistic" attitude, which looked at
the question primarily or wholly from the standpoint of what was best for the
United States, and his outline of the argument against the retention of the islands
may be regarded as one of the earliest and best statements of this position : " To
do so [take the Philippines] would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the
country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the
case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics
and the entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen
have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to the largest of powers ;
a greatly increased military establishment ; immense sums for fortifications and
harbors ; multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations,
and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for
American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap ; no area for
homes for American citizens ; climate and social conditions demoralizing to Amer-
ican youth ; new and disturbing questions introduced into our politics ; church
question menacbg."

THE TREATY OF PARIS 365

sources as to the Spanish contention that the debt of terri-
tories should pass with them in any change of sovereignty ;
the European view of the United States as a brutal aggressor
seeking self-aggrandizement by picking a quarrel over Cuba
was confirmed by the reports spread abroad that the United
States had determined to take Cuba and leave Spain to pay the
debts hanging over her. Regarding those debts as accumu-
lated by wars which Spanish misgovernment had imposed upon
the island, the United States had, in its attitude as attorney
for Cuba, refused to acknowledge the validity of certain prece-
dents in international law wherein debt had passed with the
territory ; indeed. President McEanley had instructed the com-
missioners not to consent to a clause requiring the United
States to use its good offices to induce the future Cuban Gov-
ernment to assume any part of the colonial debt, because it
was reasonably plain that no part of it had been incurred di-
rectly for pacific internal improvements, and the American po-
sition was that only misgovernment in Cuba had, since 1860,
led the island into debt at all.^

On October 26, the Spanish commissioners had provisionally
accepted the articles proposed by the Americans as to Cuba,

1 See the cableg^ms between Paris and Washington on October ?6 (Sen. Doc.
1^8^ p. 31). Also, fur a full discussion of the Cuban debt and of the Spanish prop-
osition that the debt passes with territory, see Sen. Doc. 62, protocols 4, 5, 6, 9,
and 10 and the documents respectively annexed to them. The entire formal record
of the negotiations at Paris is contained in this document, pp. 3-271. It should be
read, of course, in connection with the American cable corre8{x)ndence, already cited.
Little additional light is thrown on the history of the negotiations by the Spanish
documents in the case, which are hard to obtain ; they are found in two of the three
Spanish Red Books for 1898, viz. : Neffociaciones diplomnticas desde el principio de
la guerra con lot Estados Unidog hasta lajirma delprotocolo de Washington, 1898 ; and
Conferencia de Pari* y tratado de paz de 10 de Dtciembre de 1898, both published at
liadrid in 1899. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France also issued: N^gocioi'
tioni pour la paix entre VEtpagne et let 6ta(s Unit, 1898. For a further statement
of the position of the United States on the question of debts of a territory passing
with the sovereignty over it, see The Law of Civil Government under Military Occu'
potion (Washington, 1902; short title, Afagoon*i Reports;) pp. 180-93, C29-31 ; these
opinions of the law officer of the War Department, unfavorable to the payment
of subsidies to the cable and railway concessionaires of Spain in the Philippines,
met the approval alio of the United States Attorney-General.

866 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Porto Rico, and Guam, pending possible " advantages which
Spain may derive from other stipulations of the treaty," and
had specifically asked that the Americans now outline their
propositions as to the Philippine Islands. That night, Spain's
ambassador to France called on Commissioner Reid, and hinted
that, unless some concession for Spain could be got out of the
clauses regarding the Philippine Islands, no treaty could be
secured; the Spanish Ministry then in power could not, he
said, retain its position if it accepted the Cuban debt and got
no concession in its place. Mr. Reid said the sentiment in the
United States was not wholly unanimous upon the point of
taking all the Philippine Islands, and hinted at something,
" either in territory or debt," which might furnish the con-
cession enabling the Spanish Ministry to keep face before its
own people.^ In response to a further request for definite
instructions in view of this new turn of affairs, President
McKinley renewed his demand for the whole archipelago and
enlarged upon the chief reason, viz., duty toward the Filipinos,
but left it to the commission to make whatever concession
Spanish demands should require in order to get a treaty.'^ The

1 See Sen. Doc. 14^, p. 36, for the cable report of this extra-diplomatic confer-
ence, and for a similar appeal by the secretary of the Spanish Commission after
the meeting of October 27. The latter said " no government in Spain could sign
treaty giving up everything and live, and that such surrender without some relief
would mean national bankruptcy." The American commissioners believed that a
rupture of the negotiations was averted " because Spaniards grasped at hint
thrown out in the conversation of Mr. Reid." But the only alternative of the
Spanish Ministry, if it broke oif negotiations, was a resumption of the war, in
which the feeble hold it still had on the Philippine archipelago would speedily be
relaxed, and the Ministry would be in a worse case yet before the people. Better
knowledge of Spanish politics, which Mr. Davis later showed that he had, would
have made it plain that the Spaniards need not be taken literally. Indeed, their
rather frantic appeals at the time for the best terms possible regarding the Philip-
pines showed that they expected the Americans to put forth the most compre-
hensive demand, and that they wished to get the maximum of advantage. The as-
sertions of Continental critics of the United States at the time, and of home critics
afterward, that the Spaniards were surprised by the American demand for the
Philippines and reluctantly yielded only to force, will not hold water, in the face
of the protocol negotiations and of this episode of October 26.

2 This dispatch, dated October 28, is found on pp. 37-38 of Sen. Doc. H8. It said:
** The sentiment in the United States is almost oniversal that the people of the

THE TREATY OF PARIS 367

latter body thereupon obtained authority to assume on the
part of the United States any existing indebtedness of Spain
incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific char-
acter in the Philippines. The article providing for the cession
to the United States of the Philippine archipelago, which was
presented to the Spaniards on October 31, was accordingly
accompanied by such an offer.

Four days later, the Spaniards rejected this proposal for
cession as positively and completely as if they had not just
been begging, informally, for lenient treatment with regard to
the Philippines, but instead had never for a moment expected
a demand for those islands on the part of the United States.
They took the utterly untenable ground that not only was the
cession of the Philippines by Spain not contemplated by the
protocol, but that it was " in flagrant violation of [that] agree-
ment." They submitted what they called a " counter-proposal,"
which embodied Spain's diplomatic demand of September that
the occupation of Manila be recognized as regulated by the

Philippines, whateyer else is done, must be liberated from Spanish dominatiou. In
this sentiment the President fully concurs." Also: " Whatever consideration the
United States may show [to bankrupt Spain] must come from its sense of generos-
ity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation." " While the
Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded,"
yet the President preferred to have them secured " by negotiation." This position
the President clung to quite tenaciously, though it was never formally asserted at
Paris. On November 3, Mr. Day cabled that " the majority of the commission are
dearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippines cannot be based on con-
quest "; and they virtually rejected the position assumed by the State Department
in September regarding the capture of Manila and acknowledged the validity of
the Spanish claim that the city should be regarded as held only under the terms
of the protocol of August 12. The President replied : " In fact, the destruction of
the Spanish fleet on May 1 was the conquest of Manila, the capital of the Philip-
pines." And in his annual message to Congress for 1898 he again asserted: " Only
reluctance to cause needless loss of life and property prevented the storming and
capture [of Manila], and therewith the absolute military occupancy of the whole
group." Again : " By this [the capture of Manila] the conquest of the Philippine
Islands, virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was de-
stroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of the Ist of May, was formally sealed."
These sentences indicate how little was known at the time in Washington as to
the course of events outside of Manila, not only in the Bisayai but also in Luton,
from May to December of 1898.

ip^

868 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

protocol, and which went far beyond this in demanding a res-
toration to Spain of the city, her troops, and the taxes col-
lected, and even an indemnity for the losses sustained by the
detention of her troops and the consequent spread of the re-
bellion/ This was, of course, merely a part of the Spanish
process of bargaining; yet the positive tone that was adopted,
coupled with the constant expressions at the time of European
sympathy with Spain as the victim of an aggressor, sufficed to
make the American Commission adopt a defensive attitude in
" explaining " the protocol negotiations in their subsequent
memoranda, and, as later events showed, made some of the
Americans think the Spaniards would lose the treaty rather
than give up the Philippine archipelago. The three following
sessions, those of November 9, 16, and 21, were occupied with
the presentation of lengthy arguments on the protocol, its
negotiation and its meaning, the question of colonial debts
and the events that had happened in the Philippines during
the year, some rather sharp passages being interchanged over
these last.'^ On the 21st, however, the American Commission,

* For this remarkable document, see Sen. Doc. 62^ pp. 110-28. Their proposition
that the cession of the Philippines was in " violation " of the protocol was based
largely on tiie definition of the French word controle (by which " control " in the
protocol as drafted had been rendered in translation) as " inspection " and " in-
tervention," which they undertook to say was an admission by the United States
that its concern with the Philippines should never be anything but temporary, and
should be limited to the securing of reforms or changes in government. They en-
deavored to support this contention by quotations from the protocol correspond-
ence (ibid., pp. 120-23). They also introduced a gratuitous reflection upon Ad-
miral Dewey for taking the city after the protocol (of which he knew nothing)
was signed, and charged the American administration of Manila with releasing
common criminals from jail. The question of the Philippines debt (which they
stated was 40,000,000 pesos, besides pensions and other colonial obligations) gave
them an opportunity also to reintroduce the whole question of the Cuban debt.

2 In their answer of November 9 (Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 129-51), the Americans
dealt in detail with the question of the protocol negotiations, pointing out rather
mildly the Spanish inconsistencies in this matter and also in their demand for the
surrender of Manila and their troops; on the latter point the Americans took the
ground that everything that had been done in Manila since August 13 was justi-
fied and proper whether their army was there by virtue of conquest or in conse-
quence of the protocol. The Spanish and American memoranda of November 16
and 21 respectively also contained pages of verbal sparring about the meaning of

THE TREATY OF PARIS 869

after rejecting the Spanish proposal to submit the question of
the sovereignty of the Philippines to arbitration, made an offer
of $20,000,000, coupled with the promise of equal commer-
cial rights in the Philippines for ten years, for the cession of
those islands by Spain.

This cash offer had gradually presented itself as the solu-
tion of the differences between the two Governments, as an
outcome both of the American proposition to assume the debt
for pacific improvements in the Philippines and of the feeling
of some of the American commissioners that they must make
a concession in order to get a treaty. On October 30, Mr.
Frye had addressed a personal message to the President, ex-
pressing a pessimistic view as to the prospects for a treaty, and
suggesting the payment of $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 as a
salve to Spain's feelings ; the President had agreed to a money
payment, " to cover peace improvements," and as a means, if
such were felt to be necessary, of averting the renewal of war.*
But, by November 10, the commissioners had found that no

the protocol, etc. The differences of meaning which the Spaniards endeavored to
introduce by quoting Ambassador Cambon's notes to Madrid were more apparent
than real, and were in some cases not even apparent. Even had they been serious,
the arguments as to differences of opinion before August 10 were meaningless,
since on that date President McKinley drew up the protocol expressly because
dissatisfied with Spain's answer to his terms, and Spain had thereupon signed the
protocol. (President McKiuley's Annual Message, 1898: "[Spain] appeared to
seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the
Philippine Islands. ... I directed that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the
matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal
protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be under-
teken.")

1 Sen. Doc. 148^ pp. 38-40. Mr. Frye renewed the suggestion that the United
States use its good offices with Cuba to bring about the acceptance of the Spanish
debt for internal improvements; the amount would be small, he said: "Would
not our people prefer to pay Spain one half of war expenditures [if war resumed]
rather than indulge in its costly luxury ? £urope sympathizes with Spain in this
regard exactly." The reply was that the President " desired the commissioners to
be generous in all matters which did not require a disregard of principle or duty.
... If it should be the opinion of the ooromissionen that there should be paid a
KMonable sum of money to cover peace improvement*, which are fairly charge-
able to OS under established precedent!, he will give cheerful concurrence. The
money payment, if any is determined npon, should rest solely upon the consider-
ations suggested in your message."

370 THE AMERICANS IN ^THE PHILIPPINES

part of the Philippine debt of 1897 had been used for public
works or improvements of a specific character.^ On Novem-
ber 11, they again cabled diverse opinions as to the Philip-
pines, and asked definite instructions from the President:
Mr. Day preferred to limit the United States to a naval and
commercial base in the Orient, and minimize its holdings so
far as existing circumstances made it possible to do, but, as
the President's instructions required taking the whole archi-
pelago, he would pay Spain $15,000,000, and also, if neces-
sary, let her keep Mindanau and the Sulii group; Mr. Frye
wanted the whole group, and would pay $10,000,000, but
feared a treaty was possible only by leaving Spain the Bisayas
and Mindanau, in which case he would pay $5,000,000 ; Mr.
Gray was still on principle opposed to taking the Philippines,
but would acquiesce in such a step, making " reasonable con-
cessions," in order to secure a treaty, as he foresaw that a
renewal of the war would mean the speedy conquest of the Phil-
ippines by the United States; Mr. Reid thought the United
States had full claim to the whole archipelago on the basis of

1 See chapter in, p. 124, for the circumstances connected with the bond issue
of 200,000,000 pesetas, or 40,000,000 pesos, in July, 1897. See Sen. Doc. U8,
p. 44, for the commission's report of the details it had ascertained about this
loan. It produced 38,570,4M.27 pesos net : of this sum, 19,891,800.60 were used
in the Philippine War of 1896-97 (part of it, it is understood, to pay Agui-
naldo); 7,660,403.13 were returned to Cuba to pay a loan made from the Cu-
ban war revenues ; and 10,938,477.02 were advanced to Cuba for the war there.
In view of the various statements that have been made in the United States as to
the reasons for the payment of 320,000,000 to Spain, it is worth while quoting from
Mr. Whitelaw Reid (contribution on the Treaty of Paris in the Anglo-Saxon Re-
view for June, 1899): the American commissioners "resolved, in a final transfer,
to fix an amount at least equal to the face value of that debt, which could be given
to Spain as an acknowledgment for any pacific improvements she might ever have
made there not paid for by the revenues of the islands themselves. She could use
it to pay the Philippine bonds if she chose. That was the American view as to the
sanctity of public debts legitimately incurred in behalf of ceded territory; and that
is an explanation of the money payment in the case of the Philippines, as well as
of the precise amount at which it was finally fixed." Forty million pesos then
equaled approximately $20,000,000 in United States currency. A letter of Com-
missioner Day to D. K. Watson, of Columbus, Ohio, in October, 1899 (much com-
mented on in the press at the time), has often been quoted as authority for the
statement that the Philippines were acquired simply as a " purchase."

THE TREATY OF PARIS 871

indemnity for war expenses, but, in order to get a treaty,
would leave to Spain Mindanau and Sulii, or would pay her
$12,000,000 to $15,000,000 for the entire Philippine archi-
pelago and the Carolines; Mr. Davis, in his emphatic way,
coolly declared that only an ultimatum would get a treaty from
Spain, as she was protracting the negotiations in the hope of
European intervention, and he would promptly deliver her an
ultimatum demanding Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philip-
pines, and offering her no money at all, as it was plain that she
had contracted no debt for pacific improvements in the Philip-
pines.^ President McKinley again replied that the cession of
the whole Philippine archipelago must be demanded, but, if
necessary, a payment of $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 could

1 For these cablegrams, see Sen. Doc. 148^ pp. 45-48. Had the bluff Mr. Davis's
advice been followed, the outcome in the Philippines "might have been" very dif-
ferent. In the event of Spain refusing the ultimatum and resorting to war (a most
unlikely event), her ports in the Bisayas would speedily have been occupied by the
United States, and the chances for amicable arrangement with the Bisayan native
leaders (mostly rather conservative), before the Aguinaldo propaganda made
headway there, would have been ten to one. The sentiment for opposition to the
United States in Luzon, and even at Malolos, was by no means crystallized in No-
vember, 1898, and all strategic points in Luzon might perhaps have been occupied
without resistance. At any rate, the Americans would not have had to fight their
way out from Manila through Tag^log territory while the sentiment against them
in the other parts of Luzon was being carefully fostered and developed. Had Spain
yielded, on the other hand, and made a treaty, the proclamation of American sov-
ereignty would have come that much earlier, which would have given a better
chance for a peaceful arrangement with the Filipinos. The proposal of the Span-
ish commissioners on November 16 to submit the question of Philippine sover-
eignty to arbitration was, in some degree, a confirmation of Mr. Davis's opinion
that Spain was endeavoring to create the basis of an appeal to European sympa-
thies: as Europe then viewed the project of American occupation of the Philip-
pines, an unprejudiced tribunal of arbitration was next to impossible; moreover,
the two peace commissions were themselves already met as a board of arbitration
for the two nations, and met for the precise purpose of settling this question,
among others. Under the circumstances, one cannot feel that the Spanish propo-
sition and their appeal to American traditions in favor of arbitration were made
entirely in good faith. It was at about this time that the American Commission
felt it necessary to give out a statement as to the protocol negotiations through the
AMOciated Press, in order to counteract the repeated assertions in the Continental
ptMS, and also in leading English journals, that the United States had in Novem-
ber unwarrantably expanded the conditions of peace which it bad laid down in
August.

372 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

be made to Spain. ^ The American commissioners apparently
thought it was best to offer the full sum that was authorized.
Without formally submitting this proposition of November
21 as an ultimatum, the American Commission had virtually
declared that only the acceptance of it on or before Novem-
ber 28 could insure a continuance of the negotiations.^ On
the 23d, the chairman of the Spanish Commission, in a letter to
Mr. Day, made these alternative offers : (1) Spain would yield
all the territory asked, but the cash payment to her should be
$100,000,000, instead of $20,000,000 ; or, (2) she would
yield all, except Mindanau and Sulii, but in addition also one
island and cable privileges in the Carolines, receiving $50,-
000,000 ; or, (3) she would yield all the territory mentioned
in (1), the two countries to submit to arbitration the question
of what colonial debts ought to pass with the sovereignty (so
sure was she, apparently, of a favorable verdict from foreign
arbitrators, or else so desirous of introducing the Philippine
question into European politics).^ The American commissioners
were again divided in submitting these counter-proposals to
Washington ; but Mr. McKinley instructed them, at midnight

* Sen. Doc. 1^8, pp. 48-49. Again Mr. McKinley insisted that responsibilities to
the Filipinos demanded that the United States wrest the sovereignty from Spain;
to divide the archipelago would involve difficulties and embarrassments; more-
over, it coold all be claimed as indemnity. In the memorandum of November 21
(Sen. Doc. 62, p. 210), the American Commission said: "The Spanish commission-
ers have . . . spoken of the Filipinos as our allies. This is not a relation which
the Government of the United States intended to establish; but it must at least be
admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with the
consent of our military and naval commanders, who permitted them to arm with
weapons which we had captured from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair
treatment and justice. Should we be justified in now surrendering these people to
the Government of Spain, even under an amnesty, which we know they would not
accept?"

^ On November 22, also, they had cabled to Washington that they intended to
inform the Spaniards, if the latter rejected the proposal, that the " offer was final,"
and it only remained to close the negotiations ; and Mr. McKinley gave his ap-
proval to this (Sen. Doc. 148, p. 68). On November 22, in a letter of query as to
the details of the American proposal, Seiior E. Montero Rios, the president of the
Spanish Commission, had asked if it was an ultimatum, and had in substance been
informed that it was (Sen. Doc. 62^ pp. 216-19).

» Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 220-21.

THE TREATY OF PARIS 873

on November 25, to stand by the ultimatum.^ When the next
meeting of the peace commissions was held on November 28,
the Spaniards accepted the terms offered, in few — amazingly
few — words, ending with this dignified expression of resig-
nation : —

The Government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of
patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again
bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them,
it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of the
victor, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means
to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she
accepts the only terms the United States offers her for the concluding
of the treaty of peace.

Five more sessions were devoted to perfecting the details of
the treaty before it was finally signed by the plenipotentiaries
on December 10. The Spaniards evinced a disposition to hold
strictly to the terms which had been put into the treaty by
ultimatiun, preferring to relegate the question of a revival of
formerly existing treaties to future negotiation, and finally
refusing the American offer of $1,000,000 more for one island
and certain concessions and privileges in the Caroline group.^
They might have accepted this last proposition in part or in
whole, had not the Americans, under President McKinley's
explicit directions, refused to extend to Cuba and Porto Rico,
either for five or for ten years, the same pledge as to the equality
of treatment for Spanish and American commerce and shipping
as was made in the case of the Philippines.^ In the light of

1 For their reply of November 26, see Sen. Doc. 62^ p. 222. For the cablegrams
to and from Washington on the Spanish proposals, see Sen. Doc. l^S^ pp. 58-60.
Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid thought they must stand by the ultimatum, though
Mr. Day preferred not to take the Moro islands and feared the Spaniards would
refuse the full demand. Messrs. Frye and Gray were favorable to accepting the
•econd proposition of Spain, though paying 820,000,000 instead of 850,000,000.
Mr. Gray, however, put in also an earnest private plea for the arbitration proposal.
Mr. Davis bluntly said : " Spain will accept our ultimatum if we firmly msist
upon it."

« See Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 261-52 ; also Sen. Doc. 148, pp. 45-48, 60, 60, 62, 64.

• Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 225-26, 228, and Sen. Doc. 148, pp. 62-63, 64. On Decem-
ber 1, Mr. MoKinley cabled that "preferential privileges to Spain in Cuba and

374 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

subsequent events, perhaps the failure of most consequence to
the United States was that of its proposal to maintain public
order in the whole Philippine archipelago pending the ratifica-
tion of the treaty ; the Spanish Government insisted, through
its commissioners, that " the authorities of each of the two
nations should be charged with the maintenance of order in
the places where they might be established, those authorities
agreeing among themselves to this end whenever they might
deem it necessary.^

The boundaries of the Phihppine archipelago as defined in
Article III of the treaty left outside two little islands, Sibutii
at the extreme southwest of the Sulii group toward Borneo,
and Kagay^n de Sulii, lying northwest of Jo\6 and of some
strategic value; and two years later $100,000 was paid to
Spain to relinquish whatever claim she might have to these
islands.^ Article IV comprised the provision for the entry for
ten years "of Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of
the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and mer-

Porto Rico " were " undesirable," and, if those offered in the Philippines were ac-
cepted, " care should be taken to avoid possible embarrassments to legislation by
Congress or demands by other Governments under favored-nation clause." In his
letter of November 22, Senor Rios had asked Mr. Day if the declaration of the
" open door " in the Philippines meant that other nations were to share the same
privileges as Spain, and Mr. Day replied (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 218) : " The declaration
that the policy of the United States in the Philippines will be that of an open door
to the world's commerce necessarily implies that the offer to place Spanish vessels
and merchandise on the same footing as American is not intended to be exclusive.
But the offer to give Spain the privilege for a term of years is intended to secure
it to her for a certain period by special treaty stipulation, whatever might be at
any time the general policy of the United States."

^ Yet Spain withdrew her troops from Iloilo only ten days after the treaty was
signed, without waiting for the American troops to arrive. Immediately after the
treaty was signed, and continuing well into 1899, her military officials in the Philip-
pines urged that the Americans relieve them of the charge of Mindanau and
Sulii. It would almost appear that Spain's refusal at Paris to yield full control to
the United States outside of Manila was purposely intended to embarrass the lat-
ter country.

2 For this little treaty, signed at Washington on November 7, 1900, ratified by
the United States Senate on January 22, 1901, and finally proclaimed on March
23, 1901, see Sen. Doc. 124, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., and For. Rei, 1900, pp. 887-88.
Article III of the Treaty of 1898 defined the boundaries of the Philippines al-
most exactly as the American commissioners had proposed on October 31.

THE TREATY OF PARIS 375

chandise of the United States." ^ Besides the return of Spanish
prisoners from the Philippines to S^ain (as had already been
done in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico), under Articles V
and VII, the United States returned to the Spaniards the arras
surrendered at Manila and all movable property belonging to
their land or naval forces.^ That all immovable property
passed with the cession, was specifically provided by Article
VIII,^ which also contained the stipulation that the cession
" cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which
by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all
kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establish-
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other association

* This provision of the treaty expired on April 11, 1909, ten years from the
date when the ratifications of the treaty were formally exchanged. The Spanish
Cortes had ratified the treaty on March 20, 1899.

2 The Spaniards had, on December 2, proposed the " repatriation at the expense
of both nations of prisoners taken." But Spain then held no American prisoners,
and reciprocal relations were struck by having her return at her expense to their
homes all political prisoners (deportes, practically all) whom she still held on ac-
count of the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines. As to the Philippines, at
least, it is claimed by Filipinos that this engagement has never been completely
fulfilled by Spain. Up to November 30, 1899, the United States had spent ^908,-
583.75 in returning to Spain the prisoners taken in Manila and those subsequently
released by movements against the insurgents {Report of Secretary of War^ 1899,
p. 23), and thousands more of the latter were subsequently released from the
Filipinos and returned to Spain ; Congress in 1899 appropriated $1,500,000 for
this purpose (see War Department estimate, H. R. Doc. 264t 55th Cong., 3d Sess.).
Sastrdn (op. cit.t p. 563) gives the number of Spaniards repatriated from the
Philippines as 29,418, including officers' families and 22,498 enlisted soldiers ;
this, however, includes those brought home by the Government of Spain also, and
the number of those who were actually soldiers was hardly more than half the
figure cited.

• The return to Spain of the movable war material captured by the American
troops and the lack of precision in the clauses on this subject in Articles VI and
VIII, led to various contests during 1899and 1900 between the boards of liquida-
tion in the Philippines. On the American side, there was a single body of army
men, though there cooperated with them, with regard to naval questions and
property, a committee of officers of the navy ; for the reports of the American
board of liquidation, see appendix R to Otis^i Report^ 1899^ {Rept. War Dept.,
1899, vol. I, part 4), and appendix NN to ^facArthur^t Report, 1900 (Rept. War
Vept.y 1900, vol. I, part 10). There were three Spanish boards, respectively mili-
tary, naval, and civil ; for the Spanish side of the liquidation, which dragged
Along in some of its details till late 1900, see Sastrdn, op. cit., pp. 571-85 (Sas-
trdn being president of the Spanish civil board).

376 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the
aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individ-
uals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be." The
history of the insertion of this clause, which is virtually a
pledge by the United States that it will not practice confisca-
tion, is not yet fully known ; but it has generally been assumed
that the Spanish commissioners secured its insertion at the in-
stigation of the monastic orders which had acquired large
estates in the Philippines.^ Peninsular Spaniards in the islands
were guaranteed in their property rights, and were allowed to
retain their status as citizens of Spain by registering as such
within one year from the taking effect of the treaty. "The
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants," it
was provided, "shall be determined by the Congress." ^ The

^ On December 6, the Spanish Commission had proposed to insert in the treaty
articles pledging the United States to carry out grants and contracts for public
works and services in the islands ceded, specifying the Hongkong cable concession
and the Manila and Dagfupan railway subvention among others. The American
commissioners refused to bind their country thus, saying the United States would
"deal justly and equitably in respect of contracts that were binding under the
principles of International Law " (Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 240-41). The Spaniards next
proposed this article : " The Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion, its institutions
and ministers, shall continue to enjoy in all the territories which are the subject
of this treaty the liberty and the rights in the undisturbed possession of which
they are at present. The members of this Church, whatever their nationality, shall
continue to enjoy the same liberty they now enjoy with respect to the profession
of their religion and the exercise of their form of worship." The first clause was
clearly impossible of acceptance by the United States, and the American Com-
mission expressed its willingness to insert simply a pledge of freedom of worship,
which finally appeared in the treaty as Article X (ibid., pp. 241-42). The record
contains nothing further on the subject nntil the final signing of the treaty with
the clause quoted in the text above.

^ President McKinley had, on November 29, suggested leaving the status of
native inhabitants to Congress, having in mind particularly the uncivilized tribes
and the prevention of any provision which would confer American citizenship on
the Chinese in the Philippines (Sen. Doc. I4S, p. 61). On December 6, the Ameri-
can Commission proposed the article on citizenship (IX) substantially as it finally
appeared, and rejected the Spanish Commission's proposal that native inhabitants
also should have the right to choose Spanish citizenship within one year (Sen.
Doc. 62, pp. 237-39 ; also pp. 258 and 261-62 for the exchange of comments upon
this subject in the memoranda). The period of registration of Spanish citizens in
the Philippines was subsequently extended, by mutual convention, for six months
from April 11, 1900 (by a protocol signed at Washington on March 29, 1900,

THE TREATY OF PARIS 377

Philippines were not otherwise affected by the treaty, except
by the general provisions regarding pending judicial proceed-
ings, patents and copyrights, etc.^

approved by the Senate April 27, and proclaimed the following day ; see Foreign
Relations United States, 1899, pp. 714-20, and ibid., 1900, pp. 889-190).

1 See Articles XI-XTV; also Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 245-49, for alternative articles
proposed on these points. The last memorandum filed (ibid., pp. 261-62) con-
tained the Americans' refusal to accept the Spanish proposal for a board of arbi-
tration to fix the responsibility for the Maine disaster. This had been rejected by
the Americans in the session of December 6, on the g^und that it was a *' closed
incident." The Spaniards had been provoked to enter a protest on behalf of their
nation in this matter by the reference to it in the American memorandum of
November 21 and in President McEanley's message to Congress in December (ibid.,
pp. 259-€0).

CHAPTER X

MUTUAL DISTRUST

The fate of the Philippine Islands was not, however, to be
settled entirely at Paris. Just when Spanish power had every-
where given way of its own decrepitude before the untried
and not too powerful blows of the Filipinos, and when the
vision of a nationality of their own was every day becoming
more complete to their imaginations, the masterful American
presumed to control, in distant Paris, the surrender into his
hands not only of that territory which he had in battle wrested
from Spain, but also of all the greater extent of territory
which Spain had dropped in fright and panic. Looking upon
themselves, in their period of inflated military glory, as real
conquerors of all this territory, the Filipinos were not inclined
to pause to consider the formalities and technicalities of inter-
national law, but thought that they should have most to say
about the disposition of the archipelago.*

The moral right of the Filipinos to have a voice in the
making of any programme affecting their future must at once
be conceded by every American (except such as think gov-

* A jokelet in La Independencia of November 22, 1898, when news had been
received by cable that Spain would probably yield at Paris, is typical of Filipino
feeling at the time : " They say Spain has ceded to America all her colonies." —
"Well, then, I make you a present of St. Joseph's Hospital with all its inmates."
In ihid.f November 30, 1898, is quoted with approval the reported declaration of
Felipe Agoncillo at Paris : " The Filipinos will not permit themselves or their
homes to be bought or sold like merchandise ; they will be prepared to resist to
the utmost in defense of their rights." This newspaper (then largely under control
of General Luna) goes on to outline the possibility of war, admits that " America
has aided us indirectly by the blockade of Manila," but concludes : " People are
not to be bought and sold like horses and houses. If the aim has been to abolish
the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there still main-
tained [in international law] the sale of countries with inhabitants free to be un-
willing to form part of a[nother] nation " ? In the same number, uncommented
upon, were quotations from President McKinley's speech at Chicago about " Duty
begetting Destiny."

J

MUTUAL DISTRUST S79

ernment by the " consent of the governed " is only for white
men). This may be conceded, however, without at all implying
that the self-appointed spokesmen of the Filipinos should be
fully recognized as their people's guides and mentors by the
new sovereign, which had declared before the world that it
insisted on controlling the destinies of the Philippines out of a
sense of duty to their inhabitants. The more sober-minded
Filipinos who were most closely in touch with the situation
saw and admitted the force of the contention that the United
States was charged with responsibility before the world for at
least the maintenance of order in the archipelago, and that it
must assume the initiative and possess the final authority in
all matters affecting the exterior relations of the archipelago,
which might imply also very extensive interference with inter-
nal conditions. Moreover, these men were still more sure than
were the American authorities (to whom, in fact, they had
communicated their views) that the radical Filipinos who ac-
tually had control at Malolos and over the divisions of the new
native army outside were not the best leaders of their people
in such a crisis, if at any time. In still less degree, for a long
time, did Americans comprehend that the great mass of the
people were wholly negligible so far as having real opinions
of their own was concerned, while yet their natural racial
sympathies, stirred by the events of three years past, and
aroused more than ever by the terrible colors in which the
Americans had been painted to them by their radical (mostly,
their more ignorant) leaders, now put them at the command
less of their one-time caciques (mostly, men of property) than
of leaders of a positive, sometimes a vindictive, type, whatever
might be their origin and former record. Furthermore, this
same half-frenzy was, as some Americans never would see,
capable of being aroused not only among the Tagalogs, but
also among the masses in o'ther provinces, who, indeed, in the
extreme north and south of Luzon and in the central islands,
were more easily led than were the Tagalogs. Between the

380 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

natural conservatives and the nondescript horde with their
radical and reckless leaders, there were halting perhaps most
of the men of property and education throughout the islands,
with all shades of opinions, mostly of no very positive opinions
at all, really waiting for a long time almost leaderless, their
interests crying for peace and quiet upon any acceptable basis,
their sympathies urging them into alignment with the cam-
paign for an independent Filipino nation and the realization
all at once of the dreams Rizal and his fellow-propagandists
had held before them, — just how they knew not, but some-
how,— some of them the most shallow superficial and dis-
honest tricksters, others with a reasonable degree of character
and solidity. Without them, the Malolos absolutism, which
had steadily become less and less ephemeral since its first or-
ganization in Cavite, could not hope to keep the masses in line
throughout the country in general; it was significant that
some of the idols of this element had been absorbed into the
new organization as military leaders or trusted advisers, and
were heart and soul with the movement. Property interests,
natural cautiousness, and a quite general desire to be on the
winning side were arguments waiting to be urged with this
class in behalf of a recognition of the sovereignty of the
United States. That they should suspend judgment until they
could see whether the United States would deal fairly with
Filipino interests and Filipino aspirations was all that country's
representatives could expect.^ But something positive in the

1 In a personal letter to the writer in March, 1904 (quoted in the New York
Evening Post of May 17, 1904), one of the foremost Filipinos, for experience, legal
attainments, and a character universally recognized as of the highest, said : —

" In my judgment, the Americans who held the first conferences with some of
the Filipinos in 1898, in the United States, in Hongkong, and in Singapore, ought
to have been persons of high standing, duly authorized by their Government, and
they ought to have spoken plainly and set forth concretely what was in the thought
of the McKinley Government. It is plain that whoever was to represent and inter-
pret the desires and proposals of the American Government ought to be a man of
great culture, of well-defined policy, a statesman. Those definite and concrete pro-
posals ought to have been expressed without ambiguities nor doubts, but with ab-
solute plainness and blunt frankness. If the McKinley Government entertained the

MUTUAL DISTRUST 881

way of a programme, if not of actual performance, was neces-
sary to secure the support of this rather heterogeneous but
highly important class of at first half-decided Filipinos. The
radicals at Malolos had a positive programme, and one which
appealed to all the sympathies of the men whose support they
sought. Clearly, the conditions cried for Filipino leadership
of the best-informed and coolest-headed sort, and for Ameri-

plan of establishing its control and protectorate in the Philippines, it should have
been so set forth from the beginning, as also the governmental regime should have
been outlined upon strict principles of progressive autonomy, according to the con-
ditions and needs of the country, without any promise whatever of independence
at that time.

" It appears as though certain Americans, and even military and naval ofiGcers,
allowed to outline itself in perspective the future absolute independence of the
country, a promise more or less undecisive, or at any rate lacking formality, asked
and re-asked afterward by the Democrats during the presidential campaign ; all
which did much damage and deceived the people of ouly moderate education, and
still more the ignorant, who to this day believe that independence is the panacea
of the ills and backwardness of the country.

" Loving the Philippines, as no one does more, it is clear that it would have
satisfied me that my couutry should enjoy complete independence, as many not
thoroughly informed of the conditions desire. With all that, you know that from
the first moment I put myself, with other Filipinos who thought the same as I,
by the side of the American authorities, convinced that the country was not yet —
as it is not to-day, either — prepared to be independent Under the difficult con-
ditions through which we passed in 1899 and 1900, I, on various occasions, stated
to the authorities and to the president of the first commission, Mr. Schurman, as
also to Mr. Worcester, that those addicted to the Americans and opposed to inde-
pendence were few, but that I was confident that our opinion would predominate
in time if the American Government would establish a government according to
a frankly autonomous system.

" The Filipinos in general had suffered very greatly for more than three hun-
dred years tmder the Spanish-friar, or theocratic, regime, and it seems clear to
me that, because of emerging from that afflicted state, the Filipinos would have
accepted American protection and control under an autonomous regime, without
any promise at all of independence ; but it was essential that the intention of the
Government at Washington should then be definite and concrete, and that the one
to establish and conduct the negotiation and the agreement should be a statesman
like Mr. Taft, or some able man of public affairs, and not adventurers who had
nothing to lose ; and it was necessary also that the Democrats should not have
supported the desires for independence of many Filipinos. To the latter there
were said and promised many things which could not be carried out, especially in-
dependence, by Americans who were speaking and acting according to their own
judgment ; and the result was what we have already seen, more than three years
of war, and at this time, in spite of peace, we still have trouble-brewers abroad,
or partisans of independence who really are devoting themselves to the robbery
of the Filipinos. **

382 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

can statesmanship which would disregard formalities and in-
cidentals and strike down to essentials.

The control of the small clique of radical leaders over the
situation at Malolos was not shaken, and only once did it come
near to being openly disputed — near enough to cause a rup-
ture in the councils of government and to say plainly of the
intentions of those who remained : " We are for war." This
was in December, 1898, when, after the treaty at Paris had
been signed and the radicals at Malolos wished to clear the
decks for the fight they expected, it was proposed to add to
the constitution (which had occupied the Assembly thus far
practically to the exclusion of everything else, and which was
now ready for conclusion) certain provisional clauses, among
others Article 99, giving the President power to issue decrees
in virtually an absolute manner " during the time the country
may have to struggle for its independence." This was opposed
by the conservatives who were still nominally members of .the
Cabinet and of the Congress ; but the war element was in the
saddle, and the others now either formally severed their con-
nections with the Revolutionary Government and henceforth
remained in Manila (some of them quite fearful of personal
violence) or subsided into acquiescence with the war party.*

1 The inner circle of Aguinaldo's advisers, some of whom were in the Cabinet
as it already stood, had him send back to the Assembly with his approval the con-
stitution as it had been adopted about December 15, adding, however, the above
provisional article and others as to the postponement of the elections of President
and Representatives. The committee which the Assembly thereupon appointed to
consider these recommendations of Ag^inaldo reported that they ought to be re-
jected (see testimony of T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Rept. Phil. Comm.y 1900, vol. n,
pp. 392-93). That was the direct cause of the break. (Yet Article 69 and other
loosely drawn provisions as to the executive power already gave the President
plenty of room to indulge in absolutism and call it constitutional.) The distinc-
tive conservatives in the Cabinet had long before ceased to attempt to direct the
policy, and Senor Arellano had ceased to go to Malolos at all, though arguing,
like the others, for a peaceful adjustment with the Americans when the time
should come. It was now recognized that the disposition of the war party was such
that the conservatives had no place in the Cabinet, and they resigned. Mabini now
for the first time became the nominal, as well as actual, head of the Government,
but it took him nearly a month to re-form the Cabinet. The more significant
changes were those of Mabini for Arellano as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and

MUTUAL DISTRUST 383

Aguinaldo betrayed uneasiness over the effect it might have
upon the people to see that some of the Filipinos most con-
spicuous for attainments could no longer be advertised as of
his party, and the more conservative of the men who still re-
mained at Malolos viewed the turn of events with more or less
open discontent ; but there were no scruples of indecision or
feelings of regret on the part of the real civilian chief, Mabini,
or of the foremost military commander, Luna, who had con-
sistently been planning on war. Mabini was an enthusiast
over Filipino regeneration, which he seemed to feel confident
was being wrought overnight. Luna felt himself a giant
among puny men of war, and, in the conceit of youth, was
itching to try his powers in a world-arena. Aguinaldo, swept
along by forces which he knew not how to guide, even if he
could any longer do so, yet had had his experience of disap-
pointments in 1896 and 1897, and was by nature cautious ;
moreover, the broad scope which affairs had taken bewildered
the yet ungraduated villager, and he sometimes seemed to
halt curiously between the counsels of peace and caution and
those of war and glory. In the end, however, his name
(really the important part of him at this time) was always at
the disposal of the radicals; they had the positive programme.*

the naming of Sandiko as Secretary of the Interior; the new Cabinet was entirely
radical in its membership, and included also the military commanders who had
before composed part of it.

* A mysterious document of this period, hardly ever noticed, is of great interest
as bearing on the question of Aguinaldo's character, yet is open to various inter-
pretations. It is his letter to the Filipino people in December, 1898, asking them
to give him as his Christmas-gift (his aguinaldo^ as the Spanish word is) liberty
to retire, and to put some abler man in his place. (See the full text, translated
from a copy secured by the American Secret Service, in Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900,
vol. II, pp. 327-31.) Oscar K. Davis (Everybody*s Magazine^ August, 1901, pp.
143-44) takes Aguinaldo at his word, and finds an evidence of his ability to com-
prehend the seriousness of the situation, and of his patriotism, in such sentences
M this: ** I am aware of the fact that one of my bumble station does not de-
serve to be exalted to so high a magistracy . . . ; but as the Congress of Repre-
sentatives chooses me anew to rule the destinies of our people, it has seemed
proper to me to come to my compatriots asking as a Christmas-gift that they study
and consider some better man to take my place. . . ." The document is open to
this interpretation, and there were nimori at the time that Aguinaldo had sug-

384 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES^

It was essential to the Revolutionary Government's plans,
if it were to assert any claim at all to represent the entire
population of Christian Filipinos, that it should be recognized

gested Arellano for President, and that Mabini caused this Christmas letter to the
Filipinos to be suppressed. The latter, considered in connection with the events of
the time, is open also to a very different interpretation, namely, that Aguinaldo
was disturbed over the defection of the conservatives, and wished to make an ap-
peal to the middle and lower classes, among whom he counted his only real sup-
porters and personal admirers. The document is well calculated, almost cunningly,
it seems, to appeal to the feeling of poor Filipinos as a class, and to their pride in
a leader not from among the wealthy. Whoever is to be made President, says
Aguinaldo, " his antecedents should be followed step by step. ... It is not enough
that he be wise, for there are wise men unwilling to cast in their lot with their
native land while it is in peril. ... It is not enough that he be rich, for there are
rich men who, although they see their native land threatened by a new slavery,
are unwilling to aid her with their wealth. . . . Many have given no more than
the thousandth part of their total wealth. ... In the majority of revolutions to ob-
tain independence . . . the rich have led . . • ; here the poor have led. . . . There
are those who aspire to high places, and cannot consent to pass througli the in-
ferior g^rades. What do they wish first of all ? Ah ! Their own well-being, and
not that of the people. . . . The second motive for my dismissal I find in the pain
it gives me to see still among our military companions chiefs who . . . seek to en-
rich themselves by taking bribes, . . . even among the prisoners, and that there
are others, especially among the agents of the Government, who still mishandle the
pay, small in itself, of the soldiers. . . . Some of our friends who fill civil posi-
tions . . . sacrifice the public weal to their private advantage, . . . even to make
money out of gambling. Where is the police ? Perhaps it also is bribed ? . . .
And I am proud of the poor above all others . . . who know how to suffer that the
country may not be newly enslaved, and especially of those who lend their forces
to its defense without any personal interest. ... To those [native priests behaving
as did the friars] I wish to recommend that they forget the accumulation of
private wealth and cease exacting excessive parochial dues. . . . Some members of
the clergy are still much given to the evil habit of forming factions [referring to
those who organized the • Guards of Honor,'] availing themselves of their sacred
ministry especially among the women who confess to them, by means of whom
they insinuate themselves among their respective husbands and sons." This docu-
ment is unmistakably in Aguinaldo's own style, and is one of the few which he
himself wrote of the many issued over his name; if Mabini suppressed it, he did
80 partly at least because of the damaging admissions it contained about the work-
ings of the Filipino Government. Aguinaldo speaks of his " reelection " as Presi-
dent; he well knew that this was only a part of the programme whereby the rad-
icals were about to force into the constitution the provisions they desired. One of
these was that the " President of the Revolutionary Government " should now be-
come " President of the Republic " and should hold office until the " Constituent
Assembly " should meet to elect definitely; but there was no provision in the con-
stitution for such a Constituent Assembly. Another provision continued the Con-
gress already in existence (with members, as seen, at the dictation of the Bakoor
clique) for four years from April 15, 1899. These provisions were forced through

MUTUAL DISTRUST 885

by the Bisayan leaders. It was touch and go for some time
between caution and race sentiment with these men. The
Bisayas had virtually no representation at Malolos; their more
radical leaders, already in arms, had resented the arrival of
young, inexperienced Tagalogs from Aguinaldo's camp who
undertook to dictate military operations in Panai; their more
conservative and influential leaders (men of wealth all, plant-
ers and lawyers), who did not openly turn against Spain until
her troops had left Hoilo, had little feeling in common with
the men of greatest prominence in Malolos; in fact, looked
down upon certain of them. Efforts were made by the latter
to conciliate the Bisayan leaders, though there was nothing
like a comprehensive plan to give them a fair representation
in the new Government. In November, immediately after the
Spaniards capitulated to Juan Araneta in Negros, the Malolos
authorities named the latter " Politico-Mihtary Governor of
Negros," after the Spanish fashion in the central islands;* but
the provisional Filipino Government at Bakolod had already
sent an emissary to Captain Glass, of the Charleston, asking
for the establishment of American authority in that island and
their recognition under it. A " Delegate of the Committee of
the Bisayas " established himself at Malolos, where he osten-
sibly represented the views and wishes of the central islanders
with the Revolutionary Government, but he did not represent
the chief leaders of Bisayan opinion.^ Just before the Span-
when the constitution was finally adopted on Jannary 20, 1899, the radicals hav-
ing full control at Malolos.

There have been many magazine estimates of Aguinaldo; aside from this of Me
Davis, the reader may find interest in " The Real Aguinaldo," by James A. LeRoy,
in the Independent^ July 11, 1901, and " Letters on Aguinaldo," by Sixto Lopez and
J. A. LeRoy, ibid., July 10, 1902.

* La Independencia, November 16, 1898, announces this appointment, and pro-
tests that the rumors of disagreement between the Malolos Government and the
Biaayans are false.

* A good deal about this ^Melegate," Francisco Villanueva, may be learned
from his letter in La Independencia, a ** Manifesto to the Spaniaids in Iloilo,"
wherein he discusses the poMibility of war with the United States; says "an angel
has appeared in the form of Aguinaldo to announce to his people their long-
sought liberty'*; also that Providence will furnish the Filipinos "conditions of

386 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

iards evacuated Iloilo, a committee of representative Bisayans
from Panai and Negros visited Manila and Malolos (though
General Otis did not know at the time of their visit to the lat-
ter place). Subsequent events would indicate that they were
better satisfied with the assurances they received at Malolos
than with what was said to them at Manila. At any rate,
when the first American troops arrived in the harbor at Iloilo,
finding that the Spaniards had left and the Bisayans were in
control of the town, the latter declared that they could not
admit the entrance of the Americans or turn the place over to
them without receiving word to do so from Malolos. The
Bisayan leaders had apparently made their choice; but it al-
ways has remained very much in doubt whether they would
not have become acquiescent toward a show of determination
on the part of the Americans; would not have been glad, in
fact, to have the latter take off their hands the burden of de-
ciding for them.

The Iloilo episode brought out more clearly than did any-

the field and inclemencies of weather " to overcome all " powerful engines of
war"; and then expands his idea that the Spaniards in the Bisayas should unite
with the Filipinos (though failing to point out just how this would be possible).
The same harebrained proposal is contained in a letter signed in cipher at Malo-
los on October 25, 1898, and addressed to the Spanish commander at Iloilo, Diego
Bios, urging him to turn that city over to the Filipinos and " proclaim the federa-
tion of the Filipino Republic with the Spanish Republic." The inducements held
out are: " There will be hurrahs for Spain and the Philippines united as a federal
republic . . . you will be promoted to be a lieutenant general. . . . The flags of
Spain and the Philippines will float side by side ... we shall fight the Americans
together . . . liberty for all the 9000 Spanish prisoners in our hands." It is sol-
emnly asserted: "Your transfer to our side does not really involve treason to
Spain, since the moment sovereignty passes to the Americans you are free to trans-
fer your allegiance." This bears the earmarks of Villanueva, or shows that he had
consulted with its author before writing the above manifesto. It is a captured in-
surgent document, read in the United States Senate by Senator Spooner on May
29, 1900, and ascribed by him to Aguinaldo. It was reproduced in Sen. Doc. 208,
56th Cong., Ist Sess., part 3, pp. 4-5, and in the Republican Campaign Textbook,
1900, p. 339, and, because it is written on paper headed " Office of the President,
Revolutionary Government," and signed 1-1-9-6-1-M (Aguinaldo's cipher being
" Miong "), it is in the latter document positively ascribed to Aguinaldo. The in-
ternal evidence points to some other author, though it is quite in Aguinaldo's
style of composition; it is certainly not proved that he wrote it.

MUTUAL DISTRUST 387

thing else the lack of policy at Washington at the time, or
rather, if we assume the lack of policy at Washington to have
been an unavoidable accompaniment of the form of govern-
ment, the confusion of American aims at the time in the Phil-
ippines. How far the cheerful optimism that prevailed in the
testimony before the Peace Commission at Paris regarding the
ease with which the Philippines and the Fihpinos could be
managed by the Americans induced a belief at Washington
that a policy of " drift " for the time being offered no dangers,
cannot be said. It may perhaps be assumed that the optimistic
tone of General Otis's dispatches from the islands was influ-
ential in this respect. To be sure, he informed Washington on
November 13 that he would need all the troops that could come
to him, whereas he had in September said he did not need re-
inforcements, and his dispatches thereafter contained hints of
possible trouble, where before they had scarcely admitted such
a contingency ; but a message the least bit discouraging was
hastily pursued by one that indicated that the commanding
general's complacency, at least, had been restored with the
succeeding morning's sunrise; and the general tenor of his
whole correspondence till some time after the signing of the
treaty of peace was such as to minimize the danger of Filipino
opposition to whatever programme the United States might,
in its own good time, announce.

The War Department, which replied to his November dis-
patch that six regiments of regular troops were being held
to send to him, if necessary, had already sent away from the
Pacific Coast and from Honolulu, between October 17 and
November 10, nine transports loaded with troops, all volun-
teers except the battalions of the Eighteenth and Twenty-
third infantry regiments of regulars which were needed to
complete those organizations in the Philippines.* It was not

> These expeditions carried, all told, somewhat orer 5000 troops, making the
total of arrivals up to the outbreak of hostilities with the Filipinos over 22,000,
including the recruits transported daring the months of August and September,

388 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

altogether plain, however, that these regiments were sent so
much because it was feared at Washington that they might
be needed as because some of the volunteers confined in
Manila were clamoring to return home, there were sick men
to replace, and the states which had raised volunteer regi-
ments too late for them to land upon foreign soil during
the brief war were eager to see their men given at least gar-
rison duty in the new possessions, preferring peaceful and
near-by Porto Rico and Hawaii to no chance at all. General
Otis, indeed, started a movement of volunteers homeward after
the conclusion of the treaty at Paris, sending first the Astor
Battery, and a few days later one third of the Nebraska volun-
teers.^ He had just assured the President (December 8) that
" conditions were improving and there were signs of revolu-
tionary disintegration " ; and, in response to a disturbed query
about the newspaper reports as to the disorderly conduct of
American troops in Manila, had answered that the " conduct
of the troops was good ; most favorably commented upon by
citizens," and he believed that the "city was never more
quiet " ; in short, he had implied that, outside of the trouble
made by the Spanish prisoners and Oriental riffraff then seek-
ing entrance to Manila, the city was very much like a Sun-
day school and that the newspaper stories were inspired by
" animus."

Just then came the break in the Cabinet at Malolos, fol-
lowed by the hostile attitude of the supposedly acquiescent

when the protocol was held to forbid the sending of new organizations to the
Philippines. (It will be noted that this was disregarded when the expeditions of
October and November were sent out.) Of the total, upwards of 16,000 were vol-
unteers, nearly all from Western States. The volunteers who went out in October-
November included an infantry regiment each from Washington, Kansas, Tennes-
see, and Iowa, two more batteries of California artillery (on foot), a battery of
Wyoming artillery, and a detachment of Nevada cavalry. For the data on these
expeditions see Otis's Rept., 1899, p. 3 (also chronological summary by War De-
partment of events in Philippine Islands, published in the same volume).

1 He dispatched the Astor Battery in response to definite instructions sent to
him on December 7, but he was told to send back other volunteers only if he
thought he could spare them {Corr. Rel. War, p. 851).

MUTUAL DISTRUST 389

Bisayans ; no more volunteers were sent home, and soon the
arrival of the regular regiments that had been promised was
being anxiously awaited.^

1 For General Otis's official account of military conditions from September to
December inclusive, see Otis*s Rept., 1899^ pp. 39-44. This should be followed in
connection with his cablegrams to Washington during that period {Corr. Rel. Wary
pp. 786 et seq.). No such dispatch is found in the latter as is mentioned in his
Report (p. 41) as being sent on September 17, in which he said " prudence dic-
tates increased force " ; probably, by some error in dates, he refers to the dis-
patch sent, in an edited form, on November 13. Certainly, after the alarm of early
September regarding the evacuation of Manila by the insurgents, when at one
time he feared he might have to use force, he was consistently most cheerful
over the situation (assuming that we have in Corr. Rel. War all his dispatches) ;
indeed, on September 16 (t6u/., p. 791), he cabled " no further force required." On
October 19 (ibid.f p. 827), he cabled that the Filipinos of education and property
were gaining the ascendancy ; that be did not anticipate trouble with the Malolos
organization ; that it was not recognized by the Filipinos in the central islands,
who would welcome the rule of the United States. He also emphasized the dis-
sensions among the Filipinos in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army
on October 25 (iiu/., p. 843). On October 30, he cabled that relations with the
insurgents, strained by the trouble of that month over the Manila suburbs, were
"now apparently friendly" (ibid., p. 831). His request for more troops on No-
vember 13 modified the opinion that the Bisayans would not act with the Malolos
Government When questioned, on November 25, how many troops would be
necessary if the whole archipelago was taken over, he replied, in a very rambling
message (p. 840) : " Should Aguinaldo succeed in arousing decided opposition to
United States authority generally, 25,000 men will be required here, as campaign
must be made, although in southern islands do not now apprehend serious diffi-
culty." He urged the hurrying forward of regular troops, but added : " Hope to
report more favorable indications soon, and may succeed in destroying much of
Aguinaldo's authority." We are again indebted to the hearings in 1902 before the
Senate Committee on the Philippines for some autobiographical revelations. Said
General Otis (Sen. Doc. 331, 57th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 772) : " Until . . . possibly
the middle of November, I had more influence in Aguinaldo's Cabinet than he had
himself " (referring to the fact that the conservatives whom Aguinaldo wished to
have in his Cabinet, but whose advice was not followed, came regularly to tell him
what was going on at Malolos). Again, speaking of the Filipinos encircling Manila
and planning to drive the Americans out, he gives some explanation of his un-
willingness to the very last to believe the situation was dangerous : '* I did not
think they would attempt anything so suicidal to their own benefit " (ibid.j p. 802).
In his letter to Washington on January 12, telling of the rupture in Aguinaldo's
Cabinet, he gives the impression that all the conservative Filipinos are with him
and have abandoned the Malolos Government, and apparently he thought so. (See
OtiM*t Rept., 1899, p. 356.) Correspondent John F. Bass, writing in 1901 a review
of the Insurgent (Government for the Philippine Information Society (vol. I, no. 3,
of their series Facts about the FUipinot, pp. 70-83), says : " Of what was going on
at Malolot oar military in Manila knew little, except through Majors Bourns
aod Bell, who went there only on speoiflo miMioni. Other offioera who went to

390 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

On December 14, General Otis reported that foreign busi-
ness interests were urging the occupation of Iloilo by the
Americans, and asked if he should send there troops he had ready,
as he had before recommended.^ The President and the Secretary
of War were at the time absent from Washington, on a trip
through the southern part of the United States, and it was
more than a week before they instructed General Otis to "send
necessary troops to Iloilo to preserve the peace and protect
life and property."^ Receiving this authority on December 23,
the latter at once issued orders for General Marcus P. Miller
to take the recently arrived Iowa volunteers, the Eighteenth In-
fantry and a battery of the Sixth Artillery and proceed with them
to Iloilo. He also immediately dispatched a message to General
Rios at Iloilo, informing him of the coming of this force.
But the cable company returned the message the next morning

Malolos stole away like boys from school, fearing that their whereabouts would be
detected at headquarters." " The commanding generals [of the American army],
schooled to unintelligent obedience of a two-company post, were unwilling to take
the responsibility for any energetic or firm action. . . . They did not keep the
home Government informed of the critical state of the situation. The result was
very general and non-committal orders from Washington, supported by a strict
conformity ... in the Philippines." General Otis's disagreement with the state-
ments of the American newspaper correspondents, which was to become so marked
in 1899, began quite early, but at first had less to do with the attitude of the Fili-
pinos than with the state of health of the army. He insisted, in repeated dispatches
to Washington, that the correspondents exaggerated, but his own reports at one time
showed a sick list of twenty per cent in some regiments. Those volimteer regi-
ments which were less strictly disciplined and managed, of course showed the
worst conditions. After the idea of a convalescent hospital near the bay and within
Aguinaldo's lines was abandoned in October, one was established on Corregidor
Island, with beneficial results.

^ On December 8, he had reported that he and Dewey agreed that it was very
necessary to occupy Iloilo and Sebd as soon as possible, and later on the chief
ports of Luzon. This was in response to instructions that he and Dewey should
confer together and should keep the President informed as to military and other
necessities {Corr. Rel. War, pp. 850-51).

^ The message continued : " It is most important that there should be no conflict
with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm." The date of this message (given
in Corr. Rel. War, p. 857) is December 21, the same as the date of the President's
formal instructions to proclaim American sovereignty and extend American mili-
tary authority over the entire archipelago, which instructions were not cabled to
Otis until December 27. The Iloilo dispatch did not reach Manila till December
23 (see Otis's Kept, 1899, p. 55).

MUTUAL DISTRUST 391

with the word that it was impossible to deliver it and that all
the Spanish forces would leave Iloilo during the day. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Charles L. Potter was before night dispatched
in a coasting-vessel to reach the Spaniards before their de-
parture if possible, and on the 26th the expedition under Miller
set sail ; they encountered Colonel Potter on his way back and
found that the Spaniards had, indeed, departed on the 24th,
virtually, though not formally, turning over the town to the
Filipino armed authorities. The latter had assumed full control,
under the superior direction of the civilian " Committee of the
Bisayas," when the cruiser Baltimore and the captured gun-
boat Callao escorted the three transport-loads of American
troops and one transport-load of discharged native sol-
diers of Spain into the Straits of Iloilo on the morning of the
28th.^

^ Even before it became certain that the United States had tecured the cession
of the Philippines at Paris, General Rios had asked that the Americans send their
own troops to relieve him at Iloilo, his request for the use of 2000 of the Spanish
prisoners at Manila having first been refused (testimony of General Otis, Sen. Doc,
331 1 p. 759). His telegram to General Otis (Otis's Kept., 1899, p. 56) indicates
that, after the treaty was signed, the Government at Madrid ordered him to evacu-
ate the Bisayas, in the face of their refusal at Paris to provide in the treaty that
the United States should maintain order in the archipelago pending ratification.
(This proposal seems to have originated with the American commissioners alone ;
at least, there is no evidence to show that Washington suggested it, or that General
Otis ever urged the importance of such authority being conferred on the United
States pending ratification.) There is every indication that, after receiving from
Madrid orders to evacuate. General Rios came to terms informally with the Bi-
aayan leaders whose forces were besieging him in Iloilo, or, at any rate, with their
spokesmen inside the city. Of course, he could not meet their request formally to
commit the city to their keeping ; but he left it in the hands of the mayor, who,
being a Spaniard (though married in the country), promptly notified the Bisayans
that he was ready to turn over his authority to them, under a guaranty of property
interests. The Bisayans outside had suspended all hostilities while the Spaniards
were preparing for departure, and they marched into the city and formally took
pofsession the day following (December 25). There was also something suspicious
•bout the failure of General Otis's message to General Rios on December 23 to
reach the latter. It was cable<l to Kapis, on the north shore of Panai, with which
communication was maintained with Iloilo by boat, the land line across Panai being
in the possession of the Filipinos. The operator returned word to Manila the next
morning that General Otis*s dispatch had reached him at 5.50 p.m., but that nt
6.35 P.M. a Spanish gunboat had left Kapis with all dispatches for Iloilo. He said
also that General Rios was going to take his troopt to Mindanao, but would himself

392 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Had General Miller simply been under general instructions
to act as he thought best after investigating the situation at
Iloilo, bearing in mind that the purpose of the expedition was
the maintenance of order and the furtherance, so far as possible,
of good relations between Americans and FiHpinos, Iloilo
would almost surely have been occupied by him immediately
upon his arrival; and it is a matter of notoriety that there
w^ould have been no resistance at the time. Had he, even under
the general and rather conflicting instructions at first given to
him, and as supplemented in the same semi-contradictory
fashion for a few days thereafter, taken the reins in his own
hands, there might have been a peaceful, or practically peace-
ful, landing of his troops at any time during the first few days
that followed his arrival.^

soon come to Manila; Rios did not on this occasion formally commmiicate to Otis
bis intention to evacuate, but sent a dispatch to Kapis by another gunboat, after he
had actually evacuated.

* Otis had instructed Miller at great length, both verbally and in writing, before
his departure from Manila (Otis*s Rept.y 1899, pp. 57-59), reiterating the Presi-
dent's command : " No conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm." If
he foimd Iloilo already occupied by the insurgents, Miller was to " proceed with
great caution, avoiding all manifestation of meditated forcible action and undue
display of force." He was to land, if possible to do so by negotiating with the re-
presentative people and making them imderstand that the United States intended
to establish " an efficient government " which should protect their interests fully,
" in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increas-
ing and abundant prosperity." If he could not succeed in this, he was to ** avoid a
conflict or the use of force except in defense." He was to tell the people that he
brought 80 large a force to Iloilo ( about 2500) only with the intention of proceeding
from there to occupy other points in the central and southern islands. When Colo-
nel Potter had reported to Otis the departure of the Spaniards, he was at once dis-
patched with further instructions to Miller, saying it was necessary to occupy
Iloilo and the manner of it was left to him : " By firmness and conciliatory action,
it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will
make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking posses-
sion of the city forcibly, if more pacific measures are without avail." Here at last
was the specific authority for which Miller was looking ; but, in a postscript, Otis
said he had just heard of the break in the Cabinet at Malolos, and that the radi-
cals there were desirous of seeing the Americans begin the trouble at Iloilo, hence
it was still "quite necessary to avoid force, if you can do so and succeed." More-
over, in a note to the messenger. Colonel Potter, after closing the foregoing letter,
Otis added that Admiral Dewey thought a fight was now necessary to take Iloilo,
hence it was best to withdraw ; that he (Otis) did not think best to withdraw en-
tirely, but would leave a war-vessel and small force in front of Iloilo and take the

MUTUAL DISTRUST 893

General Otis had, indeed, in the first letter dispatched to
Iloilo, given Miller authority to use force to occupy the place, if
that should be necessary, though half -revoking this authority in
postscripts. On the strength of this, General Miller prepared
his troops to land on December 30, but desisted then and sent
for further instructions when the foreign business houses,
upon whose petition in the first place the expedition had been
sent, asked him to stay his hand, for fear his landing of troops
would result in the burning of Iloilo by the Filipino authori-
ties.^ But, the next day after authorizing force, Otis had sent
him these orders by a British man-of-war : " Do not be in haste.
It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the na-
tives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions
there." '^ At the same time, the commanding-general's cable-
grams to Washington began to take on a new tone of worry
and possible danger. This drew from the President, on Janu-

rest of the troops to other ports, yet Dewey's attitude enforced the desirability of
using " every possible means of conciliation " ; that Miller should be " governed
by these views as nearly as possible," and he would try to send " further infor-
mation " the next day ; and, notwithstanding all this, he still held to his view that
** Iloilo must be taken." As he read this batch of instructions (t&u/., pp. 60-61),
General Miller, an old Indian fighter, must have smiled at this sentence : " No
further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your
discretionary action."

* Otis^s Rept.y 1899f pp. 63-64. The British and German vice-consuls informed
the American vice-consul in Iloilo that the natives intended to fire the town. In their
note to General Miller, the foreign merchants did not assign this as their reason,
but the probability that the landing of Americans would bring on a conflict with
the natives, which " would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands
for years to come." Therefore, they asked him to " consider the orders they [the
Bisayans] had received from their chief, Aguinaldo, of Malolos." Nevertheless,
Miller for several days held his forces all ready to disembark according to a plan
of occupation he had prepared. The commander of the Baltimore informed him
that Admiral Dewey's instructions to him were to act only in the defense of the
army; hence he would not begin an attack on the city (ut supra).

* Otis' 8 Rept.y 1899t P* ^> General Otis, according to his own explanations,
seems to have heard of the overthrow of the conservatives at Malolos with a sud-
den shock. He speaks of the " situation in Luzon which had been so quickly devel-
oped." He had ordered the embarkation of the California volunteers, intending to
•end them also to occupy southern Philippine ports, but instead made them dis-
embark in a few days, and began cabling Washington that the situation was very
delicate and that hii foroee in Manila must not be widely scattered at present
(Ibid., p. 61.)

394 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

ary 1, the message: "It is of first importance that a conflict
brought on by you be avoided at this time, if possible." In
the United States, the treaty of peace loomed largest in public
discussion, and it was already evident that there was danger
of a failure to secure its ratification in the Senate. In strict
technicality, the United States had no rights in the Phihppines
outside of Manila Bay, and the Executive was not ready to
assume the responsibility of a possible conflict in the Bisayas,
whether fearing its effect on the treaty or anxious to avoid
criticism. Events moved on rapidly in the Philippines also,
the weakness of the American attitude leading the Filipinos
now in full control to be so much the more assertive in stating
their position. On January 8, General Otis, in reporting the
attitude of the Malolos leaders and the fact that the Bisayans
were now virtually allied with them, said : " Conflict at Iloilo
or any other southern port means war in all the islands."
President McKinley immediately replied, in a joint message
to Dewey and Otis : —

Am most desirous that conflict be avoided. Your statement [to
the effect above stated] increases that desire. Such conflict most un-
fortunate, considering the present, and might have results unfavor-
able affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring
on a conflict. Time given the insurgents cannot hurt us and must
weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent pur-
pose and recognize that before we can give their people good
government our sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned.
. . . You are masters of the situation there and must not relax your
power or vigilance. Hope good counsels will prevail among the in-
habitants and that you will find means to save bloodshed and restore
tranquillity to that unhappy island.^

1 There is only scant reference to the cablegrams of late December and of Jan-
uary in Otis's Report. They will be found on pp. 862-88 of Corr. Rel. War. Presi-
dent McKinley's message of January 1 had been preceded by one from Secretary
Alger, instructing Otis to " proceed with great prudence " and to " be kind and
tactful, taking time if necessary to accomplish results desired by peaceful means."
The message of January 1 was drawn forth by Otis's report regarding Miller's
status at Iloilo, saying he was awaiting orders whether to use force, and adding:
" Insurgents active. Cannot weaken force here very much." On January 2, he re-
lapsed again into optimism: " Insurgent Government becoming weak and unable

MUTUAL DISTRUST 395

So General Miller never received the formal authorization
to occupy Iloilo forcibly, for which authorization he pressed
at various times, until after the outbreak of armed trouble
around Manila had removed the danger of aggression in Iloilo
serving as an excuse for an uprising in Luzon ; also the ratifi-
cation of the treaty by the United States Senate had removed
the ground for criticism on that score. Force was needed in
the end, as it had been plain that it would be at any time after
the first few days following the arrival of the American troops.
Filipino sentiment in Iloilo, which had been halting and un-
certain, crystallized very rapidly ; the possession of the city it-
self was sufficient to strengthen the disposition in favor of
control without outside interference. The Bisayan masses had
never been stirred by talk of independence to any such extent
as had the Tagalogs ; their radical leaders, mostly now in arms,
which they had taken up against Spain, were quite inclined to
give respectful consideration to the advice of their men of
property and education, and were, as already stated, somewhat
jealous of the Tagalog military leaders whom Aguinaldo was
sending down to them ; the more conservative men themselves
had, as we have seen, found greater virtue in the positive pro-
gramme of the Malolos Government for the reaUzation of
ideals quite common to all the educated Fihpinos than in the
negative assurances of the unknown Americans, but were at
heart not altogether pleased with the character of the self-
appointed dictators at Malolos, and were, above all, anxious
to avert warfare and the consequent loss of crops. The com-
mittee which they had sent up to Luzon was brought back on
the same steamer with General Miller, and General Otis had

to hold reprenenUtiTe men. . . . Believe that it is possible to avoid coDflict."
Meanwhile, Washington was hearing, through consuls in Japan, of Filipino pur-
chases of arms there (t&uf., p. 867). On January 8, in reporting that trouble at
Iloilo meant a general war, Otis said also: " Leading insurgents here [Manila]
fear, and beg that we temporize at Iloilo." On January 11, the President author-
Ued the recall of Miller's troops from Uoilo, if it was felt they were needed at
Ml

396 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

naively expected them to go on shore and tell their people
how good and kind and benevolent the Americans were and
what a blessing their occupation would be. They bore, how-
ever, messages from the Filipinos at Malolos that, if the Span-
iards had already turned the city over to the people, it must
not be delivered to the Americans unless with a formal pro-
test that this was done in submission to force, or unless word
came from Aguinaldo that the United States bad properly
recognized Filipino independence.^ The drift of sentiment in
Hoilo steadily set toward alliance with their brethren in Ma-
lolos, and the members of this committee never returned to
carry on further negotiations with General Miller after they
were once set on shore at Iloilo. As an "object-lesson" of
American generosity and benevolence. General Otis sent down
with the expedition some 200 Bisayans, recently discharged
soldiers of Spain, with their families; they were promptly
seized on and enrolled in the Filipino army outside of Iloilo.^

1 That this was, in effect, the message from Malolos, is known from private
sources. Two dispatches from Mabiui to Aguinaldo (spending Christmas in Old
Cavite), outlining the message sent to Iloilo, practically confirm this (Tel. Corr.
Aguinaldo, pp. 34-35). They also reveal that Mabini did not feel at all sure of
the attitude of the Bisayans who had come up to Manila. General Otis's implica-
tion (Rept., 1899, pp. 59-60) that the Bisayan delegation deliberately played him
false, is therefore probably unfair. They did not feel sure, as quite certainly their
people at home did not feel sure for some few days after their return, as to just
what should be their attitude if forced to a choice between the Americans and the
Malolos Government. Generals Otis and Miller understood from the interviews
at Manila that they were to work among their own people in behalf of receiving
the Americans without opposition. The Bisayans seem to have understood that
the Americans promised not to land troops until the " Committee of the Bisayas"
had passed on the question and an agreement was reached between the two par-
ties. Mabini evidently understood from the commissioners that any agreement
reached at Iloilo was to be reported to Malolos for ratification (the Americans
sending a warship for that purpose), but he did not altogether trust the commis-
sioners nor the conservatives in control of the civilian " Committee of the Bi-
sayas," for he sent word through the interpreter direct to the military commanders
outside of Iloilo. See also Sen. Doc. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, pp. 6-8, for
the childish instructions to the Bisayan committee prepared by some one (pre-
sumably the author of the similar letter to General Rios in November) in Agui-
naldo's office, and for some minutes on the conference of the Bisayans with Otis.

' On January 21, General Otis sent down to Iloilo 600 more Bisayan troops,
trained and disciplined under Spanish officers {Otis's RepU^ 1899, p. 87). The

MUTUAL DISTRUST 397

At first, the Hoiloans with whom General Miller communicated
upon his arrival had not been willing to say that they would
resist his occupation of the town, even when he came around
to asking them this as a direct question. They notified him, on
December 30, of their determination " not to consent to any in-
terference " without express orders from the Malolos Govern-
ment, "with which we are one in ideas." The Bisayans'
choice had finally been made. Nevertheless, it is a matter of
knowledge that not even yet were they fully decided to op-
pose force to an American landing.^ A day or two more, they
were ready to go that length also, had their troops stationed
about the town, and were preparing defenses and barri-
cading the streets. Conferences of various kinds were held,
on shore and on the American ships, and outwardly the best
of relations were maintained between the two parties. This was
not all formality, either, for the relations of Panai and Negros
were close; various planters in Negros were outspoken for the

Malolos Grovernment had also hurried oflf more Tagalog troops to Panai, on hear-
ing of the Miller expedition; thej arrived on that island on December 29.

^ Indeed, they at the same time made the equivocal statement to General Miller
that, if the American troops landed without arms, they would use their troops to
endeavor to restrain the people ; if the Americans landed with arms, they " would
not answer " for the attitude either of their troops or of the people. For the full
record of Miller's negotiations with them, see Otis's Rept^ 1899, pp. 61-68, 85-87,
and General R. P. Hughes's later report to Otis on the Bisayas {Rept. War DepL,
1899, vol. I, part 5, pp. 325-33). Colonel Potter had reported to Miller on the
way down that only a show of force was needed, and this was, in effect, Miller's
first conclusion, as reported to Otis on December 28. How quick the Hoiloans
were to take the cue and assume the positive attitude the Americans had declined
to assume is well described in a letter of John F. Bass, written from Iloilo on
January 5, 1899, and reproduced in Harper*s Hist., pp. 74-77. Mr. Bass had been
in Iloilo in October, and, coming down with Miller's expedition, spent five days in
the town before it was felt to be unsafe for Americans to stay there. He says: "I
went on shore and found only a few soldiers in the town. The old fort was unoo-
eupied. Nearly all the insurgent troops were two miles distant, across the river at
Jaro. The insurgent flag was down, and the insurgents evidently expected us to
land. ... No mistake is so grare, in a situation like the present, as the mistake
of indecision. . . . With every communication we sent, with every eridenoe of hesi-
tation we showed, the insurgents gained confidence. ... At first, they made no
preparations for resistance, but gradually they took heart and began to fortify the
town. . . . When I left Hoilo for the Newport, there were 2000 armed men in town,
who patrolled the place constantly. The streets were being barricaded. . . /*

S98 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

acceptance of American sovereignty and government, and
there was more or less of the same feeling throughout the
Bisayas. While the Bisayans on Panai had taken their stand
with the Malolos Government, and were now prepared to re-
sort to arms rather than deliver Iloilo without the orders of
that Government, yet they were still not over-eager for war
(harring certain radicals and military leaders), were somewhat
divided in their feelings and opinions, and would have wel-
comed, as indeed they continued to expect, some arrangement
between Americans and Filipinos which would release them
from their promises to Malolos. No such arrangement was,
however, any longer possible of conclusion at Iloilo itself;
hence the conferences and negotiations during January were
fruitless.*

1 See Corr. Rel. War, pp. 927-28, for a letter of Colonel Potter showing the
superficially friendly relations of Americans and Bisayans during January. The
further into the background passed the original opportunity to take the city, the
more General Miller chafed under the restraint of instructions that continued to
bind him to inaction until after fighting had begun around Manila. On January 6,
he reported " the insurgents call us cowards "; they had supposed the Americans
would undoubtedly land, with their greatly superior force, the largest ever seen
off Iloilo. On January 8, reporting that a landing of the Iowa troops on Guimaras,
a little island facing Iloilo, would have been resisted if continued as attempted, he
again urged forcible action in order to save American prestige. On this date and
subsequently, even down to February 3, he pressed the question, especially the
matter of cutting the insurgents off from the customs dues they were collecting
from foreign vessels, by blockading the port, if seizure was not to be permitted.
On January 19, President McKinley had given instructions that he desired " no
forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo."
The Iowa troops were finally sent back to Manila on January 29, the Tennessee
volunteers taking their place, as the lowans had been on board ship about ninety
days since leaving San Francisco.

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY DIPLOMACY

The Iloilo episode was interwoven with another which,
while hardly to be regarded in any fair sense as an active
cause of the warfare that followed, was yet in some degree
provocative of the trouble. This episode, less a vital factor in
the final outcome of events than an interesting sidelight upon
conditions, centered about the issuance by President McKin-
ley of a declaration of American sovereignty over the Philip-
pine archipelago. Early in December, Admiral Dewey had
recommended the issuance of a proclamation declaring to the
Filipinos what were the intentions of the United States. Upon
his return to Washington from the South, President McKinley
had written a letter of instructions to the Secretary of War
which was less a statement to the Filipinos of American pur-
poses than a proclamation to the people of those islands and
of the world in general of an intention to begin at once the
extension of American control over the entire archipelago.
The document began by reasserting President McKinley's
claim that the victory of Dewey's fleet and the capture of
Manila " practically effected the conquest of the Philippine
Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein,"
and stated further that the recent confirmation of that con-
quest by Spain's formal cession at Paris made it necessary that
the authority of the United States be " extended with all pos-
sible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory." The inten-
tion to respect private property, to continue for the present
the existing municipal laws, and to open the islands to the
commerce of friendly nations, was expressed in paragraphs
which implied, though not so stating in explicit terms, that a
government of military occupation along the lines followed in

400 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Manila since August would simply be made general through-
out the archipelago " until the legislation of the United States
shall otherwise provide." The essential clauses of the procla-
mation as a declaration of American attitude toward the peo-
ple were these : —

... It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occu-
pation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we
come not as invaders or as conquerors, but as friends, to protect the
natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal
and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or honest
submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to
give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its
support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful
rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity,
so far as may be possible. . . .

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the mili-
tary administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of
the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible
way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the
heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission
of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting
the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfill-
ment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration
of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedu-
lously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance
and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good
and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands
under the free flag of the United States.

This document was started to General Otis by mail on De-
cember 21, but one week later its full text was cabled to him
from Washington ; hence, he received it after the break at
Malolos had given the war party full swing, and when the
news from Iloilo was critical and he was ordering General
Miller to stay his hand. The conservative Filipinos had been
lamenting among themselves the lack of any definite statement
of programme or of aims on the part of the United States ;
but they assured General Otis, when called into consultation
upon the President's instructions, that a comprehensive decla-

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 401

ration of sovereignty at that time, at least unless accompanied
by a very liberal programme of semi-autonomous government,
quite specifically outlined, would simply strengthen the hands
of the war party at Malolos and would be a strong incentive
to a rupture. So the commanding general, at last fully alarmed
over the situation, thought best to omit altogether certain
words and passages of the President's instructions from the
proclamation which the President required him to issue, and
to expand somewhat, upon his own authority, the assurances
to the Filipinos that they would be considerately treated. He
omitted entirely the passages proclaiming the right of the
United States to the archipelago both by conquest and cession
and the intention immediately to extend its authority to the
other important points besides Manila, avoiding especially all
such words as "sovereignty," "cession," etc. The clauses re-
garding the continuance of municipal laws and courts, and
administration generally, he expanded by a more nearly defi-
nite promise of native participation ; and, to the paragraphs
above cited, promising the Filipinos justice and benevolence
in general, which he quoted, he added his own assurances that
it was the intention of his Government " to appoint the repre-
sentative men now forming the controlling element of the
Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility," to or-
ganize the natives themselves into a military force to preserve
order, and, finally, to establish "a most liberal government for
the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full
representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit,
and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of in-
creased representation and the bestowal of increased powers,
into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by
the most favored provinces of the world." *

' The text of the President's instractions and of General Otis's proclamation
may be seen side by side in Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 776-78. A facsimile of the procla-
mation itself, in English, Spanish, and Tagalog parallel columns, is given in Otis*8
Rept.t 1899, opp. p. 359. In ibid., pp. 6G-C7, he explains his reasons for making
the changes in wording, and be in 1002 testified at length before the Senate Com-

402 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The President's instructions had been sent to General
Miller, immediately after their receipt, by a British cruiser
going to Iloilo, without directions as to their issuance or non-

mittee regarding this episode (Sen. Doc. 331, pp. 764-78). He did not think " that
the President of the United States understood the situation." This was also what
he said at the time of the affair to Admiral Dewey, when the latter informed him
that he himself had advised the issuance of a proclamation " defining the policy
of the United States " and " showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to in-
terfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the islands " and that " as soon
as they developed their capability for self-government, their powers and privileges
will be increased." (These are extracts from Dewey's message cited by Otis in
his Rept., 1899, pp. 67, 82 ; its text is not to be found in any Navy Department
document.) In part, the bad feeling between Otis and Dewey, which later came
to a head, may be traced to friction at this time. Dewey thought the proclamation
should be published just as received. The whole episode must be studied in the
light of the cablegrams exchanged during several weeks preceding and a week
following the message containing the President's instructions of December 21.
(See Corr. Rel. War, pp. 858, antec. et seq. Note also, ibid., p. 927, that on January
23, Otis wrote to Washington that he should have occupied Iloilo without waiting
for authority from Washington, had not Dewey opposed.) On December 4, the
President had instructed Dewey and Otis to confer and send not only information
as to the military preparations necessary for holding the Philippines, but also
suggestions " as to the government of the islands, which of necessity must be by
the army and the navy for some time to come." It was in response to this message
that Dewey sent the dispatch alluded to by Otis. The latter, replying to Washing-
ton on December 8, mentioned the ports and strategic points that should first be
occupied, then proceeded to make detailed recommendations as to the temporary
government (ibid., p. 852) : He would restore, apparently, the old provincial gov-
ernments in Luzon, under charge of Filipinos, and in the Bisayas continue the
former military governments until a simple form of civil control could be worked
out ; above all, he thought it urgent to restore the judicial system on the former
basis, with the supreme court presided over by a " distinguished Filipino lawyer
[Cayetano S. Arellano]. " The conservative Filipinos were urging this speedy re-
organization of government as the most effective means of showing American in-
tentions, and, above all, they regarded the reestablishment of the judicial system,
which had been overthrown by the Malolos party in favor of executive-legislative
control of the courts, this being already the cause of many arbitrarieties, as the
most effective means of drawing the propertied classes together in favor of a more
stable government. But when the President's instructions came, they contained no
reference to the rather specific proposals Otis had made, limiting themselves to
the more general declarations Dewey had felt most important at the time, " until
the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide." On December 29,
the day Otis received these instructions, the President again urged on him the
importance of occupying "all strategic points possible" before the insurgents
could do so ; this upon the suggestion of Professor Dean C. Worcester, then about
to be named a member of the civil commission to be sent to the islands, who may
have had information about the seriousness of the situation from Dr. Frank S.
Bourns, his former associate, then in the islands. Otis's reply indicates that he

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 403

issuance. Miller immediately transmitted them to the Bisayan
committee, as indicating from an authoritative source the
claims the United States had to a peaceful occupation of that
territory. A public meeting was at once held to discuss them,
and therein for the first time the intention to resist the United
States in warfare, if need be, was openly expressed. Subse-
quent conferences only drew from the Iloiloans reiterated as-
sertions that the international rights claimed by the United
States were not founded on justice, that the assurances of the
President were only too general, while his claims were all too
specific, and that they would stand upon the result of negoti-
ations with the Government at Malolos.^

General Otis issued his proclamation on January 4, and very
soon thereafter the Filipinos at Malolos received from Hoilo

considered this a sort of reflection on his own prevision and his information about
the situation. These dispatches give a hint as to the ideas at work at the time in
the President's mind, in connection with the sudden decision to send a commission
to the islands : the prime consideration in the proclamation when it was prepared
on December 21 had been the extension of American authority ; but this purpose
was very quickly changed when it became evident that such extension would bring
on trouble in advance of the ratification of the treaty.

1 John F. Bass {Harper^s Hist.j p. 75) describes the meeting held at Iloilo to
discuss the unaltered proclamation: "After the reading was over, an insurgent
officer arose and said: * This town was officially handed over to us by the Span-
iards, after we had besieged it for several months and lost many men. We are
tasting the sweets of liberty for the first time, and now we are asked to give up
the town to a strange people, who will not tell us what they intend to do after
they are the masters. Shall we give up Iloilo? ' The answering shout of ' No! '
might have been heard half a mile away.'* Still, it was not until January 9 that
the committee made formal answer to Miller's statement in transmitting the proc-
lamation on January 1: "The people of Panai owe obedience to the political au-
thority of the United States, and grave responsibilities will be incurred, if, after
deliberation, it is decided to resist that authority." In reply, they said they were
confronted by a conflict of authority over them; that of the Americans, the latter
themselves claimed as beginning only with the signing of the treaty, while " the
authority of the central Government at Maloloe is founded in the sacred and natu-
ral bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifice, etc." Greneral Miller
could in reply only press upon them the formal precepts of international law as
providing for sovereignty and allegiance. See Rept. War Dept.^ 1899, vol. I, part
6, pp. 328-33, for this correspondence and the futile conference of January 11
(wherein General Miller was represented by an "acting assistant snrgeon "), in
which the Iloiloans only reiterated their determination to wait on the Malolos
authorities and complained that Otis's promise that they should have a boat with
which to communicate with Malolos had not been kept.

404 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the full text of the President's instructions. They had already,
however, issued a counter-proclamation, over Aguinaldo's
name, protesting "one and a thousand times, with all the
energy of his soul," against the authority General Otis had
assumed in calling himself " Military Governor of the Philip-
pine Islands " ; declaring that the mention of the instructions
of President McKinley caused him to " protest solemnly in
the name of God, root and source of all justice and right, who
had visibly acceded him the power to direct his dear brethren
in the difficult task of their regeneration, against this intrusion
of the United States Government in the administration of
these islands " ; and proclaiming that " liberty and absolute
independence " was their ambition, and by it they would stand.
This proclamation was more cautious in tone and less explicit
in its assertions than one prepared and printed at Malolos at
almost the same time, but which the authorities there sought to
recall. The latter began as a statement to the " civilized pow-
ers " of the causes compelling the Malolos Government to
" the rupture of its amicable relations with the Army of the
United States " ; made a flat declaration that representatives
of the United States had promised the Filipinos independence ;
and announced a readiness " to open hostihties if the Ameri-
can troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Bisayan
islands." ^ When the President's cablegram itself was received

^ General Otis informed Washington, in forwarding the text of both these proc-
lamations (Otis's Rept.f 1899, pp. 357, 359-62), that they were of the same date,
January 5, but the more rabid document was withdrawn and the other substituted
for it. The facsimiles of the two documents, however {Harper^s Hist.f pp. 60, 101),
show that the more rabid document was issued on January 8. The history of the
documents is not clear, but it is well known that the virtual declaration of war
was promptly withdrawn from circulation so far as possible. Mabini probably
wrote the first, as it is in his style and represents well the attitude he took at the
time. The stronger terms of the second may have been occasioned by the suppo-
sition of some of the leaders at Malolos that Otis had declined to treat at all with
the commissioners whom they were appointing at the time to visit Manila; but
the day after its issuance (January 9) an arrangement was made whereby these
commissioners and American commissioners could meet, as will appear below. At
any rate, Mabini, who had on January 5 instructed these Filipinos that Aguinaldo
had made no compact at all with the Americans which could bind the Filipinos,

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 405

from Iloilo, and it was discovered that in issuing it General
Otis had veiled its pkin declarations of an intention to assert
complete sovereignty over the archipelago and had also made
various promises as to the future government apparently upon
his sole responsibility, there was so much the more excitement
at Malolos and in Manila, where the newspapers published the
texts of the two documents and their columns bristled with
insinuation and hostile comment as to American bad faith
and lack of candor.^

could hardly countenance the assertions in the proclamation of January 8 that a
definite agreement had been made between the two parties. It is interesting to
see how different the two proclamations are on this point: the proclamation that
was withdrawn asserted that Consul-Gene ral Pratt had promised them independ-
ence, and that the American military men, in spite of their subsequent unfriendly
acts, had virtually ratified this promise. The formal and official proclamation of
January 5 asserted instead (significantly, in the light of Mabini's secret instruc-
tions at the time) that Aguinaldo never, "either at Singapore or at Hongkong or
here in the Philippines," incurred "any verbal or written obligation for the recog-
nition of American sovereignty over this cherished soil," and it asserted merely
that the acts and proclamations of Dewey, Merritt, and Otis had virtually consti-
tuted a recognition of the belligerency of the Philippine Government and the
American authorities had verbally " promised him their active support and effi-
cacious cooperation."

1 Apparently it was not the discovery of the Filipinos that Otis had changed
the President's proclamation which led to the sudden outbreak of Filipino hostil-
ity as evinced in the counter-proclamations. At any rate, neither proclamation
makes a handle of the alteration of the President's cablegram by Otis, as the
Spanish and Filipino papers promptly did when they knew of it. La Independenciat
tinder Luna's instigation, was especially violent. The Spanish press of Manila and
Iloilo (especially two or three papers edited by discredited adventurers of the old
regime) fairly reveled in this opportunity to breed trouble between the Filipinos
and Americans. General Otis appeared to be much nettled when he found out that
Miller had published the message upon its receipt; but Miller could point out that
nothing was said to him about not publishing it, either when it was sent down or
when it was followed by the President's further cablegram of January 1, which
message, moreover, plainly indicated that Washington desired to have the procla-
mation published at Iloilo. On January 15, Otis told Miller the proclamation was
sent to him only for his " information," and that, as soon as he had had time to
consider it, he had cabled Washington that it was not opportune to publish it.
General Otis was hardly candid here; he cabled Washington on January 2 that
the proclamation was " not issued here yet, as time not opportune; will be in two
or three days." On January 4, he informed Washington of its issuance, but said
nothing of changing the terms of the proclamation; nor did he, in reporting, on
January 8, that he had " issued a conservative proclamation," state that he had
omitted the important declarations of the President as to the right of sovereignty.
Daring the week intervening between the receipt of the cablegram and the issu-

406 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The President's proclamation, though following rather tar-
dily the final assurance that Philippine sovereignty was to be
transferred at Paris, implied, if followed out logically, a
straightforward, positive course of action, namely, the extension
of American authority throughout the archipelago, the set-
ting-up of temporary military government elsewhere as in
Manila, reference to Congress of all questions regarding per-
manent government, and virtual disregard of the Malolos
Government, while yet the cooperation of the Filipinos in the
temporary military administration should be invited. But, aside
from questions of internal policy in the United States, there
was in the islands a practical obstacle to any such "thorough
policy,*' namely, the fact that there were not troops enough on
hand to back it, either as a show of force or in the event of
actual warfare resulting. A foreseeing eye, directed toward
such a policy, might, of course, have obviated this difficulty ;
but partly in default of such provision, the proclamation itself
did not appear until the United States had already, by shrink-
ing back at Iloilo, belied its own declaration of intentions. The
time for the success of this policy had now passed by.

The other logical course open to the United States Government
was to endeavor to arrange with the Filipinos a mutual adjust-
ment of at least temporary duration, a sort of modus vivendL
(Of course, the United States could blindly stagger along, la-
ment that its hands were tied by the threefold division of its
governmental powers, and optimistically trust to luck; but
such a course of procedure cannot here be treated as a " policy "

ance of his proclamation, he made no mention whatever of the importance of
changing its terms, nor did he ask authority to do so, though in daily communica-
tion with Washington. He accompanied his virtual reprimand of Miller with
another "special emissary" to Iloilo, Major Mallory, who was to give Miller full
information as to the " policy " pursued at Manila. Further along, he explained
this policy as being " to keep as quiet as possible, permitting the insurgent au-
thorities to work out their own protection, if possible," whatever that might mean
(Rept. War Dept., 1899, vol. i, part 5, p. 333). For General Miller's defense of
himself against the implication by Senator Hoar that he circulated the Presi-
dent's proclamation in order to bring on a fight, see Cong. Record^ vol. 35, part 6,
p. 6026.

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 407

with reference to the Philippines.) How far it would have
been necessary, in order to secure a modus vivendi, to recog-
nize the Malolos Government, including objectionable institu-
tions and personages as well as those properly representative
of the people, was a practical question of no small moment.
Whether, indeed, there was ever a time, after the radicals
among them had openly and completely secured control, when
there was any chance for peace with them, short of such a re-
cognition of their own powers and an abdication by the United
States of practically all the control which it had judged neces-
sary and had tenaciously insisted at Paris upon having, is very
much in doubt. That, before this, the chances for mutual ad-
justment were very good had been the opinion of those Fili-
pinos whose preferences, as between control by the United
States and a government by their own radical and military
pretenders, were with the United States; and the point for us
to note at this stage of the situation is that these men, or some
of them at least, still clung to the hope of a peaceable adjust-
ment. This hope was predicated, however, upon the giving,
as well as the taking, by the United States of concessions.
Legal refinements as to the division of governmental powers
in the United States necessitating a postponement of the ques-
tion of Philippine government could not now find sympathetic
listeners in these men, who had been waiting only for the close
of the negotiations at Paris to hear definite proposals from the
United States ; and they knew only too well with what impa-
tience their more radical brethren would regard such argu-
ments as mere pretexts to cover ulterior purposes.

An effort at diplomatic adjustment of the situation was
made at this stage of affairs. Though it failed to affect seriously
the course of events, it deserves examination somewhat in de-
tail. First of all, we note that it was mainly inspired and car-
ried on by the Filipino peace party we have mentioned ; that
the American representatives on the ground, while promptly
acceding to the request for a negotiation, were only less luke-

408 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

warm toward it than the Filipinos who held the reins at
Malolos ; and that Washington scarcely heeded it at all, indeed,
knew little about it until it was all over. It did, however, shed
much light upon the aims entertained at Malolos at the time, and
it brought into sharper relief the Washington policy of " drift."
The proposals for this conference antedated by some little
time the publication of the President's proclamation. The plan
was interfered with, not so much by the appearance of this
document and of the counter-proclamations at Malolos as by
Mabini's inevitable effort to obtain from Otis, by inadvertence
or otherwise, something that should appear as a "recognition"
of the Filipino Government. He sent to Otis, on January 5,
two commissioners "with the aim of reaching an agreement
upon questions affecting the relations between the Americans
and the Filipinos," in the name of Aguinaldo, as "President
of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines." Otis
declined to recognize these men, and said he could only appoint
officers representing him as "commanding general of the
United States Army in the Philippines," to "confer with"
Filipinos nominated by "General Aguinaldo, commanding
general of the revolutionary forces"; and at last, on January 9,
Mabini yielded, under the pressure of his own representatives,
who were waiting at Manila, and the first conference was held
on that day.^

^ Scant data as to these conferences are given in the nnsatisfactorj accounts by
Otis {Rept., 1899, pp. 80-84) and Aguinaldo (Resena veridica). In Sen. Doc. 331
(57th Cong., 1st Sess.), pp. 2709-51, are the official minutes of the six meetings
held, both English and Spanish texts. The same document contains also statements
about the conferences in the testimony of Generals Otis and Hughes. The writer
has seen the private correspondence between Mabini and the Filipino commis-
sioners on this occasion, and has had private information regarding this episode
from two of these commissioners. The letters of Aguinaldo and Otis on January 9
{Otis*s Rept.f 1899, pp. 80-81) were only formal expressions on the matter of a
recognition of the Filipino Government, exchanged after the matter was settled
and Mabini, having failed in his renewed effort to secure a useless paper " recog-
nition " of the Malolos Government from Otis, had yielded the point. See also
Cong. Record, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6183, for a telegram to Aguinaldo from Otis's go-
between, an American who had suddenly acquired prominence as a contractor in
the wake of the army.

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 409

The American commissioners were Brigadier-General Rob-
ert P. Hughes, provost-marshal-general of Manila; Colonel
James F. Smith, a civilian attorney having command of the
California volunteer infantry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch
H. Crowder, judge-advocate. The Filipinos were Florentino
Torres, a Tagalog lawyer of first rank, a man of high charac-
ter, and an official of the Solicitor-General's department under
Spain ; Ambrosio Flores, a middle-class Tagalog, once officer
of the native troops of Spain, later a prominent organizer of
Filipino Masonry, at this time a general in the revolutionary
army, afterward to succeed Luna as nominal Director of War ;
and Manuel Arguelles, a middle-class Tagalog from Batangas,
an honest, sturdy specimen of his race, one of Aguinaldo's
military aides with the rank of colonel.^

* Senor Torres, who became under the American military government Attorney-
General of the Islands, and is now one of the justices of the Supreme Court, was
the prime mover in bringing about these conferences. He had come up from Sebii
just before the break at Malolos occurred iu December. He at once perceived the
gravity of the situation, and became for the time the active spokesman of the
peace party, its more prominent members in Manila virtually having ceased to
make representations at Malolos. Perhaps we may give Aguinaldo the credit
for this last effort to recognize the conservatives and have them work with him.
Mabini, however, held the commissioners closely confined by instructions, and,
after his failure to win formal recognition of his government from Otis, he added
to the original commission of two, Torres and Arguelles, the military commander
Flores. Mabini had been suspicious of Torres from the first, and this enlarg^ement
of the commission when they were given new instructions on January 9 as repre-
sentatives of Aguinaldo, " chief of the revolutionary army," followed a teleg^m
from Torres at Manila to Mabini at Malolos on January 8, which also sheds some
light on the '* war " proclamation of that date. Torres said: " A member of Con-
gress assures me that a certain person has brought from Malolos some proclama-
tions of the Honorable President, declaring relations broken off and hostilities
begun with Americans, and that such documents will be circulated. Is that true ?
If so, I am surprised that since last night they have not communicated it to us,
at least to maintain seriousness and loyalty in relations with us." Mabini an-
swered : " The news is not exact. The President has said he is prepared to open
hostilities if they insist upon occupying by force a part of the territory subject to
bis jurisdiction." Judge Torres has stated his own position and that of the con-
•ervative party at the time as follows: "As the absolute independence of the coun-
try was impossible, owing to its peculiarities and thote of its inhabitants, on account
of its situation and the dangers to which it wu exposed by the conflicting interests
of the foreign powers and the ulterior designs they might have . . . these people
[the propertied, educated oUm of Manila and some adjoining provinces] thought

410 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

' The Filipino representatives were commissioned by Agui-
naldo, "as General-in-Chief of the Filipino Army," to "treat
as to the bases of a provisional agreement which may assure
peace and amity between the said forces [American] and the
Filipino people, until the establishment of a definite and per-
manent agreement between the Governments of both nations."
The instructions drawn by Mabini on January 4 were to be
their guide. From that document, it at once becomes apparent
that the thing of immediate importance in Mabini' s eyes was
that the Americans should be made to desist from their pro-
ject of occupying Iloilo ; the maintenance of the status quo
ante he intimated was an absolute essential of the " provisional
treaty," which being secured, commissioners would meet to
negotiate the " formal convention " between the two Govern-
ments. He hinted that at that time the Filipino Government
would recognize the "necessity for the protection" of the
American people, but all else but the demand for a halt at
Iloilo was blissfully vague and general.^ In this first meeting,

this was the best thing that could be done [to accept the new sovereignty]. . . .
They were few in number, but they worked in good faith, being convinced that,
as there had never been any hope that Spain would willingly eliminate from the
administration of the archipelago the harmful monastic element ... or that she
would consent to liberal reforms, . . . the only possible way of saving these
islands from anarchy in the interior, from the ambitions of certain powers, or from
some other colonial system similar to that of Spain, . . . was the frank and loyal
acceptance of the sovereignty of America. . . . These individuals were violently
opposed by the great mass of the people, who were decidedly in favor of inde-
pendence, and even of war to secure it, and also by a certain class of foreignert
[he means the Spaniards], and received the nickname of ' Americanistas.'" {Rept.
War Dept, 1901, vol. i, part 4, p. 120.)

^ A comparison of the preamble of January 4 instructions with the letter com-
missioning the Filipinos on January 9 will be of interest. The thing chiefly notable
about the Mabini document of January 4 is this explicit statement : " The Chief
of the Filipino people has not made any contract with the Government of the
United States, but, inspired by the same ideal of destroying the sovereignty of
Spain in these islands, they have mutually assisted each other." Just below, com-
plaining of the exclusion of the Filipinos from Manila, Mabini is careful in call-
ing them allies, to say "though only de facto." Plainly, having taken this official
position, Mabini could not countenance the proclamation of January 8, formally
reasserting that there had been an official promise of independence. Mabini was
not direct in his mental processes, nor in his methods, but he was mentally honest,
and, having now taken full control, he may have thought it time to do away with

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 411

the Filipinos stated as their specific grievances also the failure
to share the occupation of Manila, the extension of the Amer-
ican territory outside of the city's boundaries, the seizure of
their vessels on the bay and elsewhere, and the interference
with the flying of their flag ; but they put forward the pre-
sent attempt upon Iloilo as the immediate and most serious
cause of friction.* They declared their aim to be "absolute
independence," yet indicated, when questioned further, that
they meant by that to include protection by the United States
in their foreign relations; not being authorized to enter into
details upon this point, they promised to obtain instructions
upon it for the next meeting. But when the next session was
held on January 14, at the call of the Filipinos, they coidd
only present the following signed statement : " That the aspi-
ration of the Filipino people is independence, with the limita-
tions resulting from the conditions which the Government
shall agree upon with the American Government, when the
latter consents officially to recognize the former." This was an
even more indefinite statement of the desires of the Malolos
Government than had been made informally by the commis-
sioners Torres and Argiielles when they first presented them-
selves with credentials at Manila. But it appeared, as they
were pressed for concrete answers, that their instructions now
were to demand a recognition of Philippine independence as
a sine qua non to even the discussion of the terms of a " pro-

tbis fiction of an alliance with the United States. At any rate, it had, from his point
of view, more than served its purpose, and he now wished to be in position to dis-
own any counterclaim to Filipino gratitude which the Americans might put for-
ward on the basis of their help to Aguinaldo in May and June.

> Mabini's preoccupation over the Iloilo matter is indicated in his telegram of
January 5 to the two commissioners first appointed, rehearsing a rumor he had
heiurd that the Americans had ** forged the signature and seal of Aguinaldo in an
order addrewed to the Iloiloans, commanding them to surrender that place."
Mabini was much excited over this tale (which seems to have started with two
Spanish ship-captains), and wished every step taken to head ofif the false order at
Iloilo and to tell the people there, " We are preparing to help them if our adver-
saries resort to war." He added: "I am convinced that, if the Americans do not
gain their object, we have traveled half the road toward the ooDoesiion of our

412 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

tectorate," and that, without such recognition, they could only
discuss some modus vivendi to avert immediate trouble. They
put it on record that the desire for a protectorate of some sort
arose not " from the lack of capacity to govern, but from lack
of ability to maintain their independence" ; and they did go so
far as to say that, if the Filipino Government should attempt
to make treaties, declare war, etc., with foreign powers, with-
out consultation with the United States as protecting power,
the latter " ought to be considered absolved from the obliga-
tion of interceding in their behalf." But nothing more definite
could be obtained from them as to the nature of the protec-
torate desired.^ The Americans insisted that these points
ought frankly and specifically to be set forth, in order that
they might lay them before their Government ; already, they
said, the Filipinos had a sufficient guaranty that the United
States would not disturb the present peace upon its own ini-
tiative, in the instructions from the President to General Otis
that there must be no conflict with the Filipinos unless they
initiated it themselves.'^

* The rest of the meeting was devoted to generalities, the Filipinos setting forth
their desire never again to be subjected to a "colonial regime"; the Americans
replying that they could rely for justice upon the character and traditions of the
American Government and people. Mabini had in the interim tied the Filipino
commissioners down with more restricted instructions, after hearing the report of
the first conference, laying down recognition of the Filipino Government as a sine
qua non to even the formulation by the latter Government of its wishes and aims.
He also instructed them to recall the recognition of the " necessity of American
protection " expressed in his instructions of January 4, to state that it was a mere
private expression of opinion, or, at any rate, to interpret it as meaning only " aid,
support, or assistance." He also wished to have them threaten the Americans with
foreign intervention if they became involved in a war with the Filipinos. Never-
theless, he showed some fear lest his refusal to let them discuss the vital questions
underlying the threatened disagreement and his re-insistence upon a recognition
of the Malolos Government should cause the Americans to break off the confer-
ence abruptly, in which event "our case would be much prejudiced."

^ Otis had commimicated the fact that he was mider such orders in his letter of
January 9 to Aguinaldo. One of the Filipino junta at Hongkong confirmed this
news to Aguinaldo in a letter of January 26 (Cong. Record, vol. 35, part 6,
p. 6106). The insurgent agents at Manila had the news before that, one notifying
Aguinaldo on January 10 that Otis was ordered not to open hostilities, supposedly
because he was " awaiting 15,000 regular troops and congressional action on peace

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 413

Beyond this point the two commissions never got, though
the longest and most interesting of their sessions (which were
held at night, after the American officers had done their day's
work) was the third, on January 17. The most definite answer
the Filipinos could then make, as a commission, to the objec-
tion that the United States was asked to recognize their Gov-
ernment but remain entirely in the dark as to the nature of
the protectorate it was to maintain over them, was that, the
Filipino people being the weaker of the two and desiring a
protectorate " both for convenience and as a matter of grati-
tude," it might be expected to " propose the most reasonable
terms," but they would not desire " a protectorate over them
in the same manner as over savages." Individually, when
further closely pressed, they hazarded various general opin-
ions: Argil elles, that the Filipinos, being a weak people,
"would be in perfect accord with the United States in all
foreign relations and would never enter into any alliance in-
imical to them " ; Flores, that foreign relations should be left
to the United States and internal affairs entirely to the Fili-
pinos, and that some way of compensating the United States
for the expense of maintaining a protectorate should be found;
Torres, admitting that the administration of internal affairs
might give rise to foreign difficulties, thought that the pro-
tecting power, having given its guaranty to the world, should
be allowed " at least great moral interference " in the admin-
istration of the archipelago, and that the Filipino people, "un-
derstanding as they did the need of protection, would do al-
most anything required by the United States not inimical to
their rights and interests."

The Filipinos then came back to their original complaints
about the seizure of their vessels by Dewey and the interfer-
ence with the flying of their flag, making definite requests

treaty," and another, on the same date, saying: " Otis has a cablegram from Mo-
Kinley, which directs him to make the bent possible bargain in the Philippines,
but to avoid a conflict byerery possible means; as a last resort, to grant independ-
ence under certain conditions." (See Tel. Con. Aguinaldo, p. 40.)

414 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

now for the first time for restitution and non-interference, and
also asking that no more American troops be sent to the
islands ; virtually, they asked that the United States perform
no further acts of sovereignty in the islands, and that it cease
to interfere with Filipino acts of sovereignty. This led to an
exchange of views on sovereignty, the Americans fortifying
themselves in the legally impregnable assertion of their rights
under international law, the Filipinos taking the broader
ground that "sovereignty is inalienable and issues directly
from the people," and asserting the invalidity of the Treaty
of Paris. ^

Two more conferences were held, mainly devoted to a dis-
cussion of the accusations brought by the Filipinos against
the conduct of the American soldiers in Manila, and in a final
session held on January 29, the commissions merely met to
adjourn siiie die, the Americans exchanging a final concilia-
tory letter from General Otis for a copy of the constitution
formally adopted at Malolos the week before. At that time
the " war party " had, by resolution, confirmed Aguinaldo in
the presidency, and had finally put through the clauses which
virtually placed it in his power to declare war as well as to
make laws dictatorily. The chance for adjustment was past.
Having failed to entrap the Americans in his childish snare
and to secure a quasi-recognition of his Government, Mabini,
who at heart desired little or no American " protection," and
really believed it unnecessary, became convinced that the

^ In the interim, Mabini had again drawn his lines closer about the commis-
sioners, in the form of supplementary instructions of January 16. He now went
so far as to make it a sine qua non for even the signing of a modus vivendi that the
Americans should send no more troops, should return the Filipino boats, and
should let them fly their flag, all which would be, under the circumstances, vir-
tual recognition of Filipino sovereignty. Answering the American commissioners*
queries as to how an independent Filipino Government would defend itself from
foreign aggression, he said no power " had any right " to disembark forces while
the Filipinos maintained order ; the latter were " disposed never to permit it " ;
and finally, if they had the services of the American fleet, they could repulse any
foreign invasion, anyway ; one is reminded of the three defenses in the famous
case of the man who borrowed the churn.

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 415

Americans were bent on aggression ; and, having carried his
will at Malolos, he was now anxious to strike before American
reinforcements arrived.^

On the other hand, while the Americans had throughout
displayed a willingness to discuss fairiy and fully all the mat-
ters, great and small, which underiay the threatened hostility
between the two peoples, they had not, it would appear, de-
voted any attention to a positive programme for mutual agree-
ment. The attitude they assumed was that they must decline
to recognize the existence of hostility between Americans and
Filipinos — which was merely declining to recognize a fact.
The theory upon which General Otis, and for him his commis-
sioners, proceeded was that the future relations of Filipinos
and Americans, and the nature of the government to be estab-
lished over the archipelago, must be left to Congress — a very
correct constitutional theory, but one which did not offer any
immediate remedy for existing conditions.'^ Hence, though the
American commissioners exhibited great diligence in drawing
out the inconsistencies and the vagueness of the Filipino ideas

^ The new tone, forbidding compromise, appeared in his instructions of January
16. Later, as on January 22, he wired that ** the President waits with anxiety for
you to end the conferences." Captured documents have shown that there was cor-
respondence between the Malolos Government and its agents in Europe (almost
certainly also in Washington) regarding the advisability of attacking the Ameri-
cans in Manila before the regular troops then being sent from New York could
arrive. One such document is given in Cong. Recardy vol. 35, part 6, p. 6103. This
was dated at London February 3, but the Malolos leaders had full knowledge of
the reinforcements long before that, the Manila papers had occupied themselves
with the matter, and the Filipino commissioners had broached it in the sessions.
Aguinaldo himself still seems to have had some personal inclination to compro-
mise and adjustment, but he was not the most influential man in his own camp.

« And which eventually was, in actual fact, belied, since, under the " war power,"
the President proceeded to construct the Philippine governmental system, while it
was not until 1002 that Congress acted, and then only to ratify executive action.
General Otis has testified {Sen. Doe. SSI, p. 815) that he received " commission
after commission " (probably not meaning literally what is stated) from the revo-
lutionary camp, to whom he gave only the assurance that the government set up
by the United States would be republican in form : " 1 told them 1 could make
no promises. They asked some expression as to what the United States intended
to do. I said that the question retted entirely with Congress." (See also Otis*$
Kept, 1899, pp. 67-68.)

416 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

about a protectorate, it was done only with the negative pur-
pose of showing them their lack of a logical governmental
programme, not for the purpose of preparing the way for a
definite proposition from the American side.^

And the Filipinos waited in vain for any word from Wash-
ington making such a proposition or indicating that their
own almost meaningless propositions had been received at
the American capital. They were, indeed, told that they
could not expect by cable an answer to the Mabini proposi-
tion of January 14 for "independence with limitations,"
since this was a matter for Congress. In his conciliatory
letter at the close of the conference, General Otis, explain-
ing that the Philippine Commission which was being sent
out from Washington could directly represent the President
and was coming with full instructions from him, while the
army commissioners in Manila had no authority to grant
concessions except by permission from Washington, said he
had had no answer to his cablegram conveying this expression
of Filipino "aspiration." After the approval of the constitu-
tion at Malolos, and when Mabini was ready to adopt a more
positive tone, Aguinaldo and he addressed Otis asking him to
convey to Washington their assurance that the Filipinos were
"making superhuman efforts to reclaim their sovereignty and
their nationality before the civilized powers," and that, when
the United States had officially recognized their Government,
its desire was " to contribute, to the best of its scanty abihty,
to the establishment of a general peace." ^ No answer was re-
ceived from Washington to this more formal statement of a
demand for Filipino independence, a declaration which was,

* In the meeting of January 22, the Fih'pinos asked if the " grievances " they
had submitted in the first meeting (thirteen days before) had yet been given a
definite answer by General Otis ; the Americans replied that they had not yet been
formally submitted to him, only verbally having been told him. This was, of
course, equivalent to a polite refusal to discuss them.

2 See Otis' sRepU 1899,^]^. 84-86, for this document, cabled in full to Washing-
ton on January 27.

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 417

under the circumstances, belligerent in tone.^ At Washington,
interest was centered primarily upon the action which the
Senate was about to take upon the Treaty of Paris. From one
side of the continent the three civilian members of the Philip-
pine Commission were setting sail, while from the other side

^ Otis did not, indeed, expect any answer to these messages (according to his
testimony in Sen. Doc. 331). From the beginning to the end of the conferences,
he sent no messages which indicated that he laid much stress upon them, nor
which contained anything more than the most summary statement of the position
assumed by the Filipinos. On January 8, he reported the efforts to bring about
the conferences, said he would avoid recognition of the Malolos Government, and
that " they desire protection of United States and independence ; have no clear
idea of meaning of these words, but think definite arrangements can be made by
which United States will hold supervisory control and they conduct government,
United States to assist when necessary. . . . Have told them they must await
action of Congress." In ordering no conflict at Iloilo, the President replied to this
simply : " Glad you are conferrmg with them in their unofficial capacity." On
January 10, Otis reported : " Revolutionary Government anxious for conference
and action on my part, to enable them to allay excitement, which they appear
powerless to control." But at the same time he cabled that he thought Aguiualdo's
revolutionary proclamation was "more the restdtof fear for personal safety [I]
than determined hostility to American Government " ; he said the city was " very
quiet," though there was " great suppressed excitement " and families were leav-
ing ; also that a further conference would be held and " if peace kept for few
days, immediate danger will have passed." This last bit of information he repeated
the following day, though reporting that 30,000 citizens had left Manila within a
week past. On the 14th, he cabled : " Conditions improving. Insurgent Govern-
ment seeking further conference. . . . More intelligent members admit their de-
pendence on United States assistance." In sending Mabini's "aspiration" for
" independence with limitations," Otis said : " I understand insurgents wish quali-
fied independence under United States protection." But he also said at the same
time : " Conditions improving. Confidence. Citizens returning. Business active."
At the time of the adoption of the constitution at Malolos, when the leaders of the
radical party made delirious speeches about driving out the " invaders," Otis re-
ported : " Insurgent radical element comfortable, in full possession, and with aid
of Spaniards and circulation of falsehoods are intensifying sentiment against
Americans. Conservative, educated P^ilipinos fear for personal safety should they
resume prominence in affairs. . . . Insurgent Congress adopted constitution. . . .
Aguinaldo proclaimed President. . . . Excitement at Malolos and threats to
drive invader from soil." Finally, in sending Mabini's formal demand for recog-
nition on January 27, Otis took the edge off its belligerency with this preface :
"Conditions apparently improving. Less excitement prevailing. Conferences with
insurgent representatives still held. More moderation in demands." (The two
commissions had, the day before, virtually agreed to close the conferences on the
29th, having reached an end of their discussions.) This was his last report on Manila
conditions until he told of the outbreak of fighting, except for the statements on
February 1 : " City quiet. No material change. Insurgents threaten ; make no

418 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

reinforcements of regular troops were being dispatched to the
Philippines by the Suez route.^ Orders were repeated for the
maintenance of the status quo at Iloilo, and Washington
rested its hands and hoped — that the Commission might reach
the islands in time to effect adjustment by the means of con-
ciHation, but that, if fighting did begin, the regulars would
be there in time.^

active demoustration in force." These messages are to be found in Corr. Rel. War,
pp. 872-91. If the record there is complete, no notice was ever taken at Washing-
ton of the peace conference at Manila beyond the President's commendation of
the idea on January 8. Otis's notion that those in chief control at Malolos really
wanted peace, and that they were afraid of the radicals [their own disciples] and
of the people [whom they themselves had stirred up] was persistent with him ; in
his letter to General Miller on January 15, he said : " The Revolutionary Govern-
ment is very anxious for peaceful relations, and knows the value of United States
protection ; but unfortunately some of their radical representatives have raised a
flood of excitement which they cannot control. . . . Conditions are improving,
and the Malolos Government is slowly disintegrating, I think." (Rept. War Dept.f
1899, vol. I, part 5, p. 333.)

^ Five regiments of regular infantry set sail from New York between January
19 and February 9, and one regiment of regular infantry from San Francisco on
January 31.

' In forbidding the taking of Iloilo, by force, President McKinley had said, in
his cable of January 8 to Otis and Dewey : " Will send commissioners, if you
think desirable, to cooperate with you both in your delicate task." Upon confer-
ring with Dewey, Otis says, he learned that about January 1 the admiral had
recommended the sending of civilian commissioners, and, "desiring to be in ac-
cord " with Dewey, he cabled back : " We think commissioners of tact could do
excellent work here." (Olis*s Rept., 1899, p. 80.) There is a mild intimation here
that Otis did not relish the appointment of the Commission, and he avoided con-
nection with it so far as possible after its arrival. The President made both him
and Admiral Dewey members ; the chairman was Jacob G. Schurman, president
of Cornell University, and the other civilian members were Charles Denby, ex-
minister to China, and Dean C. Worcester, assistant professor of zoology in the
University of Michigan, who had as a student made two trips to the Philippines
in the interests of science. The President's instructions to this Commission under
date of January 21, 1899 {Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900, vol. i, pp. 185-86), show that
his appointment of this body was not intended to do away with the plan outlined
in his proclamation of December 21, namely, the continuance of military govern-
ment until Congress should legislate on the subject. The Commission was to "an-
nounce by a public proclamation " that, " while the military government already
proclaimed is to be maintained and continued so long as necessity may require,"
yet there would be efforts " to alleviate the burden of taxation, to establish indus-
trial and commercial prosperity, and to provide for the safety of persons and
property." The Commission was to study conditions and report, to confer with
Filipino citizens, to make recommendations relative to temporary changes in
governmental forms and methods as well as for the more permanent scheme

4

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 419

That the complaints of the Filipinos against the American
soldiers had some justification was admitted by the American
commissioners during these January conferences. The latter
expressed a willingness to investigate all complaints with speci-
fications, and indicated that disciplinary measures had been
taken and others were being considered. The chief complaint
of the Filipinos seemed to be against the searching of houses
and the too free use of firearms by the American sentries ;
but the American authorities declared that they could not
consent to order that no soldier should use his weapon until
violence had actually been used against him, and that they
must exercise the right of military search, for the evidence of
plots for revolt within the city, of the secretion of arms, etc.,
was constantly coming to light. The American commissioners,
who were familiar not only with the repeated and strict dis-
ciplinary orders that were issued, but also with the attempts
all the time being made to keep their soldiers within the spirit
as well as the letter of these orders, would not concede that
any downright abuses in the way of violence had been com-
mitted or that force had been resorted to otherwise than as
circumstances demanded. They admitted the friction with the
population over minor matters, particularly over a habit a
minority of the American soldiers had acquired of using their
uniform to compel tradesmen to supply their wants and then
refusing to pay their debts.* The clashes on the outskirts of

which it waa aMamed Congress would enact, and to recommend natives for ap-
pointment to ofiBce. Hence they did not come, as General Otis supposed when he
wrote bis letter of January 25 to the Filipinos, " with full instructions from the
President of the United States and empowered to act for him." The attitude of
Luna and the military radicals is revealed by this sentence from La Independmcia
of January 17, 1899 : "The Filipinos are disillusioned and believe that the ap-
pointment of this Commission is only for the purpose of gaining time which will
allow the arrival of more forces."

* General Otis issued orders on January 28, 1890, condemning the non-payment
of debts of soldiers to native tradesmen as a " despicable species of robbery more
dangerous than looting, because less open," and instructing company commanders
to see that such debts were paid, collecting the amounts at the pay-table, if neces-
sary {Sen. Doe. 5S1, p. 984).

420 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the city and the small rows inside, which had resulted in the
death of one or more Filipinos, they insisted were due to the
constant disregard by the petty officers and men of the Fili-
pino forces of the rules of the occupation.^

Activities on the American side during January were mainly
of a defensive character, calculated to guard against surprise

^ In the last two conferences, the matter of the alleged abuses was the princi-
pal topic of discussion. A Filipino captain had been shot by an American sentry
inside the city a few days before ; General Hughes, himself the provost-marshal-
general, informed the Filipinos that he had carefully investigated the affair and
found the Filipino had violated the rules by wearing a revolver into the city, and
the American soldier had declared he fired only when the revolver had been
drawn on him. (See also Hughes's further testimony in 1902, Sen. Doc. 331, p.
506.) In the Reseha veridica, Aguinaldo charges that the American soldiers killed
a woman and child in the Arroceros market, saying it was done " only in play " ;
that an American sentry shot a seven-year-old child becauses he stole a banana
from a Chinese ; that the Americans repeated the abuses of the Spaniards in
searching houses ; and, finally charged the army of occupation with " shooting
women and childreu for looking out of the balconies, leveling houses at midnight,
breaking open boxes and drawers, and carrying away money, jewels, and whatever
objects of value they found, and breaking chairs, tables, and looking-glasses which
they could not carry off." That there was some looting, and that other incidents
of a state of war existed in Manila, is undoubtedly true ; but the more serious
charges made above are gratuitous inventions, in the same spirit as Aguinaldo's
assertion that, after the outbreak of hostilities, " Otis secretly shot many who
would not sign the document asking for autonomy." John Foreman's charges, in
the Contemporary Review for September, 1904, are apparently based only on this
or similar authority. John F. Bass, who on various occasions bore testimony to the
fact that the American soldier early in Manila adopted a contemptuous attitude
toward the natives, wrote from Manila on January 23 {Harper* s Hist., p. 77) : " The
Tagalogs have grown impudent. They elbow our generals off the sidewalk. They
openly threaten to cut all our throats. They laugh at us. . . . Each day brings
some new story of insurgent plans to wipe the American forces in Manila out of
existence. These plans are met each time with counter-preparations by our
army. . . . Our sentries at night challenge and fire with little hesitation. Already
two of our sentries have killed natives who were trying to steal upon them un-
awares to stab them and take their rifles." Dr. Frank S. Bourns, then health
officer in Manila, who was on intimate terms with the Filipinos and virtually con-
ducted an intelligence bureau at the time, says, in a personal letter : " I believe
that the conduct of our troops had very little, if anything, to do with the bringing
on of the trouble. No one who was not here preceding February 4 can appreciate
the restraint that was placed upon our troops to avoid the bringing-on of the
trouble. As an American acquainted with Oriental ways, I was so ashamed of
myself the last month or two that I hated to leave the house. Our soldiers re-
ceived and submitted to untold insults from the insurgent troops, and bore them
patiently, all because of the most stringent orders from headquarters to avoid
trouble, if possible, without actual sacrifice of dignity."

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 421

(especially by an outbreak in Manila), though the troops were
constantly drilled on the outskirts (partly for effect), and the
commands were placed as effectively as possible for the carry-
ing-out of movements already decided upon when an advance
beyond the city's lines should be ordered. The staff corps,
especially the hospital corps, had their parts thoroughly as-
signed, and the first artillery movements had been studied out.
The secret service was, however, the only aggressively active
branch, and the wits of the American officers were constantly
strained to tell who was Filipino friend and who Filipino foe,
in the mass of rumors that were daily being sifted. On the
18th, an order was issued requiring all telegrams to or from
Manila which contained political news to be submitted to a
military censor.^ On the 23d, the provost-marshal's forces
seized the telegraph office which the Filipinos had been al-
lowed to establish some months before at the end of the rail-
way line in Manila.^ Sharper attention was also given to the

^ The first mention between Washington and Manila of a press censorship seems
to have been the cablegram to Otis on January 13 : " Secretary War directs you
cause press dispatches to be censored at your end of the line." On January 17, Otii
cabled : "No discrimination by press censor. Numerous baseless rumors circulated
here, tending to excite outside world, stricken from proposed press cablegrams.
Correspondents permitted to cable established facts." (See Corr. Rel. War.)

' The ofiBce was searched, its papers taken and several operators placed under
arrest. By direction of Mabini, the Filipino commissioners in Manila asked the
release of the men and the return of the property. General Hughes informed them
that the seizure had been made because these men had established a system of
spies upon American operations and had also opened a post-office without author-
ity. (Probably the real reason was to cut off in some degree the constant com-
munication between Malolos and its agents in Manila.) He turned over, unopened,
correspondence for Agtiinaldo found in the teleg^ph office. Mabini wrote to his
commissioners : " The continued abuses which their forces are committing in Ma-
nila excite the feelings of the populace, which may revolt on that account, in spite
of the advice and restraint of the Government." When the Filipinos presented
this statement, really a qnasi-threat, it gave the American commissioners oppor-
tunity to retort that " it would produce a very poor impression on the powers of
the world if it was given out that the government which they claimed to have
organized had so little of authority and respect that those who claimed to he its
subjects could not be controlled by it while deliberations were being had looking
to their future welfare and happiness." (Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 2737.) Yet General
Otis seemed always to ascribe great importance to the claim of the Malolof lead-
en that they eoald not control the populace they had aroused.

422 THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Spanish press of Manila, and one or two more newspapers were
suspended.^ The Spanish authorities were insistent upon dis-
banding their native troops in Manila, and, as it was well
known that they would at once join the insurgent ranks (pre-
liminary arrangements to that effect having already been
made, with the more or less active connivance of at least some
of the subordinate Spanish officers), they were first held pris-
oners in Manila, then an ineffectual attempt was made to scat-
ter them in Luzon and the Bisayas. Practically all, except the
Makabebes, eventually found their way into the insurgent
ranks, where some of their discharged sergeants and corporals
of Spanish blood were already enlisted.^

^ General Hughes says be closed up three newspapers in all while acting as
provost-marshal-general from Septemher 4, 1898, to May 25, 1899. {Sen. Doc.
SSI, p. 557 ; see also p. 507, for his account of some of his means of securing in-
formation regarding plots against the peace in Manila.)

2 Diego Rios, at the time serving nominally as Spanish governor-general of the
archipelago, arrived at Manila early in January, and at once began pressing the
work of discharging the Spanish soldiers and urging their return to Spain. He
also wished to have committees of liquidation beg^n the work of listing the public
property and settling upon its division between the two countries. As the treaty
was not yet ratified, the American authorities would not consent to enter formally
upon these matters as yet. General Rios ordered the cessation on January 31 of
all the Spanish civil administrative departments in the archipelago. The Spanish
Government was at the same time pressing the United States to secure the release
of the friars and other prisoners held by the Filipinos. To a cablegram instructing
him to use his utmost efforts in this direction, Otis replied, on January 22 : " Do
not believe Malolos Government will release [as was then promised], believing
detention will involve Spain and the United States. Efforts to secure release of
priests gives basis for charge that I am in sympathy with priests, and priests con-
firm rumor [desiring to have the people believe that the American Government
would be at their beck and call, as the Spanish Government had been]. Do not
think I can effect anything at present, as cannot recognize in correspondence In-
surgent Government." Data regarding the native troops discharged by Rios will be
found in Otis*s daily correspondence with Dewey from January 16 to February 3
( Otis^s Rept., 1899, pp. 88-90), which also reveals the situation in the American
headquarters at the time. On January 21, Otis sent 600 more Bisayan troops to
Iloilo, where they joined the Filipino forces. Of the 276 natives of Luzon whom
he sent to Mariveles, at the entrance of Manila Bay, 264 promptly went to Bataan
in small boats and joined the Filipino forces there (Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 44).
On January 21, the Filipino militia organizers in Manila reported that they had
enlisted 400 of these native soldiers of Spain whom the Americans were keeping
confined in the walled city. Aguinaldo replied : " Tell the Filipino soldiers in the
walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keep on good terms with the

MILITARY DIPLOMACY 423

The complaint of the Filipino press (aided by the Spanish
editors, who were improving every opportunity to make mis-
chief between the two parties) that the Americans were simply
prolonging the conferences in order to gain time for the ar-
rival of reinforcements had considerable justification in fact.^
General Otis's assurance to the Filipinos that the regulars were
being sent out merely to take the place of the volunteers whom
he was authorized to return was, therefore, not entirely in-
genuous ; but the American commander added that he would
not return the volunteers " so long as threatened with active
hostilities" ; and his reiterated assurance that "no hostile act
will be inaugurated by the United States troops" was an ad-
ditional notice to the Filipinos that they, in large degree, held
the question of peace or war in their own hands. We are not
able to find any such definite statement of peaceful intent on
the part of the Malolos authorities, who, on the contrary, in-
dulged in some very belligerent declarations. Still, when two
armies face each other in the attitude which these two had
now assumed, the blame for trouble, when trouble comes, is
to be found rather in the conditions existing between them
than in the attitudes of the respective commanders or forces
themselves. It was the business of the American superior offi-
cers, unless they would be grossly negligent of their duty, to
prepare for war, since at any time some incident might bring

Americans, io order to deceive them and prevent their confining them, since the
hoped-for moment has not yet arrived." (/6w/., p. 43.) Mabini had already in-
structed the Filipino commissioners to broach to the Americans the subject of the
release of these men, and one of his commissioners wired back : " I think negotia-
tion in behalf of these troops would have a bad effect, fur it would confirm the
Americans' suspicions that they have been spoken for to aid the revolutionary
army.**

» Said General R. P. Hughes (Sen. Doc. SSl^ p. 527) : "We were very sorry,
at least I was, to have the conferences stopped, because I was trying to prolong
them until General Lawton's ship could get there with four battalions, which we
needed very much. But we could not stretch it out any longer. The papers had
began to attack us, and stated absolutely in words that we were doing nothing but
tr3ring to gain time ; and a telegram had been received from Agoncillo, in the
United States, to make the attack before the reinforcements got there. And it

i

424

THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

it on ; being military men by profession, they prepared for
war much more intelligently, effectively, and even zealously
than they labored for peace. On the Filipino side, as we have
seen, the prospect of fighting the Americans had been held
in view from the very first movement in reorganizing the revo-
lution, and preparations for such warfare had been carried on
more or less consistently since before the fall of Manila. One
side was waiting, with trigger drawn and aim taken, only for
the other to convert bluster into action. Their opponents, less
restrained by disciphne, and excited by the belief in an easy
victory over men they were being trained to hate as white
barbarians, might at any time disregard the word from above,
which was still the cautious " It is not yet the time." Peace
must now be obtained by an effort; war would come of itself.

END OF VOLUME I

I

n

«3S

O
CD

to
to

I

I

Jl

4)
HP

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

Acme Library Card Pocket

Under I'at. " Re(. Index Kile."
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU